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Abstract 
In spite of a large number of studies on the international transmission of crises, 
research is still unable to quantify the determinants of severity of crisis across 
countries. This thesis contributes to knowledge in this area by investigating the 
impact of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) on European transition countries. In 
analysing the transmission of the GFC to these countries and the nature and severity 
of the spillovers, both trade and financial channels are examined and particular 
emphasis is placed on the degree of euroisation, integration with the EU, remittances, 
bank ownership and foreign credit flows.  
This thesis firstly provides a critical review of the existing literature on the 
transmission of the GFC to European transition countries and identifies gaps in 
knowledge, which are then addressed through empirical investigations. The first 
empirical investigation explores how GDP and financial shocks in the European 
advanced countries (EU15) are transmitted to European transition countries, using 
the recently-developed global vector auto-regression (GVAR) approach. The results 
suggest that while trade appears to be the strongest linkage between EU15 and 
European transition countries, the shocks are propagated by both trade and financial 
channels. Moreover, although the estimated spillovers from GDP and financial shocks 
in the EU15 to European transition countries are always negative, there are 
considerable heterogeneities in the size and statistical significance of these effects 
across regions. The Baltic countries display the most severe impact from the shocks 
in the EU15, which appear to be propagated mostly through the financial channel: 
foreign credit flows; FDI; and remittances. The Balkan countries are affected 
predominantly through exports, FDI and foreign credit flows. The other Central and 
Eastern European transition countries are less severely affected by shocks to the 
EU15 GDP. Furthermore, highly euroised, non-EU members and more open transition 
countries appear to be more severely affected by the shocks in the EU15.  
The initial analysis is extended through a firm-level analysis, which investigates 
whether initial conditions (from 2007) had an impact on firms' sales during the GFC 
in 2009. The major finding of this firm-level study is the importance of the financial 
channel in the transmission of the GFC to European transition countries: a higher 
share of working capital financed by banks, a higher share of foreign currency loans 
and a higher share of foreign bank ownership each increased the impact of the GFC 
on the firms operating in these countries. With regards to the export channel, it is 
found that both exporting and non-exporting firms operating in the countries 
covered in this study were significantly affected by the crisis. This finding suggests 
that, although there is a trade channel, the exporting firms are able to cope with the 
crisis better than non-exporting firms due to their overall superior performance. This 
finding may also reflect the cross-sectional nature of the data which can reveal only 
between-firm differences. So exports, or more precisely, exporting firms constitute a 
transmission channel of the GFC. Yet, exporting firms are also more able to offset 
effects of crisis and thus contribute to the resilience of transitional economies.  
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1.1 Introduction 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the transmission of the global financial crisis 
(GFC) to European transition economies (ETEs), taking into account the extent of 
euroisation and integration with the EU, remittance flows, exports, pattern of bank 
ownership, FDI and foreign credit flows. One particular feature of the GFC has been 
the speed and synchronicity with which it spread around the world, affecting, both 
emerging and advanced countries. Although there have been a few studies that have 
investigated the transmission of the GFC to ETEs (Berglöf et al., 2009; Blanchard et al, 
2010; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2011; Rose and Spiegel, 2009a, 2009b, 2011; 
Berkmen et al., 2012; Popov and Udell, 2012; Feldkircher, 2014; Park and Mercado, 
2014; De Haas et al., 2015; Ongena et al., 2015; Ahmed et al., 2017), the literature is 
still unable to provide conclusive results of the determinants of crisis severity across 
these countries. This thesis contributes to knowledge in this area by firstly 
identifying gaps in the literature, then exploring the channels of the international 
transmission of shocks to ETEs, and finally investigating whether the extent of 
euroisation and integration with the EU, pattern of bank ownership, exports, 
remittances, FDI and foreign credit flows significantly modified the propagation of 
the GFC to ETEs.  
The objective of this introductory chapter is to provide the context of the research 
reported in this thesis. It initially presents an overview of the transition process in 
the Central and Eastern European countries, focusing on the key areas relevant to the 
research questions addressed in this thesis. Namely, it starts by describing the 
process of transition from centrally planned economies towards open, market-
oriented economies, examines the output, trade, FDI and remittance fluctuations 
throughout the period and describes financial developments as well as recording the 
progress made towards integration with the EU during this period. It then continues 
with an overview of the GFC and an investigation of its impact on the ETEs. The last 
section of this chapter lists the key research questions addressed in this research 
programme and explains the structure of the thesis.   
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1.2 The transition process in ETEs  
Almost three decades ago, Central and Eastern European countries started the 
transition from centrally planned economies towards open, market-oriented 
economies. The long-term objective of transition was to build a successful market 
economy able to deliver sustainable growth (Kolodko, 1999). The transition itself 
involved a complex process of institutional, structural and behavioural change (De 
Melo et al., 1996). Considering that the Central and Eastern European countries 
inherited entrenched and inefficient bureaucratic institutions from the previous 
decades dominated by the socialist system, they faced many challenges throughout 
this process (Carmin and Vandeveer, 2004). Three main objectives dominated 
transition: macroeconomic stabilization; real adjustment at the microeconomic level 
and creation of a new institutional framework (Piazolo, 2000). Macroeconomic 
stabilization aimed to resolve the drop in output and monetary and fiscal instability 
that emerged after the start of transition and was an important accompaniment to 
liberalization in promoting economic growth during transition (World Bank, 1996). 
The microeconomic-level reforms sought to stabilize markets through privatization 
of state entities, price liberalization and openness to international trade. The 
institutional framework reform was intended to ensure that a decentralization of 
economic decisions would occur. These three objectives were interrelated; hence, 
simultaneous progress in all of them was required for the overall economic reform to 
be successful (Piazolo, 2000). One of the main arguments in favour of moving to a 
market-oriented economy was the expectation that the move would improve 
productivity in the former socialist economies (Grün and Klasen, 2001). It was 
expected that, after a short period of adjustment (the so-called transformational 
recession), the new market-oriented system would lead to a rapid recovery and 
sustainable economic growth. However, such anticipations were not fulfilled equally 
in all transition countries. Some countries recovered rapidly from the initial 
recession following the beginning of transition, while others went through a deeper 
transitional recession that lasted for a longer period than was initially expected.  
Many economists agree that there were three main economic variables which greatly 
impacted the recovery period and subsequent economic growth (Falcetti, et al., 
2006). Firstly, the initial conditions played an important role in countries’ 
21 
 
performance and subsequent development (Fischer and Sahay, 2000; De Melo et al., 
2001; EBRD, 2004; Coricelli and Maurel, 2011, Roaf et al., 2014). However, there is a 
general agreement that the impact of initial conditions on performance weakens over 
time. Secondly, most studies have shown that higher inflation rates and larger budget 
deficits were negatively associated with recovery and growth. Hence, considering 
that after the beginning of transition most countries were faced by high inflation and 
large fiscal deficits, it was essential to introduce a macroeconomic stabilisation 
programme (Falcetti et al. 2006). Finally, most of these studies concluded that 
reforms are important for sustainable growth, from early reforms such as price and 
trade liberalisation and small-scale privatisation to more profound reforms such as 
corporate restructuring, financial sector development and competition policy (De 
Melo et al., 2001; Falcetti et al., 2006). Considering that the transition objectives 
overlapped with the key criteria required for accession to the EU (Piazolo, 2000), 
progress with EU integration has been positively correlated with progress with 
transition. Based on different initial conditions and different reform strategies 
followed by these countries, the transition literature identifies different 
categorisations of transition countries with regards to their economic performance. 
In the context of this study, based on the classification of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) in regard to progress with transition (liberalization, macroeconomic 
stabilization, restructuring and privatization and legal and institutional reforms), 
together with their economic performance and geographical location, European 
transition countries are classified into three main groups:  
1. South East European (SEE) countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH), 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania and Serbia;  
2. Central East European (CEE) countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
the Slovak Republic and Slovenia; 
3. Baltic Countries: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. 
The selection of countries to be studied in this thesis was based on their European 
perspective and similar transition history. Even though many of these countries are 
22 
 
now post-transition, have joined the EU1 and are today more frequently considered 
within the group of 10 new EU member states, they have many common features 
with other ETEs as a result of similar transition experiences and are therefore 
considered as “transition” countries throughout this thesis. Nevertheless, it has to be 
pointed out that Russia, for example, was not included in the study since it would 
have dominated and distorted the sample given its larger size.   
In order to provide the necessary background to answer the research questions 
which will be investigated in this thesis, the rest of this section focuses on output 
behaviour, trade integration, financial development, FDI, migration and remittances 
and integration with the EU throughout the period of transition starting from 1989 or 
from the earliest year for which data is available, usually 1995, up to the latest year 
available for most of these countries, usually 2015.  
1.2.1 Output during transition 
The pattern of output movement since the commencement of transition is illustrated 
in Figure 1.1 and can be summarized as follows. The beginning of transition was 
associated with a sharp output decline in all transition countries. However, the three 
country groups experienced different initial recessions, with the Baltic States being 
most severely affected where economic activity declined by around 25%.  The timing 
of the recovery period varied among the transition country groups. CEE countries 
achieved positive economic growth from the beginning of 1992, while SEE countries 
achieved positive economic growth in 1993 and Baltic States in 1994. Due to bolder 
reforms undertaken, the CEE countries had a faster return to growth and avoided the 
second recession that hit the region in 1997 after the initial recession. For the SEE 
countries, the reversal repeated twice, in 1997 and 1999. All groups of countries 
appear to have recovered quickly from this second recession, and up to 2007 
continued having positive and stable economic growth, which averaged 6% for the 
region, with no country growing at less than 3 percent annually (World Bank, 2017). 
The SEE countries’ growth continued at around 5 percent up to 2007. However, 
growth in this period became increasingly imbalanced, driven in many countries by 
                                                             
1 Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia became EU 
members in 2004, Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 and Croatia in 2013. 
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large-scale borrowing for consumption and construction, high current account 
deficits and rising external debt (Roaf et al., 2014). The GFC hit the transition 
countries with different intensity, with output decline in the region averaging 7% in 
2009, a more severe impact than in any other region in the world, including the 
EU152 where the output decline averaged 5%. The Baltic States suffered the largest 
output decline, which averaged 14% in 2009. The second most affected group of 
transition countries appears to have been the CEE countries, with an average GDP 
decline of around 4%. The last group of transition countries, the SEE countries, had 
an average GDP decline of only around 2%. 
Figure 1.1 Annual percentage change of GDP per capita (1989-2017) 
 
Data source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (GDP per capita growth - annual % 
change) 2017 
All three groups of countries returned to positive economic growth in 2010. 
However, during 2012, economic activity in all country groups declined again due to 
the intensification of the sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone. Since 2012 growth has 
remained relatively weak across those transition countries which were particularly 
integrated with the eurozone due to decline in their exports and capital inflows.  
                                                             
2 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. 
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1.2.2 Trade during transition 
One of the key outcomes of the transition process in the former communist countries 
has been deeper international integration through increased trade and capital flows 
(Roaf et al., 2014). Before the transition started, trade in transition countries was 
mainly focused inwards. In 1990, around 80 percent of exports from the Baltic 
countries went to Russia (Roaf et al., 2014). After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
these countries experienced a sharp decline in exports. Due to a small manufacturing 
base and the small size of the economies, the Baltic countries’ exports remained 
relatively low compared to the CEE and SEE countries (see figure 1.2a). 
After transition started, considering the failure of the previous system, all countries 
stood to gain from price and market liberalisation. New open markets increased 
investment opportunities, which resulted in faster economic growth and 
improvements in the standards of living.  Hence, the transition countries embraced 
both internal and external liberalisation (EBRD, 2003). By 2000, most of the ETEs 
became members of the World Trade Organization, which offered new markets and 
assisted countries in harmonising regulatory and political frameworks and building 
stable market institutions (Roaf et al., 2014). In addition, most countries joined the 
Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) during the period 1992-2007 
(EBRD, 2012). Therefore, transition and integration have been closely linked during 
the past 20 years, with the total value of exports growing significantly during this 
period, which included an increase of 382% between 1995 and 2015 for the region 
(see Figure 1.2).  
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Figure 1.2a Exports patterns across ETEs (1995-2015) 
 
Figure 1.2b Exports as a share of GDP (2000, 2009, 2015) 
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Figure 1.2c Annual percentage growth of exports (2000-2015) 
 
Data source: World Bank – World Development Indicators (Exports of goods and services – 
constant 2010 US$; Exports of goods and services - % of GDP and Exports of goods and 
services – annual % growth) 2017. 
Figure 1.2a above shows the exports behaviour throughout the period 1995-2015. It 
is important to note that while the region as a whole, particularly CEE region, 
experienced a rapid growth of exports, there were considerable heterogeneities 
across countries. The Czech Republic, Hungary and the Slovak Republic were the 
largest exporters in 2015, whilst the Western Balkan countries exported the least in 
2015. However, it has to be noted that Albania and Serbia achieved the highest 
growth rate in their exports from 1995 to 2015 (805% and 511%, respectively). The 
rapid increase of exports led to a significant expansion of exports to GDP ratio. In 
2015, exports accounted for around 58% of GDP across transition countries. Figure 
1.2b shows that the Slovak Republic, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovenia have 
the highest share of exports in their GDP in 2015 (93%, 91% and 83%, respectively). 
On the other hand, Kosovo, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina have the lowest 
share of exports in their GDP in 2015 (22%, 27% and 35%, respectively). This 
heterogeneity can be attributed to location, initial conditions and the policy 
environment (Roaf et al, 2014). 
During 2009 the European transition region experienced a decline of around 10% in 
exports of goods and services due to the GFC. As can be seen in Figure 1.2c the Baltic 
countries experienced the largest decline in exports, which averaged 15% in 2009. 
The CEE countries’ exports also declined sharply, averaging 12%, while exports from 
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SEE countries dropped by an average of 7%. In terms of individual countries, the 
steepest decline in exports in 2009 was experienced in Estonia, Slovak Republic, and 
Slovenia (20%, 17% and 16%, respectively), while exports from Kosovo and Albania 
continued growing throughout 2009, although at a slower rate compared to previous 
years before the GFC (4% and 12% respectively). The variation in export 
performance across the region during 2009 can in part be attributed to different 
levels of exposure to the EU (EBRD, 2012). Figure 1.3 below shows that exports of 
ETEs with stronger trade linkages with the EU15 appeared to have declined more 
steeply in 2009 compared to exports of countries with weaker ties. The overall 
exports recovered rapidly in 2010, with an average rate of increase of 15% in the 
region. However, the onset of the Eurozone debt crisis resulted in export decline in 
many ETEs in 2011 and 2012 and export growth has remained slow and/or negative 
ever since.  
Figure 1.3 Export growth in 2009 versus share of trade with EU15 
 
Data source: World Bank – World Development Indicators (Exports of goods and services 
(annual % growth) 2017; Author’s calculations based on IMF – Direction of Trade Statistics 
2017. 
Note: Share of trade with EU15 is calculated based on average trade flows (sum of exports 
and imports) among countries for the period 2005-2007. 
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1.2.3 Financial developments 
Since the beginning of transition the banking systems have evolved dramatically from 
a single institution designed to support the central planning system and responsible 
for both monetary policy and commercial banking. During the transition from a 
planned to a market-oriented economy, the financial system was transformed from 
these single banking institutions into two-tier financial systems. Most countries 
started this process by dividing the central and commercial banking activities and by 
breaking up the commercial banking activities into multiple smaller units, which 
were initially state-owned. However, the banking sector in transition countries faced 
many difficulties during this stage, due to the fact that these newly established state-
owned banks inherited portfolios of unknown quality and balance sheets and staff 
from the old bureaucratic institutions, which in turn imposed a very heavy 
supervisory burden on the central banks which were inexperienced in this task 
(Berglof and Bolton, 2002). Initially, most ETEs went through several waves of 
restructuring, in an attempt to address these problems in the banking sector. After a 
number of unsuccessful attempts, the next step of financial reforms was banks’ 
privatisation.  Within this period, most countries also allowed the entry of new banks. 
The ownership structure of the banks has changed dramatically since the beginning 
of the transition process. Foreign-owned banks became dominant in Central, Eastern 
and South-eastern European countries, by establishing subsidiaries or branches in 
this region, mostly stimulated by the high returns in these financial markets due to 
their underdeveloped financial systems (Bartlett and Prica, 2012). Foreign bank 
presence in transition countries helped to strengthen national banking systems and 
improve the low level of financial intermediation (De Haas and Van Lelyveld 2006).  
The average degree of financial depth in transition countries, measured by domestic 
credit provided by the banking sector to the private sector as a share of GDP, 
increased from 25% in 1995 to 49% in 2015 (World Bank, 2017). On the other hand, 
the increased role of foreign banks increased the exposure of transition countries to 
foreign shocks (Roaf et al., 2014), as the foreign banks’ propensity to experience 
positive and negative shocks affects credit possibilities in the same direction 
(Piccotti, 2017). 
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The average asset share of foreign banks in total banking sector assets in the 
transition region had, by the time the GFC hit the region, reached more than 82%. 
Figure 1.4 shows that the degree of foreign bank ownership in 2009 varied from 29% 
in Slovenia to 98% in the Czech Republic. 
Figure 1.4 Asset share of foreign-owned banks in total banking assets - 2009 
 
Data source: EBRD / Structural Change Indicators 2017 and Claessens and Van Horen, 2015. 
Since the early 2000s, an aggressive strategy of expansion of cross-border lending 
was pursued by many Western European banks with the ETEs being their main focus 
(Roaf et al., 2014). This resulted in a credit boom in the transition region, which 
boosted investment and output growth, but also led to large external imbalances 
financed by cross-border capital flows (EBRD, 2015).  During the GFC and the 
subsequent eurozone debt crisis, cross-border bank flows declined sharply in the 
region. The average decline of cross-border credit flows reached 13% by the first 
quarter of 2009. The countries that experienced the sharpest decline in cross-border 
credit flows during 2009 were Slovakia, Romania and the Czech Republic (60%, 21% 
and 16%, respectively) (BIS, 2017). Figure 1.5 shows a dramatic decline in cross-
border lending by BIS-reporting banks to the transition region during the years 
following the GFC.  
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Figure 1.5 Cross-border credit flows to ETEs (2000-2015) 
 
Data source: BIS / Locational data statistics 2017. 
The credit boom prior to the GFC was accompanied by a significant expansion in the 
domestic credit to the private sector to GDP ratio, with the highest share in 2009 
being in Latvia (103%) Estonia (101%) and Montenegro (77%) and the lowest share 
being in Kosovo (34%), Albania (37%) and Romania (38%) (World Bank 2017). In 
most countries, credit was mainly denominated in foreign currency, which made the 
borrowers vulnerable to a depreciation in their domestic currency (Berglöf, et al., 
2009). Namely, during the GFC, the domestic currencies in ETEs depreciated against 
the US dollar by an average of 7% in 2008 (World Bank, 2017), which might have 
boosted competitiveness, but also worsened the debt situation of foreign currency 
borrowers. The process of substitution of local currency with a foreign currency, 
known as euroisation, is a common characteristic of ETEs. As can be seen in Figure 
1.6 high levels of credit euroisation (the share of foreign currency loans in total 
loans) and deposit euroisation (the share of foreign currency deposits in total 
deposits) are prevalent in all transition countries, particularly in SEE countries. 
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Figure 1.6 Average degree of credit and deposit euroisation (2004-2014) 
 
Data source: EBRD, central banks (various years). 
Figure 1.6 shows that throughout the period 2004-2014, SEE countries have had the 
highest degree of euroisation. An exception is Kosovo which had a very low degree of 
euroisation, as it adopted Euro as its legal tender, therefore the degree of euroisation 
is here measured by share of loans and deposits in foreign currencies other than Euro 
(US dollar, Swiss Franc etc.) in total loans and deposits. As for the other countries, 
Figure 1.6 shows that credit euroisation varied from 9% in Slovak Republic to 72% in 
Serbia. The degree of deposit euroisation also varied from 7% in Slovak Republic to 
76% in Serbia.  
1.2.4 FDI inflows 
The large scale privatisation during the transition process was accompanied by 
continuous FDI inflows in ETEs. FDI brought capital, technology and know-how, 
contributing to transition countries’ productivity growth and development (Derado, 
2013). The largest pre-crisis net FDI inflows during the period 2000-2007 were 
achieved by Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania and Bulgaria. However, 
the GFC considerably reduced international capital flows and almost halved FDI 
worldwide, with the most pronounced fall throughout developed countries, including 
the EU (by 40-60%). In ETEs, with the exceptions of Albania and Montenegro, FDI 
inflows fell sharply in 2009. The average decline of FDI inflows across the ETEs was 
57% in 2009. The sharpest falls took place in Slovenia, Hungary, Latvia and Lithuania. 
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The severe impact of GFC on FDI inflows in ETEs reflects the large percentage of FDI 
coming from the EU15, as shown in Figure 1.7b. In addition to FDI flows, the GFC also 
affected remittance flows in ETEs. Considering their importance to these countries, 
the next sub-section discusses remittances fluctuations throughout the period of 
transition.  
Figure 1.7a Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) (1995-2015) 
 
Figure 1.7b Share of FDI inflows from EU15 (2005-2007) 
 
Data source: World Bank / World Development Indicators, 2017; UNCTAD / Bilateral FDI 
statistics, 2017. 
Note: Share of FDI inflows from the EU15 is calculated based on average FDI inflows among 
countries for the period 2005-2007. 
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1.2.5 Migration and remittances 
The transition process initially resulted in massive increases in unemployment rates 
in most of the ETEs. Consequently, there was frequently a rapid rise in migration, in 
particular to EU countries. High emigration rates also resulted in the high level of 
remittance inflows (Roaf et al., 2014). A large percentage of remittances came from 
the EU. As can be seen in Figure 1.8 below, the share of remittances coming from 
EU15 countries varies between 98% in Albania and Poland to 48% in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  
Figure 1.8 Share of remittance inflows from EU15 (20103)
 
Data source: World Bank / Bilateral remittance flows (2017) and author’s calculations. 
Note: Share of remittance inflows from the EU15 is calculated based on bilateral remittance 
flows among countries during 2010, which is the earliest year the data on bilateral 
remittance flows are available. 
Even though remittances lead to positive economic growth through their impact on 
consumption, savings and investment (Catrinescu et al,, 2009), they create channels 
of financial contagion throughout periods of economic and financial instability.  As a 
result, during the GFC and the subsequent Eurozone debt crisis, remittances inflows 
dropped substantially in most ETEs. As can be seen in the first graph of Figure 1.9 
below, the average amount of remittances received as a share of GDP throughout the 
                                                             
3 2010 is the earliest year bilateral remittance flows are available. 
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period 1997-2015 varied from 19% in Bosnia and Herzegovina to 0.6% in Romania. 
Figure 1.9b shows that during 2009, in most transition countries there was a 
significant decrease in remittance income. More specifically, remittances fell sharply 
in Romania, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Poland and Albania.  Hence, 
remittance flows might also have composed an important transmission mechanism 
for the impact of economic crisis in these countries. In the SEE region remittances 
have yet to return to pre-crisis shares of GDP, as they continued contracting 
throughout the Eurozone debt crisis. The negative growth in all ETEs reflects the 
large percentage of remittances coming from the EU15, as shown in Figure 1.8.  
Figure 1.9a Remittances received as a share of GDP, average 1997-2015  
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Figure 1.9b Annual percentage change of remittances received 
 
Data source: World Bank / World Development Indicators, 2017. 
1.2.6 Integration with the EU and pre-accession support 
During the period of transition many countries, in particular West European 
countries, the United States, Canada and Japan and many intergovernmental 
organizations offered financial assistance to ETEs (Carmin and Vandeveer, 2004). 
This assistance was particularly directed towards fulfilling EU accession 
requirements, by focusing on harmonising ETEs policies and practices with EU 
directives and regulations (Carius et al., 1999). Since 2007, countries wishing to join 
the EU have received EU funding and support through the Instrument for Pre-
Accession Assistance (IPA), which is designed to build institutional and human 
capacities in the respective countries. These countries can be divided into candidate 
countries and potential candidate countries. Candidate countries are those in the 
process of harmonizing their laws with EU legislation, while potential candidate 
countries do not yet fulfil the requirements for EU membership. IPA funds amounted 
to EUR 11.5 billion during the period 2007-2013. The countries currently benefiting 
from these funds are: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia and 
Serbia 
Before 2007, the pre-accession support was provided through the following 
instruments: Phare; ISPA; SAPARD; the pre-accession instrument for Turkey; and 
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the financial instrument for the Western Balkans, CARDS. The Phare programme 
supported institution-building, associated investment in candidate countries and 
economic and social cohesion and cross-border cooperation. The ISPA programme 
supported the environmental and transport infrastructure in candidate countries, 
whilst the SAPAPRD programme supported agricultural and rural development. 
Finally, the CARDS programme was the financial instrument for the Western Balkan 
countries and its main objective was to support participation of the Western Balkans 
in the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), which seeks to promote stability in 
the region. Since 2004, 11 ETEs have joined the EU. Hungary, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, Poland, Latvia and Lithuania became EU 
members in 2004, while Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in 2007 and, most 
recently, Croatia became an EU member in 2013.  
The aim of this section was to present a discussion of the transition process and 
economic integration of ETEs throughout this period, in order to provide background 
for the investigation of the research questions in this thesis. Despite the well-known 
benefits of economic integration, this section showed that it also appears to have 
made the countries more vulnerable to the effects of the GFC by creating and/or 
strengthening potential channels for contagion through trade, foreign banks, FDI, 
remittances and cross-border bank lending. On the other hand, countries that made 
more progress with EU integration and institutional reforms may have been better 
able to deal with external shocks, since their higher quality institutions may be 
expected to contribute to output stability (Balavac and Pugh, 2016). The next section 
provides an overview of the origins of the GFC and how it spread, while section 1.4 
investigates its impact on the ETEs. 
1.3 Causes and nature of the GFC and how it spread 
Financial crises have occurred repeatedly throughout modern history, affecting both 
developing and developed countries. The literature identifies four major types of 
crises: currency crises; sudden stop (or capital account or balance of payments) 
crises; debt crises; and banking crises (Claessens and Kose, 2013). In recent decades, 
crises have become more frequent. Laeven and Valencia (2013) identify 147 banking 
crises, 218 currency crises and 66 debt crises over the period 1970–2011. This rise in 
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frequency has been attributed to an increase in financial market liberalization and 
floating exchange rates (Claessens and Kose, 2013). A financial crisis can be 
extremely costly. They are associated with larger declines in output, consumption, 
investment, employment, exports and imports compared to recessions without 
financial crises (Cleassens and Kose, 2013). In addition, a large number of studies 
have shown that recoveries from financial crises are slower than from typical 
recessions (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; Claessens et al., 2012; Papell and Prodan, 
2012).  Despite its unusual severity, the GFC had many common features with past 
crises, the most important being a preceding asset price bubble and credit boom 
(Allen and Gale, 2000; Brunnermeier, 2008; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008a, 2008b, and 
2009; Schularick and Taylor 2009). There is general agreement that financial 
innovation in the form of asset securitization, global imbalances, expansionary 
monetary policy, government policies to increase homeownership and weak 
regulatory oversight played a significant role in causing the pre-crisis boom (Taylor, 
2009; Keys et al., 2010; Laeven and Valencia, 2013). Many economists consider the 
GFC as the worst meltdown since the Great Depression. It resulted in the collapse of 
large financial institutions, bailouts of banks by governments and declines in stock 
markets all over the world. The crisis had a major impact on business failures and 
consumer wealth and economic activity declined, which led to a global recession and 
the European sovereign-debt crisis.  
The origins of the GFC are by now well-known; it can be traced back to a credit and 
housing boom in the United States. The housing boom started in the late 1990s and 
reached its peak in mid 2000s (Crotty, 2008). Prices increased at a 7 to 8 percent 
annual rate in 1998 and 1999, and at 9 to 11 percent from 2000 to 2003, while the 
most rapid price increases were in 2004 and 2005, with house price appreciation 
ranging from 15 to 17 percent (Bernanke, 2010). The large inflows of foreign funds 
following the Russian debt crisis and Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998, increased 
the availability of credit in the U.S., which led to a housing construction boom and 
debt-financed consumer spending (Brunnermeier, 2008). Following the housing and 
credit boom, a number of financial innovations emerged, such as mortgage-backed 
securities and collateralized debt obligations (Simkovic, 2013). These financial 
innovations made it easier for investors and institutions around the world to invest 
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in the U.S. A decline in U.S. housing prices caused mortgage-backed financial 
securities to experience significant losses, which, by 2008, were estimated to be 
approximately 500 billion dollars (Greenlaw et al., 2008). The associated increase in 
mortgage delinquencies triggered a liquidity crisis and bank runs. However, this did 
not initially occur in the traditional-banking system. Instead, as pointed out by 
Gorton and Metrick (2012), it took place in the “securitized-banking” system. As 
opposed to traditional banking, which is the business of making and holding loans 
with insured demand deposits as the main source of funds, securitized banking is the 
business of packaging and reselling loans, with repo agreements as the main source 
of funds (Gorton and Metrick, 2012). As such, a traditional-banking run is triggered 
by the withdrawal of deposits, while a securitized-banking run is triggered by the 
withdrawal of repurchase (repo) agreements. An important element of the repo 
agreement is the requirement to post collateral with a higher value than the loan: 
Gorton and Metrick (2012) refer to this as a “haircut”. The authors define the 
“haircut” as the percentage by which an asset’s market value is reduced for the 
purpose of calculating the amount of overcollateralization of the repo agreement. 
Since the value of mortgage backed securities fell continuously, the haircuts’ levels 
grew up to 50 percent. Hence, the borrowing that could be supported by the same 
amount of capital decreased significantly. This led to deleveraging and forced many 
financial institutions to sell off assets, which had an adverse effect since the lower 
asset values decreased collateral’s value. Uncertainty kept rising, which caused 
haircuts levels to continue rising and financial institutions to sell more assets. 
One particular feature of the GFC was the speed and synchronicity with which it 
spread around the world (Chudik and Fratzscher, 2011). Even though it originated in 
the U.S., it spread not only to countries that shared similar vulnerabilities, but also to 
most emerging and advanced countries. The international spillovers were 
transmitted through a number of phases. The first phase was through direct 
exposures and affected a few financial markets which had a heavy exposure to the 
U.S. market. As a result of direct exposures to subprime assets, the crisis spread 
quickly to European banks, e.g. in France (BNP Paribas, 2007) and in Germany (IKB, 
2007) (Claessens et al., 2010). These events as well as housing market stress caused 
liquidity and funding problems in some markets. In the UK, Northern Rock, which 
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was disproportionately funded through short-term borrowing in the capital markets 
suffered a bank-run in 2007. 
The second phase of the transmission of the crisis was through asset markets. 
Namely, liquidity shortages, frozen credit markets, foreign exchange fluctuations and 
stock price declines accelerated the transmission of the international spillovers. 
Policy responses aiming to address liquidity problems were not effective in the short 
term. In addition, countries used different approaches to address the liquidity 
problems. These ad-hoc interventions worsened the level of confidence among 
creditors and investors and were unable to resolve the underlying problems that 
caused an almost complete breakdown in market trust and confidence (Claessens et 
al., 2010). Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the third phase of transmission 
of crisis started mainly due to insolvency problems. By October 2008, many of the 
major global financial institutions had massive losses and had written off a large 
number of illiquid assets.  Market confidence continued to deteriorate which resulted 
in further failures.  
As the crisis developed into a global recession, in many countries economic stimulus 
was used as a main tool to attempt to stabilise output. Rescue plans and bailouts 
were carried out for banking systems and failing businesses in the U.S, China and EU.  
Most policy responses to the economic and financial crisis were taken by individual 
nations. Nevertheless, there was some coordination at the European level as well as 
global level through the G-20 countries. The first summit dedicated to the crisis took 
place in November 2008 and a second summit in April 2009. The main decisions 
taken in these summits were to coordinate actions and to stimulate demand and 
employment. In addition, G-20 countries committed to maintain the supply of credit 
by providing more liquidity. Central banks committed to maintain low interest rate 
policies for as long as it was necessary. Moreover, it was also agreed to help the 
emerging economies through the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  
The crisis in Europe transformed from a banking crisis to a sovereign debt crisis. The 
European sovereign debt crisis started in 2008, with the collapse of Iceland's banking 
system, and spread primarily to Greece, Ireland and Portugal during 2009 (Arghyrou 
and Kontonikas, 2012). The debt crisis led to a crisis of confidence in European 
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businesses and economies. Several countries received bailout packages from the 
European Commission, European Central Bank, and IMF. By 2012, many European 
countries had improved their budget deficits relative to their GDP and the eurozone’s 
recovery started to take hold in 2013.  
1.4 The impact of the GFC on ETEs 
Even though the GFC commenced in the United States, as a result of the current global 
macroeconomic imbalances and financial globalization, the crisis could not be 
contained within the United States financial system and quickly spread to the other 
major financial centres. The GFC was associated with the worst recession since World 
War II. The world GDP per capita declined by 2% in 2009. As discussed in sub-section 
1.2.1, the ETEs were severely affected by the GFC with an average GDP decline of 
around 7 percent in 2009, a more severe impact than in any other region in the 
world, including the EU15, where the output decline averaged 5% in 2009. However, 
as identified in sub-section 1.2.1, the impact of the crisis on economic activity varied 
extensively across countries in transition, with the Baltic States being most severely 
affected where economic activity in 2009 declined, on average, by around 14%, while 
the least affected were the Balkan countries with an average GDP decline of only 
around 4% in 2009.  
ETEs, like other emerging markets, weathered the GFC relatively well up to mid-
2008. The region was first hit by the crisis in the third and fourth quarters of 
2008. Until then, most of these countries continued experiencing output and credit 
growth, large capital inflows and stable financial markets, despite the fact that the 
financial crisis had already hit the advanced economies over a year previously 
(EBRD, 2009).  Based on the experience of previous emerging market crises, a 
dramatic decrease and subsequent reversal in cross-border lending flows was 
expected. In particular, ETEs seemed particularly at risk since they generally 
financed expansion with foreign bank loans, which resulted in the accumulation of 
large external and internal imbalances in many countries. Although a shock of such 
a massive proportions at the international financial system‘s centre was expected 
to rapidly spread to the transition countries, that did not occur (Berglöf et al., 2009). 
With a few exceptions, emerging Europe was left unaffected by the crisis during its 
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first four quarters, since capital inflows held up and credit and output growth 
continued. The exceptions include the three Baltic States, where the credit boom 
started to reverse even before the beginning of the GFC. However, after the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers and Washington Mutual, the crisis finally hit emerging Europe. 
By the end of 2008 capital inflows to the ETEs and global trade declined sharply. 
More specifically, exports of goods and services dropped by around 10% in 2009. As 
shown in Figure 1.2c in sub-section 1.2.2, the Baltic countries experienced the largest 
decline in exports, which averaged 15% in 2009. The CEE countries’ exports also 
declined sharply, averaging 12% in 2009, while exports from SEE countries dropped 
by an average of 7% during 2009. As for individual countries, the steepest decline in 
exports in 2009 was experienced in Estonia, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia (20%, 
17% and 16%, respectively), while exports from Kosovo and Albania continued 
growing throughout 2009, although at a slower rate. The variation of the impact of 
GFC on exports in these countries can in part be attributed to different levels of 
exposure to the EU (EBRD, 2012). Figure 1.3 in sub-section 1.2.2 showed that exports 
of ETEs with stronger trade linkages with the EU15 appear to have declined more 
steeply in 2009 compared to exports of countries with weaker ties. Cross-border 
bank flows also declined sharply in the region, averaging 13% by the first quarter of 
2009. As shown in sub-section 1.2.3, the countries that experienced the sharpest 
decline in cross-border credit flows during 2009 were Slovakia, Romania and the 
Czech Republic (60%, 21% and 16%, respectively) (BIS, 2017). The average decline 
of FDI inflows across the ETEs was 57% in 2009. The sharpest falls took place in 
Slovenia, Hungary, Latvia and Lithuania. The GFC also affected the remittance inflows 
in ETEs. More specifically, remittances fell sharply in Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Poland, Romania and Slovenia. 
Most of the financial indicators started to  point  up in 2010,  corresponding  to  the  
general  recovery  in  international  financial markets. Almost all countries in the 
region saw a return to growth in 2010 and early 2011. However, the nature of the 
crisis changed fundamentally in 2011-2012. The banking crisis was transformed into 
a sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone. The European banks weakened, which led to 
a decline in inflows of funds to emerging Europe. The average decline of the cross-
border bank flows in the region was 7% in 2012 As shown in section 1.2.3, the 
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countries that experienced the sharpest decline in cross-border credit flows during 
2012 were Hungary and Slovenia (30% and 29%, respectively) (BIS, 2017). 
Nevertheless, the impact of this crisis was not as severe as from the 2008 crisis, 
considering that in most transition countries the governments undertook important 
adjustment measures. In addition, the Vienna Initiative helped to ensure that an 
immediate large-scale withdrawal of foreign banks from the region did not occur; 
thus it stabilised lending temporarily by the 17 banks that signed commitment letters 
(EBRD, 2015). Even so, transition countries were still vulnerable due to their 
dependence on the eurozone and their high levels of non-performing loans and 
foreign-currency denominated debt (EBRD, 2011).  Consequently, since 2013, growth 
has remained relatively weak across many transition countries highly integrated with 
the eurozone due to decreases in capital flows and export demand.  
Given the severity of the GFC and its impact on ETEs, it is important for policy makers 
in these countries to understand the international channels of transmission of the 
crisis in order to reduce their vulnerability to future negative shocks.  
1.5 Key research questions and structure of the thesis 
One of the key outcomes of the transition process in the former communist countries, 
as shown in section 1.2, has been deeper international integration through trade and 
financial flows. The rapid increase in exports led to a significant expansion of the 
exports to GDP ratio, which made these countries vulnerable to a decrease in export 
demand. In addition, a large proportion of exports was directed towards the EU, 
exposing these countries to shocks in the EU. Moreover, evidence suggests that 
countries with stronger trade linkages have more synchronized business cycles 
(Juvenal and Monteiro, 2017). In addition, cross-border bank acquisitions composed 
an important component of financial integration. The average asset share of foreign 
banks in transition region had, by 2009, reached more than 82% (Figure 1.4).  Cross-
border lending and foreign bank ownership resulted in a pre-GFC credit boom in the 
transition region, which boosted investment and output growth, but also led to large 
external imbalances financed by cross-border capital flows. In most of these 
countries, debt was mainly denominated in foreign currency, as shown in Figure 1.6, 
which made the borrowers vulnerable to a depreciation of the exchange rate. 
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Furthermore, even though remittances are an important source of capital flows in 
many transition countries, particularly SEE countries, as shown in sub-section 1.2.5, 
they made the countries more vulnerable to external shocks by creating an additional 
potential channel for contagion. These possibilities, to our knowledge, have not been 
addressed thoroughly in empirical studies related to transmission of the GFC to ETEs.  
To sum up, by investigating the transmission of the GFC to ETEs, whilst taking into 
account the degree of euroisation, integration with the EU, exports, remittance flows, 
bank ownership, FDI and foreign credit flows, this research intends to explore the 
extent to which they matter, and consequently make an original contribution to 
knowledge. Thus, this thesis will address these three key research questions:   
1) What are the relevant models and empirical evidence on the international 
transmission of financial crises? What are the gaps in knowledge? 
2) Which were the most significant channels of international transmission of shocks 
to ETEs?  
3) Did the degree of euroisation, integration with the EU, remittance inflows, bank 
ownership, trade and foreign credit flows significantly modify the propagation of the 
GFC to ETEs? 
The first research question is addressed through a review of the literature on 
financial contagion presented in Chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 2 identifies the theoretical 
framework behind the channels of transmission of the GFC and the influences of the 
degree of euroisation, foreign bank ownership, foreign capital flows and integration 
with the EU in transmission of the GFC to ETEs. It starts with an overview of the 
theory of financial contagion, which is followed by a review of the theory on the 
causes of increased euroisation and its main costs and, lastly, the theory of European 
integration. Chapter 3 provides a critical review of the empirical studies that have 
investigated the international transmission of the GFC and the role of euroisation, 
bank ownership, foreign credit flows and integration with the EU in this process. The 
aim of both these chapters is to identify the gaps in the literature, which are then 
addressed empirically in Chapters 4 and 5.  
The analysis presented in Chapters 4 and 5 answer questions 2 and 3 using, 
respectively, macro and micro level data and different estimations techniques. 
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Chapter 4 investigates how GDP and financial shocks in European advanced countries 
were transmitted to ETEs, using the recently-developed GVAR (global vector auto-
regression) approach. Two samples were employed over the period 1999Q1-2014Q4 
and 2003Q1-2014Q4. The first sample encompasses 30 countries (15 ETEs and 15 
advanced EU countries) and the second sample encompasses 32 countries (17 ETEs 
and 15 advanced EU countries). Two types of variables are used to capture the main 
channels of international financial contagion: trade and financial. 
Chapter 5 investigates the transmission of the GFC of 2008/2009 by employing firm-
level data. This chapter covers six transition countries and examines whether the 
initial conditions (from 2007) had an impact on the firms' sales in 2009. The measure 
of sales growth from 2008 to 2009 is used to proxy the impact of the GFC on firms. 
The intention of this study is to distinguish between two main channels of 
transmission as suggested by theory, namely the trade and financial channels, thus a 
wide range of variables is used to capture these channels. 
Finally, Chapter 6 presents the key findings of the thesis, establishes their 
contribution to knowledge, examines their policy implications, identifies the main 
limitations of the research and provides recommendations for future research.   
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2.1 Introduction 
Having looked at the influences of exports, bank ownership, foreign credit flows, FDI 
inflows, remittances, the degree of euroisation and extent of progress towards EU 
integration in the transmission of the GFC to ETEs in Chapter 1, this thesis proceeds 
with a critical review of the theoretical (Chapter 2) and the empirical literature on 
the international transmission of crises (Chapter 3). The reviews presented in these 
chapters will provide the basis for developing the models that will be used to explore 
the international transmission of GFC to ETEs in the empirical chapters.  
The increase in the frequency of crises during recent decades has generated a 
growing strand of theoretical and empirical literature on their origins and channels 
of transmission. Considering the severe impact of the GFC on transition countries 
(see section 1.4), a number of studies have been particularly focused on the 
transmission of the crisis from developed to transition countries. Factors that have 
been highlighted as playing an important role in explaining why certain countries 
were hit by the crisis harder than others include: fast pre-crisis credit growth; large 
current account deficits; high trade openness; high international openness of the 
banking sector; a higher level of GDP per capita (Berglöf et al., 2009; Blanchard et al, 
2010; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2011; Rose and Spiegel, 2009a, 2009b, 2011; 
Berkmen et al., 2012; Popov and Udell, 2012; Feldkircher, 2014; Park et al., 2014; De 
Haas et al., 2015; Ongena et al., 2015; Ahmed et al., 2017). One potentially important 
factor that previous studies neglected, although it is a common characteristic of ETEs, 
is the extent to which a country has assets and liabilities denominated in foreign 
currencies, namely the degree of euroisation. Consequently, when investigating the 
transmission of the GFC to ETEs, it is important to control for the degree of 
euroisation.  Additionally, the degree of integration with the EU and quality of 
institutions may have given rise to different exposure to the transmission 
mechanisms and different transmission channels. As highlighted in Chapter 1, these 
additional possibilities, to the best of our knowledge, have not been addressed 
thoroughly in previous empirical studies related to the transmission of GFC to ETEs.  
Accordingly, three main strands of literature are relevant to this research. First, there 
is research on financial contagion and transmission channels, which distinguishes 
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between fundamental causes (common shocks, trade linkages and financial linkages) 
and investors’ behaviour (liquidity problems, asymmetric information, incentive 
problems etc.) (Masson, 1998; Dornbusch et al., 2000; Forbes and Rigobon, 2001). 
While these causes shape the transmission of the shock from the advanced 
economies, the magnitude to which it gets intensified depends, to a large extent, on 
institutional responses and existing macroeconomic vulnerabilities (Berkmen et al., 
2012).  
Consequently, the second strand of literature that is relevant to this research is 
related to the extent to which a country has assets and liabilities denominated in 
foreign currencies, namely the degree of euroisation. The main costs/risks associated 
with euroisation are: inability/ineffectiveness to act as a lender of last resort, adverse 
currency mismatches and reduction in monetary policy autonomy/effectiveness all of 
which can increase the vulnerability of the banking system, increase interest spreads 
and reduce the credit supply (Honohan and Shi, 2002; Winkler, et al., 2004; Click, 
2007; Honohan, 2007; Chitu, 2013). These three main costs associated with 
euroisation might become more evident during periods of severe financial crisis. 
Hence, the recent global financial crisis can be considered as a unique opportunity to 
investigate the influence of degree of euroisation on the severity of the impact of the 
GFC in ETEs.  
The third strand of the literature relevant to this research relates to integration with 
the EU, which might have provided different exposures to the transmission 
mechanisms and different transmission channels. Countries that made more progress 
with institutional reforms may have been better able to deal with external shocks, 
given their higher quality institutions and/or more effective governments. On the 
other hand, countries that made the most progress in integrating with the EU may be 
more vulnerable to the crisis, as they were more open to the transmission effects 
through financial flows and falling export demand (Bartlett and Prica, 2012).  
This chapter identifies the theoretical framework behind the channels of 
transmission of the GFC and the influences of the degree of euroisation, trade, foreign 
bank ownership, foreign capital flows and integration with the EU in transmission of 
the financial crisis to ETEs. It starts with an overview of the theory on international 
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channels of transmission of shocks, which is followed by the theory on the causes of 
increased euroisation and its main costs and, lastly, the theory of European 
integration.  
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the theoretical framework on 
channels of transmission of the global financial crises. The theory behind euroisation 
and its main costs is summarized in section 2.3. Section 2.4 provides some theoretical 
background on European integration. The last section of this chapter provides 
conclusions and examines their implications for the design and implementation of 
this research programme.   
 2.2 International transmission of the GFC 
A rich literature covering both theoretical and empirical research on crises and 
transmission channels has emerged in recent years. There are different views on 
defining “financial contagion” and modelling the transmission of shocks. According to 
Claessens and Forbes (2004), a contagion is defined as the transmission of a crisis 
between two countries that are located in different regions and have no direct trade 
or financial ties. However, the authors point out that there seems to be some 
disagreement on whether this scenario should be defined as contagion, as some 
economists prefer to use the term shift contagion to describe this kind of situation. 
Moreover, there is also disagreement on whether “financial contagion” is appropriate 
to describe a situation where a crisis spreads between two similar and strongly 
linked countries. As an example, if there are two countries in the same geographical 
location, linked through trade and financial channels and very similar regarding their 
market structure, then they tend to be highly inter-connected all the time, during 
stable as well as crisis periods (Claessens and Forbes, 2004). Nevertheless, there is a 
general agreement that financial contagion can be defined as co-movement in asset 
prices or financial flows after a shock to a country or group of countries.  
Orthodox theory on the transmission of shocks distinguishes between two groups of 
theories that explain contagion: fundamental causes (common shocks, trade and 
financial linkages) and investors’ behaviour (liquidity problems, asymmetric 
information, incentive problems etc.) (Masson 1998; Dornbusch et al., 2000; Forbes 
and Rigobon, 2001; Karolyi, 2003; Claessens and Forbes, 2004). Given the increasing 
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international integration of ETEs through trade and capital flows discussed in section 
1.2, sub-section 2.2.1 focuses on explaining the international transmission of shocks 
through fundamental causes, in particular trade and financial channels, with a 
particular focus on the GFC. Further, investors’ behaviour as a mechanism for the 
international transmission of shocks is elaborated in sub-section 2.2.2. However, 
given the relatively low level of financial market development in most ETEs, 
investors’ behaviour factors are likely to be less important in explaining contagion in 
these countries. Nevertheless, it has to be pointed out that there might be some 
overlap between these two categories of theories that explain contagion.  Namely, if 
investors’ behaviour is not completely irrational and if it is partially based on some 
macroeconomic fundamentals, then this behaviour might also fit under the theory 
that explains contagion based on fundamental causes. Section 2.2.3 provides an 
overview of the theory of transmission of shocks from the financial to the real 
economy. 
2.2.1 Fundamental causes 
The first group of theories that explain contagion, fundamental causes, refer to 
transmission of shocks due to the usual interdependencies that exists across markets 
and economies. Typically, fundamental causes are divided into three categories: 
common or global shocks; financial channel; and the trade channel. The first of these 
mechanisms of transmission of shocks is the common or global shock, such as a 
major change in the relative price of oil, which triggers crises in both developed and 
emerging economies (Dornbusch et al, 2000). Common shocks can lead to co-
movements in asset prices or capital flows.    
Secondly, trade linkages are considered one of the most important fundamental 
causes for the international transmission of crises.  This group includes linkages 
through direct trade and competitive devaluations (Eichengreen et al.  1996; Glick 
and Rose, 1999; Corsetti et al., 2000; Dornbusch et al., 2000; and Forbes, 2002). 
During the last two decades, there has been a growing consensus that countries with 
stronger trade linkages have more synchronized business cycles (Juvenal and 
Monteiro, 2017). Chui et al. (2004) identify a number of potential trade channels. A 
crisis in one country by causing a reduction in income may reduce the demand for 
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imports, thus affecting exports, the trade balance, and related economic 
fundamentals in other economies through direct trade links. A competitiveness effect 
may arise if the initial crisis in one economy causes its currency to be devalued (Chui 
et al., 2004).  Devaluation temporarily improves the country’s competitiveness, while 
reducing the competitiveness (both bilaterally and in common export markets) of 
tradables produced by other economies, thus worsening their economic 
performance. This can lead to pressuring other countries’ currencies to depreciate. 
Therefore, a currency crisis that hits one country may be expected to spread over 
time to other countries. Gerlach and Smets (1995) show how the depreciation of one 
currency affects the competitiveness of countries with pegged currencies, which 
might trigger a crisis and force depreciation of their currency.  Moreover, they show 
that the contagion impact is higher, the higher the degree of trade integration 
between these countries and the lower the degree of integration of these countries 
with another country. Similarly, Glick and Rose (1999) concluded that currency 
crises spread mainly because of the trade linkages.  Specifically, countries may be 
attacked because of  the  actions  of  their  neighbours,  who  mainly  due  to 
geographic proximity tend to  be  their major trading partners. A crisis is spread from 
one country to another if these two countries share various economic features, such 
as a real exchange rate over-valuation, weaknesses in their banking systems and low 
international reserves (Sachs et al., 1996). Given that bilateral trade flows are, in 
most of the cases, negatively affected by distance, currency crises are likely to be 
regional. As shown in section 1.2, during 2009 the European transition region 
experienced a decline of around 10% in exports of goods and services that was 
attributed to the GFC. It was argued in section 1.2 that the variation in export 
performance during the GFC can in part be attributed to different levels of exposure 
to the Eurozone: exports of ETEs with stronger trade linkages with the EU15 declined 
more steeply in 2009 compared to exports of countries with weaker ties.  
The third mechanism for the transmission of shocks through fundamental causes is 
the financial channel. Transmission of shocks through this channel has gained 
increasing attention in recent years. In a highly integrated region, a crisis that starts 
in one country will affect other countries by reducing capital inflows (Claessens and 
Forbes, 2004). Therefore, as argued in section 1.2, increased financial integration 
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made the ETEs more vulnerable to international crises by creating and/or 
strengthening potential financial channels for contagion through foreign banks, 
cross-border bank flows, FDI and remittances. In particular, the crisis in one 
country, by reducing the capital supply of that country, will decrease the lending and 
investing abilities of that country to another country. Therefore, these reductions in 
capital inflows will increase the borrowing costs and put pressure on currency 
depreciation for countries that are highly dependent on external funding. According 
to Chui et al. (2004), the impact of shocks on the costs of domestic or cross-border 
sources of finance will depend on an emerging economy’s sensitivity to each.  
Theoretical models of banking crises suggest that an important role in the 
propagation of a financial crisis is played by large and highly leveraged financial 
institutions, such as international banks (Tirole, 2011; Greenwood et al., 2015). 
During the GFC, an important transmission mechanism has been the global 
restriction of credit, which has especially affected transition economies with a high 
penetration of foreign banks (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2011). As argued in section 
1.2, the presence of foreign banks in transition countries helped to strengthen their 
national banking systems and improve their low level of financial intermediation. On 
the other hand, the growing role of foreign banks increased the exposure of 
transition countries to foreign shocks (Roaf et al., 2014).  
Árvai et al. (2009) highlight the importance of cross-border finance in transmitting 
crises through financial linkages. They illustrate some of the channels of transmission 
of contagion through financial linkages. One possible channel is the existence of a 
common lender which lends to a number of countries. If one of the countries that 
borrows from the banking system of this common lender faces a shock, given that the 
common lender’s banking system is largely exposed to this country, it will affect the 
liquidity or solvency of the common lender.  Therefore, other countries borrowing 
from the lending country will also be affected, even though they do not have direct 
linkages with the country that was hit by the shock. Similarly, if a parent bank 
withdraws its deposit or lending or charges higher interest rates to its subsidiary, 
and if the subsidiary is highly dependent on the funding of the parent bank, it will 
face liquidity and solvency problems.  As a consequence, in heavily concentrated 
banking systems with substantial market linkages, liquidity problems can rapidly 
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spread to other domestic or foreign-owned banks and, as a result, their parent banks 
and the banking systems in which the parent banks operate. This in turn will affect 
the banking sector of the entire region. Árvai et al. (2009), point out that the size of 
contagion through financial channel depends on:  the size of the exposures of home 
banks (common lender) to the host country with a problem and the dependence of 
the host country on funds from the home country. “Bank balance-sheet driven 
contagion” can also occur through the international banking system when banks 
decrease loans in one country as a response to losses in another country. This 
indirect financial contagion mechanism was first suggested by Calvo (1998) to 
introduce a causal link between the 1998 Russian crisis and the following crisis in 
Brazil. Bank balance sheet shocks start from deteriorations in the balance sheets of a 
country's foreign bank creditors. Such shocks can be direct or indirect. Direct bank 
balance sheet contagion occurs when banks from a creditor country with a 
deteriorating risk profile decide to withdraw international funding to comply with 
internal rules or prudential regulations such as capital adequacy requirements. On 
the other hand, indirect bank balance sheet contagion occurs when banks decrease 
loans to a debtor country in response to deteriorations in their loan portfolio in 
another country (Ahrend and Goujard, 2013).   
Even though, as argued above, trade and financial linkages serve as international 
channels of transmission of shocks, the extent to which the shocks get amplified also 
depend on the responses of policy-makers and existing domestic vulnerabilities. 
During the years following the GFC there has been a growing consensus on the 
importance of macroeconomic fundamentals in coping with external shocks. Frankel 
and Saravelos (2012) analyse the effects of the GFC by selecting variables from an 
extensive review of the previous literature on early warning indicators. They find 
that real exchange rate overvaluation and levels of international reserves can explain 
the variation of the impact of GFC across countries. Fratzscher (2012) demonstrates 
that the heterogeneity of the impact of the GFC across countries can be explained by 
differences in country risk, quality of domestic institutions and the strength of 
domestic macroeconomic fundamentals. More specifically, the author shows that 
countries with high-quality institutions and strong macroeconomic fundamentals 
were better able to protect their financial markets from adverse shocks during the 
GFC. In addition, the author highlights that trade and financial linkages played a 
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minor role in explaining cross-country heterogeneities in the transmission of the 
GFC. Ahmed et al., (2017) show that the financial markets in emerging economies 
with better macroeconomic fundamentals (current account balance; foreign 
exchange reserves; short-term external debt; the gross government debt; inflation 
etc.) were less severely affected by the GFC and the subsequent Eurozone debt crisis 
in 2011. They also find that financial conditions worsened more in countries that had 
previously experienced larger capital inflows and greater exchange rate appreciation. 
In contrast, Eichengreen and Gupta (2015) and Aizenman et al. (2016) do not find 
evidence that strong macroeconomic fundamentals (a lower public debt, a lower 
budget deficit, a higher level of international reserves and higher economic growth) 
protected emerging economies from the effects of the global shocks. 
2.2.2 Investors’ behaviour  
The second group of theories that explain contagion are based on investors’ 
behaviour. If fundamentals and common shocks are not able to fully explain the 
relationship between countries, then the spillover effects might be explained by 
rational or irrational herding behaviour (Dornbusch et al., 2000; Forbes and Rigobon, 
2001; Karolyi, 2003; Economou et al., 2011; Galariotis et al., 2016).  Claessens and 
Forbes (2004) define five main categories of theories explaining contagion based on 
investors’ behaviour:  liquidity problems; incentive problems; informational 
asymmetries; market coordination problems and investor reassessment. One 
common feature of all of these theories is that despite the fact that investors’ 
behaviour is often rational ex-ante, it might still lead to excessive co-movements in 
market prices in the sense that market prices are not explained by real 
fundamentals (Claessens and Forbes, 2004). However, given the relatively low level 
of financial market development in ETEs, investors’ behaviour factors are likely to be 
less important in explaining contagion.  
The first category focuses on liquidity problems (Goldfajn and Valdés,  1 997; 
Dornbusch et al., 2000; Kaminsky et al., 2001; Claessens and Forbes, 2004). 
Investors who due to a crisis are faced with liquidity problems tend to sell their 
securities in other markets in order to raise cash. This kind of behaviour causes a 
decrease in asset prices outside of the crisis region. As a result, the initial 
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disturbances will spread and affect different markets and borrowers. 
The second category of theories that explain the impact of investors’ behaviour on 
contagion focuses on incentives and risk aversion (Claessens and Forbes, 2004). 
Broner et al. (2006) present a model that analyses the effect of changes in investors’ 
risk aversion on portfolio decisions and stock prices. Their findings suggest that an 
investor who cares about his performance relative to that of other investors, would 
shift his portfolio towards the average portfolio as a response to an increase in risk 
aversion. More specifically, the investor would shift his assets from countries to 
which he is overexposed towards those to which he is underexposed. Considering 
that crises mostly affect those investors who are most exposed to the crisis country 
and those investors, in turn, adjust their portfolios away from other countries in 
which they are overexposed, crises are transmitted through overexposed investors. 
This type of behaviour could result in widespread price declines and currency 
depreciations. 
A third type of theories explaining contagion caused by investors’ behaviour is based 
on asymmetric and imperfect information.  Due to the lack of complete information 
about the conditions in each country, a financial crisis in one country can make 
investors think that other countries may face the crisis too. Therefore, they start 
selling their assets in those countries which they believe will face similar problems. 
This type of behaviour can also be a result of actions of other investors (Calvo and 
Mendoza, 2000). Due to the lack of information, investors may find it less costly 
and easier to follow the example of other informed and uninformed investors.  
A fourth group of theories explaining contagion based on investors’ behaviour 
focuses on market coordination problems (Masson, 1998). According to this theory, 
investors can change their behaviour as a result of   self-fulfilling expectations that 
can cause multiple equilibria (Dornubusch et al., 2000; Claessens and Forbes, 2004). 
In particular, investors could unexpectedly withdraw from a country based on their 
beliefs about the future and their fears that unless they act quickly, it will be too late to 
utilise the limited foreign exchange reserves (Dornbusch et al, 2000). These types of 
market coordination problems are believed to be one of the most important channels 
of contagion.  
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As per Claessens and Forbes (2004), the last category of theories that explain 
contagion based on investors’ behaviour focuses on the reassessment and beliefs of 
investors regarding the stability of rules governing international finance. A country’s 
and more generally investors’ concerns regarding the aggressive policies that other 
countries might follow during the crisis period with respect to foreign creditors, as 
well as their concern that financial institutions will not help countries in difficulties 
due to limited funds, would cause investors to sell their assets outside the crisis 
country, thus causing contagion.  
Having identified the theory behind the international channels of transmission of 
shocks, the next sub-section summarizes the theory on transmission of shocks from 
the financial sector to the real economy. 
2.2.3 Transmission of shocks from the financial sector to the real economy 
The recent global crisis prompted many researchers to revise the analysis of the 
transmission of shocks from the financial to the real sphere of the economy, both in 
general and with regards to particular economies (Blot et al., 2009; Boorman, 2009; 
Cardarelli et al., 2011). The literature on the transmission of shocks identifies 
channels between real and financial sectors that might work in both directions. 
Namely, financial conditions are influenced by the conditions in the real economy, 
specifically households’ and firms’ balance sheets, whilst those balance sheets 
eventually influence the real economic sector (Foglia et al., 2011). Literature on the 
transmission channels between the real and the financial sectors is based on 
standard macroeconomic theory (Vousinas, 2013). More specifically, households’ and 
businesses’ performance decreases as a result of weaker macroeconomic conditions 
that affect their income and profits (Foglia et al., 2011; Lupu, 2012, Vousinas, 2013). 
Another potential effect would be a tightening of credit conditions and an increase in 
borrowers’ default probabilities, which would directly weaken banks’ net returns and 
hence their balance sheets. There is considerable academic research that documents 
the link between financial and real sectors. The most well-known categories of these 
transmission channels are: the interest rate channel; the wealth effect; and, the 
financial accelerator (also referred to as the borrower balance sheet channel and the 
bank balance sheet channel).  
56 
 
The interest rate channel or cost of capital may be a significant mechanism in the 
transmission of interest rate shocks (due to changes of liquidity on interbank market 
and/or changes of monetary policy) (Lupu, 2012). A decrease in interest rates, by 
causing a reduction in the cost of capital and assuming that prices and wages are 
fixed, typically induces a rise in investment spending, therefore leading to a rise in 
aggregate demand and in output. A similar rationale applies to investment decisions 
in housing or purchases of durable goods by households, with a fall in the interest 
rate accounting for a fall in the cost of borrowing. The interest rate channel of 
monetary transmission has traditionally been a key component of how monetary 
policy effects are transmitted to the economy (Mishkin, 1995). More specifically, 
contractionary monetary policy increases the short-term nominal interest rate, then, 
due to sticky prices and rational expectations, the long-term interest rate increases as 
well (Lupu, 2012). The higher interest rates initially decrease residential investment 
and consumption expenditure, which is followed by a decline in business investment, 
resulting in an overall decline in aggregate output (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995).   
While traditional theory suggests that the interest rate channel may play a key role in 
transmission of shocks from the financial to the real sector, the lack of empirical 
evidence in this area has led to consideration of other channels, in particular the 
wealth effect and the credit channel (Mishkin, 1995; Boschi and Goenka, 2012; Lupu, 
2012). The wealth effect is based on Friedman's permanent income hypothesis. 
According to this theory, the consumption of households is determined by the wealth 
they own through actualizing their current and expected future incomes. A negative 
shock on equity price or stock markets, by reducing consumers’ permanent income, 
will reduce their consumption expenditure. However, if the shock is perceived as 
temporary, consumption will not change, considering that the households actualize 
their current and future income. On the contrary, higher equity prices will boost 
consumers’ confidence and increase consumption expenditure (Bernanke, 2010). 
The borrower balance sheet channel and the bank balance sheet channel highlight 
the influence of the net worth of agents on the credit conditions they face. In most of 
the cases, these channels result from the information asymmetries and agency costs 
as well as regulations on bank capital requirements (Vousinas, 2013). Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981) have suggested that information asymmetries between lenders and 
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borrowers generate agency costs because of the need to monitor and obtain 
information on the quality of projects applying for financing. In addition, Bernanke 
and Blinder (1988) and Bernanke and Gertler (1995) show that financial 
imperfections, due to asymmetric information, can contribute to the transmission 
and amplification of the shocks. In models based on the financial accelerator, 
borrowers have to pay a premium for external financing that is specific to each 
debtor depending on agency costs. (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). The higher the 
informational asymmetries, the more costly external financing and the higher net 
wealth, the less costly external financing is. Thus, a shock that decreases the revenues 
of non-financial agents or reduces the value of their collateral, will lead to a higher 
premium for external financing. As a consequence, agents will modify investment and 
consumption projects, which would result in amplification of the initial shock 
(Goodhart and Hofmann, 2008, Mishkin, 2007). On the other hand, considering that 
the premium for external financing depends on the net wealth of agents, banks may 
adjust their balance sheets in favour of larger firms.  
The literature related to the bank balance sheet channel is itself divided into two 
separate parts. The first part is the bank lending channel which emphasizes that 
credit supply is affected by shocks on banks’ balance sheets. The second part is the 
bank capital channel. Specifically, a decrease in banking capital would result in an 
increase of the cost of financing faced by banks and, as a result, in the cost of credit 
faced by borrowers. Regulatory capital requirements also affect lending decisions. 
During economic downturns, in addition to loan losses, the increased risk-weighted 
assets also decrease the banks’ capital. As a result, banks would be faced with higher 
capital needs, but due to difficulties in increasing their capital, they would most likely 
de-lever their assets and decrease assets with higher risk weights, such as lending. As 
a result of this reduction in credit extended to firms and households, the initial 
economic downturn worsens. Peek and Rosengren (1995) have shown that 
contractionary shocks to banking capital reduce banks’ credit supply in the case of 
regulatory capital requirements, which reactivates the credit channel. Following a 
shock which would lower assets’ quality, in order to satisfy their prudential ratios, 
banks have either to reduce their exposure to risk (by offering fewer loans) or 
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increase their capital. However, in the context of informational asymmetries, raising 
capital is costly, especially in financially and economically “troubled” times.   
This section provided an overview of the theory explaining the international and 
domestic channels of transmission of shocks, covering the first strand of literature 
relevant to this research programme. The next section continues with the second 
strand of relevant literature: the theory explaining the causes of increased 
euroisation and its main benefits and costs.  
2.3 Euroisation 
As shown in section 1.2, ETEs are characterized by a high degree of euroisation. 
There are various causes of this high degree of euroisation: a lack of macroeconomic 
credibility and high inflation volatility, whilst the expected euro adoption in some 
countries has also stimulated the use of foreign currency instead of domestic 
currency (Zettelmeyer et al., 2010). In addition, the high concentration of foreign 
bank ownership in most transition countries and the availability of foreign financing 
have further encouraged the use of foreign currency. The presence of euroisation in 
these countries made them more vulnerable to the crisis. The remaining discussion in 
this section will provide a brief overview of the theory of euroisation, the main costs 
and benefits associated with it and relevance to the transmission of international 
crises to ETEs. 
Euroisation is a process where the domestic currency is substituted by a foreign 
currency for conducting transactions. The literature distinguishes between official or 
full and unofficial or partial euroisation depending on whether the country has 
officially adopted a foreign currency. The literature also recognizes two different 
types of partial euroisation: currency substitution when foreign currency is used as a 
means of payment and unit of account; and asset substitution when assets are held in 
a foreign currency. 
Previous research identifies four different streams of theories that explain the 
reasons for euroisation: the conventional view; the portfolio view; the market failure 
view; and the institutional view (Calvo and Veigh, 1992; Savastano, 1996; Levy Yeyati 
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and Sturzenegger, 2001; Ize and Levy Yeyati, 2003; De Nicolo et al., 2005; Galindo 
and Leiderman, 2006; Levy Yeyati, 2006; Sanchez, 2006).  
The first stream of theory that explains the presence of euroisation, the conventional 
view, relates partial euroisation to macroeconomic instability and considers it as an 
obstacle to the conduct of monetary policy. The conventional view mainly derives 
from the early literature on currency substitution, whose findings showed a positive 
impact of inflation and exchange rate instability on foreign currency presence (Baliño 
et al., 1999; Reinhart et al., 2003; Court et al., 2010).  More specifically, the early 
literature on currency substitution argued that in highly euroised economies the 
demand for money is more unstable and the price response to monetary shocks is 
more elastic, considering that devaluation expectations influence the currency 
composition of liquid balances (Levy Yeyati, 2006). In highly euroised economies 
monetary policy may be less effective in influencing interest rates (Baliño et al., 1999; 
Levy Yeyati, 2006; Reinhart et al., 2014).  
The second stream of theory behind euroisation, the portfolio approach, justifies the 
presence of euroisation as reflecting optimum portfolio choices made by risk-averse 
investors based on given distributions of expected returns for each currency (Levy 
Yeyati, 2006). According to this view, the degree of financial euroisation is a result of 
the interaction between supply and demand for foreign currency assets in the 
loanable funds market (Levy Yeyati, 2006). Consequently, financial euroisation is a 
result of financial equilibrium between borrowers and creditors who seek to 
optimize their assets based on risk/return across currencies.  Thus, the return on 
domestic currencies depends on changes in the inflation rates, while the return on 
euroised assets depends on changes affected by the real exchange rates. If the real 
interest rates do not differ across currencies, then investors would choose the 
currency composition which would minimize the variance on portfolio returns, which 
is affected by changes in inflation rates and real exchange rates. Hence, according to 
the portfolio approach, it would be expected that the degree of financial euroisation 
will increase if the expected instability of the inflation rate is high in relation to that 
of the real exchange rate (Levy Yeyati, 2006).  
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The market failure view relates financial euroisation to the presence of market 
imperfections and externalities, and an inadequate regulatory framework which fails 
to address them (Levy Yeyati, 2006). More specifically, the market failure view 
suggests that financial euroisation increases when economic agents ignore the risks 
associated with exchange rates while lending and borrowing in foreign currency. 
The final stream of theory behind euroisation, the institutional view, argues that 
euroisation is a direct result of the low institutional credibility. Due to low 
institutional credibility, borrowers would expect high interest rates and inflation in 
domestic currency, which would lead to a higher level of euroisation (Savastano, 
1996) 
2.3.1 Benefits and costs/risks associated with euroisation 
Euroisation was endorsed in ETEs due to the potential benefits expected from it. One 
of the expected benefits of full euroisation is the decrease in inflation rates, taking 
into account that under full euroisation there is no risk of currency depreciation. 
Another expected benefit from full euroisation is the lower cost of borrowing, 
considering that full euroisation eliminates the devaluation risk and should therefore 
reduce interest rates. In the public sector, the reduction in the cost of borrowing 
represents a reduction in the costs of servicing debt, while in the private sector, the 
lack of devaluation risk should attract investors and stablise capital flows (Quispe-
Agnoli, 2002). When it comes to benefits from partial euroisation, the research 
identifies the following. By allowing the opening of deposits in foreign currency 
accounts, monetary authorities have an opportunity to promote higher financial 
intermediation, financial sophistication and diversification (Quispe-Agnoli, 2002; 
Komarek and Melecky, 2003). Moreover, by lowering the cost of international 
financial transactions, euroisation increases the degree of integration with global 
financial markets and reduces the possibility of foreign exchange and financial crises 
(Quispe-Agnoli, 2002; Click, 2007). 
On the other hand, research highlights various costs associated with a high degree of 
euroisation. First, there is inability/ineffectiveness to act as a lender of last resort. A 
classical explanation of the lender of last resort is that bank runs may occur even if 
the banking system is solvent (Broda and Levy Yeyati, 2002). However, Diamond and 
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Dybvig (1983) argue that the lender of last resort can prevent such runs on deposits 
if, for example, an excessive number of depositors withdraw their deposits, they can 
trigger a general withdrawal. Due to imperfect information about the solvency of the 
banks, potential lenders may decline credit to solvent institutions in need.  However, 
the lender of last resort can provide liquidity, and under such conditions, the 
withdrawal of deposits could be stopped and bankruptcy avoided. Nevertheless, it 
has been argued that a high degree of euroisation may impair the country’s lender of 
last resort function and central bank’s response to emergencies in the financial 
system (Berg and Borensztein, 2000). More specifically, a devaluation would pose a 
significant threat to unhedged banks, especially if banks are permitted to keep open 
currency positions in foreign currencies. Bank runs may be triggered if foreign 
currency borrowers earn their income in domestic currency. If devaluation 
expectations continue, depositors could withdraw their money which would increase 
the demand for foreign currency, hence would further increase the devaluation 
expectations. Euroisation does not completely limit the ability of central bank to 
provide short term liquidity to the banking system, considering that it may have 
foreign currency reserves or may secure credit from international institutions. 
However, in a situation where there is a general loss of confidence in the banking 
system, the central bank would not be able to fully back bank deposits. Considering 
that the central banks do not have the ability to print foreign currencies, then their 
function as a lender of last resort would be impaired.  
The second cost of euroisation relates to adverse currency mismatches, deﬁned as 
diﬀerences in the values of the foreign currency denominated assets and liabilities on 
the balance sheets of households, ﬁrms, the government, and the economy as a whole 
(Eichengreen et al., 2003). The banking sector is affected by this imbalance if a bank 
borrows in foreign currency and lends in the domestic currency (Levy Yeyati, 2006). 
The currency mismatch is the difference between the foreign currency denominated 
liabilities and assets. Currency mismatches are mainly present at the firm level. Due 
to increased levels of deposit euroisation, banks tend to lend in foreign currency in 
order to reduce their currency risk (Abrams and Beato, 1998). Foreign currency 
loans are usually made available to borrowers whose income is mainly denominated 
in domestic currency, thus the foreign exchange risk is transferred to them (Levy 
62 
 
Yeyati, 2006). With regards to firms, the currency mismatch derives from the 
relationship between net foreign currency denominated liabilities and the net 
present value of domestic currency denominated cash ﬂow. Hence, a firm with a 
currency mismatch will be subject to an adverse balance sheet effect if a depreciation 
of the exchange rate increases the value of its foreign currency denominated 
liabilities in relation to the net present value of its cash flow (Eichengreen et al., 
2003). 
Similarly, the sovereign debt denominated in a foreign currency can be a subject to 
adverse currency mismatches due to the increased vulnerability of the country to 
depreciations of its domestic currency during severe crises. Furthermore, the 
exposure to real exchange rate variations would amplify the effect of shocks or 
speculations on the currency, which could lead to bankruptcies and financial 
collapses (Levy Yeyati, 2006). 
The third cost of euroisation is related to a reduction in monetary policy autonomy. A 
common view among economists is that a high degree of euroisation makes 
monetary policy less effective since it can increase the volatility of demand for 
domestic currency due to reduced costs of switching from local to foreign currency in 
order to avoid the impact of inflation (Alvares-Plata and García-Herrero, 2007). 
However, currency substitution also increases exchange rate volatility. In an 
economy with high currency substitution, a policy of devaluation is less effective in 
changing the real exchange rate because of significant pass-through effects to 
domestic prices (Berg and Borensztein, 2000).  
The three main costs associated with euroisation may become more evident during 
periods of severe financial crisis. Given the presence of the relatively high degree of 
euroisation in ETEs (discussed in section 1.2), the GFC can be considered an 
exceptional opportunity to investigate the impact of the degree of euroisation on the 
international transmission of crises to these countries. Even though euroisation is 
associated with several benefits highlighted above, it is not clear whether they might 
have outweighed the costs during the GFC. On the one hand, given the liquidity 
problems that many transition countries faced during the GFC, euroisation might 
have helped with financial intermediation due to its advantage in reducing 
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transaction costs and leading to a greater financial integration. On the other hand, 
euroisation might have made these countries more vulnerable to cross-border 
lending, which, as shown in section 1.2, decreased dramatically during the GFC. In 
addition, the depreciation of the domestic currencies during the crisis, as mentioned 
in section 1.2, might have prevented unhedged borrowers from servicing their loans 
in foreign currencies. Hence, it is crucial to investigate the impact of the degree of 
euroisation on ETEs during the GFC. The next section provides an overview of the 
third strand of literature relevant to this research programme: the degree of 
integration with the EU. 
2.4 Integration with the EU  
In general, economic integration starts with a free trade agreement, which 
guarantees free trade between countries that enter this agreement, by eliminating 
customs duties and tariff trade barriers within the free trade zone. The establishment 
of the customs union in 1968 was the first major achievement of the process of 
European integration (Vetter, 2013). A customs union is a free trade area that 
requires all member countries to adopt the same policies with regards to tariffs for 
trade with non-members, whereas members of the free trade area are entitled to set 
their own policies regarding trade with non-member countries. The Single European 
Market is a higher level of integration which allows free movement of all factors of 
production between member countries.  Most countries in the Single Market 
participated in the Economic and Monetary Union, which was established in 1999. 
With the formation of the Economic and Monetary Union, European economic 
integration reached its highest level (Badinger and Breuss, 2011). Many theories 
which aim to explain the process of integration with the European Union and its 
possible outcomes have emerged during the years. The most influential theories 
about the process are the following: neo-functionalism, which places a major 
emphasis on the role of “spill-over” effects which would trigger economic and 
political dynamics leading to further cooperation and integration; 
intergovernmentalism, which rejects the “spill-over” effects proposed by the neo-
functionalism theory and emphasizes the importance of the member states in the 
integration process by arguing that the governments of the member states are the 
main actors in this process and they get strengthened by the process; liberal 
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intergovernmentalism, which also argues that the national governments are the main 
actors in the integration process and stresses the model of preferences, where 
governments state their preferences and bargain with other member states; 
institutionalism, which gives emphasis to the relevance of institutions during the 
process of European integration; and multi-level governance, which argues that 
European integration is a too complicated process to be explained by the static 
integration theories and considers policy-making in the EU as uneven and frequently 
changing (Moravscik, 1993; Puchala, 1999; Rosamond, 2000). 
2.4.1 Benefits associated with European integration 
The impact of European integration on countries and regions is a much debated topic 
in the theoretical and empirical literature. From a theoretical point of view, both 
positive and negative effects from increased economic integration are possible 
(Badinger, 2005). Smith and Wanke (1993) argue that while the EU as a whole may 
benefit from the implementation of the 1992 program and the Maastricht Treaty, 
individual countries are expected to be differently affected by the increased economic 
integration.  
- When it comes to economic benefits that result from European integration, 
although there is a general agreement that most of them are related to trade 
liberalization, the single market and the common currency, it is widely recognised 
that the most important effects are related to economic growth and productivity 
(Baldwin, 1989; Baldwin and Seghezza, 1996; Frankel, 2010). The main recognised 
economic benefits associated with European integration are the following (Anderson 
and Reichert, 1995; Vetter, 2013): 
- Cost reductions resulting from the elimination of border formalities and 
national regulations due to harmonisation of production and quality standards 
(Vetter, 2013). This results in a reduction of import prices, both for companies and 
consumers. 
- Economies of scale: access to a larger market potentially increases the sales of 
companies. In industries characterized by increasing economies of scale, companies 
can become more cost-efficient. As such, companies can optimise their production by 
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establishing international manufacturing networks and using comparative cost 
advantages. This would in turn increase competitiveness with rival companies 
outside the EU as well as attract foreign direct investment from third countries.  
- Increased competition as a result of lower entry barriers and easier market 
entry for foreign firms. Companies that are inefficient are competed out of the market 
by more efficient companies, which reduces the mark-ups in heavily protected and 
inefficient markets (Vetter, 2013). Another benefit for consumers is greater product 
diversity. In addition, consumers are faced with greater product diversity. 
- Increased employment opportunities: EU citizens have equal rights in labours 
markets of any Single Market country as domestic workers. Professional and 
academic qualifications are mutually recognised, which enhances opportunities 
abroad and enables companies to attract skilled employees from abroad (Vetter, 
2013).  
- Lower financial transaction costs: cross border financial transactions are 
cheaper due to liberalisation of capital flows and financial integration. Consumers are 
faced with greater package of financial products and have greater portfolio 
diversification possibilities.  
2.4.2 Integration with EU 
The process of accession to the European Union requires countries to fulfil a number 
of key criteria, by focusing on harmonising their policies and practices with EU 
directives and regulations (Carius et al., 1999). These key criteria overlap with the 
objectives that dominated the transition process: macroeconomic stabilization; real 
adjustment at the microeconomic level; and creation of a liberal institutional 
framework (Piazolo, 2000). Consequently, progress with EU integration has been 
positively correlated with progress in transition.  
The theory on European integration lacks clear economic arguments to explain the 
mechanism by which the degree of European integration and progress with 
transition influence the severity of impact of the external shocks on transition 
countries.  However, there are a few views as to whether progress with transition 
and integration to EU better equipped countries with the tools necessary to deal with 
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external shocks, or rather made them more vulnerable to them. Belke et al. (2009) 
have shown that progress with EU integration has a positive effect on institutional 
quality as measured by the World Bank Governance Indicators. They conclude that 
even introducing formal relationships of a country with the EU improves its 
institutional quality beyond merely economic institutions. In general, the 
institutional characteristics which may shape the impact of external shocks are 
related to the quality of developed institutions, progress with transition to a market 
economy and the quality of government policy making. On the one hand, the EU-
induced institutional development might have prepared transition countries to better 
offset the crisis effects. On the other hand, the increased economic and institutional 
integration may facilitate the transmission of the crisis to these countries by creating 
and/or strengthening potential channels for contagion through trade, foreign banks, 
FDI, remittances and cross-border bank flows. Even though political, trade and 
financial integration have been considered as the fundamentals of the development 
model for ETEs in the past two decades (Friedrich et al., 2013), the severe impact of 
the GFC on the transition countries has shaken the foundations of this model. 
Countries that made more progress with integration to EU, were more exposed to 
financial and export flows, therefore potentially being more vulnerable to the crisis. 
Hence, despite the large potential benefits of European integration for most ETEs, 
during periods of instability increased economic and institutional integration may 
facilitate the transmission of the crisis to these countries (Bartlett and Prica, 2012). 
Moreover, during the recent Eurozone crisis, transition countries outside the EU did 
not receive the bailout support from EU funds and policy instruments intended to 
help EU member countries to cope with the Eurozone crisis. Namely, while the 
Eurozone crisis had impacted the weakest members in the EU, it has not been widely 
recognized that it had even more impact on some countries outside the EU (Bartlett 
and Uvalic, 2013). These countries’ dependency on the EU appears to have made 
them even more vulnerable to the crisis, considering that EU monetary integration 
might have amplified the effects of the financial and Eurozone crisis in these 
countries (Bartlet and Prica, 2012). Therefore, the current research is needed to 
better understand the impact of the degree of European integration on the 
transmission of GFC to ETEs.  
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2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a review of theoretical framework on the international 
transmission of crises. It initially identified the main strands of literature that are 
relevant to the objectives of this thesis, namely:  financial contagion; euroisation and 
integration with the EU. Next, the discussion revealed that theory on financial 
contagion and transmission channels distinguishes between fundamental causes 
(common shocks, trade linkages and financial linkages) and investors’ behaviour 
(liquidity problems, asymmetric information, incentive problems etc.).  Fundamental 
causes, in particular trade and financial linkages, are considered as the most 
applicable mechanism of transmission of the GFC to ETEs, given the strong trade and 
financial ties these countries have with the EU15 recorded in section 1.2. It was 
argued that, given the relatively low level of financial market development in 
European Transition economies, investors’ behaviour factors are likely to be less 
important in explaining contagion in these countries. Nevertheless, it was also 
concluded that there might be some overlap between the two categories of theories 
that explain contagion.  Namely, if investors’ behaviour is not completely irrational 
and if it is partially based on some macroeconomic fundamentals, then this behaviour 
might also fit under the theory that explains contagion based on fundamental causes. 
The chapter continued with elaboration of the theory of the transmission of shocks 
from the financial sector to the real economy, identifying the following transmission 
channels: the interest rate channel; the wealth effect and the financial accelerator 
(also referred to as the borrower balance sheet channel and the bank balance sheet 
channel). 
Subsequently, the chapter provided an overview of the theory on the causes of 
increased euroisation in ETEs and its main benefits and costs. Despite the benefits 
associated with euroisation, the chapter argued that it is not yet known whether they 
might have been outweighed by the costs during the GFC. It concluded that the main 
costs associated with euroisation may become more evident during the periods with 
severe financial crisis and, therefore, that the GFC can be considered an exceptional 
opportunity to investigate the impact of the degree of euroisation on transmission of 
shocks to ETEs. 
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Lastly, the chapter provides a theoretical overview of the third strand of the 
literature relevant to this thesis, which is integration with the EU. Initially, it provides 
a concise outline of the main theories which aim to explain the process of integration 
with the European Union. Next, it continues with a breakdown of the advantages 
associated with European integration. The chapter concludes that the theory on 
European integration lacks clear economic arguments to explain the mechanism by 
which the degree of European integration influences the severity of impact of 
external shocks on transition countries. On the one hand, the EU-induced 
institutional development might have prepared transition countries to offset the 
crisis effects. On the other hand, the increased economic and institutional integration 
may facilitate the transmission of the crisis to these countries by creating and/or 
strengthening potential channels for contagion through trade, foreign banks, FDI, 
remittances and cross-border bank flows. Therefore, the current research is needed 
to better understand the impact of European integration on transmission of 
international crises to ETEs. 
The theoretical review presented in this chapter provides the base for developing the 
models that will be used to explore the international transmission of GFC in the 
empirical chapters. Specifically, the discussion in this chapter emphasized the 
potential importance of trade and financial linkages, as well as the degree of 
euroisation and European integration in transmission of the GFC to ETEs. It is clear 
that further research is needed to understand these potential transmission channels 
and amplification mechanisms. The next chapter of the thesis provides a critical 
review of the empirical studies that have investigated the international transmission 
of the GFC and the role of euroisation and integration with the EU in this process. The 
gaps identified in the literature will be addressed empirically in Chapters 4 and 5. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Having established the importance of the GFC’s impact on ETEs in Chapter 1 and 
examined the international channels of transmission, as well as other potential 
amplification factors, of the crisis in Chapter 2, this chapter reviews previous 
empirical studies that have investigated the international transmission of the 
financial crises and the roles of both the extent of euroisation and integration with 
the EU in this process.  
Although there are an extensive number of empirical studies that have investigated 
the international transmission of the GFC, the literature is still unable to provide 
conclusive results of determinants of crisis severity across countries. The studies 
reviewed in the following sections provide a wide range of results, which are 
sometimes not in line with the expectations suggested by orthodox theory.  Rose and 
Spiegel (2011) argue that there seems to be developing a consensus that it is difficult 
to understand the determinants of the intensity of the crisis across countries using 
simple quantitative models. Moreover, within these empirical studies, a wide range of 
measures of crisis severity are used. With respect to crisis definition, the recent 
literature has generally focused on the decline of GDP growth (e.g. Berglöf et al., 
2009; Rose and Spiegel, 2010; Brezigar-Masten et al., 2011; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 
2011; Milesi-Ferretti and Tille 2011; Berkmen et al., 2012). However, other measures 
of crisis severity such as cross-market correlation coefficients, financial stress 
indexes, changes in capital flows, exchange rate tensions, credit growth and credit 
rating downgrades have also been considered (e.g. Balakrishnan et al., 2011; Cetorelli 
and Golberg, 2011; Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2011; Frankel and Saravelos, 2012; 
Ozkan and Unsal, 2012; De Haas and Van Lelyveld, 2014; Ahmed et al., 2017), which 
makes it difficult to reach conclusions regarding the severity of the crisis. Even 
though there are a large number of studies that have investigated the transmission of 
the GFC to developed and developing countries, there is still a lack of studies 
focusing on ETEs. Moreover, the latter limited number of studies have not considered 
certain factors such as the extent of integration with the EU and, in particular, the 
degree of euroisation, although these are common characteristics of ETEs.  
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The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 reviews empirical studies 
that have investigated the channels of transmission of global financial crises, shocks 
and contagion. Section 3.3 provides a comprehensive review of studies that have 
taken into account the impact of euroisation on financial fragility and transmission of 
shocks. Section 3.4 provides a critical review of the empirical studies that have 
investigated the costs and benefits associated with the integration with the EU, 
focusing on its impact on crises severity. Empirical studies on transmission of the 
GFC to ETEs are critically reviewed in section 3.5. Important details such as authors 
of the study, sample size, period under investigation, estimation technique adopted, 
definition of the crisis (when available), independent variables employed as well as 
the main findings of the study are summarized in respective tables (3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 
3.4) in each section. Section 3.6 provides conclusions on the empirical work related 
to the impact of the GFC on ETEs and summarizes the main identified limitations and 
gaps in the existing empirical studies. 
3.2 Channels of transmission of global financial crises, shocks and contagion 
Financial crises in the last three decades have attracted extensive empirical research 
on financial contagion and international channels of transmission of financial shocks. 
The empirical literature on financial contagion can be categorized into two main 
frameworks: a framework focusing on the co-movement of asset prices during 
periods of crisis; and the other framework focusing on the individual channels of 
transmission of financial crises (e.g. trade and financial linkages). The rest of this 
section is organized as follows. Sub-section 3.2.1 provides a comprehensive review of 
studies that investigate the presence of financial contagion based on cross-market 
correlation coefficients, while sub-section 3.2.2 reviews empirical studies that 
investigate individual channels of transmission of financial crises. The key features of 
the main studies reviewed in these sub-sections are summarized in tables 3.1 and 
3.2, respectively.  
3.2.1 Cross-market correlation coefficients 
The first group of empirical studies that investigate contagion examine changes in the 
cross-market correlation coefficients of stock prices, interest rates and sovereign 
spreads across different countries from normal periods and periods after a shock. 
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Most of these studies find evidence of a co-movement of asset prices, although there 
is no general agreement that such co-movements increase during and after a crisis. 
However, the studies that use this framework for testing for contagion find mixed 
results partly due to econometric problems with heteroscedacity, omitted variables 
and endogeneity. In addition, there may be country, region and time-specific factors 
which give rise to differences in results. The results of the main studies investigating 
financial contagion based on cross-market asset correlation coefficients are 
summarized in Table 3.1 below. 
 
                                                                                            .                         
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Table 3.1 Empirical studies investigating financial contagion based on cross market correlation coefficients 
 
Authors (year) Sample Period Main conclusions 
King and 
Wadhwani (1990) 
Unites States, United Kingdom 
and Japan 
Daily returns on the US, UK 
and Japanese stock markets 
during 1987- 1988. 
Increase in price volatility in the United 
States’ stock market causes an increase 
in the correlation of returns across other 
markets. 
Baig and Goldfajn 
(1999) 
Five Asian countries 
Daily returns on stock 
market, exchange rates and 
sovereign spreads 1995-
1998. 
Cross-country correlations between 
currencies and sovereign spreads 
increase during the crisis. 
Andersen et al. 
(2001) 
Germany and Japan 
December 1, 1986, - 
November 30, 1996. 
Volatility movement are highly 
correlated across two exchange rates. 
Correlation between exchange rates 
increases with volatility. 
Forbes and Rigobon 
(2002) 
28 stock markets (OECD, East 
Asia, Latin America and other 
emerging markets)  
Daily returns on 10 stock 
markets during NYSE crash in 
1987, 28 stock markets 
during the Mexican crisis in 
1994 and Asian crisis in 1997. 
Results using the adjusting correlations 
indicate that there was only one case of 
contagion in 1997 (out of 27); zero cases 
in 1994 (out of 27); and zero cases in 
1987 (out of 9). 
Boschi (2005) 
Brazil, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela  
Daily data ranging from 
December 1st, 2001 to 
November 29th, 2002. 
There is no evidence of contagion.  
Chiang et al. (2007) Eight Asian markets 
Daily stock-return data series 
from 1990 to 2003. 
Two phases of correlation during Asian 
crisis are identified (contagion and 
herding behaviour).  
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Authors (year) Sample Period Main conclusions 
Guo et al. (2011) United States 
Weekly data ranging from 
October 2003 to March 2009. 
There is evidence of contagion. 
Kenourgios et al. 
(2011) 
Brazil, Russia, India, China, U.S. 
and United Kingdom 
1995–2006 
The results confirm a contagion effect 
from the crisis country to all others, for 
each of the examined financial crises. 
Choe et al. (2012) 
27 national stock markets – 11 
national markets from Asia, 10 
markets from Europe, and 6 
markets from North and South 
America 
1997 
No evidence of contagion during the 
1997 Asian crisis. The correlations 
during crisis, reported as contagion by 
the constant correlation tests are caused 
by the cross-market co-movements as a 
result of changes in behaviour of risk-
averse investors during the crisis. 
Bekaert et al. 
(2014) 
415 country-sector equity 
portfolios across 55 countries 
worldwide 
Weekly data ranging from 
January 1, 1995 to March 15, 
2009  
There is little evidence of contagion 
from the United States and the global 
financial sector. Contagion was mainly 
spread from domestic equity markets to 
individual domestic equity portfolios. 
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Amongst the first papers that use this framework, King and Wadhwani (1990) 
investigate the increased cross-market correlations between stock markets of the 
United States, United Kingdom and Japan in 1987 and show that an increase in price 
volatility in the United Sates causes an increase in the correlation of returns across 
other markets. The authors argue that contagion spread can be attributed to 
investors who infer information about price fluctuations in other economies due to 
the lack of complete information about the conditions in each economy. In the same 
vein, Baig and Goldfajn (1999) test for an increase in cross-market correlations 
during the East Asian crisis in the financial markets of Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Korea and the Philippines. They use daily data for the period 1995-1998 for the five 
selected countries. The authors employ VAR methodology to estimate impulse 
responses to shocks in each stock and currency markets. They show that correlations 
in currency and sovereign spreads increased significantly during the crisis, while 
their results for equity market correlations are inconclusive. Andersen et al. (2001) 
use high-frequency data on deutschemark and yen returns against the dollar and 
estimate a model of daily exchange rate volatility and correlation for a period of 10 
years. They find that volatility movement are highly correlated across the two 
exchange rates. The authors also show that correlation between exchange rates 
increases with volatility. Chiang et al. (2007) by using a dynamic multivariate GARCH 
model, analyse financial contagion during the Asian crisis. The authors present 
evidence of contagion. They identify two phases of correlation during the Asian crisis 
(contagion and herding behaviour). Guo et al. (2011) study the cross-asset contagion 
between the stock market, real estate market, credit default market and energy 
market during the GFC and find evidence of contagion. However, they only 
investigate the cross-asset contagion within the United States and cannot conclude 
on the contagion spread to the other economies worldwide.  
Kenourgios et al. (2011), using daily data analyse the cross-market correlations 
during and immediately after the 1987 Black Monday, the 1998 Russian Crisis, the 
burst of the dot-com bubble of 2001, the shock after September, 11, 2001, and the 
USA subprime mortgage crisis of 2008. Their results confirm a contagion effect from 
the crisis country to all others, for each of the examined financial crises. Results show 
that correlations between the crisis country and other countries’ financial markets 
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are higher following shocks than during stable periods, confirming contagion, and 
during the more volatile periods, conditional correlations are higher than 
unconditional correlations, supporting the presence of asymmetric responses to 
shocks. The authors find that the previously conventional policy responses to a crisis 
are unlikely to prevent the spread among countries, arguing that changes in 
fundamentals do not help to avoid it since cross-market correlation dynamics are 
driven by behavioural factors. Bekaert et al. (2014) analyse the transmission of the 
GFC to 415 country-industry equity portfolios and find evidence of contagion. 
However, despite the origins of the GFC in the United States, the authors find that 
contagion was mainly spread from domestic equity markets to individual domestic 
equity portfolios. Namely, the authors find that while the co-movements of equity 
portfolios across markets during the GFC were low, there was a significant increase 
of within-country portfolio co-movements. 
Even though most of the studies reviewed above provide evidence of financial 
contagion, Forbes and Rigobon (2002), who investigate contagion based on stock 
market correlations during the 1997 Asian crisis, the 1994 Mexican devaluation and 
the 1987 United States market crash, conclude that tests for contagion based on 
cross-market correlations are biased and inaccurate due to heteroscedasticity. 
According to the authors, these correlation coefficients depend on the degree of 
market volatility. As a result, during the periods of crisis when markets are more 
volatile, correlation coefficients tend to increase.  Hence, if no adjustment is made for 
this bias, tests based on these coefficients usually find evidence of contagion. The 
authors argue that it is possible to correct the biasness of the coefficients; however, 
this can be done only under assumptions of no endogeneity and no omitted variables. 
After correcting for heteroscedsticity, the authors find no evidence of contagion 
during these three crises’ periods. Similarly, Boschi (2005) using VAR models tests 
for contagion and after adjusting for heteroscedasticity, finds no evidence of 
contagion between Argentina and Brazil, Venezuela, Uruguay, Mexico and Russia. 
Choe et al. (2012) use the Structural Dynamic Conditional Correlation (SDCC) 
multivariate GARCH model to estimate time-varying cross-market correlations 
associated with the 1997 Asian crisis and find no evidence of contagion. However, 
their conclusions are based on a number of assumptions, which do not appear to be 
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in line with the theory of contagion. More specifically, they define contagion as a 
structural break in correlation dynamics during a crisis and assume that a structural 
break in time-varying correlation dynamics is a consequence of an excessive cross-
market co-movement beyond the level that can be explained by the risk-return 
relation. They do not view a temporal change in the correlation dynamics as evidence 
of contagion, as they assume that a temporal variation in the correlation dynamics is 
a reflection of time-varying cross-market co-movements induced by the 
intertemporal risk-return adjustments by rational, risk-averse investors in response 
to changing volatility. 
Considering the studies reviewed above, the empirical results concerning the 
presence of contagion based on cross-market correlation coefficients are 
inconclusive. The first group of studies define contagion as a significant increase in 
cross-country asset correlations following a crisis and find evidence of contagion, 
whereas the second group of studies argue that, when taking into account 
heteroscedasticity, there is no evidence of contagion. The next section presents an 
overview of empirical studies that investigate financial contagion based on individual 
channels of contagion.                                         
3.2.2 Individual channels of contagion 
The second method of testing for contagion is based on measuring the different 
channels through which contagion might occur. This method provides more intuition 
on how exactly a crisis has been transmitted (Claessens and Forbes, 2004) and given 
the limitations of the previous method presented in section 3.2.1 has become the 
most popular method to test for financial contagion. The empirical studies focused on 
individual channels of transmission of financial crises have provided different results. 
The first group of studies that used this method found evidence that trade linkages 
were the major factor that explain how a crisis was transmitted. A second group of 
studies showed the importance of financial linkages as a channel of transmission of 
crises, while a third group found evidence of the importance of macroeconomic 
fundamentals on the amplification and severity of financial crises. Table 3.2 below 
summarizes the results of the main studies that have investigated the international 
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transmission of financial crises focusing on trade and financial linkages as well as 
macroeconomic fundamentals. 
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Table 3.2: Empirical studies investigating financial contagion based on individual channels 
 
Authors 
(year) 
Countries Period 
Estimation 
technique 
Crisis definition Explanatory variables Main conclusions 
Eichengreen 
et al. (1996) 
20 industrial 
countries 
1959 - 
1993 
Probit and 
logit model 
Extreme values of 
exchange market; Pressure 
index calculated as a 
weighted average of 
exchange rate changes, 
reserve changes, and 
interest rate changes 
(values measured relative 
to those prevailing in 
Germany). 
Total non-gold 
international reserves; 
period-average exchange 
rates; short-term interest 
rates; discount rates 
otherwise; exports and 
imports. 
The occurrence of a 
currency crisis in one 
country increases the 
probability of a 
speculative attack in 
other countries by 8 
percentage points. Trade 
linkages explain 
contagion better than 
macroeconomic 
similarities. 
Masson 
(1998) 
13 Asian and 
South 
American 
countries 
The 1994 
Mexican 
crisis and 
the 1997 
Asian 
crisis 
Simple 
balance of 
payments 
model 
Jumps between equilibria 
(multiple equilibria). 
Level of reserves; trade 
balance; external debt; 
foreign interest rate. 
Trade was not important 
in the international 
transmission of the 1994 
Mexican crisis and the 
1997 Asian crisis. 
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Authors 
(year) 
Countries Period 
Estimation 
technique 
Crisis definition Explanatory variables Main conclusions 
Glick and 
Rose (1999) 
161 developed 
and 
developing 
countries 
1971-
1997 (five 
different 
currency 
crises in 
1971, 
1973, 
1992, 
1994, and 
1997) 
Binary 
probit 
model 
An indicator variable 
which is initially defined as 
unity if country i suffered 
from the crisis in a given 
episode, and zero if 
otherwise. 
Trade; the annual growth 
rate of domestic credit; 
the government budget as 
a percentage of GDP; the 
current account as a 
percentage of GDP;  the 
growth rate of real GDP;  
the ratio of M2 to 
international reserves;  
domestic CPI inflation; 
and the degree of 
currency under-valuation. 
Macroeconomic and 
financial influences are 
not associated with the 
cross-country incidence 
of speculative attacks. 
Trade linkages help 
explain cross-country 
correlations in exchange 
market pressure during 
crisis episodes, even after 
controlling for 
macroeconomic factors. 
Van 
Rijckeghem 
and Weder 
(2001) 
Cross 
sectional data 
for 118 
industrial and 
developing 
countries 
1994, 
1996 and 
1997 
Probit and 
logit model 
Contagion is a binary 
variable that takes the 
value 1 if the country had a 
currency crisis in a 
particular episode. 
 Funds competition; trade     
competition; credit to 
private sector (% of GDP); 
M2/reserves; real 
exchange rate 
appreciation; current 
account. 
The common lender 
channel is significant in 
explaining contagion 
during the Mexican, Asian 
and Russian crises. Trade 
and financial linkages 
appear to be correlated. 
81 
 
Authors 
(year) 
Countries Period 
Estimation 
technique 
Crisis definition Explanatory variables Main conclusions 
Forbes 
(2002) 
58 countries  
1994 - 
1999 
Probit and 
logit model 
Extreme values of 
exchange market pressure 
index which account for 
movements in a country’s 
exchange rate, interest rate 
and reserve levels. 
Competiveness-effect 
linkages; income effect 
linkages; cheap import 
effect linkages; private 
credit growth; 
government 
consumption/GDP; 
current account surplus; 
bank reserves; private 
capital inflows/GDP; 
domestic credit 
growth/GDP; money 
supply/reserves; 
openness-total 
trade/GDP; growth in 
GNP per capita; inflation 
(CPI). 
Trade can transmit crises 
through three different 
channels: a 
competitiveness effect; an 
income effect; and cheap-
import effect. 
Fratzscher 
(2003) 
24 emerging 
markets and 
transition 
economies  
1986- 
1998 
using 
monthly 
data 
Markov – 
switching 
model and 
panel data 
models 
Exchange market pressure 
which is a weighted 
average of the changes in 
the exchange rate, the 
interest rate and the 
foreign exchange reserves. 
Capital flows; lending 
boom; foreign debt; 
overvaluation; reserves; 
trade balance; real 
contagion; equity market 
contagion; bank 
contagion. 
A high degree of 
economic integration 
through trade and 
financial linkages can 
explain and predict the 
transmission of financial 
crises. 
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Authors 
(year) 
Countries Period 
Estimation 
technique 
Crisis definition Explanatory variables Main conclusions 
Caramazza et 
al. (2004) 
41 emerging  
countries 
Monthly 
data 
during 
1990-
1998 
Panel 
probit  
Binary values of index of 
exchange market pressure 
that accounts for the 
movements in a country’s 
exchange rate and foreign 
exchange reserves. 
Real exchange rate 
appreciation; current 
account balance;  fiscal 
balance;  M2 growth;  GDP 
growth;  trade contagion;  
short-term BIS debt;  
short-term debt to 
reserves;  common 
creditor (CC);  crisis 
dummies; regional 
dummies. 
External imbalances play 
a larger role than 
domestic imbalances in 
the occurrence of a crisis. 
Financial linkages are 
highly important, while 
trade spillovers are 
relevant for countries 
with weak current 
account balances. 
Balakrishnan 
et al. (2011) 
16 emerging 
economies 
and three 
advanced 
regions 
1997-
2009 
Two-stage 
estimation 
approach; 
panel and 
case studies 
Stress index composed of 
banking-sector beta, stock 
market returns, time-
varying stock market 
return volatility, sovereign 
debt spreads, and an 
exchange market pressure 
index. 
Industrial production 
growth; commodity price 
growth;  Libor (3-month);  
bank linkages;  portfolio 
linkages;  direct 
investment linkages; 
trade linkages;  US and 
Canada dummy;  Western 
Europe dummy; trade 
openness; financial 
openness; current 
account; fiscal balance; 
foreign reserves. 
Financial links appear to 
be a key channel of 
transmission: emerging 
economies with higher 
foreign liabilities to 
advanced economies have 
been more affected by 
financial stress in 
advanced economies than 
emerging economies that 
are less linked. In the 
most recent period, bank 
lending ties have been a 
major channel of 
transmission, with 
western European banks 
a main source of stress. 
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Authors 
(year) 
Countries Period 
Estimation 
technique 
Crisis definition Explanatory variables Main conclusions 
Milesi-
Ferretti and 
Tille (2011) 
22 countries 
1993-
2009 
Panel 
The change in a country’s 
capital flows relative to the 
pre-crisis situation and the 
annualized value of capital 
flows.  
GDP per capita; GDP 
growth 2005-2007; 
financial openness; gross 
debt; grow equity; net 
debt; net equity; Net 
foreign assets 
(NFA)/GDP; Net position 
vis a vis BIS banks; 
foreign exchange 
reserves; trade openness; 
share of manufacturing 
output; commodity trade 
balance; private credit 
credit/ GDP and change in 
private credit/GDP; 
change in growth; change 
in growth in trading 
partners; change in public 
debt projections; change 
in fiscal balance 
projections; change in 
growth projections; credit 
market restriction index. 
The degree of financial 
integration explains the 
scale of decrease in 
capital flows during the 
GFC.  Macroeconomic 
conditions and their 
connection to world trade 
flows are also important 
in explaining the 
magnitude of decrease in 
capital flows. 
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Authors 
(year) 
Countries Period 
Estimation 
technique 
Crisis definition Explanatory variables Main conclusions 
Rose and 
Spiegel 
(2010) 
85 countries 
2006-
2009 
Multiple 
Indicator 
Multiple 
Cause 
(MIMIC) 
Real GDP growth over 
2008; the percentage 
change in a broad measure 
of the national stock 
market over the 2008; the 
percentage change in the 
SDR (measured as the 
domestic currency price of 
a Special Drawing Right); 
change in the country 
credit rating from 
Institutional Investor 
magazine. 
Natural logarithm of 2006 
real GDP per capita, and 
the percentage change in 
the stock market between 
2003 and 2006; log of 
2006 population; 
variables covering trade 
linkages and financial 
linkages. 
International financial 
linkages were not a 
transmission channel of 
the GFC in developed 
countries and emerging 
markets. 
Cetorelli and 
Golberg 
(2011) 
49 emerging 
markets 
across Europe, 
Asia, and Latin 
America 
2006Q2 to 
2007Q2 
and the 
post-crisis 
period 
from 
2008Q3 to 
2009Q2 
Cross-
country 
panel 
The domestic and cross-
border bank lending 
growth pre-post crisis for 
each emerging market 
country.  
Share of cross border 
interbank funding 
obtained; ratio of total 
cross- border interbank 
funding to total domestic 
lending; Vienna Initiative 
participant dummy. 
Exposure of domestic and 
foreign-owned banks to 
cross-border funding and 
to the internal capital of 
the banking group where 
they operate explains 
their vulnerability to 
foreign liquidity shocks.  
Chudik and 
Fratzscher 
(2011) 
26 advanced 
and emerging 
economies 
Weekly 
data for 
the period 
2005-
2009 
GVAR 
model 
n/a 
VIX index, for the S&P500, 
as proxy for financial 
market risk; and TED 
spread as proxy for US 
liquidity pressures; 
money market rates; 
During the GFC, advanced 
economies were most 
severely affected by the 
tightening in financial 
conditions, whereas the 
real side of the economy 
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Authors 
(year) 
Countries Period 
Estimation 
technique 
Crisis definition Explanatory variables Main conclusions 
stock markets. was the main channel for 
the transmission of crises 
in emerging economies.  
Frankel and 
Saravelos 
(2012) 
122 emerging 
and advanced 
countries 
2006-
2009 
OLS and 
Probit 
Nominal local currency 
percentage change versus 
the US dollar; Equity 
market returns; 
Percentage change in the 
level of real GDP; 
Percentage change in 
industrial production; 
Recourse to IMF financing. 
Reserves; real effective 
exchange rate; GDP; 
credit; current account; 
money supply; exports 
and imports; inflation; 
equity returns; interest 
rates; debt composition; 
external debt; 
peg/financial openness; 
regional/income dummy 
variables. 
Real exchange rate 
overvaluation and levels 
of international reserves 
explain the heterogeneity 
of the impact of the GFC 
across countries. 
Fratzscher 
(2012) 
50 emerging 
and developed 
countries 
Weekly 
data from 
12 
October 
2005 to 22 
November 
2010  
Pooled OLS  Net capital flows 
Macroeconomic 
fundamentals; 
institutions; policy 
interventions; exposure 
(trade/financial). 
The variation of the 
impact of the GFC across 
countries can be 
explained by differences 
in: country risk; the 
quality of domestic 
institutions; and the 
strength of domestic 
macroeconomic 
fundamentals. 
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Authors 
(year) 
Countries Period 
Estimation 
technique 
Crisis definition Explanatory variables Main conclusions 
Kalemli-
Ozcan et al. 
(2013) 
18/20 
developed 
countries 
1978-
2009 
Panel 
Crisis indicator – dummy 
variable and  time-varying 
bilateral measure 
reflecting the 
synchronization of output 
growth between countries 
and business cycle 
synchronization with the 
negative of divergence in 
growth rates, defined as 
the absolute value of GDP 
growth differences 
between countries. 
Log of the share of the 
stock of bilateral assets 
and liabilities between 
countries i and j in the 
previous quarter 
relatively to the sum of 
the two countries' GDP in 
the previous period;  log 
of the share of the stock of 
bilateral assets and 
liabilities between each 
country-pair and the U.S. 
and the Cayman Islands in 
the previous quarter 
relatively to the two 
countries' GDP in the 
previous period. 
Countries with stronger 
financial links to U.S. had 
more synchronized 
business cycles during 
the GFC.  
Kapan and 
Minoiu 
(2013) 
55 advanced 
economies 
and emerging 
markets  
Quarterly 
data from 
2006-
2010 
OLS Log-change in lending 
Loan amount; syndicate 
size; dummies for year-
quarters; loan currency; 
lender role; lender and 
borrower nationality; and 
borrower industry. 
Lending of banks that 
were more exposed to 
cross-border funding 
declined more steeply 
during the GFC. The 
adequacy of bank capital 
also determined the 
magnitude of credit 
decline: better-
capitalized banks 
decreased their lending 
less than other banks. 
87 
 
Authors 
(year) 
Countries Period 
Estimation 
technique 
Crisis definition Explanatory variables Main conclusions 
De Haas and 
Van Lelyveld 
(2014) 
48 
multinational 
banks from 19 
home 
countries with 
199 
subsidiaries 
across 53 
countries.  
1992-
2009  
Cross-
country 
panel 
Percentage growth of gross 
loans; a matrix of host-
country macroeconomic 
variables; a matrix of 
characteristics of bank i 
itself, including a dummy 
to distinguish between 
multinational bank 
subsidiaries and domestic 
banks, and/or its parent 
bank; crisis dummy. 
Credit growth of banks. 
Multinational bank 
subsidiaries decreased 
lending about twice as 
fast as domestic banks 
during the GFC. This 
difference in lending can 
be attributed to the 
greater use of deposits as 
a more stable source of 
funding by domestic 
banks. 
Ahmed et al. 
(2017) 
20 emerging 
economies 
1994-
2013 
Cross-
country 
panel 
Percent change in the 
country’s bilateral nominal 
exchange rate against the 
dollar; the change in the 
local currency bond yields 
on ten-year government 
bonds; the percent change 
in the stock market index; 
and the change in EMBI 
and CDS spreads between 
the peak and trough of 
each crisis episode. 
Macroeconomic 
fundamentals and policy 
choices of a country; 
variables that might help 
identify how much capital 
might have been flowing 
in prior to the episode; 
those that might be 
capturing aspects of a 
country’s financial 
structure such as 
openness and financial 
development.  
Macroeconomic 
fundamentals such as 
current account balance, 
foreign exchange 
reserves, short-term 
external debt, the gross 
government debt, 
inflation etc. explain the 
severity of the impact of 
the GFC and Eurozone 
debt crisis. 
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A number of empirical studies have investigated the impact of trade on the 
international transmission of shocks.  The results are mixed, some studies argue that 
trade is a major important mechanism for transmission of the financial crises, while 
other studies find no evidence for the importance of a trade channel in the 
international transmission of the recent financial crises. Among the first studies 
arguing that trade is an important channel for the international transmission of the 
financial crisis is that of Eichengreen et al. (1996). The authors use panel data from 
twenty countries during the period 1959-1993 and find that contagion spreads more 
easily to countries with stronger trade linkages than to countries with similar 
macroeconomic conditions. They conclude that trade links have been the dominant 
channel for the international transmission of crises in the selected sample. Glick and 
Rose (1999) further develop this framework by investigating five different currency 
crises during the period 1971-1997 for 161 countries, many of which were not 
directly involved in any of the five episodes and test whether trade linkages had an 
impact in the probability of a country being affected by the crisis. They conclude that 
trade linkages help explain cross-country correlations in exchange market pressure 
during crisis episodes, even after controlling for macroeconomic factors. Similarly, 
Forbes (2002) measures whether trade linkages are an important determinant of a 
country’s vulnerability to crises that originate in other countries. The author shows 
that trade can transmit crises through three different channels: a competitiveness 
effect (when changes in relative prices affect a country’s ability to compete abroad); 
an income effect (when a crisis affects income and imports); and cheap-import effect 
(when crisis decreases import prices and acts as a positive supply shock). More 
recently, Ozkan and Unsal (2012) investigate the transmission of the GFC to emerging 
economies (Argentina, Brazil, Korea, Mexico and the Philippines). The authors 
develop a two-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with an explicit 
treatment of both trade and financial linkages between the countries. They find that 
the greater a country’s trade integration with the rest of the world, the greater the 
response of its macroeconomic aggregates to a sudden stop in capital flows. 
While the empirical studies reviewed above present convincing evidence that trade 
linkages composed an important channel for the international transmission of recent 
financial crises, several other studies disagree. Among the first of these studies was 
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Masson (1998), who based on a two-country simple balance of payments model 
argues that trade was not important in the international transmission of the 1994 
Mexican crisis and the 1997 Asian crisis. Baig and Goldfajn (1999) also argue that 
trade was not an important international transmission channel for the Asian crisis. 
Harrigan (2000) likewise concludes that trade did not compose a significant channel 
of transmission of the Asian crisis to the United States. Van Rijckeghem and Weder 
(2001) show that spillovers through bank lending, as opposed to trade linkages and 
country characteristics can better explain contagion. They find that if either trade or 
financial linkages are included in the model, they are highly significant. But if both of 
them are included in the model, one of them becomes insignificant, reflecting the high 
correlation between competition for funds and trade.  
Trade linkages were the focus of the earlier research and helped explain contagion. 
However, the researchers of the recent financial crises focused more on financial 
linkages as an international channel of transmission of crises.  Nevertheless, the 
results of empirical studies focused on financial linkages are also diverse. A number 
of empirical studies have found evidence that direct financial ties and competition for 
funds from common bank lenders can forecast the impact of financial contagion and 
crises, while others argue that financial linkages have played no role in international 
transmission of recent financial crises. 
Among the first studies arguing that financial linkages is an important channel for the 
international transmission of financial crises was that of Fratzscher (2003), who 
analyses the role of contagion in the currency crises in emerging markets during the 
1990s. By using Markov-switching and panel data models, the author concludes that 
financial crises can be explained and future transmission of financial crises can be 
predicted by a high degree of economic integration through trade and financial 
channels. Balakrishnan et al. (2011), using a new financial stress index for emerging 
economies, investigate how financial stress is transmitted from advanced to 
emerging countries. They find that the extent of pass-through of financial stress is 
related to the depth of financial linkages between advanced and emerging economies.  
Similarly, Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011) show that the magnitude of the decrease in 
capital flows across countries is linked to the extent of international financial 
integration, its specific nature (with countries relying on bank flows being the 
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hardest hit) as well as domestic macroeconomic conditions and their connection to 
world trade flows. The authors argue that this diversity of experiences across 
countries can be explained by the size of external exposures, reliance on debt 
instruments and the importance of cross-border banking activity. Countries with 
high degrees of financial integration through debt and banking were more affected, 
and countries with large net liabilities in debt instruments suffered sharper declines 
in capital inflows. Chudik and Fratzscher (2011) study 26 economies using weekly 
data and find that a tightening of financial conditions was the key transmission 
channel in advanced economies, whereas the real side of the economy was the main 
channel in emerging economies. Another conclusion of their paper is that Europe 
suffered a greater effect than other advanced economies from the shocks in the US, in 
particular shocks to risk appetite (measured by VIX index for the S&P500 as a proxy 
of financial market risk). Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2013) also study the effect of financial 
integration on the transmission of financial crises.  They use a sample of 18/20 
developed countries between 1978 and 2009 and find that financial crises induce co-
movement among more financially integrated countries. They also show that 
countries with stronger financial links to the US had more synchronized business 
cycles during the GFC.  
A number of empirical studies that investigate the transmission of financial crises 
have focused on the common creditor channel which links the probability of 
experiencing a financial crisis with sharing the same lender with a country hit by a 
crisis. Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) show that spillovers through bank lending 
contributed to the transmission of currency crises during a number of episodes of 
financial instability in emerging markets. They indicate that spillovers caused by 
banks’ exposures to a crisis country help predict flows in third world countries after 
the Mexican and Asian crisis. Moreover, they argue that countries might reduce 
contagion risk by diversifying the sources of their financing and by carefully 
monitoring borrowing from creditors exposed to potential crisis countries. 
Caramazza et al. (2004) using panel probit regressions, examine the role of financial 
linkages, especially through a common creditor, in the international transmission of 
crisis to 41 emerging economies during the 1990s. They show that financial linkages 
were important factors in explaining the spread of the Mexican, Asian, and Russian 
crises. Similarly, Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011) demonstrate that the impact of 
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foreign liquidity shocks on domestic and foreign-owned banks depends on their 
exposure to cross-border funding and to the internal capital of the banking group 
where they operate. Likewise, Kapan and Minoiu (2013) show that banks that were 
more dependent on cross-border funding reduced their lending more than other 
banks during the GFC and that the adequacy of bank capital was important in 
explaining the scale of credit decline: better capitalized banks decreased their 
lending less than other banks. De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2014) investigate a large 
group of multinational bank subsidiaries and stand-alone domestic banks and 
conclude that multinational bank subsidiaries decreased lending about twice as fast 
as domestic banks during the GFC. They argue that this difference in lending can be 
attributed to the greater use of deposits, a more stable source of funding by domestic 
banks.  
In contrast to the evidence related to the role of financial linkages in international 
transmission of crisis provided by the studies reviewed above, a number of other 
studies find opposing empirical results. In particular Rose and Spiegel (2010) find no 
role for international financial linkages in transmitting the GFC to developed 
countries and emerging markets. Similarly, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2011) find no 
evidence that higher financial integration contributed to the intensity of the GFC. 
After controlling for the pre-crisis level of development, buoyancy of economic 
activity and credit, external vulnerabilities and openness to trade, the authors find 
that more financially integrated economies experienced smaller output declines 
during the GFC. The lack of conclusive evidence of the relationship between financial 
linkages and output decline during recent years has even led some researchers to 
claim that financial linkages might not be an important factor in determining crisis 
severity. The diversity of results might be due to variations across studies in terms of 
samples, periods covered, methodologies and variables employed to account for 
crisis severity.  
Even though the literature on the international transmission of shocks focuses 
extensively on trade and financial linkages as channels of contagion, the extent to 
which the shocks get amplified also depends on the responses of policy-makers and 
existing domestic vulnerabilities. During the years following the GFC there has been a 
growing consensus on the importance of macroeconomic fundamentals in 
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determining the severity of the impact of crises across countries. Frankel and 
Saravelos (2012) analyse the effects of the GFC by selecting variables from an 
extensive review of the previous literature on early warning indicators. They find 
that real exchange rate overvaluation and levels of international reserves can explain 
the variation of the impact of GFC across countries. Fratzscher (2012) demonstrates 
that the heterogeneity of the impact of the GFC across countries can be explained by 
differences in country risk, quality of domestic institutions and the strength of 
domestic macroeconomic fundamentals. More specifically, the author shows that 
countries with high-quality institutions and strong macroeconomic fundamentals 
were better able to protect their financial markets from adverse shocks during the 
GFC. In addition, the author highlights that trade and financial linkages played a 
minor role in explaining cross-country heterogeneities in the transmission of the 
GFC. Ahmed et al. (2017) show that the financial markets in those emerging 
economies with better macroeconomic fundamentals (current account balance; 
foreign exchange reserves; short-term external debt; the gross government debt; 
inflation etc.) were less severely affected by the GFC and the subsequent Eurozone 
debt crisis. They also find that financial conditions worsened more in countries that 
had previously experienced larger capital inflows and greater exchange rate 
appreciation.  
3.3  Benefits and costs associated with euroisation 
The consequences of increasing dollarization/euroisation has been a subject of 
controversial debates for a long time due to the costs associated with it (refer to 
section 2.3) and the potentially greater financial instability it creates. One important 
issue stressed in the literature is the increased vulnerability to exchange rate 
fluctuations that increased euroisation creates with respect to financial distress and 
limitations on monetary and exchange rate policies (Chitu, 2013). The role of 
euroisation in amplifying the impact of financial crises has not been sufficiently 
investigated by previous research. Nevertheless, a number of empirical studies have 
investigated the relationship between financial dollarization and financial instability, 
banking crises and inflation, but overall the evidence is inconclusive. Results of the 
main studies investigating the impact of dollarization/euroisation on financial 
stability/crisis severity are summarized in Table 3.3 below.    
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Table 3.3: Empirical studies investigating  dollarization/euroisation and its impact on financial stability/crisis severity/inflation 
 
Authors 
(year) 
Sample Period 
Estimation 
technique 
Dependent 
variable 
Independent variables Main conclusions 
Edwards and 
Magendzo 
(2001) 
199 
countries 
1970-1998 Probit 
Binary variable (if 
country is 
dollarized) 
GDP; population; degree of openness 
of the economy; dummy variable  if 
the country is an island; dummy 
variable if the country has a common 
border with a nation whose  currency 
is defined by the IMF as a convertible 
currency; variable that measures  the 
country’s geographical location; 
dummy  if the economy in question is 
an independent nation. 
Inflation has been 
significantly lower in 
dollarized nations than in 
non-dollarized ones. 
Dollarized nations have had 
a lower rate of economic 
growth than non-dollarized 
ones. Macroeconomic 
volatility is not significantly 
different across dollarized 
and non-dollarized 
economies. 
Honohan and 
Shi (2002) 
58 emerging 
economies 
1980-2000 
Seemingly 
unrelated 
regression  
The log of the 
consumer price 
index  
Log dollar exchange rate; real 
exchange rate. 
A high level of dollarization 
increases banking spreads.  
A greater degree of 
dollarization is associated 
with a higher pass-through 
coefficient from exchange 
rate change to consumer 
prices. 
Arteta 
(2003) 
 92 
developing 
and 
transition 
economies 
1975 - 
1999 
Probit, OLS, 
panel and 
instrumental-
variable 
regression 
Crisis-binary 
variable; currency 
crash - binary 
variable; GDP 
growth. 
Deposit and credit dollarization; 
FDI/GDP; short term debt/total debt; 
international reserves; current 
account balance/GDP; real exchange 
rate overvaluation; domestic credit 
growth;  GDP growth;  M2 reserves;  
US interest rate; OECD growth rate. 
The results show little 
evidence that dollarization 
increases the probability of 
banking crises or currency 
crashes. There is no 
evidence that banking 
crises and currency crashes 
are more costly in 
countries with high degree 
of dollarization.  
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Authors 
(year) 
Sample Period 
Estimation 
technique 
Dependent 
variable 
Independent variables Main conclusions 
Bahmani - 
Oskooee and 
Domac 
(2003) 
Turkey 
Monthly 
data from 
January 
1990 to 
December 
2001 
VAR n/a 
CPI; exchange rate; public prices; 
dollarization ratio. 
There is a positive 
relationship between the 
degree of dollarization and 
inflation. 
De Nicolo et 
al. (2003) 
100 
countries 
1990-2001 
Cross-country 
panel 
2001 level of 
deposit 
dollarization; the 
average level for 
available years 
during 1990-2001; 
a calculated country 
specific equilibrium 
level of 
dollarization for 
2001 based on a 
simple trend-
augmented 
autoregressive 
model. 
Risk measures based on price 
movements; proxies for policy 
credibility effects; adoption of formal 
inflation targeting regime; 
institutional variables; dummy 
regional variables for countries in 
transition. 
Financial instability is 
likely to be higher in 
dollarized economies. 
Gulde et al 
(2004) 
58 countries 1995-2001 Cross section 
Deposit volatility 
(standard deviation 
of total deposit 
growth); Index of 
the probability of 
insolvency of a firm. 
Average ratio of foreign deposits to 
total deposits; variance of inflation; 
variance of real exchange rate 
depreciation; covariance between 
inflation and real exchange rate 
depreciation; financial dollarization 
(foreign deposits to total deposits); 
average variance of inflation. 
Increased dollarization 
may increase financial 
vulnerability. The variance 
of deposit growth is 
positively and significantly 
correlated with 
dollarization, suggesting 
that dollarized financial 
systems may be more 
exposed to credit cycles 
and liquidity risk. 
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Authors 
(year) 
Sample Period 
Estimation 
technique 
Dependent 
variable 
Independent variables Main conclusions 
Bailey 
(2005) 
Jamaica 1996-2004 VAR analysis n/a 
Exchange rate; CPI; base money; an 
index of public sector prices (PSP) 
computed  as government 
expenditure per capita and is deflated 
using 1995 values; the dollarization 
ratio; dummy variable for crisis years. 
Shocks to financial 
dollarization reduce the 
monetary base, since 
investors switch to 
domestic currency from 
foreign currency. The high 
elasticity of substitution 
between domestic and 
foreign currency is also 
confirmed by the positive 
exchange rate response to 
an increase in foreign 
money holdings. 
Calvo (2006) 
161 
countries 
1990-2004 Panel OLS 
EMBI Index 
(Emerging Markets 
Bond Index Spread) 
Volatility of EMBI; nominal exchange 
rate; exports; imports; capital flows 
proxy; exchange rate regime; sudden 
stop dummy;  GDP; pre-crisis level of 
RES;  Minimum level of RES during SS;  
maximum loss of Reserves during SS;  
pre-crisis level of EXR;  maximum 
level of EXR during SS;  maximum 
nominal depreciation;  ratio reserves 
to external short-term debt;  ratio 
reserves to M2. 
Emerging market 
economies with greater 
degrees of euroisation face 
financial vulnerabilities 
that weaken the 
effectiveness of a domestic 
lender of last resort. As a 
result, monetary policy is 
linked to the state of the 
credit market. These 
conditions also impact on 
optimal monetary policy in 
normal but high-volatility 
periods. 
Berkmen 
and Cavallo 
(2010) 
145 
countries 
1970-2003 GMM 
Liability 
dollarization 
Reserve volatility; exchange rate 
policy; volatility of Inflation; trade 
openness; capital account openness; 
country size. 
Countries with high liability 
dollarization tend to 
stabilize their exchange 
rate. There is no causal 
effect going in the opposite 
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Authors 
(year) 
Sample Period 
Estimation 
technique 
Dependent 
variable 
Independent variables Main conclusions 
direction.  The move 
towards more flexible 
exchange rates is not, in-
and-of-itself, sufficient to 
promote de-dollarization.   
Bordo et al. 
(2010) 
45 countries 
1880-1913 
and 1973-
2003 
Fixed effects 
panel 
regression; 
Probit 
Dummy: one if 
there was a 
currency crisis and 
zero otherwise; 
Sovereign debt 
obligations  
Change in the ratio of the net 
international investment position to 
GDP; the ratio of hard currency 
government debt outstanding to total 
government debt (1880 - 1913) or the 
within country average ratio of 
foreign currency debt to total debt 
issued on international markets. 
Greater ratios of foreign 
currency debt to total debt 
is associated with 
increased risks of currency 
and debt crises, although 
the strength of the 
association depends 
crucially on the size of a 
country’s reserve base and 
its policy credibility.  
Chitu (2013) 
60 emerging 
countries 
2006-2009 
Bayesian 
Averaging with 
Classical 
Estimates 
framework 
(BACE) OLS 
Change in the real 
GDP growth rate 
between 2007 and 
2009  
Loan and deposit dollarization; pre-
crisis credit growth; current account 
deficits; trade an financial openness; 
market regulation; international 
openness of the banking sector; GDP 
per capita. 
High degrees of unofficial 
dollarization/euroisation 
were an important 
contributor to the severity 
of the crisis, once other 
determinants are taken 
into account. The adverse 
impact of 
dollarization/euroisation 
has been transmitted 
through the main 
traditional channels. 
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Authors 
(year) 
Sample Period 
Estimation 
technique 
Dependent 
variable 
Independent variables Main conclusions 
Reinhart, 
Rogoff and 
Savastano 
(2014) 
1980-2001 
and 1996-
2001 
2 samples: 
90 and 48 
non-
industrial 
economies 
Two-pronged 
methodology 
Inflation rate, 
average GDP 
growth and 
revenues from 
seigniorage as a 
measure of 
monetary policy 
effectiveness. 
The sum of the ratio of foreign 
currency deposits to broad money, 
the ratio of domestic government debt 
to total government debt and the ratio 
of external debt to GNP. 
A high degree of 
dollarization does not seem 
to be an obstacle to 
monetary control or to 
disinflation. A high level of 
dollarization increases 
exchange rate pass-
through. 
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Honohan and Shi (2002) show that that a high level of dollarization increases banking 
spreads. A greater degree of dollarization is associated with a higher pass-through 
coefficient from exchange rate change to consumer prices.  Similarly, De Nicolo et al. 
(2003) analyse the advantages and disadvantages of increased dollarization. The 
authors show that dollarization is associated with higher financial instability. Similar 
results are presented by Gulde et al. (2004), who investigate the solvency and liquidity 
risks related to dollarization. The authors find that increased dollarization may increase 
financial vulnerability. They also show that more dollarized economies are more prone 
to credit cycles as well as liquidity and solvency risk. Levy Yeyati (2006) shows that 
dollarized countries have a more unstable demand for money, higher inflation rates, a 
greater propensity to suffer from banking crises after a depreciation of the local 
currency and slower and more volatile output growth, without a significant positive 
impact on financial depth. 
On the other hand, very different results are provided by Arteta (2003). Using data on 
deposit and credit dollarization for a large number of developing and developed 
countries, the author finds little evidence that greater levels of dollarization increase the 
probability of banking crises or currency crashes. Also, the author finds no evidence that 
banking crises and currency crashes are more costly in countries with a high degree of 
dollarization. Instead, macroeconomic and exchange rate policies are more significant in 
determining such costs. Similarly, Honig (2006) investigate the potential variables that 
could predict banking crises, focusing on the role played by unofficial dollarization. 
Through a multivariate probit model, the author finds only weak evidence that the 
degree of unofficial dollarization affects the probability of a banking crisis. Calvo (2006) 
investigates the limitations faced by more dollarized countries to act as a lender of last 
resort. Calvo argues that highly dollarized emerging market economies face greater 
financial vulnerabilities that impair the function of the lender of last resort. An empirical 
investigation of the relationship between dollarization and exchange rate policy choice 
was conducted by Berkmen and Cavallo (2010). They find that countries with a high 
share of foreign currency lending are likely to be more actively involved in exchange 
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rate stabilization operations, while they find no evidence that floating encourages de-
dollarization. Bordo et al. (2010) investigate the impact of foreign currency debt on 
currency and debt crises and find a positive relationship between the two. However, the 
authors show that the severity of the crises depends on the amount of reserves and 
policy credibility.  On the other hand, Reinhart et al. (2014), using a large sample of 
developing countries, which they group according to their variety of dollarization 
(degree and type), find that a high degree of dollarization does not impact the 
effectiveness of monetary policy and that output fluctuations are similar in countries 
with different levels of dollarization. However, they show that the average inflation rate 
has been higher in more dollarized countries compared to those where the degree of 
dollarization has been low. In addition, they show that the exchange rate pass-through 
to prices has been different across countries with different levels of dollarization. They 
conclude that the inflationary impact of exchange rate changes in the 1990s was higher 
in more dollarized economies and lower in less dollarized economies. The relationship 
between dollarization and inflation is also investigated by Bahmani-Oskooee and Domac 
(2003). The authors investigate the role of dollarization in the dynamics of inflation in 
Turkey. They find a positive relationship between the degree of dollarization and 
inflation. Their results suggest that an increase in dollarization initially leads to a decline 
in the monetary base as the public switches from domestic to foreign money holdings. 
However, the monetary base increases later on to generate the required inflation tax for 
a given budget deficit as fiscal authority tries to compensate for part of the decline in the 
inflation tax through raising administered prices. As expected, the exchange rate 
responds positively to increased dollarization owing to the high elasticity of substitution 
between domestic and foreign currency. Likewise, Bailey (2005) analyses the 
association between dollarization and inflation volatility in Jamaica. The author uses 
VAR analysis and finds a positive relationship between dollarization and inflation. The 
results show that shocks to financial dollarization reduce the monetary base, since 
investors switch to domestic currency from foreign currency. The high elasticity of 
substitution between domestic and foreign currency is also confirmed by the positive 
exchange rate response to the increase in foreign money holdings. Very different results 
are presented by Edwards and Magendzo (2001), who investigate whether dollarization 
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is associated with lower inflation and faster growth. They use a matching estimator 
technique and conclude that inflation has been significantly lower in dollarized 
countries. They also find that the rate of economic growth has been lower in more 
dollarized economies. The authors show that dollarized and non-dollarized economies 
experience similar levels of macroeconomic volatility.  
None of the previous studies reviewed above consider the impact of 
dollarization/euroisation on the amplification of financial crises. One study that 
investigates the role of dollarization in amplification of the recent financial crises is that 
of Chitu (2013). The author investigates whether the GFC had a more severe impact in 
unofficially dollarized/euroised economies than in other economies. The author uses 
OLS and Bayesian analysis for 60 emerging economies and shows that unofficial 
dollarization/euroisation intensified the crisis, after controlling for other determinants 
(fast pre-crisis credit growth; market regulation; international openness of the banking 
sector; trade and financial openness; current account deficits;  and GDP per capita). 
Moreover, the author shows that the impact of dollarization was transmitted through 
the three main traditional channels (currency mismatches, reduced monetary policy 
autonomy and limited lender of last resort ability). However, as the author also 
acknowledges, the data are not fully harmonised across countries.4 Furthermore, the 
study employed a commonly used measure of currency mismatches: the difference 
                                                             
4The data on loan and deposit dollarization pertain to both advanced and emerging economies 
worldwide, from Europe, CIS, America, Africa, Middle East to Asia and Pacific. Data on the share 
of foreign currency loans to total loans are available for 76 economies worldwide, of which 60 
are emerging economies, and those on the share of foreign currency deposits to total deposits 
for 75 economies worldwide, of which 55 are emerging economies. For the purpose of the 
empirical exercise, end-2006 was taken for data on foreign currency loans and deposit ratios. 
However, the data have been collected for an extended time horizon, which varies according to 
the countries considered. For example, data for loan dollarization for the period 1999 to 2008 
for Albania, as opposed to Serbia where the ratio of foreign currency- denominated loans is 
available only since 2008. In addition, the change in the ratio of the private sector credit growth 
to GDP refers to the period between 2004 and 2007; the current account balance to GDP ratio is 
averaged out over 2005-2007; both (log) GDP per capita and trade openness are set at their 
2007 values. As regards the transmission channels, the monetary policy channel is captured by 
the change in the key policy rate between July 2007 and April 2009, while the lender of last 
resort channel is captured by the changes in the central bank’s total assets (scaled by GDP in 
2007) between July 2007 and April 2009. 
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between foreign currency loans and foreign currency deposits as a share of total loans, 
which is an aggregate measure and cannot fully  account for the potential currency 
mismatches at the firm level 
3.4 Integration with EU  
Given the lack of empirical studies investigating the relationship between the degree of 
integration with the EU and the international transmission of the GFC, this section 
focuses on the empirical studies that have investigated the costs and benefits associated 
with EU integration. The impact of European integration on countries and regions has 
been a subject of controversial debates for a long time. From a theoretical point of view, 
both positive and negative effects from increased economic integration are possible 
(Badinger, 2005). When it comes to economic benefits that result from European 
integration, although there is a general agreement that most of them are related to trade 
liberalization, the single market and the common currency, it is widely recognised that 
the most important effects are related to economic growth and productivity (Baldwin 
and Seghezza, 1996; Badinger, 2005; Campos et al., 2014). Table 3.4 below summarizes 
the results of the main studies related to the costs and benefits associated with a higher 
degree of integration with the EU.  
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Table 3.4 Empirical studies investigating the degree of integration with EU and progress with transition 
 
Authors 
(year) 
Sample Period 
Estimation 
technique 
Dependent 
variable 
Explanatory variables Main conclusions 
Baldwin and 
Seghezza 
(1996)  
20 
countries 
and 39 
countries 
1965 and 
1989 
Three stage 
least 
square, 
cross-
country 
data 
Real per capita 
income 
Average population growth; 
1960 secondary school 
enrolment rate; secondary 
school attainment rate; average 
investment to GDP ratio; 
domestic and foreign trade 
barriers. 
Domestic protection 
reduces investment and 
slows economic growth. 
Badinger 
(2001) 
14 EU 
countries 
1950-
2000 
Time series 
and panel 
Per capita 
growth 
Real capita stock; gross fixed 
capital formation; depreciation 
rate; employment of persons; 
degree of integration; tariff 
country; real trade with country 
j; country indexes. 
GDP per capita of the EU 
would be approximately 
one fifth lower today, if 
no integration had taken 
place since 1950. 
Dion (2004) 
14 EU 
countries 
1975-
2000 
Cross-
section time 
series and  
GDP growth 
Imports of goods and services; 
inflows of foreign direct 
investment; distance between 
capitals; gross domestic product; 
population; border (dummy); 
language (dummy); membership 
to regional trade area (dummy); 
area; domestic R&D; foreign 
R&D; patents. 
Regional economic 
integration has, through 
the liberalization of trade 
and its consequent 
international 
transmission of 
knowledge, a positive 
impact on growth. 
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Authors 
(year) 
Sample Period 
Estimation 
technique 
Dependent 
variable 
Explanatory variables Main conclusions 
Belke et al. 
(2009) 
25 
transition 
countries  
1996-
2008 
Cross-
country 
panel 
Institutional 
quality 
measured by an 
index based on 
the World Bank 
Governance 
Indicators. 
Dummy variable about 
Stabilization and Association 
Agreement; Dummy variable 
which equals 1 starting in the 
year a membership action plan 
was established; Dummy 
variable which equals 1 for all 
years following WTO or GATT 
accession; Official Development 
Assistance and Official Aid 
(Share of GDP), average over 
current and past two years; FDI 
net Inflows (share of GDP), 
average over current and past 
two years. 
Pre-accession incentives 
provided by EU and 
NATO are important for 
the development of 
institutions.  
Bartlett and 
Prica (2012) 
12 SEE 
countries 
2008-
2009 
Descriptive 
statistics 
and 
graphical 
analysis 
Change in GDP 
growth 
Exports; credit growth; FDI; 
remittances; integration with EU; 
quality of institutions; progress 
with transition. 
Countries that were 
more integrated with the 
EU were more affected 
by the crisis, especially 
through credit and 
foreign investment 
channels. Countries that 
made more progress 
with transition were also 
more affected. 
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Authors 
(year) 
Sample Period 
Estimation 
technique 
Dependent 
variable 
Explanatory variables Main conclusions 
Campos et 
al. (2014) 
17 EU 
countries 
Country 
and 
regional 
level data 
from the 
1973, 
1980s, 
1995 and 
2004 
Synthetic 
control 
methods for 
causal 
inference in 
comparative 
case studies 
Percentage 
difference 
between the 
actual and 
estimated GDP 
per capita.  
Real GDP per capita; labour 
productivity; trade openness; 
financial integration; EURO; 
political constraints; year of 
membership; country dummies, 
year dummies. 
Growth and productivity 
effects from European 
Union accession vary 
across countries and 
over time, but without 
the EU, European 
incomes would be 
around 10 percent lower 
in 2013. 
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Baldwin and Seghezza (1996) investigate the relationship between trade 
liberalization and investment-led growth. They find that domestic protection reduces 
investment and slows economic growth. Badinger (2005) using a time series and 
panel approach, study the permanent and temporary growth effects of integration 
with EU. Even though the hypothesis of a permanent growth effect is rejected, the 
author finds that GDP per capita of the EU would be approximately one fifth lower 
today, if no integration had taken place since 1950.  Dion (2004) contributes to the 
empirical literature by providing a quantitative measurement of the inﬂuence of 
regional trade integration on productivity. They address the link between trade and 
productivity of EU countries through knowledge spillovers in a multi-country model. 
They show that regional economic integration has, through the liberalization of trade 
and its consequent international transmission of knowledge, a positive impact on 
growth. Campos et al. (2014) also analyse the growth and productivity effects from 
European Integration. The authors use country and regional level data from the 
1973, 1980s, 1995 and 2004 enlargements for various measures of growth and 
productivity and find significant and substantial positive growth and productivity 
effects from European Union accession. They find that these effects vary across 
countries and over time, but they conclude that without the EU, European incomes 
would be around 10 percent lower in 2013. Additional benefits from integration with 
the EU are the increased employment opportunities, cost reductions resulting from 
the elimination of border formalities and national regulations, economies of scale 
(Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2004; De Sousa et al., 2012).  
Despite the overall positive effects associated with European integration, when it 
comes to periods of crisis and shocks, it is still a debatable topic whether progress 
with integration to EU equipped countries with the necessary tools to better deal 
with them or whether it made them more vulnerable. A number of empirical studies 
suggest that progress with EU integration has a positive effect on the quality of 
institutions (Beck and Laeven, 2006; Di Tommaso et al., 2007; Belke et al. 2009). In 
general, the institutional characteristics that may shape the impact of external shocks 
are related to the quality of developed institutions, progress with transition to a 
market economy and the quality of government policy-making (Bartlett and Prica, 
2012). From the perspective of adjusting to external shocks, the institutional 
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development with respect to governance, including capacity for monetary and fiscal 
policy/stabilization and well-functioning markets are unambiguously positive. 
Likewise, during the periods of financial crises investors tend to withdraw from 
those markets with weak macroeconomic fundamentals and poor institutions, thus 
contributing to the transmission of crises (Bekaert et al., 2014). 
Beck and Laeven (2006) show that EU membership has positive effects on 
institutional change in ETEs. They measure institutional change using the World 
Bank Governance Indicators. Di Tommaso et al. (2007) find similar results of the 
positive impact of basic agreements between the EU and transition countries. They 
measure institutional change by using EBRD indicators; however, they focus only on 
economic institutions, ignoring political and legal institutions. Belke et al. (2009) 
using a panel of 25 transition countries for the period 1996-2008 show that pre-
accession incentives provided by EU and NATO are important for the development of 
institutions. They provide similar results for a positive relationship between 
progress with EU integration and institutional quality measured by the World Bank 
Governance Indicators. 
The empirical studies reviewed above suggest that there is a positive relationship 
between increased integration with the EU and the quality of institutions. However, 
there is a lack of empirical studies that investigate the impact of integration with the 
EU on the sensitivity of economies to exposure to external shocks. One paper that 
considers integration with the EU and progress with transition in assessing the 
impact of the GFC on economic activities of transition countries is that of Bartlett and 
Prica (2012). The authors conclude that countries that were more integrated with 
the EU were more affected by the crisis, mainly through credit and FDI channels. 
Countries that made more progress with transition were also more affected, possibly 
because this has led to deeper structural and institutional integration with the EU. 
The authors argue that progress in adopting market-friendly institutions has made 
these countries more vulnerable to external shocks by creating new channels of 
contagion. However, this conclusion relies excessively on descriptive statistics and 
graphical analysis and the authors consider only the South East European countries. 
Nevertheless, as shown in section 1.2, despite the well-known benefits of economic 
integration, it also appears to have made the countries more vulnerable to the effects 
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of the GFC by creating and/or strengthening potential channels for contagion 
through trade, foreign banks, FDI, remittances and cross-border bank flows. On the 
other hand, countries that made more progress with EU integration and institutional 
reforms may have been better able to deal with external shocks, since their higher 
quality institutions may be expected to contribute to output stability (Balavac and 
Pugh, 2016).  
3.5 Empirical work for European transition economies  
Even though previous research contains numerous empirical studies on the 
transmission of the GFC to developed and developing countries, there is still a lack 
of empirical studies regarding transmission to the Central and Eastern European 
countries. Given the relatively low level of financial market development in ETEs, the 
empirical studies investigating the transmission of the GFC to these countries have 
generally employed the second method of testing for contagion, which focuses on 
individual channels of transmission of shocks. The following part of this section 
reviews the main studies that have included ETEs in investigating the impact of the 
GFC. It starts with studies that have focused on financial linkages and then continues 
with those that focused on trade linkages as an international channel of transmission 
of crises. The empirical studies which include ETEs in the investigation of the 
determinants of the GFC are summarized in Table 3.5 below. 
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Table 3.5 Empirical studies investigating ETEs 
 
Authors (year) Countries  Period 
Estimation 
technique 
Crisis 
definition 
Main explanatory 
variables 
Main conclusions 
Árvai et al. 
(2009) 
CEE and 
Western 
European 
countries 
2002-
2008 
N/A 
Contagion 
index 
Cross-border 
exposures 
Most of Central, Eastern and 
Southern European 
countries are highly 
dependent on cross-border 
credit flows from Western 
European banks.  Even in the 
cases where exposures of 
CESE countries are 
diversified, 
interdependencies between 
each other could trigger a 
regional contagion if one of 
the countries were to face a 
shock. 
Milesi-Ferretti 
and Tille 
(2011) 
75 countries 
from 
Emerging 
Europe, CIS, 
Emerging 
Asia, Western 
Hem. Carib. 
Africa, 
Industrial 
countries, 
Middle East 
2008-
2009 
Panel, OLS 
estimation 
Change in 
output growth 
between 
2008-2009 
and 2005-
2007 
GDP per capita, 
CA/GDP is the ratio of 
the 2007 current 
account balance to 
GDP, Private credit 
growth, Financial 
openness and Growth 
gap. 
Trade openness and the 
manufacturing share in GDP 
are positively correlated 
with the output and demand 
declines;  also, fast private 
credit growth and current 
account deficits are 
correlated with the decline 
in the growth rate of output 
and especially domestic 
demand during the crisis. 
The nature of the crisis in 
advanced economies is 
highlighted by the negative 
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Authors (year) Countries  Period Estimation 
technique 
Crisis 
definition 
Main explanatory 
variables 
Main conclusions 
correlation between GDP per 
capita and the decline in 
output growth. 
Berglof et al. 
(2009) 
European 
emerging 
economies 
2008-
2009 
Cross–country 
OLS 
Sum of 
quarterly real 
GDP  growth  
Q4 2008 + Q1 
2009 
The loan-to-deposit 
ratio; openness to 
trade; reserves as a 
share of short-term 
debt; the asset share of 
foreign banks in the 
banking system; the 
stock of foreign direct 
investment liabilities; 
the current account 
deficit in 2007; the 
share of foreign 
currency debt in total 
liabilities of the 
banking system. 
Countries with higher shares 
of foreign-owned banks in 
the financial system tended 
to suffer smaller bank 
lending outflows in the 
fourth quarter of 2008 and 
first quarter of 2009. Higher 
foreign-bank ownership is 
also associated with milder 
output declines in the 
transition region. 
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Authors (year) Countries  Period Estimation 
technique 
Crisis 
definition 
Main explanatory 
variables 
Main conclusions 
Balakrishnan 
et al. (2011) 
26 advanced 
and emerging 
countries  
1998-
2003 
2003-
2009 
Two stage 
econometric 
analysis; 
cross-section 
panel 
Financial 
stress 
Industrial production 
growth; commodity 
price growth; libor (3-
month); bank linkages; 
portfolio linkages; 
direct investment 
linkages; trade 
linkages; US and 
Canada dummy; 
Western Europe 
dummy; trade 
openness; financial 
openness; current 
account; fiscal balance; 
foreign reserves. 
Financial stress passes 
through rapidly to emerging 
economies. Financial links 
are the main channel of 
transmission of crisis. 
Emerging economies with 
higher levels of foreign 
liabilities to advanced 
economies have been more 
affected by the  crisis  that  
originated  in  advanced  
economies  than  emerging  
economies  with  lower 
foreign liabilities. 
Jovičić (2010) 
Western 
Balkan 
countries 
2009 VAR N/A 
Domestic production; 
exports 
Countries with stronger 
trade ties with the EU 
experienced the crisis 
sooner.  However, the 
countries with weaker trade 
ties with the EU had a larger 
decrease in production. 
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Authors (year) Countries  Period Estimation 
technique 
Crisis 
definition 
Main explanatory 
variables 
Main conclusions 
Brezigar-
Masten et al. 
(2011) 
31 European 
countries  
1996-
2004 
Cross-country 
panel 
Real GDP per 
capita growth 
Lagged GDP per capita 
growth; depth of 
national financial 
markets; inflation. 
A high degree of financial 
integration did not increase 
the degree of financial 
fragility of transition 
countries and did not 
intensify the effects of the 
financial crises. They 
conclude that countries with 
a higher degree of financial 
openness had less of a credit 
decline during the GFC. 
Berkmen et al. 
(2012) 
40 emerging 
market 
economies 
2009 
Cross-country 
OLS 
Changes in the 
consensus 
forecast for 
2009 between 
the averages 
of January–
June 2009 and 
January–June 
2008 
Trade openness; 
Leverage; exchange 
rate peg dummy; EU 
accession dummy; 
cumulative credit 
growth. 
Degree of leverage and 
cumulative credit growth 
and exchange rate policy 
explain a large share of the 
variation in the growth 
forecast revisions across 
these countries. Also the 
effect of leverage appears to 
have been stronger in the EU 
accession countries and 
there is weak evidence 
suggesting that a strong 
fiscal position helped shield 
countries from the effect of 
the GFC. 
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Authors (year) Countries  Period Estimation 
technique 
Crisis 
definition 
Main explanatory 
variables 
Main conclusions 
De Hass et al. 
(2012) 
1,294 banks 
in emerging 
Europe 
1999-
2009 
Cross-section 
panel 
Annual gross 
nominal credit 
growth 
Vienna participation 
dummy variables; 
dummy for crisis; 
Both domestic and foreign 
banks sharply reduced credit 
during the crisis, but foreign 
banks that participated in 
the Vienna Initiative were 
relatively more stable 
lenders.  
dummy variables for 
private  domestic, state 
or foreign banks. 
Popov and 
Udell (2012) 
16 emerging 
European 
countries 
Survey 
data from 
2005 and 
2008 on 
10,701 
firms 
Cross-section 
A dummy 
variable equal 
to 1 if firm i in 
city j in 
country k 
A matrix of firm 
characteristics; index of 
average bank balance 
sheet conditions; a 
matrix of country 
dummies; a matrix of 
industry dummies. 
Firms' access to credit was 
affected by changes in the 
financial conditions of their 
parent banks.  
in industry l is 
credit 
constrained in 
fiscal year 
2007 
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Authors (year) Countries  Period Estimation 
technique 
Crisis 
definition 
Main explanatory 
variables 
Main conclusions 
Ongena et al. 
(2015) 
14 transition 
countries in 
Eastern 
Europe and 
Central Asia 
2009 Cross-country Loan Growth 
Internationally-
borrowing domestic 
bank that equals one if 
the domestic bank 
borrowed at least once 
from the international 
wholesale market 
between 2004 and 
2007 and equals zero 
otherwise; dummy 
foreign bank that 
equals one if the bank 
was foreign-owned in 
2007 and equals zero 
otherwise. 
Internationally borrowing 
domestic and foreign-owned 
banks contracted their credit 
more during the crisis than 
domestic banks that are 
funded only locally. Firms 
that are dependent on credit 
and at the same time have a 
relationship with an 
internationally borrowing 
domestic or a foreign bank 
suffer more in their 
financing and real 
performance.  
Bonin and 
Louie (2015) 
256 
European 
bank 
subsidies in 8 
ETEs 
2004-
2010 
Cross-country 
panel 
Real loan 
growth  
GDP growth; assets, 
equity rationing; loans. 
deposits; ROAA; 
Inflation; Depreciation. 
The 6 biggest European 
banks did not change their 
behavior in 8 ETEs under 
investigation during the GFC 
and the Eurozone debt crisis, 
whereas other foreign banks, 
in addition to contributing to 
credit boom prior to the GFC, 
also reduced their lending 
during the crises. 
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Authors (year) Countries  Period Estimation 
technique 
Crisis 
definition 
Main explanatory 
variables 
Main conclusions 
Fadejeva et al. 
(2017) 
41 emerging 
countries 
from Asia, the 
CESEE region 
including the 
Baltics, the 
CIS region, 
Latin America 
and EU.  
Quarterly 
data from 
1995Q1 to 
2013Q4   
GVAR N/A 
Real GDP; change in 
prices; the real 
exchange rate;  short 
term interest rates; and 
government bond yield; 
total credit to the 
private sector. 
All shocks originating in the 
US and EU affect output and 
credit internationally, but 
with a different intensity. 
The study also finds that 
European emerging 
countries are more severely 
affected by these shocks 
than other emerging 
countries included in the 
sample. 
Allen et al. 
(2017) 
400 banks in 
CEE countries 
1994-
2010 
Cross-section 
panel 
Real growth in 
total loans  
Deposit growth; 
liquidity (liquid assets 
to total assets); 
profitability (return on 
average assets); 
solvency (equity to 
asset); total bank assets 
to a country’s GDP as a 
measure of Size; parent 
bank-specific 
measures. 
Lending behavior of foreign 
banks depended on the type 
of crisis; it remained 
constant during the domestic 
crises, while foreign crises 
were associated with 
decreased lending by foreign 
bank subsidies. 
 
 
 
115 
 
An important international transmission mechanism of the GFC highlighted in the 
literature has been the restriction of credit, which, as discussed in section 1.2, has 
particularly affected transition countries with a high degree of foreign bank 
ownership. The EBRD (2009) claims that prior to the crisis, foreign financing, often 
disproportionately funded by foreign banks, contributed to credit booms in these 
countries. Moreover, most of this debt was denominated in foreign currency, which 
increased the vulnerability of the region to external shocks. Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 
(2011) analyse capital flows in 75 countries (including ETEs) at a quarterly 
frequency. They show that the global restriction of credit during the GFC in particular 
affected those transition economies with a deeper international financial integration.  
Similarly, Árvai et al. (2009) explore financial contagion focusing on financial 
linkages. This study also draws attention to the important role of external financing 
as a source of funding domestic credit growth. The authors explore the cross-border 
exposures between emerging and advanced European countries. They present 
indicators of contagion exposure which help identify the key points and spillover 
effects and propagation channels of a shock that starts in a certain country. The 
findings of this research highlight the relevance of financial interlinkages within 
Europe and the high dependence of most of t h e  Central, Eastern and Southern 
European countries on Western European banks.  The authors point out that even in 
cases where exposures of CESE countries are diversified, interdependencies between 
each other could trigger a regional contagion if one of the countries faces a shock. 
However, their conclusions are mostly based on an interpretation of stylized facts, 
without employing econometric techniques. Balakrishnan et al. (2011) develop a 
new financial stress index for emerging economies to investigate how financial 
stress is transmitted during crises, including the GFC. Based on a two- s t a g e  
estimation, the authors assess the factors and intensity of transmission of stress 
between advanced and emerging economies. In the first stage the degree of the 
transmission of stress is estimated, while in the second stage differences and the 
factors of co-movement are assessed. An annual panel data model employing 
structural variables and policy variables is also used. The main results suggest 
that financial stress passes rapidly to emerging economies. They suggest that 
financial links are the main channel of transmission of crisis. They show that 
emerging economies with a higher level of foreign liabilities to advanced economies 
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have been more affected by a  crisis  that  originated  in  advanced  economies  than  
emerging  economies  with  lower foreign liabilities.  
The determinants of credit growth during the GFC are analysed by De Hass et al. 
(2012). By using data on 1,294 banks, the authors find that foreign banks reduced 
lending earlier and deeper than did domestic banks in the 30 transition economies 
they investigate. However, they show that countries that were part of the Vienna 
Initiative were more stable sources of credit than those that did not participate in 
this scheme. Similarly, Popov and Udell (2012), using survey data on 10,701 firms in 
16 ETEs, find that firms’ credit access during the GFC was affected by the balance 
sheet conditions of parent banks.  Ongena et al. (2015) also find that banks that had 
international funding sources as well as foreign-owned banks contracted lending 
more during the GFC than did banks that had mainly domestic funding sources. Their 
investigation employs bank-firm level data from Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 
They also show that firms that relied on external funding were more severely 
affected by the GFC.  Another similar investigation assessing the lending behavior of 
foreign banks during the GFC and the Eurozone debt crisis conducted by Bonin and 
Louie (2015) provides additional insights. They show that the 6 biggest European 
banks did not change their behavior in 8 ETEs under investigation during the GFC 
and the Eurozone debt crisis, whereas other foreign banks, in addition to 
contributing to credit boom prior to the GFC, also reduced their lending during the 
crisis. Allen et al. (2017), using a panel data for 400 banks, also investigate the impact 
of foreign bank ownership on lending behavior in Central and Eastern European 
countries during the period 1994-2010. They find that the lending behavior of 
foreign banks depended on the type of crisis; it remained constant during the crises 
originating domestically, while crises that originated in foreign countries were 
associated with decreased lending by foreign bank subsidies. A study that employs 
the global vector auto-regression (GVAR) approach to investigate the international 
transmission of aggregate demand, loan supply and loan demand shocks originating 
in the USA and EU was conducted by Fadejeva et al. (2017). The findings of this 
research revealed that all shocks originating in the US and EU affect output and credit 
internationally, but with a different intensity. While aggregate demand and loan 
demand shocks significantly affect output internationally, there is no evidence of 
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spillovers from loan supply shocks. The study also finds that European emerging 
countries were more severely affected by these shocks due to their deep economic 
integration with the EU, which exposed these countries to both EU and US shocks. 
Consequently, the studies reviewed above provide evidence of the international 
transmission of the crisis to the transition countries through financial linkages. These 
studies point out the importance of foreign banks in international transmission of 
shocks to these countries. However, this finding is not completely confirmed by 
Berglöf et al. (2009); Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, (2011); Brezigar-Masten et al. (2011) 
and Berkmen et al. (2012). These authors find no evidence that the presence of 
foreign banks in transition countries have amplified the effects of the GFC.  
Berkmen et al. (2012) employs cross-country regressions to try to explain the 
differences in the severity of the GFC across developing and emerging economies. As a 
proxy for the financial crisis impact on output, the authors focus on revisions of 
projections for GDP growth, comparing the forecasts prior to and after the crisis in 
September 2008. The authors use several explanatory variables in order to 
capture the transmission of crisis through financial and trade channels.  Another 
group of  variables  such  as  current  account  deficit,  level  of reserves, level of 
debt, credit growth etc, are used to capture the principal vulnerabilities and 
financial structure and pre-existing conditions. For the basic regression, the authors 
use the changes in the forecast between the averages of January–June 2009 and 
January–June 2008 for 40 emerging economies. They find that the degree of 
leverage and cumulative credit growth, as well as exchange rate policy, can 
explain a high share of projected output decline in emerging countries. Moreover, 
their results suggest that countries with a larger number of foreign banks experienced 
less banking outflows in the fourth quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009.  
Similarly, they find that those emerging economies with a higher share of foreign-
owned banking assets suffered a softer output decline. The authors conclude that, in 
general, the increasing level of financial integration has had a mixed effect in emerging 
economies, since the foreign banks contributed to credit booms and external debts 
but helped to stabilise the economies during the crisis. Similar results are reported by 
Berglöf et al. (2009) who analyse the effects of the GFC on growth in emerging 
Europe. They show that countries with higher shares of foreign-owned banking 
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assets experienced smaller bank lending outflows and milder output declines during 
the GFC; whereas countries with larger pre-crisis credit booms, higher external debt 
and hard pegs experienced larger output declines. The authors also argue that, 
considering that foreign-owned banks have contributed to credit booms and external 
debt accumulation, the effect of financial integration on the crisis in ETEs has been 
mixed.  
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2011) analyse whether the severity of the GFC depended on 
pre-crisis macroeconomic and financial conditions, especially focusing on financial 
linkages for a global sample of countries, including ETEs. They include 
macroeconomic variables for 2008 and 2009 (though the 2009 data are based on 
October 2009 projections) and they also include total domestic demand and 
consumption. Their results suggest that pre-crisis factors such as a higher 
development level, increasing economic activity and higher credit and trade 
openness significantly increased the intensity of the crisis. On the other hand, they do 
not find any evidence supporting the view that a higher level of financial integration 
intensified the crisis. Brezigar-Masten et al. (2011) also investigate the role of 
financial integration in transition countries’ growth, differentiating periods of 
financial crisis from normal times. The authors conclude that a high degree of 
financial integration did not increase the degree of financial fragility of transition 
countries and did not intensify the effects of the financial crises. They conclude that 
countries with a higher degree of financial openness had less of a credit decline 
during the GFC. The final group of studies reviewed above find no evidence of the 
importance of financial linkages in the international transmission of the GFC to 
transition countries.  
Trade appears to have been another important transmission channel of the crisis for 
ETEs, considering that increasing trade deepening and rising trade integration with 
the EU has made these countries more vulnerable to a reduction in export demand 
(EBRD, 2009; Bartlett and Prica, 2012). A few studies have empirically investigated 
this relationship and found a positive relationship between the impact of greater 
trade linkages and the severity of the impact of the GFCC in transition countries (IMF, 
2010; Jovicic, 2010; Blanchard, 2010; Lane and Milesi-Ferreti, 2011). Jovcic (2010) 
using VAR modelling investigated the relationship between the strength of trade 
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linkages with the EU and the speed of contagion and the intensity of the crisis in 
Western Balkan countries. The author shows that those countries with stronger 
trade ties with the EU experienced the crisis sooner. However, the countries with 
weaker trade ties with the EU had a larger decrease in production. On the other hand, 
the IMF (2010) finds that, amongst other factors (higher pre-crisis vulnerabilities, 
including pre-crisis credit booms), countries with a higher degree of trade 
integration with the global economy were more severely affected by the crisis. 
Blanchard et al. (2010) also show that trade and financial linkages as well as different 
growth performances of partners in trade explain a large portion of the variability of 
growth performance across transition countries during the GFC. Similarly, Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2011) show that international trade variables mattered during the 
crisis. They find that countries more open to international trade and countries whose 
main trading partners’ growth declined further during the crisis suffered larger 
declines in capital inflows.  
The review of the empirical studies presented above has shown that the majority of 
the investigations have concentrated on financial linkages/financial integration as an 
international channel of transmission of shocks, while less attention has been given 
to trade linkages. More specifically, most of the studies reviewed above focus on the 
degree of foreign-bank ownership and credit restriction during the GFC. However, 
there is no consensus as to whether increased financial integration and foreign bank 
ownership intensified the impact of the GFC on ETEs. While a number of the studies 
reviewed above report a positive relationship between foreign-bank ownership and 
the restriction of credit during the GFC, other studies claim that a higher degree of 
foreign bank-ownership contributed to the resilience of the transition region. 
Nevertheless, the latter group of studies acknowledge the contribution of foreign-
bank ownership in fuelling credit booms prior to the GFC. A potential explanation for 
this difference in the results of the relationship between financial integration/foreign 
bank ownership and crisis severity is the difference in sample/period coverage, 
estimation technique adopted and measurement of the crisis severity.  
A common weakness of most of the studies reviewed above, but also of other 
empirical studies addressing the determinants of the severity of the GFC which can 
lead to biased estimates, is the employment of inappropriate variables to measure 
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the impact of the GFC and define the crisis. The most commonly used measures have 
been based on GDP growth/change in GDP growth or difference between forecast 
and actual  GDP  growth and binary definition of the crisis presence during a certain 
year/country. These might not be the most appropriate measures, given that using a 
binary definition of the presence of a crisis does not provide a measure of the 
intensity of the crisis nor does it take into account situations that do not completely 
fit into a full-scale crisis, even though they might have a certain level of 
macroeconomic impact. Likewise, using the difference between forecast and actual 
GDP growth might lead to distorted results, given that forecasts for GDP growth for 
2009 were made during 2008 when the initial effects of the crisis were already 
present in most of these countries. Hence, the forecast GDP growth for 2009 already 
took into consideration some of the effects of the crisis. Also, employing simply GDP 
growth as a measure of the impact of the crisis  might not provide accurate estimates, 
considering that factors other than the crisis affect GDP growth and that these 
studies have generally not controlled for such factors. Other measures of crisis 
severity such as credit growth and financial stress indexes have also been 
considered, which makes it difficult to reach conclusions regarding the severity of the 
crisis. 
An additional weakness of many of the studies reviewed above is that they have not 
reported diagnostic tests regarding model specification, therefore the conclusions 
reached regarding the determinants of the crisis severity should be interpreted with 
some caution. With regards to estimation techniques, the majority of the studies 
reviewed above adopted cross-country panel methods. However, other estimation 
techniques such as VAR and GVAR have been adopted by some studies. It should be 
pointed out that even though panel analysis is a well-established method, 
nonetheless it is, normally, a single equations method with one endogenous variable 
and other exogenous variables. Given the ambiguity of defining and measuring crisis 
severity, other modelling approaches such as VAR and GVAR might be more 
appropriate to model the transmission of financial crises as they treat all variables as 
endogenous and provide full-system estimation where everything is allowed to 
depend on everything else. In addition, the GVAR modelling approach allows for 
interdependencies at international level and for long-run and short-run relationships 
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consistent with the theory and data. Overall GVAR provides a coherent and theory-
consistent solution to the issue of dimensionality in global modelling (Smith and 
Galessi, 2014). 
The limited number of studies that have investigated the transmission of the GFC to 
ETEs have not considered certain factors such as the degree of integration with the 
EU, and, in particular, the high but differing degrees of euroisation, although both are 
key characteristics of ETEs. Furthermore, the majority of the studies reviewed above 
have been carried out at country level, while there is a lack of studies that investigate 
the transmission of the GFC to ETEs based on firm-level analysis. As Claessens and 
Forbes (2004) point out, trade and financial linkages between countries are often 
highly correlated; therefore, a firm-level investigation could provide additional 
insights into the specific channels for the international transmission of crisis.  
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of the main empirical studies that have 
investigated the international transmission of shocks through different channels 
(cross-market asset correlations and individual channels of transmission of shocks) 
before focusing on the determinants of the severity of GFC on ETEs. Although there 
are a large number of empirical studies that have investigated the international 
transmission of financial crises, the literature is still unable to provide conclusive 
results on the determinants of crisis severity across countries. The studies reviewed 
in this chapter provide a wide range of results, which are sometimes not in line with 
the expectations suggested by orthodox theory. The analysis presented in this 
chapter showed that the empirical results on the transmission of financial crises 
based on cross-market correlation coefficients are inconclusive. More specifically, 
when contagion was defined as a significant increase in cross-country asset 
correlations following a crisis, without taking into account heteroscedasticity, the 
authors found evidence of contagion, whereas when heteroscedasticity was 
accounted for, no evidence of contagion was found. It was argued that the second 
approach of testing for contagion, which is based on individual channels of 
transmission of shocks, might provide more intuition on how exactly crisis has been 
transmitted, as it distinguishes between different channels and propagation 
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mechanisms (e.g. trade and financial linkages, macroeconomic fundamentals). 
However, in spite of the large number of empirical studies that have investigated the 
transmission of financial crises based on individual channels of contagion, the results 
remain inconclusive. To a large extent, the lack of conclusive results has been 
attributed to measurement and misspecification errors of crisis severity. With 
respect to crisis definition, the recent literature has most commonly focused on the 
decline of GDP growth, cross-market correlation coefficients, financial stress indexes, 
changes in capital flows and exchange rate tensions, which makes it difficult to reach 
overall conclusions regarding the severity of the crisis. 
The empirical studies investigating the transmission of the GFC to ETEs have 
generally employed the second method of testing for contagion. The lack of studies 
employing the first method of testing for contagion (based on cross-market 
correlation confidents) has been attributed to the relatively low level of financial 
market development in ETEs. The majority of the investigations have concentrated 
on financial linkages/financial integration as an international channel of 
transmission of shocks, while less attention has been given to trade linkages. As yet 
there is no consensus as to whether the strengthening of financial linkages 
intensified the impact of the GFC on ETEs. As for the estimation techniques, the 
majority of the studies reviewed in this chapter have adopted cross-country panel 
methods, while some studies also considered other methods such as GVAR and VAR. 
Given the measurement and misspecification errors of crisis severity, it was argued 
that panel analysis might not be the most appropriate method to test for 
transmission of the GFC, since it is a single equation approach, with one endogenous 
variable and other exogenous variables, which requires researchers to define and 
measure crisis severity as a dependent variable. On the other hand, an approach such 
as GVAR treats all variables as endogenous and is a full system approach to 
estimation in which everything is allowed to depend on everything else. Therefore, 
GVAR is considered a more appropriate approach to model interdependencies 
between countries and international transmission of shocks. 
The empirical review also disclosed that the limited number of studies that have 
investigated the transmission of the GFC to ETEs have ignored factors such as 
differing levels of integration with the EU, and, in particular, variations in the degree 
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of euroisation. In addition, it was shown that there is a complete lack of studies that 
investigate the transmission of the GFC to ETEs based on firm-level analysis, which is 
an important gap given (i) the argued correlations between trade and financial 
linkages and (ii) the possibility that a firm-level investigation would provide more 
insights into the specific channels of international transmission of crisis to ETEs.  The 
gaps identified in this chapter will be addressed empirically in Chapters 4 and 5. The 
following chapter will investigate the international transmission of GDP and financial 
shocks from 15 European advanced countries to 17 ETEs using the recently 
developed GVAR approach, while Chapter 5 will investigate the transmission of the 
GFC to 6 ETEs by employing firm-level data.  
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4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 of this thesis provided an overview of the theoretical framework within 
which the international channels of transmission of the GFC are investigated. The 
review presented in Chapter 3 showed that although there are a large number of 
empirical studies that have investigated the international transmission of crises, the 
literature is still unable to provide conclusive results of the determinants of crisis 
severity across transition countries. To a large extent, the lack of conclusive results 
has been attributed to measurement and misspecification errors of crisis severity.  
With respect to crisis definition, the recent literature has most commonly focused on 
the decline of GDP growth, cross-market correlation coefficients, financial stress 
indexes, changes in capital flows and exchange rate tensions, which makes it difficult 
to reach overall conclusions regarding the severity of the crisis. In addition, previous 
studies have generally not reported diagnostic tests regarding model specification. 
Furthermore, these studies have generally neglected to address the degree of 
integration with the EU, and, in particular, the level of euroisation, even though these 
are common characteristics of ETEs.  
Understanding how external shocks transmit into domestic economies in ETEs is 
important for policy makers. In order to investigate the interdependencies among 
countries and to understand how shocks are transmitted internationally, a model 
that accounts for these interdependencies and looks at them from a global 
perspective is needed. Given the measurement and misspecification errors of crisis 
severity presented in Chapter 3, it was argued that panel analysis might not be the 
most appropriate method to test for transmission of the GFC, since it is a single 
equation approach, with one endogenous variable and other exogenous variables, 
which requires researchers to define and measure crisis severity as a dependent 
variable. On the other hand, an approach such as GVAR treats all variables as 
endogenous and, as such, is a full system approach to estimation in which everything 
is allowed to depend on everything else. The main thing about the GVAR 
methodology is time series depth. Single equation methods, whether they are cross 
sectional or panel, are rooted in microeconomics, whereas in macroeconomic 
analysis it is very difficult to distinguish between dependent and independent 
variables and, potentially, everything is endogenous.  That is why time series analysis 
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has developed a range of tools, most of which are in the platform of VAR and GVAR, 
precisely to analyse interdependences. GVAR provides an effective way of modelling 
interactions in a complex high-dimensional system such as the global economy.  
Consequently, this chapter presents analyses of the international transmission of the 
GFC in a global context. More specifically, by employing the global vector auto-
regression (GVAR) approach developed by Pesaran et al. (2004) and Dees et al. 
(2007), this chapter investigates the international transmission of financial shocks to 
ETEs. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides an overview of 
the GVAR modelling framework, its structure and applications. Section 4.3 specifies 
the variables and data to be used in this investigation. Section 4.4 provides details of 
the estimation technique adopted, specifying each step and presents the empirical 
findings and diagnostic tests. The last section provides conclusions. 
4.2 The GVAR approach 
As reviewed in Chapter 2, there are many channels through which the international 
transmission of shocks takes place. Transmission could be a result of the common 
observed global shocks or other unobserved factors, but even when all common 
factors are taken into account, there is likely to be important residual 
interdependence that remains to be explained (Di Mauro and Pesaran, 2013). 
Therefore, a global framework is needed to investigate the importance of sources of 
international transmission of crises. In order to investigate the international 
transmission of the global financial shocks to ETEs, in this chapter we use the Global 
Vector Auto-Regression (GVAR) modelling framework. The GVAR approach, 
developed by Pesaran et al. (2004) and further extended by Dées et al. (2007) and 
Dées et al. (2009), can be used to investigate the international interdependencies 
among countries and international channels of transmission of shocks (Dovern and 
Roye, 2013). The main advantages of the GVAR modelling approach are that it allows: 
(i) for interdependence at different levels (national or international) in a transparent 
way that can be empirically evaluated; and (ii) for long-run relationships consistent 
with theory together with short-run relationships consistent with the data and 
provides a coherent, theory-consistent solution to the “curse of dimensionality” in 
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global modelling (Smith and Galesi, 2014). For a detailed description of the 
methodology, this chapter refers to Di Mauro and Pesaran (2013).  
GVAR combines separately estimated country-specific VARs into a global model. In 
this model, domestic variables are linked to country-specific foreign variables, such 
as foreign GDP or foreign exports. The latter are constructed from the domestic 
variables based on certain weights in order to account for the international trade, 
international finance or other interdependencies between countries. The country-
specific foreign variables serve as a proxy for common unobserved factors, such as 
the diffusion of technological progress, or investors’ behaviour during times of 
financial crisis or other determinants that we may not be able to measure, but it is 
known that they are present and affect all the countries. However, even when all 
these commonalities are accounted for, there might still be some residual 
interdependencies due to policy or trade spillover effects. Therefore, in the GVAR 
model the weighted combinations of observable factors are assumed to take into 
account the unobservable factors. All country-specific variables are treated as 
endogenous variables. Country-specific foreign variables are calculated and allowed 
to directly influence domestic variables in the model. The foreign variables and 
global variables are assumed to be weakly exogenous, assuming that every individual 
country is a small economy compared to the rest of the world. More specifically, the 
weak exogeneity of foreign variables means that domestic variables do not affect 
foreign variables in the long run, while they are affected by them. This is the key 
assumption of the GVAR modelling strategy since it allows country models to be 
estimated individually and only at a later stage to be combined together (Di Mauro 
and Pesaran, 2013). For every country, the standard VAR augmented with foreign 
variables is estimated. The augmentation takes place at the country level, but once 
the system as a whole is solved, we end up with a simple VAR. The general 
specification of a country specific VARX* model is described below: 
Suppose there are 𝑁 + 1 countries in the global economy, indexed by 𝑖 = 0,1,2, … ,𝑁,  
where 𝑁 = 18 and country 0 is treated as the reference country (EU15 in our case) . 
For each country 𝑖 an augmented 𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑋∗(𝑞𝑖, 𝑞𝑖
∗) model, where 𝑞𝑖  and 𝑞𝑖
∗ are the lag 
orders of the domestic and foreign variables respectively, can be written as follows: 
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𝑥𝑖𝑡 = a𝑖,0 + a𝑖,1𝑡 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖,𝑗𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑗  
𝑞𝑖
𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖,𝑗𝑥
∗
𝑖,𝑡−𝑗  
𝑞𝑖
∗
𝑗=0 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖,𝑗𝑑𝑡−𝑗  
𝑞𝑖
𝑗=0 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡,                        (4.1) 
for 𝑡 = 0,1,2, … , 𝑇,  and 𝑁 = 0,1,2, … ,𝑁, where 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is the 𝑘𝑖X 1 vector of country-
specific domestic or endogenous variables, 𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗  is the 𝑘𝑖
∗𝑋 1 vector of country-specific 
foreign variables (weakly exogenous), 𝑑𝑡a vector of global exogenous variable (here, 
oil prices) that exist in every country VARX*, 𝑎𝑖0 is a constant, t  is a linear trend, and 
𝑢𝑖,𝑡 is the 𝑘𝑖X 1 vector of idiosyncratic, serially uncorrelated, country-specific shocks.  
Foreign-specific variables are constructed as weighted averages across the domestic 
variables of all countries, with the weights also being country-specific:   
 𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗ = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=0 𝑥𝑗𝑡                                                                                                                                        (4.2)    
where 𝑤𝑖𝑗are a set of weights such that 𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 0 and the sum of all weights equals to 1. 
The weights are determined to capture the importance of country j in the economy of 
country i. The country specific VAR models can be transformed into error correction 
forms (VECMX*) which allows a distinction between short-run and long-run 
relationships and treatment of the long-run relationships as co-integrating. Even 
though the VECMX* models are separately estimated on a country-by-country basis 
taking potential cointegration between 𝑥𝑖𝑡 and 𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗ x into account (Smith and Galesi, 
2014), the GVAR model is solved for the whole system in which all variables are 
endogenous. The GVAR model can allow interactions between countries through 
three different channels: dependence of the domestic variables on foreign specific 
variables and their lags; dependence of the domestic variables on global exogenous 
variables such as oil prices; and dependence of shocks in country i on shocks in 
country j (Di Mauro and Pesaran, 2013). 
The GVAR model is a suitable tool for policy analysis, but it can be used more broadly. 
For example, previously it has been used for analysing the transmission of shocks 
(Galesi and Sgherri, 2009; Chudik and Fratszcher, 2011); credit risk (Pesaran et. al., 
2006); for forecasting purposes (Pesaran et. al. 2009); dynamics of global trade flows 
(Bussière et al., 2009); and the role of oil prices in a global context (Rebucci and 
Spatafora, 2006). 
Galesi and Sgherri (2009) use a GVAR model to investigate the international 
spillovers following slowdowns in U.S. equity prices. Their model contains 27 
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countries, including the United States, 17 European advanced economies, and 9 
European emerging economies. They find that asset prices are the main channel 
through which shocks are transmitted across countries in the short run, while the 
cost and quantity of credit are important channels of transmission of shocks in the 
long run. Chudik and Fratzscher (2011) through a GVAR model investigate the 
importance of a tightening in liquidity conditions and collapse in risk appetite in the 
international transmission of the GFC. They find that the tightening of financial 
conditions was the most important transmission channel in advanced economies, 
while the emerging market economies were more affected by the decline in risk 
appetite. Bussière et al. (2009) use a GVAR model for a panel of 21 emerging market 
and advanced economies to investigate the factors that influence the dynamics of 
global trade flows. They model exports-imports response to three possible shocks: a 
shock to U.S. output; a shock to the US real exchange rate; and a shock to German 
output. They find that global exports are more affected by a shock to US output than 
by a real effective depreciation of the dollar. Rebucci and Spatafora (2006) use a 
GVAR model to investigate the role of oil prices in a global context. They find that 
positive oil price shocks have a negative effect on the current account balance of non-
oil exporter countries including the US.  
GVAR has not previously been used to model the transmission of financial shocks to 
ETEs. Hence, in using the GVAR model to investigate the transmission of the GFC to 
ETEs, this chapter will fill this gap in the literature.  
4.3 Specification of data and variables 
The first GVAR model will be estimated for 32 countries, including 17 ETEs5 and 15 
European advanced economies (EU15)6, and using quarterly data for the period 
2003Q1–2014Q4. Two types of variables are used to capture the main channels of 
international financial contagion: trade and financial. The variable used to capture 
the trade channel is exports. Since a major part of the theoretical and empirical 
                                                             
5 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovak Republic 
and Slovenia. 
6 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
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review in previous chapters implies that exports are one of the main channels of 
international transmission of shocks (Eichengreen et al., 1996; Glick and Rose, 1999; 
Forbes, 2002; Ozgan and Unsal, 2012) the shocks in European advanced countries 
are expected to affect more severely the ETEs with stronger trade links with them. 
Quarterly data on exports are obtained from EUROSTAT, the World Bank and central 
banks. The second group of variables will capture the international transmission of 
the global financial shocks through financial linkages. A financial crisis in one country 
can lead to direct financial effects, including reductions in foreign direct investment 
and other capital flows abroad (Dornbusch et al, 2000; Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011; 
Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2011; Fratzscher, 2012). Since the GFC affected the EU15 
financial sectors, transition countries with strong financial links with these advanced 
economies are expected to have been more severely affected by the crisis. Therefore, 
based on the overview of the impact of the GFC presented in Chapter 1 and literature 
on the transmission of GFC presented in Chapters 2 and 3, the following variables are 
used to capture the effect of transmission of crisis through the financial channel: 
foreign credit flows; credit flows in foreign currencies; inward foreign direct 
investment flows; and remittances. All these variables are expected to influence the 
international transmission of the global financial shocks. Data on foreign direct 
investment is obtained from the OECD, EUROSTAT and the European Commission; 
and on foreign credit flows and credit flows in foreign currencies from the Bank of 
International Settlements’ International Banking Statistics (BIS IBS). This analysis is 
based on locational data, since these data are residence-based, therefore they are 
expected to reflect whether conditions in specific ‘financial centre’ countries affect 
flows to other countries, including flows to local subsidiaries. Data on remittances 
are obtained from the World Bank database. 
The third group of variables will capture the factors that might have amplified the 
effects of the crisis on ETEs. They include: the degree of euroisation, namely, the 
extent to which a country has assets and liabilities denominated in foreign currencies; 
and the degree of integration with the EU. The degree of euroisation is measured by 
the average of the share of foreign currency loans in total loans and of foreign 
currency deposits in total deposits. Data on foreign currency loans and foreign 
currency deposits are obtained from the EBRD, the ECB, the Bank for International 
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Settlements and national central banks. The degree of integration with the EU, is 
captured by EU membership7 and partially by the trade and financial linkages 
described in the previous paragraphs. Data from most of the sources are reported in 
real terms. In cases when data were available only in nominal terms, they were 
transformed into real terms by dividing the nominal time series with CPI. 
4.4 Empirical Approach 
The methodology proceeds through the following stages. First, the variables that 
enter each country model are selected and the VAR model is extended with the 
addition of a set of country-specific foreign variables. Second, the weights for 
constructing the country-specific foreign variables are computed. In the third stage, 
each variable in the model is tested for stationarity. Next, the VECM is specified for 
each country, which means determining the lag order of the underlying VAR models 
and testing for cointegration and the cointegrating ranks. Subsequently, different 
diagnostic tests are checked and the global GVAR is solved. Accordingly, after 
estimating the individual country VECMX* models as described, the corresponding 
VARX* models are recovered as the platform for impulse-response analysis and 
forecast error variance decomposition. 
4.4.1 Specification and estimation of the country-specific models 
The foreign country-specific variables are constructed as weighted averages of the 
corresponding variables of other countries based on certain schemes of weights. In 
theory, we could employ different weighting schemes for each country and variable, 
but considering the relatively large number of countries, variables and schemes of 
weights, this would result in an uncontrollable number of possible schemes. In 
addition, the choice of weighting scheme depends on data availability. However, it is 
important to know that using a bilateral weight based on a certain type of exposure, 
i.e. trade or financial exposure, does not imply that the transmission channel 
associated with the chosen type of exposure will be the only one captured by the 
                                                             
7 In section 4.4.2 the transmission of shocks from advanced EU countries to ETEs is analysed 
in sub-samples, which are defined by various country features, one of which is EU 
membership. Consequently, we address one of the main aims of the thesis, i.e. to analyse 
whether the degree of integration with the EU influenced the transmission of the global 
financial crisis to ETEs. 
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weight since an appropriate bilateral weight will capture a combination of different 
channels between two countries, as it is assumed to capture the interdependencies 
that exist between those countries (Di Mauro and Pesaran, 2013). Previous GVAR 
studies have mainly employed trade weights for constructing the foreign-country 
specific variables (Pesaran et al., 2004; Dées et al., 2007; Nickel and Vansteenkiste, 
2013). In contrast, Eickemier and Ng (2011) use a combination of trade and financial 
weights, namely, inward and outward FDI positions, cross-country bilateral trade 
flows and bilateral financial claim positions. Galesi and Sgherri (2009) employ 
weights based on bank lending data. Nevertheless, considering the importance of 
both trade and financial linkages between ETEs and European advanced countries 
(EU15), we believe that it is necessary to consider both trade and financial weights 
and investigate which capture more accurately the transmission channels between 
ETEs and European advanced countries. Hence, the number of weighting schemes is 
limited to trade and financial weights for all the variables in the model, and those 
weights for which data on bilateral flows are available for all the countries included 
in the model are chosen. The trade weights are computed using the cross-country 
exports and imports data for the years before the beginning of the GFC, 2005-2007. 
The country level trade shares are constructed by dividing the total trade of each 
country i (exports plus imports) by the amount of trade with country j, such that the 
ith row sums to one, for all is. The first type of the financial weights is based on 
foreign direct investment. Foreign Direct Investment weights are computed based on 
the average FDI inward and outward positions during the period 2003-2007.8  
In addition, considering the large share of remittance income in ETEs, in particular 
SEE countries, it was decided to employ a second type of financial weight based on 
bilateral remittance flows among countries in our model9. Weights based on bilateral 
remittance flows, to our knowledge, represent an original contribution to the GVAR 
                                                             
8These specific periods for computing trade and FDI weights were chosen for two reasons: 
data availability and to cover the period immediately before the GFC. 
 
9 Bilateral remittance estimates are obtained from the World Bank database. They are 
constructed based on a methodology developed by Ratha and Shaw (2007). The remittance 
data used in this study is for 2010, disaggregated using host country and origin country 
incomes and estimated migrant stocks. The earliest year for which bilateral remittance flow 
data are available is 2010, hence we use this year for constructing remittance weights in this 
study. 
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modelling framework. Trade, FDI and remittance weights are presented in tables 
4.1a, 4.1b and 4.1c below. 
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Table 4.1a Trade weights used for computing foreign country-specific variables 
Note: Bilateral weights are shown in columns and sum up to one. There is one column for each country in the sample; across the columns row 
totals have no meaning. Weights are calculated based on average trade flows (sum of exports and imports) among countries for the period 2005-
2007. Rows represent the origin country and columns the partner countries; i.e. if we look at Albania, we can see that Bosnia and Herzegovina 
accounted for 0.4% of the total trade (exports + imports) of Albania during the period 2005-2007, Bulgaria 2.8%, and Croatia 1.3% (the same 
interpretation applies to all other countries). 
Countries Alb bosn Bulg croat czeck esto Hung koso Latv Lithu maced monte pola roma Serbi slovak sloven EU15 
alb 0 0.0013 0.0036 0.0013 0.0001 0.0000 0.0004 0.0361 0.0000 0.0000 0.0135 0.0064 0.0001 0.0006 0.0036 0.0001 0.0009 0.0142 
bosn 0.0038 0 0.0041 0.0865 0.0011 0.0001 0.0039 0.0250 0.0001 0.0001 0.0215 0.0390 0.0008 0.0030 0.0744 0.0009 0.0297 0.0083 
bulg 0.0278 0.0123 0 0.0110 0.0031 0.0006 0.0061 0.0507 0.0013 0.0020 0.0897 0.0035 0.0032 0.0257 0.0387 0.0030 0.0072 0.0718 
croat 0.0134 0.2548 0.0113 0 0.0037 0.0003 0.0112 0.0299 0.0008 0.0008 0.0473 0.0405 0.0024 0.0043 0.0406 0.0035 0.0760 0.0368 
czeck 0.0104 0.0228 0.0215 0.0255 0 0.0097 0.0435 0.0100 0.0172 0.0186 0.0111 0.0156 0.0589 0.0280 0.0206 0.1963 0.0281 0.2253 
esto 0.0000 0.0002 0.0005 0.0004 0.0013 0 0.0018 0.0000 0.1269 0.0685 0.0001 0.0001 0.0039 0.0003 0.0004 0.0008 0.0006 0.0702 
hung 0.0097 0.0588 0.0264 0.0361 0.0343 0.0151 0 0.0193 0.0111 0.0108 0.0108 0.0384 0.0325 0.0715 0.0545 0.0761 0.0387 0.1830 
koso 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0013 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0023 0.0012 
latv 0.0000 0.0001 0.0009 0.0003 0.0016 0.1053 0.0013 0.0000 0 0.1193 0.0001 0.0000 0.0060 0.0004 0.0006 0.0018 0.0007 0.0322 
lithu 0.0000 0.0002 0.0018 0.0009 0.0027 0.0815 0.0021 0.0000 0.1806 0 0.0003 0.0000 0.0137 0.0010 0.0010 0.0021 0.0017 0.0372 
maced 0.0236 0.0120 0.0220 0.0117 0.0003 0.0000 0.0010 0.2343 0.0000 0.0001 0 0.0104 0.0006 0.0015 0.0350 0.0003 0.0056 0.0185 
monte 0.0009 0.0000 0.0001 0.0024 0.0001 0.0000 0.0006 0.0141 0.0000 0.0000 0.0022 0 0.0001 0.0001 0.0519 0.0000 0.0035 0.0035 
pola 0.0070 0.0176 0.0284 0.0215 0.0705 0.0391 0.0515 0.0133 0.0759 0.1261 0.0295 0.0123 0 0.0377 0.0223 0.0679 0.0268 0.0200 
roma 0.0107 0.0227 0.0689 0.0122 0.0098 0.0009 0.0424 0.0135 0.0010 0.0024 0.0216 0.0097 0.0109 0 0.0366 0.0128 0.0127 0.1134 
serbi 0.0040 0.0000 0.0250 0.0147 0.0019 0.0003 0.0079 0.1914 0.0006 0.0002 0.0818 0.2718 0.0013 0.0042 0 0.0032 0.0266 0.0196 
slovak 0.0020 0.0086 0.0112 0.0117 0.0893 0.0026 0.0420 0.0028 0.0069 0.0053 0.0049 0.0024 0.0257 0.0146 0.0200 0 0.0181 0.0858 
sloven 0.0086 0.1534 0.0131 0.0949 0.0069 0.0015 0.0118 0.0572 0.0019 0.0029 0.0413 0.0595 0.0058 0.0086 0.0619 0.0088 0 0.0590 
EU15 0.8779 0.4353 0.7605 0.6690 0.7734 0.7430 0.7724 0.3024 0.5756 0.6430 0.6244 0.4891 0.8342 0.7984 0.5380 0.6224 0.7208 0 
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Table 4.1b FDI weights 
Note: Bilateral weights are shown in columns and sum up to one. FDI weights are computed based on the average FDI inflows from each country 
in the sample during the period 2003-2007. 
  
Countr
ies alb bosn bulg croat Czeck esto hung koso latv lithu maced monte pola roma serbi slovak sloven EU15 
alb 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0041 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0197 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0659 
bosn 0.0000 0 0.0000 0.0167 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 
bulg 0.0000 0.0000 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
croat 0.0000 0.4184 0.0000 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0394 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2567 0.0363 
czeck 0.0001 0.0012 0.0100 0.0030 0 0.0010 0.0243 0.0000 0.0014 0.0006 0.0018 0.0000 0.0127 0.0052 0.0000 0.6296 0.0026 0.0929 
esto 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0321 0.0056 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0017 
hung 0.0001 0.0001 0.0034 0.0015 0.0021 0.0011 0 0.0000 0.0006 0.0002 0.0001 0.0246 0.0018 0.0797 0.0000 0.0063 0.0010 0.1488 
koso 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
latv 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0563 0.0000 0.0000 0 0.0391 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0087 
lithu 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0111 0.0003 0.0000 0.0538 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0012 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0043 
maced 0.0602 0.0022 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0338 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
monte 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
pola 0.0000 0.0028 0.0043 0.0016 0.0255 0.0049 0.0055 0.0000 0.0250 0.3116 0.0008 0.0000 0 0.0015 0.0000 0.0037 0.0015 0.5729 
roma 0.0000 0.0000 0.0392 0.0026 0.0000 0.0000 0.0217 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0127 
serbi 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
slovak 0.0000 0.0003 0.0023 0.0009 0.2567 0.0002 0.0545 0.0000 0.0005 0.0001 0.0097 0.0000 0.0023 0.0012 0.0000 0 0.0015 0.0436 
sloven 0.0001 0.0687 0.0004 0.0469 0.0011 0.0000 0.0009 0.0629 0.0000 0.0000 0.0538 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0 0.0122 
EU15 0.9393 0.5063 0.9404 0.9268 0.7105 0.9254 0.8928 0.9370 0.8867 0.6428 0.8747 0.9754 0.9816 0.9123 0.9662 0.3603 0.7363 0 
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Table 4.1c Remittance weights 
Note: Bilateral weights are shown in columns and sum up to one. The remittance weights are constructed based on the sum of incoming 
remittances from each country in the sample in 2010. 
Countri
es Alb bosn bulg croat czeck esto hung koso latv lithu maced monte pola roma Serbi slovak sloven EU15 
alb 0 0.0000 0.0008 0.0003 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0624 0.0000 0.0000 0.0095 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0049 
bosn 0.0000 0 0.0000 0.0224 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0017 0.0000 0.0028 0.0015 0.0117 0.0000 0.0004 0.0070 0.0005 0.0448 0.0042 
bulg 0.0179 0.0001 0 0.0001 0.0056 0.0014 0.0118 0.0252 0.0006 0.0049 0.0342 
-
0.0002 0.0003 0.0041 0.0077 0.0001 0.0018 0.0292 
croat 0.0045 0.2124 0.0003 0 0.0000 0.0009 0.0290 0.0090 0.0002 0.0001 0.0233 0.0298 0.0003 0.0001 0.0308 0.0001 0.1405 0.0320 
czeck 0.0032 0.0012 0.0207 0.0017 0 0.0003 0.0037 0.0017 0.0013 0.0019 0.0006 0.0038 0.0022 0.0145 0.0013 0.1012 0.0106 0.1980 
esto 0.0000 0.0000 0.0026 0.0000 0.0000 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.1709 0.0926 0.0009 0.0061 0.0005 0.0000 0.0004 0.0001 0.0000 0.0219 
hung 0.0010 0.0064 0.0373 0.0871 0.0038 0.0002 0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0010 0.1799 0.1064 0.0051 0.0204 0.0167 0.0624 0.0056 0.2108 
koso 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 
latv 0.0000 0.0000 0.0049 0.0000 0.0000 0.0902 0.0000 0.0000 0 0.0726 0.0000 0.0113 0.0003 0.0000 0.0011 0.0002 0.0002 0.0099 
lithu 0.0000 0.0020 0.0063 0.0001 0.0000 0.0955 0.0001 0.0000 0.0595 0 0.0000 0.0065 0.0081 0.0002 0.0016 0.0002 0.0000 0.0151 
maced 0.0000 0.0000 0.0020 0.0013 0.0000 0.0000 0.0073 0.0093 0.0000 0.0000 0 0.0033 0.0000 0.0000 0.0032 0.0000 0.0193 0.0025 
monte 0.0000 0.0017 0.0003 0.0018 0.0000 0.0000 0.0022 0.0000 0.0007 0.0000 0.0007 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0113 0.0000 0.0088 0.0014 
pola 0.0000 0.0044 0.0033 0.0040 0.0170 0.0045 0.0061 0.0000 0.0050 0.1444 0.0009 0.0056 0 0.0037 0.0018 0.0035 0.0095 0.2792 
roma 0.0001 0.0001 0.0091 0.0006 0.0050 0.0022 0.0193 0.0000 0.0001 0.0022 0.0003 0.0003 0.0022 0 0.0057 0.0000 0.0030 0.0841 
serbi 0.0000 0.1814 0.0031 0.0145 0.0000 0.0000 0.0047 0.0065 0.0000 0.0024 0.0340 0.1363 0.0002 0.0031 0 -0.0003 0.0887 0.0168 
slovak 0.0000 0.0068 0.0006 0.0004 0.0415 0.0006 0.0369 0.0003 0.0013 0.0016 0.0000 0.0006 0.0020 0.0004 -0.0009 0 0.0032 0.0658 
sloven 0.0001 0.1136 0.0019 0.0603 0.0015 0.0000 0.0011 0.1552 0.0001 0.0000 0.1120 0.0603 0.0011 0.0005 0.0719 0.0007 0 0.0232 
EU15 0.9732 0.4698 0.9067 0.8054 0.9251 0.8042 0.8778 0.7287 0.7603 0.6735 0.6022 0.6181 0.9777 0.9526 0.8404 0.8313 0.6636 0 
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4.4.2 GVAR model specification 
We use the GVAR Toolbox 2.0 developed by Smith and Galesi (2014) to estimate the 
model. At the onset of the analysis, following the literature review in previous 
chapters, the EU15 countries are aggregated into a region in order to be able to treat 
it as the base ‘country’ and so capture its impact on the ETEs.  
With the exception of the EU15 model, all country models include the same set of 
variables, when data are available. The following domestic variables enter each 
country model: GDP, gdp; exports, exp; foreign direct investment inward flows, FDI; 
foreign credit flows, fcf; remittances, rem; and the foreign credit flows in foreign 
currency, eur. The global variable price of oil, poil, enters as a weakly exogenous 
variable in all country models.  Considering the importance of the EU15 variables for 
the other countries and the EU15's size compared to the transition countries and its 
dominance in the region, it is not expected that other transition countries' variables 
will significantly affect the EU variables, therefore, following the practice adopted in 
the GVAR literature, the foreign country-specific variables are not included in the EU 
model.  Other country models include all the foreign country-specific variables. GDP, 
exports, FDI, foreign credit flows, credit flows in foreign currencies and remittances 
are measured in real terms and transformed to logs. In addition, the cubic spline 
interpolation was used to convert annual data into quarterly data for several 
variables and countries for earlier years where data were not available on a quarterly 
basis. It has to be noted that this technique can only provide estimates of data 
between known data points; it cannot create new “unknown” data. The variable 
specifications are presented in Table 4.2 below.  
     Table 4.2 Variable specification of country VARX*10  models 
Variable Description 
Expected 
impact 
Source 
Units of 
measurement 
Frequency 
EU 
model 
Non-
EU 
Model 
Foreign 
Variables 
EU 
model 
Non-
EU 
Model 
gdp 
Gross 
Domestic 
Product 
n/a EUROSTAT, World Bank log quarterly   gdp*  
exp Exports Negative 
EUROSTAT, World Bank, 
central banks 
log quarterly   exp*  
fdi 
Foreign 
Direct 
Investment 
Negative 
OECD, EUROSTAT, 
European Commission 
log quarterly   fdi*  
fcf 
Foreign 
Credit 
Flows 
Negative 
Bank of International 
Settlements 
log quarterly   fcf*  
rem Remittances Negative World Bank log quarterly   rem*  
eur 
Euroisation 
- foreign 
credit flows 
in foreign 
currencies 
Negative 
OECD, EUROSTAT, 
European Commission 
log quarterly   eur*  
poil Price of oil n/a World Bank log quarterly       
 
                                                             
10 * represents the foreign country-specific variables included in the model. 
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Before proceeding with the next stage of GVAR estimation, different information 
criteria are checked and, based on their results, the benchmark model with respect to 
weighting schemes is selected. More specifically, the performance of the GVAR model 
in terms of stability (related to its eigenvalues) persistence profiles and impulse 
response functions is compared under different weighting schemes. These three 
indicators are crucial with regards to overall stability and performance of the GVAR 
model (Pesaran et al., 2004; Eickemeier and Ng, 2011; Smith and Galesi, 2014). In the 
case of I(1) cointegrated variables, the eigenvalues should lie on or inside the unit 
circle, i.e. no eigenvalue should be above 1. The persistence profiles refer to the time 
profiles of the effects of system or variable-specific shocks on the cointegrating 
relations in the GVAR model (Pesaran and Shin, 1996, 1998) and they have a value of 
unity on impact, while they should tend to zero as n→∞. It was observed that the 
GVAR model that uses only trade weights provides the best performance in terms of 
these indicators (no eigenvalues that lie above the unit circle, persistence profiles 
converge to zero, while the impulse responses, which will be discussed latter, are 
statistically and economically more significant, hence, it was selected as the 
benchmark model. The next section presents the diagnostic tests for the benchmark 
model. 
 Unit root tests 
The standard Dickey-Fuller unit-root tests and weighted symmetric (WS) ADF tests 
(Park and Fuller, 1995) are estimated11. Leybourne et al. (2005) provide evidence of 
the superior performance of the weighted symmetric test statistic compared to the 
standard ADF test or the GLS-ADF test proposed by Elliot et al. (1996). The lag length 
employed in the ADF and WS unit root tests is selected to be 1 for all countries (see 
the next section for further details). Results of the ADF and WS statistics are provided 
for the level, first differences and second differences of all the country and region-
specific domestic and foreign, as well as for the global variables. The results at the 
5% significance level suggest that for the majority of the variables the null of non-
stationarity cannot be rejected (refer to Table 4.3 below for the number of rejections 
of the null hypothesis of non-stationarity, while for the complete set of results, refer 
                                                             
11 The current version of the GVAR toolbox used for estimation of the model does not allow control for 
structural breaks. 
 to tables A4.6 and A4.7 in appendix A4). The test results show that GDP is mostly I(1) 
or borderline I(1) - I(2) (e.g. for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro and 
the Slovak Republic). Exports are I(1) variables for all countries, except for Poland 
where they appear to be I(2). FDI is mostly I(1), except for Bulgaria and Croatia, 
where it appears to be I(2). Remittances appear to be I(0) variables in Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania and the Slovak Republic, while in all other countries they are I(1). Foreign 
credit flows is I(0) in Albania and I(2) in Bulgaria, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Romania. Euroisation is mostly I(1), except for Albania, where it is I(0) and Bulgaria 
and Latvia, where it is I(2).   
Since GDP, exports, FDI and remittances are usually considered as I(1) variables in 
the literature, and taking into account that Dickey-Fuller unit-root tests and weighted 
symmetric ADF tests do not perform well when the number of observations is 
relatively small, after looking at the data plots, we assume these variables to be I(1) 
for all the countries, which allows for long-run cointegration among them. It is 
important to note that GVAR can be estimated in the presence of I(0) variables. 
However, cointegration exists only between I(1) variables. The estimation of the 
model continues under the assumptions of the weak exogeneity of the country-
specific foreign variables and stability of the parameters, which are both needed for 
the GVAR estimation and will be tested at a later stage. 
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Table 4.3 Number of rejection of the null hypothesis of non-stationarity12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Selecting lag length and cointegration rank 
In the next stage, the specifications for individual country models are selected. 
Initially, the order of the individual country VARX models, pi and qi is determined, 
corresponding to the lag orders of domestic and foreign variables, respectively. The 
lag orders are selected according to the Akaike information criterion under the 
constraints imposed by data limitations, where the maximum lag order of domestic 
variables was selected to be 2, while the maximum lag order of foreign variables was 
selected to be 1. However, considering the small number of observations, whilst 
taking into account the results of the serial correlation diagnostics, eigenvalues of the 
model and persistence profiles, and following the practice adopted in the GVAR 
literature, the number of lags is reduced to 1 for both domestic and foreign variables 
in all countries.  
The choice of cointegration rank is a crucial step in the empirical analysis, 
considering that a misspecification of the long-run relationships can destabilise the 
GVAR model and distort the results and impulse response functions (Bussière et al., 
2009). The VARX* can manage within and between country cointegration, and as a 
result country-specific foreign variables also need to be considered for the long-run 
relationships (Pesaran and Smith, 2006), as there are many international long-run 
relationships, e.g. the relationship between remittances and remittance-sending 
                                                             
12 Again, we note that the current version of the GVAR toolbox used for estimation of the 
model does not allow control for structural breaks. 
Variables 
Number of 
countries 
with I(0) 
variables 
Number of 
countries 
with I(2) 
variables 
Number of 
countries 
with I(1) 
variables 
(from 18) 
Gdp 0 4 14 
exp 0 1 17 
FDI 0 2 16 
fcf 1 5 12 
rem 4 0 14 
eur 1 2 15 
 countries' economic performance / GDP. It should be noted that when the sample is 
small, the asymptotic distributions are generally poor approximations to the true 
distributions and can result in substantial size and power distortions (Juselius, 
2006). However, the definition of a "small" or "big" sample is not straightforward, 
being based on the number of observations and also on the amount of information in 
the data. When the data are very informative about a hypothetical long-run relation, 
we might have good test properties even if the sample period is relatively short 
(Juselius, 2006). It is also important to note that the cointegration rank is not in 
general equivalent to the number of theoretical equilibrium relations derived from 
an economic model. Namely, cointegration between variables is a statistical property 
of the data that only exceptionally can be given a direct interpretation as an economic 
equilibrium relation. The reason for this is that a theoretically meaningful relation 
can be a linear combination of several ‘irreducible’ cointegration relations (Davidson, 
2002).  The rank orders of the VARX models are estimated based on Johansen’s trace 
statistic, as set out in Pesaran et al. (2000) for models with weakly exogenous I(1) 
regressors. The critical values for models including weakly exogenous variables are 
obtained from Mackinnon et al. (1999). However, considering that the GVAR model 
with the reported integrating relations (table 4.4) was not stable, i.e. there were a 
number of eigenvalues lying above the unit circle and the persistent profiles did not 
converge to zero even after 40 periods, then following Smith and Galesi (2014), the 
number of cointegrating relations was decreased in the countries where the 
persistence profiles did not converge to zero after 40 periods, or where they did 
converge to zero in a manner that clearly indicated a problem in the underlying 
vector. Table 4.4 below reports the final order of the VARX* models and the number 
of cointegration relations. The persistence profiles under the final number of 
cointegrating vectors are presented in Figure A4.8 in appendix A4. 
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 Testing for weak exogeneity 
The main assumption of the GVAR methodology is the weak exogeneity of foreign 
variables. After estimating each country model, the weak exogeneity hypothesis of 
country-specific foreign variables and global variables (oil prices) has to be tested. 
The weak exogeneity assumption is verified by employing a test developed by 
Johansen (1992) and Harbo et al. (1998) which checks the joint significance of the 
estimated error correction terms in auxiliary equations for the country-specific 
foreign variables. In particular, for each 𝑙𝑡ℎelement of 𝑋𝑖𝑡
∗  the following regression is 
carried out: 
∆𝑥𝑖𝑡,𝑙 = a𝑖,𝑙 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑗,𝑙
𝑟𝑖
𝑗=1 𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛷𝑖𝑘,𝑙
𝑞𝑖
𝑘=1 ∆𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 +∑ ¥𝑖𝑚,𝑙∆𝑥 𝑖,𝑡−𝑚
∗ + ɳ𝑖𝑡,𝑙
𝑞𝑖∗
𝑚=1                  (4.3) 
Table 4.4 Chosen lag length and cointegration rank 
Country p q 
Number of 
cointegrating 
relations 
based on 
Johansen 
trace statistics 
Final number 
of 
cointegrating 
relations 
ALBANIA 1 1 5 2 
BOSNIA 1 1 3 2 
BULGARIA 1 1 4 4 
CROATIA 1 1 3 3 
CZECK 
REPUBLIC 
1 1 4 4 
ESTONIA 1 1 3 3 
EURO 1 1 0 0 
HUNGARY 1 1 2 2 
KOSOVO 1 1 2 2 
LATVIA 1 1 4 4 
LITHUANIA 1 1 3 3 
MACEDONIA 1 1 3 3 
MONTENEGRO 1 1 4 1 
POLAND 1 1 3 3 
ROMANIA 1 1 3 3 
SERBIA 1 1 2 2 
SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC 
1 1 3 3 
SLOVENIA 1 1 4 4 
 where 𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1,  𝑗 = 1, 2,…, 𝑟𝑖, are the estimated error-correction terms corresponding 
to the 𝑟𝑖 cointegrating relations found for the ith country model, 𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗  is the 𝑘𝑖
∗𝑋 1 
vector of country-specific foreign variables that have to be weakly exogenous, 𝑞𝑖 and 
𝑞𝑖
∗ are the lag orders of the domestic and foreign variables respectively,  𝑎𝑖,𝑙 is a 
constant, t  is a linear trend, and ɳ𝑖𝑡,𝑙 is the 𝑘𝑖X 1 vector of idiosyncratic, serially 
uncorrelated, country-specific shocks. For the weak exogeneity assumption to hold, 
the ECM of the above equation must not be statistically significant. The test for weak 
exogeneity is a F-test of the joint hypothesis that  
𝛿𝑖𝑗,𝑙 = 0,  j= 1,2,…, 𝑟𝑖 in the above regression. 
A weakly exogenous variable can be defined as a variable whose value does not 
depend on the contemporaneous values of the endogenous variables, but may 
depend on lagged values of these variables. Formally, the weak exogeneity of foreign 
variables means that domestic variables do not affect foreign variables in the long-
run, while they are affected by them. This assumption allows proper identification of 
the co-integration relation as noted in Johansen (1992). The results of the test are 
reported in Table 4.5 below. These suggest that the weak exogeneity assumption is 
not rejected for most of the variables. Nevertheless, the weak exogeneity assumption 
is rejected at the 5% significance level for the following two variables: exports from 
Macedonia and foreign credit flows to Montenegro. Even though, based on the results 
of the test, weak exogeneity holds for all variables of the EU15 region, we decided to 
exclude all the foreign variables in the EU15 model, since EU15 is considered as the 
dominant ‘country’ in our model and we would not expect other smaller countries to 
significantly affect its variables.  
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Table 4.5 Test for weak exogeneity at the 5% significance level 
 
Note: The numbers in bold indicate rejection of null hypothesis of weak exogeneity at 5% 
significance level. 
 
 Testing for structural breaks 
The following tests for structural stability are performed: Ploberger and Krämer’s 
(1992) maximal OLS cumulative sum (CUSUM) statistic, denoted by PKsup, and its 
mean square variant PKmsq; tests for parameter constancy against non-stationary 
alternatives proposed by Nyblom (1989), denoted by X. These tests also include 
several sequential Wald-type tests of a one-time structural change at an unknown 
change point: the Wald form of Quandt’s (1960) likelihood ratio statistic (QLR), the 
mean Wald statistic (MW) of Hansen (1992) and Andrews and Ploberger (1994) 
Wald statistic based on the exponential average (APW). The heteroskedasticity-
robust versions of the above tests are also presented. Table 4.6 below reports the 
number of rejections of the null hypothesis of structural stability based on countries 
and variables at the 90% confidence level. The results vary across the variables and 
tests. Using PK tests, the null hypothesis of structural stability is rejected in at most 4 
out of the total number of 192 cases. Looking at the other four tests (Nyblom, QLR, 
Country F test Fcrit_0.05 gdps exps FDIs fcls rems eurs poil 
ALBANIA F(2,16) 3.63 0.21 0.59 0.29 0.02 3.56 0.12 1.66 
BOSNIA F(2,18) 3.55 0.41 3.51 0.19 0.37 0.00 1.17 0.69 
BULGARIA F(4,14) 3.11 1.24 1.04 1.67 1.20 1.32 0.83 2.58 
CROATIA F(3,30) 2.92 0.64 0.23 0.84 0.13 0.56 0.14 1.15 
CZECK 
REPUBLIC F(4,14) 3.11 0.76 2.07 0.06 0.31 0.43 0.95 1.45 
ESTONIA F(3,15) 3.29 1.50 0.19 2.04 0.23 0.32 0.21 1.37 
HUNGARY F(2,16) 3.63 0.37 0.01 3.68 0.75 0.08 0.78 0.05 
KOSOVO F(2,33) 3.28 0.38 0.33 0.14 1.23 0.76 2.00 0.49 
LATVIA F(4,14) 3.11 0.35 0.31 0.90 0.16 2.03 0.27 0.34 
LITHUANIA F(3,15) 3.29 0.21 0.45 1.03 0.28 0.75 0.19 1.25 
MACEDONIA F(3,15) 3.29 1.43 5.99 0.24 1.48 0.18 0.14 1.16 
MONTENEGRO F(1,21) 4.32 0.01 0.54 3.96 5.17 2.39 2.79 0.14 
POLAND F(3,15) 3.29 1.60 0.49 1.30 1.68 0.51 2.58 1.37 
ROMANIA F(3,15) 3.29 2.00 1.84 0.13 0.74 0.77 0.98 0.53 
SERBIA F(2,22) 3.44 2.59 2.53 1.57 1.76 2.14 2.62 0.11 
SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC F(3,15) 3.29 0.74 0.66 1.20 0.23 0.64 0.61 0.19 
SLOVENIA F(4,14) 3.11 2.66 1.77 0.38 0.70 0.90 0.18 2.33 
 MW, APW), the results depend on whether the heteroscedasticity-robust versions of 
these tests were used. The results of the robust versions of these tests are in line with 
the PK tests. However, the non-robust versions of these four tests show a larger 
number of rejections of structural stability hypothesis, 41(QLR) and 40(APW) out of 
the 192 cases. The results of all the tests indicate that the main reason for rejection of 
the structural stability hypothesis is the breaks in the error variances and not in the 
parameter coefficients.  
In conclusion, the results suggest that there is structural instability, but it seems to be 
present mainly in the error variances. Therefore, a conservative approach to 
inference is adopted in GVAR by using bootstrap medians and confidence intervals 
when interpreting the impulse responses.  
 Table 4.6 Number of rejection of structural stability hypothesis per variables and 
different test statistics 
 
 
 Contemporaneous effects of foreign variables on their domestic counterparts 
The contemporaneous effects of foreign variables on their domestic counterparts can 
be interpreted as impact elasticities between the domestic and foreign variables and 
they reveal the international linkages between the domestic and foreign variables 
(Dées et al., 2007). They are estimated together with t-ratios computed based on 
standard, as well as White and Newey-West adjusted variance matrices. High 
elasticities between domestic and foreign variables imply strong co-movements 
  Number of rejections (%) at 90% significance level   
Test 
statistics 
gdp exp fdi fcf rem eur  total 
PK sup 2(0.06) 0(0.00) 3(0.10) 1(0.03) 1(0.03) 0(0.00) 7(0.04) 
PK msq 1(0.03) 0(0.00) 3(0.10) 1(0.03) 1(0.03) 0(0.00) 6(0.03) 
Nyblom 2(0.06) 0(0.00) 4(0.13) 1(0.03) 3(0.10) 1(0.03) 11(0.06) 
Robust 
Nyblom 
1(0.03) 0(0.00) 4(0.13) 2(0.07) 2(0.07) 1(0.03) 10(0.05) 
QLR 8(0.31) 4(0.13) 9(0.29) 7(0.07) 7(0.24) 6(0.21) 41(0.21) 
Robust QLR 1(0.03) 0(0.00) 1(0.03) 0(0.00) 0(0.00) 0(0.00) 2(0.01) 
MW 5(0.16) 5(0.16) 7(0.22) 6(0.21) 5(0.17) 4(0.13) 29(0.15) 
Robust MW 0(0.00) 0(0.00) 0(0.00) 1(0.03) 0(0.00) 0(0.00) 1(0.01) 
APW 8(0.31) 4(0.13) 8(0.26) 7(0.04) 7(0.24) 6(0.21) 40(0.21) 
Robust APW 1(0.03) 0(0.00) 0(0.00) 1(0.03) 0(0.00) 0(0.00) 2(0.01) 
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between these variables (Smith and Galesi, 2014). Table A4.9 in appendix A4 reports 
these coefficients as well as their Newey-West t-ratios.   
We observe a significant elasticity between the foreign and the domestic exports, 
indicating that trade linkages are likely to be strong among countries in our model. 
For example, for Kosovo, the results suggest that a 1% increase in foreign exports in 
a given quarter leads to a 0.75% increase in domestic exports in the same quarter. 
We also observe a significant elasticity between domestic and foreign variables of 
GDP, indicating close co-movements of this variable in the countries included in the 
model. In contrast, we find fewer statistically significant elasticities for FDI, 
suggesting that in the short run the domestic FDI in most countries is not affected 
significantly by changes in foreign FDI. 
 Pair-wise cross-country correlations: variables and residuals 
One of the basic assumptions of the GVAR modelling approach is that the country-
specific shocks are cross-sectionally ‘weakly correlated’ so that the weak exogeneity 
of the foreign variables is ensured (Dées et al., 2007; Smith and Galesi, 2014).13  We 
follow Dées et al. (2007) in checking this assumption by calculating pairwise cross-
section correlations for the levels and first differences of the endogenous variables of 
the model, as well as those of the associated residuals over the selected estimation 
period. These are computed as follows: for every country for each given variable, the 
pairwise correlation of that country with each of the remaining countries is 
computed, and averaged across countries. In Table A4.10 in appendix A4 we report 
the average cross section correlations. The results differ across variables and 
countries. However, they are generally higher for the level and fall in the first 
differences. Trade levels show the highest degree of cross section correlations of 
around 43%-90%. The FDI levels also show a high degree of cross section correlation 
with an average across countries of 71%, which is followed by the levels of 
remittances, with an average of 45%, and EU integration variable, with an average 
cross section correlation of 30%. In contrast, very small correlation coefficients are 
                                                             
13 Ideally, we would specify our model with period dummies to attenuate cross-country error 
correlation. Unfortunately, the current version of the GVAR toolbox does not allow for this. 
 found for the residuals from the VECM models, which is an indication that the model 
has been successful in capturing the unobserved global common effects.14  
4.4.3 Dynamic analysis using generalized impulse response functions and 
generalized forecast error variance decomposition 
This section investigates the dynamic properties of the GVAR model based on 
generalized impulse response functions (GIRFs) and generalized forecast error 
variance decomposition. Impulse responses, proposed by Koop et al. (1996) for non-
linear models and developed further in Pesaran and Shin (1998) and Pesaran and 
Smith (1998) for vector error correcting models, refer to the time profile of the 
effects of variable-specific shocks or identified shocks on the future states of a 
dynamic system and thus on all the variables in the model (Smith and Galesi, 2014). 
Identification of shocks in a GVAR is difficult, as in standard VARs, but is further 
complicated due to the cross-country interactions and the high dimensionality of the 
model (Chudik and Pesaran, 2016). Hence, in the absence of strong a priori beliefs on 
the ordering of the variables and countries in the GVAR model, although the GIRFs 
cannot identify the origins of shocks they do provide useful information about the 
dynamics of the transmission of shocks. In this study, the EU region is considered as 
the possible source of shocks. The GIRFs are provided for a period of 40 quarters. 
However, only the impulse responses of the first 8-10 quarters are considered for 
interpretation. Due to the relatively large number of countries included in the model, 
in order to simplify discussion of the impulse responses and focus the interpretation 
on the common patterns of responses based on specific regions, the ETEs are 
aggregated into these sub-regions:15 Baltic countries, which include Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania; Balkan countries, which include Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Serbia; the rest of the ETEs, which include the 
Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia 
and Croatia; and the previously aggregated EU countries. 
                                                             
14 By conditioning the country-specific models on weakly exogenous foreign variables, 
viewed as proxies for the “common” global factors, it is reasonable to expect that the degree 
of correlation of the remaining shocks across countries/regions will be modest. 
15 This procedure yields similar results to individual country estimation. However, it is easier 
to interpret our findings in groups compared to individual countries. 
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The generalized forecast error-variance decomposition (GFEVD) is also employed to 
investigate the international linkages between EU and ETEs. GFEVD provides useful 
information about the international transmission channels through which shocks are 
propagated (Galesi and Sgherri, 2009). GFEVD allocates the forecast error variance of 
the shock to its respective variables and regions, where the relative contributions 
measure the importance of the innovation to a given region’s variable to the rest of 
the regions’ variables (Di Mauro and Pesaran, 2013). In the results presented in 
figures 4.1 and 4.2, the impulse responses stabilise relatively quickly, suggesting that 
the estimated GVAR model is stable. This is confirmed by the eigenvalues of the GVAR 
model, which are all within the unit circle and by the persistence profiles, which 
converge to zero relatively quickly. However, the bootstrap simulation provides 
rapidly widening confidence bands around the impulse responses, which is most 
likely a result of the short time series included in the model.  
Impulse response functions of one standard error shock to GDP in EU 
This subsection reports the effects of a one standard error negative shock in the 
EU15 GDP, (which corresponds to a 0.3% decline) on five variables of interest: GDP; 
exports; FDI; foreign credit flows and remittances.  
Figure 4.1 reports the regional impulse response functions (in order to simplify the 
comparison, only point estimates are presented without the standard error bands) of 
GDP to a shock in EU's GDP using trade weights, FDI weights and remittance weights. 
These show the effect in each quarter, not the cumulative effect. The graphs indicate 
that the effect of the shock to GDP is stronger in all regions when using trade weights 
to construct the foreign country-specific variables, indicating that trade represents 
the strongest linkage between ETEs and European advanced countries. In addition, 
as discussed in sub-section 4.2.2, it is observed that the GVAR model using only trade 
weights provides the best performance in terms of persistence profiles and 
eigenvalues, hence we selected it as the benchmark model.  
  
 Figure 4.1 Regional impulse response functions (point estimates) of GDP to a one 
standard error shock to GDP in EU15 - remittance weights vs. trade weights vs. FDI 
weights 
 
Note: Figures are impulse responses (point estimates) to a one standard error fall in the EU’s 
GDP. The impact is in percentages and the horizon is quarterly. 
Next, the impulse response functions of the variables of interest are discussed, 
keeping in mind that trade weights were used to construct the foreign country-
specific variables. Figure 4.2 presents the regional impulse response functions of 
GDP, exports, FDI, foreign credit flows and remittances to a one standard error shock 
to aggregate EU GDP. The lower and upper bands represent the 90% confidence 
intervals and the middle band represents the actual impact of the shock in the 
respective variable. The impact is considered to be statistically significant when all 
three bands are below or above the X axis (zero line).  Although the 90% confidence 
intervals figures suggest statistical insignificance or borderline significance of the 
impulse response functions in some cases, there is an economic interest in analysing 
whether the dynamic behaviour of the variables used in the model are moving in a 
synchronised way across countries. The Baltic countries display the most severe and 
statistically significant impact from the shock in EU15 on their GDP, possibly due to 
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their stronger trade links with the EU15 countries.16 They experience a decline of 
0.3% on impact, which then rises by the seventh quarter to 0.7% and dissipates in 
the following periods. The Balkan transition countries also display a severe impact 
from the shock to the EU15's GDP, with a decline of their GDP by 0.3% on impact, 
which increases to 0.5% and stabilises by the eighth quarter. In the other CE 
countries, the GDP falls by 0.15% on impact and stabilises in the eighth quarter at 
about 0.3% (see Figure 4.2). 
As expected, exports are also negatively affected by a GDP shock in EU15. From the 
regional perspective, exports from the Balkan countries appear to be most severely 
affected by the shock in the EU15, even though the impact is at the borderline of the 
10% level of statistical significance. The CE transition countries also display a severe 
and statistically significant impact from a shock to EU15 GDP on their exports which 
stabilises at a 0.6% decline by the eighth quarter. Contrary to the strong and 
synchronized regional GDP and exports responses to the EU15 GDP shock, the 
generalized impulse responses of FDI to the GDP shock are statistically insignificant 
or close to borderline significance at the 10% level, indicating that economic shocks 
in the EU15 may not have a severe impact on FDI flows. The Balkan transition 
countries display the most severe and statistically significant impact from the shock 
in the EU15's GDP with a decline of their FDI by 0.5% on impact, which then rises by 
the fifth quarter to 1% and stabilises in the following periods. 
On average, all regions experience a fall in foreign credit flows of 1%-5% following a 
negative shock to GDP in EU15. The impulse response functions stabilise after about 
8 quarters. The effect is strongest in the Balkan countries; however, it appears to be 
statistically insignificant, though close to the 10% borderline of statistical 
significance across all regions. 
All regions experience a fall in remittances of 1%-5% following a negative shock to 
GDP in EU15. The impulse response functions stabilise after about 8 quarters. 
However, the affect appears to be statistically insignificant across all regions except 
                                                             
16 The average share of exports of the Baltic countries to the EU15 during the period 2005-
2007 was 65% of their total exports. 
 for the Baltic countries, where it appears to be at the 10% borderline of statistical 
significance. 
 
Figure 4.2 Regional impulse response functions of GDP, exports, FDI, foreign credit 
flows and remittances to a one standard error shock to GDP in EU with their 90% 
confidence bands 
 
 
 
 
Note: Figures are median generalized impulse responses to a one standard error fall in the 
EU’s GDP, together with the 10 percent confidence bands. The impact is in percentages and 
the horizon is quarterly. 
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Generalized forecast error variance decomposition 
 Shock to GDP in the Balkan Countries 
Following a historical shock to GDP in the Balkan countries, we analyse which of the 
variables and regions explain most of the forecast error variance decomposition in 
the short run. More specifically, the forecast error variance of the simulated shock is 
allocated into respective variables and regions and the importance of innovations in 
all the variables is checked.  Results are presented in Table A4.11 in appendix A4. We 
observe that among Balkan countries' variables, in the short run, on impact the GDP 
explains most of the forecast error variance decomposition, it contributes 12% of the 
variance of the historical shock. On the other hand, exports contribute to the variance 
in the GDP shock with 10%, remittances with 3%, foreign credit flows with 4%, FDI 
with 3% and foreign currency credit flows with 2%. The average relative importance 
of all the variables that explain the shock increases over time. In addition, we also 
look at the contribution of each region to the explanation of the forecast error 
variance, since this illustrates how important are the international linkages in the 
international transmission of shocks. As expected, the foreign regions that contribute 
mostly to the variance in the shock to the GDP in the Balkan countries are: the EU 
which, on impact, contributes to the shock with 38%; other ETEs contribute to the 
shock with 19%; while the Baltic countries contribute 8% to the shock. The average 
relative importance of all the variables of other regions that explain the shock 
decreases over time. 
 Shock to GDP in the Baltic countries 
Following a historical shock to GDP in the Baltic countries, we now assess which of 
the following Baltic countries' variables explain most of the forecast error variance 
decomposition in the short run. The results are presented in Table A4.12 in appendix 
A4.  Similar to the EU and the Balkan region, GDP explains most of the variance of the 
shock in the GDP (7%); foreign credit flows explain 5% of the variance of the shock; 
credit flows in foreign currency explains 5% of the variation; FDI explains 1%; 
remittances 0.3% and exports 0.1%. The average relative importance of the variables 
in the Baltic region that explain the shock decreases over time. In addition, we also 
look at the contribution of each region to the explanation of the forecast error 
variance. As expected, the foreign regions that contribute most to the variance in the 
 shock to GDP in the Baltic countries are: the EU, which, on impact, contributes to the 
shock with 57%; other ETEs contribute 10%; while the Balkan countries contribute 
14%.  
 Shock to GDP in CE transition countries 
After a historical shock to GDP in CE transition countries, we observe that, among 
other EU variables, in the short run, remittances explain most of the forecast error 
variance decomposition. It contributes 10% to the variance of the historical shock, 
while foreign credit flows contribute to the shock with 3%, credit flows in foreign 
currency 3%, FDI 2% and exports 1%. As expected, the foreign regions that 
contribute mostly to the variance in the shock to GDP in CE countries are: the EU, 
which, on impact, contributes to the shock with 50%; the Balkan countries contribute 
19%; while the Baltic countries contribute to the shock with 9%. The complete set of 
results is presented in Table A4.13 in appendix A4. 
4.4.4 Robustness analysis  
In this section we modify the baseline model in two ways. Firstly, given the relatively 
small number of observations and large number of variables included in the baseline 
model, which reduces the degrees of freedom available to estimate the parameters' 
variability, we investigate whether the statistical significance of the impulse 
responses of the main variables changes when reducing the number of variables in 
the model. Namely, we estimate the GVAR model with these core variables 
representing the main transmission channels: exports, FDI, foreign credit flows and 
GDP. Secondly, we analyse the transmission of shocks from advanced EU countries to 
ETEs in sub-samples, which are defined by various country features. Consequently, 
we address one of the main aims of the thesis, i.e. to analyse whether country 
structural characteristics influence the transmission of the GFC. In addition, splitting 
the sample in various ways also enables us to deal with country heterogeneity in a 
more careful manner, since sub-samples analysed here consist of more homogenous 
groups than the entire sample of 15 transition countries.    
In the results presented in the figures, we can see that the impulse responses 
stabilise relatively quickly, suggesting that the estimated GVAR model is stable. This 
is confirmed by the eigenvalues of the GVAR model, which are all within the unit 
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circle and by the persistence profiles, which converge to zero relatively quickly. We 
observe that the impulse response results are similar in terms of shape, signs and 
magnitudes, suggesting that the estimated impulse responses do not differ 
significantly; however, the confidence bands are generally below zero, which 
indicates more statistical significance. Persistence profiles and other diagnostic tests 
are presented in appendix A4.  
Impulse response functions of a one standard error shock to GDP in the EU 
This subsection reports the effects of a one standard error negative shock to the GDP 
of the EU region (around a 0.3% GDP decline) on four variables of interest: GDP; 
exports; FDI; and foreign credit flows. Although the 90% confidence intervals suggest 
only borderline statistical significance of the impulse response functions in some 
cases, there is nonetheless economic interest in analysing whether the dynamic 
behaviour of the variables used in our model are moving in a synchronised way 
across countries. Figure 4.3 presents the regional impulse response functions 
together with their 10% confidence bands. As can be seen in this Figure, the negative 
shock to the GDP in the EU15 region results in decreases in the GDP of all regions in 
the model. The impulse responses in general follow the same pattern: in the first 
quarters there is an immediate decline in GDP, but the impact stabilizes after 6-10 
quarters. The Baltic countries display the most severe and statistically significant 
impact from the shock in their GDP with a decline of 0.01% on impact, which then 
rises by the seventh quarter to 0.6% and dissipates in the following periods. Across 
other regions, the GDP falls by similar amounts (around 0.2%-0.3%). The Balkan 
transition countries also display a severe impact from the shock to the EU's GDP, with 
a decline of their GDP by 0.15% on impact increasing to 0.3% by the eighth quarter 
and then stabilising. In CE countries, the GDP falls by 0.1% on impact and stabilises in 
the sixth quarter at a decline of about 0.2% compared to the pre-shock level. As 
expected, exports are also negatively affected by the GDP shock in EU, varying 
between 0.5% and 1%.  The exports impulse response pattern is similar across all 
regions, showing an initial decline of 0.5% during the first two quarters following the 
shock, and then oscillating and dissipating in about 5-8 quarters. From the regional 
perspective, the exports from Balkan countries appear to be the most severely 
affected by a shock to EU GDP, even though the impact is at the borderline of the 10% 
 statistical significance level. The CE transition countries also display a severe and 
statistically significant impact from a shock to EU GDP on their exports, which 
stabilises at a 0.59% decline by the eighth quarter. Similar behaviour is observed also 
across the Baltic countries, even though the effect is statistically significant only in 
the third quarter. The effect of the shock to EU GDP on foreign credit flows is the 
strongest in the Baltic countries; the foreign credit flows decline by 2% by the eighth 
quarter. The generalized impulse responses of foreign credit flows are weaker and 
clearly statistically insignificant for Balkan countries. CE transition countries also 
show a negative decline in foreign credit flows following a shock to the EU GDP. The 
generalized impulse responses of FDI to the GDP shock are both small and borderline 
at the 10% significance level. The Baltic countries display the most severe and 
statistically significant impact from the shock in the EU GDP with a decline of 1% on 
impact, which then rises by the eighth quarter to 2.2% and dissipates in the following 
periods. 
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Figure 4.3 Regional impulse response functions of GDP, exports, foreign credit flows 
and FDI to a one standard error shock to GDP in the EU15, with 90% confidence 
bands (trade weights) 
 
 
 
Note: Figures are median generalized impulse responses to a one standard error fall in EU’s 
GDP, together with the 10 percent confidence bands. The impact is in percentages and the 
horizon is quarterly. 
Figure 4.4 shows the generalized impulse response of GDP, exports, FDI and foreign 
credit flows in EU transition countries versus non-EU transition countries to the 
negative one standard error shock to the EU's GDP. As expected, almost all variables 
in both sub-samples are negatively affected by the GDP shock in the EU, varying 
between 0.2% and 1%. However, the impact of the shock is larger in all the variables 
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 of the non-EU transition countries. The GDPs impulse response pattern is similar in 
both sub-samples, showing an initial decline of 0.2% during the first four quarters 
following the shock and stabilising by the fourth quarter at 0.2% decline in the EU 
transition countries and 0.3% decline in the non-EU transition countries. The 
impulse response function of exports in non-EU transition countries show a decline 
which stabilises at 1% by the second quarter, while in the EU transition countries the 
impulse response stabilises at a 0.55% decline by the eighth quarter. Nevertheless, it 
should be pointed out that the impact has a higher statistical significance in non-EU 
transition countries, while it is at the borderline of the 10% significance level in EU 
transition countries.  Similarly, the effects of the shock to EU GDP on foreign credit 
flows and FDI are the strongest in the non-EU transition countries; the foreign credit 
flows decline by 1.2% by the eighth quarter and FDI declines by 0.9% by the eighth 
quarter. For EU transition countries, the generalized impulse responses of foreign 
credit flows and FDI are weaker and statistically insignificant, or at the borderline of 
the 10% statistical significance in the case of FDI.  
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Figure 4.4 Impulse response functions to a one standard error shock to GDP in EU15 
with their 90% confidence bands (EU transition countries vs. NON-EU transition 
countries) 
 
 
 
Note: Figures are median generalized impulse responses to a one standard error fall in EU’s 
GDP, together with the 10 percent confidence bands. The impact is in percentages and the 
horizon is quarterly. 
-0.007
-0.006
-0.005
-0.004
-0.003
-0.002
-0.001
0
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40
EU GDP 
-0.01
-0.008
-0.006
-0.004
-0.002
0
0.002
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40
Non-EU GDP 
-0.014
-0.012
-0.01
-0.008
-0.006
-0.004
-0.002
0
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40
EU exports 
-0.03
-0.025
-0.02
-0.015
-0.01
-0.005
0
0.005
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40
Non-EU exports 
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40
EU FCF 
-0.04
-0.035
-0.03
-0.025
-0.02
-0.015
-0.01
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40
Non-EU FCF 
-0.025
-0.02
-0.015
-0.01
-0.005
0
0.005
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40
EU FDI 
-0.03
-0.025
-0.02
-0.015
-0.01
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40
Non-EU FDI 
  
Figure 4.5 shows the generalized impulse response of GDP, exports, FDI and foreign 
credit flows in countries with a high degree of euroisation versus countries with a 
low degree of euroisation to a negative one standard error shock to the EU's GDP. All 
variables are negatively affected by the EU GDP shock in both sub-samples, varying 
between 0.1% and 2%. The impact of the shock is larger and statistically more 
significant in highly euroised countries' GDPs. The impulse response functions of GDP 
show a decline which stabilises by the fifth quarter at -0.3% for highly euroised 
countries and -0.1% for countries with a lower degree of euroisation. Other variables 
impulse response patterns are similar between both sub-samples, showing an initial 
decline of 0.2%-2% during the first four quarters following the shock and stabilising 
by the eighth quarter.  
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Figure 4.5 Regional impulse response functions to one standard error shock to GDP 
in EU15 with their 90% confidence bands (Highly euroised countries vs. lowly 
euroised countries) 
 
 
 
Note: Figures are median generalized impulse responses to a one standard error fall in EU’s 
GDP, together with the 10 percent confidence bands. The impact is in percentages and the 
horizon is quarterly. 
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Figure 4.6 shows the generalized impulse response of GDP, exports, FDI and foreign 
credit flows in more open transition countries versus less open transition countries 
to a negative one standard error shock to the EU's GDP. As expected, almost all 
variables are negatively affected by the EU GDP shock in both sub-samples, varying 
between 0.2% and 1%. The impact of the shock is larger on the GDP and the exports 
of the more open economies compared to the less open economies and it is slightly 
smaller for foreign credit flows and FDI in more open economies. The GDP impulse 
response functions show a decline which stabilises at 0.2% by the eighth quarter in 
both sub-samples; however, the effect is statistically more significant in more open 
economies. The impulse response function of exports in more open economies shows 
an initial decline of 0.7%, which stabilises at 0.6% by the eighth quarter, while in the 
less open transition countries the impulse response stabilises at a 0.5% decline by 
the eighth quarter. The effect of the shock to EU GDP on foreign credit flows and FDI 
is stronger and more statistically significant in less open transition countries.  
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Figure 4.6 Regional impulse response functions to one standard error shock to GDP 
in EU15 with their 90% confidence bands (highly open countries vs. lowly open 
countries) 
 
 
 
Note: Figures are median generalized impulse responses to a one standard error fall in EU’s 
GDP, together with the 10 percent confidence bands. The impact is in percentages and the 
horizon is quarterly. 
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 4.4.5 The effects of increased financial stress in the EU15 
In this section the baseline model is modified in two ways. Firstly, given the relatively 
small number of observations included in the baseline model, the dataset is extended 
by using observations from the first quarter of 1999 to the fourth quarter of 2014 to 
estimate the 16 country/region-specific VARX* models. However, due to data 
availability, two countries were dropped from estimation (Kosovo and Montenegro). 
Secondly, given this study’s objective to analyse the macroeconomic effects of 
increased global financial market volatility, we include an indicator to measure the 
systemic stress in advanced economies in our framework. This indicator for 
advanced economies is the composite indicator of systemic stress (CISS), constructed 
by Holló et al. (2012), which measures the contemporaneous state of instability in 
the financial system. The CISS can be interpreted as a measure of the systemic risk 
that has materialised already (Holló et al., 2012). The CISS is composed of 15 mostly 
market-based financial stress measures17 equally split into five categories, namely 
the financial intermediaries’ sector, money markets, equity markets, bond markets 
and foreign exchange markets, which represent the most important segments of an 
economy’s financial system. In the results presented in the figures, we can see that 
the impulse responses stabilise relatively quickly, suggesting that the estimated 
GVAR model is stable. This is confirmed by the eigenvalues of the GVAR model, which 
are all within the unit circle and by the persistence profiles, which converge to zero 
relatively quickly. Persistence profiles and other diagnostic tests are presented in 
appendix A4. However, here as well it should be pointed out that the bootstrap 
simulation provides rapidly widening confidence bands around the impulse 
                                                             
17 Realised volatility of the 3-month Euribor rate; interest rate spread between 3-month 
Euribor and 3-month French T-bills; Monetary Financial Institution’s (MFI) emergency 
lending at Eurosystem central banks; realised volatility of the German 10-year benchmark 
government bond index; yield spread between A-rated non-financial corporations and 
government bonds; 10-year interest rate swap spread; realised volatility of the DataStream 
non-financial sector stock market index: CMAX for the DataStream non-financial sector stock 
market index; stock-bond correlation; realised volatility of the idiosyncratic equity return of 
the DataStream bank sector stock market index over the total market index; yield spread 
between A-rated financial and non-financial corporations (7-year maturity); CMAX as 
defined above interacted with the inverse price-book ratio (book-price ratio) for the financial 
sector equity market index; and realised volatility of the euro exchange rate vis-à-vis the US 
dollar, the Japanese Yen and the British Pound, respectively. 
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responses, which is again most likely a result of the short time series available for 
estimation. 
Impulse response functions of a one standard error shock to CISS in EU 
This subsection reports the effects of a one standard error positive shock to the EU15 
CISS on five variables of interest: GDP, exports, FDI, foreign credit flows and 
remittances. The generalized impulse responses of GDP to the shock in the EU's CISS 
are presented in Figure 4.7 below. As can be seen in this Figure, the positive shock to 
the CISS in EU15 region results in decreases in the GDP of all regions in our model. 
The Baltic countries display the most severe and statistically significant impact from 
the shock in their GDP with a decline of 0.1% on impact, which then rises by the 
eighth quarter to 0.5% and stabilises in the following periods. The Central and 
Eastern ETEs also display a severe impact from the shock to the EU's CISS, with a 
decline of their GDP by 0.1% on impact, which increases to 0.2% by the eighth 
quarter. The effect is not statistically significant in the Balkan countries. As expected, 
exports are also negatively affected by the EU15 CISS shock, varying between 0.5% 
and 1%.  The exports impulse response pattern is similar across all regions, showing 
an initial decline of 0.5% during the first two quarters following the shock, and then 
oscillating and dissipating in about 5-8 quarters. From the regional perspective, the 
exports from Baltic countries appear to be the most severely affected by a shock to 
the EU15's CISS, even though the impact is at the borderline of the 10% statistical 
significance level. The CE transition countries also display a severe and statistically 
significant impact from a shock to the EU15's CISS on their exports.  
The effect is less significant statistically in the Balkan region. When it comes to FDI, 
the Baltic countries display the most severe and statistically significant impact from 
the shock in the EU15's CISS with a decline of 1% on impact, which then rises by the 
eighth quarter to 3%. Similar behaviour of the impulse response is observed across 
CE transition countries. The generalized impulse responses of FDI are weaker and 
clearly statistically insignificant for Balkan countries. The generalized impulse 
responses of remittances are clearly statistically insignificant for all regions. The 
generalized impulse responses of foreign credit flows are the strongest in the Baltic 
countries; the foreign credit flows decline by 5% by the eighth quarter, while they 
 are weaker and clearly statistically insignificant for Balkan countries. Other CE 
transition countries also show a negative decline in foreign credit flows following a 
shock in the CISS of the EU15. 
Figure 4.7 Regional impulse response functions of GDP, exports, FDI, foreign credit 
flows and remittances to a one standard error shock to the EU15 CISS with their 90% 
confidence bands 
 
 
 
 
Note: Figures are median generalized impulse responses to a one standard error fall in EU15 
CISS together with the 10 percent confidence bands. The impact is in percentages and the 
horizon is quarterly. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
Although there are a number of empirical studies that have investigated the 
international transmission of crisis, the literature is still unable to provide conclusive 
results on the determinants of crisis severity across transition countries. This study 
contributes to knowledge in this area by providing analyses of the international 
transmission of the global financial crises in a global context, employing the global 
vector auto-regression (GVAR) approach. 
The study begins with a discussion of the modelling framework, its structure and 
applications. The discussion also relates the choice of the methodology to the 
objective of the thesis. The methodology proceeds through four stages. Firstly, the 
weights for constructing the country-specific foreign variables are computed. 
Considering the importance of both trade and financial linkages between ETEs and 
European advanced countries (EU15), trade, FDI and remittance weights are 
computed and considered for the model. Second, for each country the VAR model is 
extended with the addition of a set of country-specific foreign variables. These 
foreign variables are computed as weighted averages of the respective domestic 
variables, using the weights constructed during the first stage. In the third stage, each 
variable in the model is tested for stationarity. Next, the VECM is specified for each 
country. Particular attention has been paid to diagnostic tests and stability to ensure 
the model is statistically well specified and thus produces valid estimates. In the final 
stage, the global GVAR is solved and results from the estimated model are 
interpreted by means of impulse responses and forecast error variance 
decomposition. 
By using GVAR, we extend the limited and quite recent body of literature that uses 
this modelling framework in several key aspects. First, this is the first study that uses 
the GVAR to model the transmission of shocks to ETEs. Second, weights based on 
bilateral remittance flows, to our knowledge, represent an original contribution to 
the GVAR modelling framework. Thirdly, unlike several other GVAR studies on the 
transmission of crises, this method is applied in an extensive manner to deal with 
country heterogeneity, by dividing the countries in sub-samples based on several 
country characteristics (the level of country openness, the degree of euroisation, and 
 EU membership). Last but not least, our model specifications and variable definitions 
to a considerable extent rely on the arguments put forward in the extensive literature 
on the transmission of the GFC (discussed in chapters two and three), which is not 
always the case in the relatively small body of GVAR studies.  
The results indicate that the transmission of the shock from EU's GDP to ETEs' GDP is 
stronger in all regions when using trade weights to construct the foreign country-
specific variables, indicating that trade linkages represent a significant channel of 
transmission of shocks from advanced EU countries to ETEs. While the estimated 
spillovers from shocks to GDP and financial stress index in the EU to ETEs are 
negative, there are considerable heterogeneities across regions. The main results are 
reported in Table 4.7 below and discussed more thoroughly in the following part of 
the section. 
Table 4.7 Summary of main results 
 
Impact on variables of different regions / sub-samples 
Variables Baltic Balkan CE Baltic Balkan CE 
 Shock to EU15 GDP Shock to EU15 CISS 
GDP 
Negative / 
significant 
Negative / 
10% 
borderline 
significance 
Negative / 
10% 
borderline 
significance 
Negative / 
significant 
Negative / 
insignifcant 
Negative / 10% 
borderline 
significance 
Exports Insignificant 
Negative / 
10% 
borderline 
significance 
Negative/si
gnificant 
Negative / 
10% 
borderline 
significance 
Negative / 
insignifcant 
Negative / 10% 
borderline 
significance 
FDI 
Negative / 
insignifcant 
Negative / 
10% 
borderline 
significance 
Negative / 
insignifcant 
Negative / 
10% 
borderline 
significance 
Negative / 
insignifcant 
Negative / 10% 
borderline 
significance 
Remittances 
Negative / 
10% 
borderline 
significance Insignificant 
Insignifican
t 
Negative / 
10% 
borderline 
significance 
Negative / 
i+G18Insign
ifcant 
Negative / 
insignifcant 
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The Baltic countries display the most severe and statistically significant impact to 
both GDP and the financial stress index in the EU15 on their GDP. The shocks appear 
to be propagated to this region mainly through foreign credit flows, FDI and 
remittances, suggesting that the financial channel, particularly foreign credit flows, 
played a major role in the transmission of the shocks to these countries. An 
important transmission mechanism of the recent GFC previously identified in the 
literature has been the global restriction of credit. Moreover, it is well known that a 
higher level of foreign bank presence18, may expose a country to foreign shocks and 
can tighten liquidity conditions during a crisis, as parent banks reallocate capital 
across borders and therefore capital may be withdrawn from the transition country 
                                                             
18The average share of foreign bank assets in Baltic region during the period 2000-2014 was 
83%. 
Foreign 
credit flows 
Negative / 
close to 10% 
of borderline 
statistical 
significance 
Negative / 
close to 
10% of 
borderline 
statistical 
significance 
Negative / 
significant 
Negative / 
10% 
borderline 
significance 
Negative / 
insignifcant 
Negative / 10% 
borderline 
significance 
 
 
Shocks to EU15 GDP 
 
 
EU Non-EU High EUR Low EUR 
High trade 
openness 
Low trade 
openness 
GDP 
Negative / 
borderline 
statistical 
significance 
Negative / 
significant 
Negative / 
significant 
Negative / 
borderline 
statistical 
significance 
Negative / 
significant 
Negative / 
borderline 
statistical 
significance 
Exports 
Negative / 
significant 
Negative / 
borderline 
statistical 
significance 
Negative / 
borderline 
statistical 
significance 
Negative / 
significant 
Negative / 
significant 
Negative / 
significant 
FDI 
Negative / 
borderline 
statistical 
significance 
Negative / 
borderline 
statistical 
significance 
Negative / 
borderline 
statistical 
significance 
Negative / 
borderline 
statistical 
significance Insignificant 
Negative / 
significant 
Foreign 
credit flows Insignificant 
Negative / 
significant 
Negative / 
borderline 
statistical 
significance 
Negative / 
significant 
Negative / 
borderline 
statistical 
significance 
Negative / 
significant 
 
 when it is needed in the bank’s home country (in line with the findings of Cetorelli 
and Goldberg, 2011). In addition, recent empirical studies (Popov and Udell, 2012; 
Ongena et al., 2015; by Bonin and Louie, 2015; Allen et al., 2017) have shown that 
foreign bank subsidiaries in emerging Europe reduced lending earlier and faster than 
domestic banks. 
The Balkan transition countries also display a severe impact from the shock to the 
EU15 GDP, with a decline of their GDP by 0.3% on impact, which increases to 0.6% 
and stabilises by the eighth quarter. The shock in this region is propagated mainly 
through exports, FDI and foreign credit flows. However, the region does not appear 
to be affected by a shock to the EU15’s CISS; the impulse response functions are 
clearly statistically insignificant for all the variables, possibly due to their relative 
lack of development of the financial sector, which has not been affected by risky and 
unsafe financial instruments. 
The other CE transition countries are less severely affected by the shock to the EU's 
GDP, possibly because they represent more advanced transition countries. Belke et 
al. (2009) have shown that the level of development has a positive effect on 
institutional quality as measured by the World Bank Governance Indicators, hence 
making these countries more able to deal with external shocks. In general, the 
institutional characteristics that may shape the impact of external shocks are related 
to the quality of developed institutions, progress with transition to a market 
economy and the quality of government policy making. Therefore, it seems that these 
countries are more able to offset crisis effects and thus contribute to the resilience of 
the region. The shock in this region is mainly propagated through the export channel, 
probably due to their stronger trade linkages with the EU15.   
In addition, through general forecast error variance decomposition, it was observed 
that the variables of the EU region can explain most of the shock on other regions’ 
GDP, confirming the importance of linkages between the EU15 and ETEs in the 
transmission of shocks. The baseline analysis is followed by robustness checks, 
which in general confirm the results of the baseline model for the core variables 
representing the main transmission channels: exports; FDI; foreign credit flows; and 
GDP.  
      
 
171 
The chapter proceeds to analyse the transmission of shocks in various subsamples, 
which are defined by various country characteristics: the degree of euroisation; EU 
membership; and level of openness. The results suggest that the impact of the shock 
is larger and statistically more significant on the GDPs of highly euroised countries. 
Chapter 2 highlights various costs associated with euoisation, which may become 
more visible during periods of severe financial crisis. First, there is the 
inability/ineffectiveness to act as a lender of last resort. In a situation where there is 
a general loss of confidence in the banking system, the central banks in these 
countries are unable to fully back bank deposits. Considering that the central banks 
do not have the ability to print foreign currencies, their function as a lender of last 
resort is impaired. The second cost of euroisation relates to adverse currency 
mismatches. During the recent GFC, the depreciation of the domestic currencies in 
these countries prevented some unhedged borrowers from servicing their loans in 
foreign currencies. The third cost of euroisation is related to a reduction in monetary 
policy autonomy. A common view among economists is that euroisation makes 
monetary policy less effective, since it can increase the volatility of demand for 
domestic currency due to reduced costs of switching from local to foreign currency in 
order to avoid the impact of inflation (Alvares-Plata and García-Herrero, 2007). 
However, currency substitution also increases exchange rate volatility. In an 
economy with high currency substitution, a policy of devaluation is less effective in 
changing the real exchange rate because of significant pass-through effects to 
domestic prices (Berg and Borensztein, 2000).   
With regards to country openness, as expected, the impact of the shock is larger on 
the GDPs of the more open economies compared to the less open economies. This 
finding is in line with our expectations, as the literature on financial contagion 
identifies exports as one of the main channels of the transmission of shocks. In 
addition, impulse responses show that the shock is amplified in these countries 
mainly through exports. Moreover, dividing the sample into more/less open 
economies delivers a general gain in the statistical significance of the results, 
suggesting an important heterogeneity that should be controlled for any modelling of 
transmission effects. 
 When it comes to EU membership, it was observed that the impact of the shock in EU 
GDP is larger on all the variables of the non-EU transition countries compared to the 
EU transition countries. Although in the Balkan context, as argued above, there may 
have been some advantages to lack of financial development, our findings for the EU 
transition countries and the other CE transition countries suggest the advantages of 
greater institutional development. This contrast may suggest that while institutional 
development with respect to governance, including capacity for monetary and fiscal 
policy/stabilization, and well-functioning markets are unambiguously positive from 
the perspective of adjusting to external shocks, financial development may bring 
both benefits and costs (i.e. a “mixed blessing”).  
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 5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 of this thesis presented an analysis of the international transmission of 
shocks to ETEs. The results from the GVAR approach suggested the importance of 
financial and trade interdependencies across countries in the international 
transmission of shocks. Even though the GVAR model is very effective in dealing with 
interdependencies and international co-movements of business cycles (Di Mauro and 
Pesaran, 2013), the analysis faces difficulties when attempting to identify real shocks. 
In addition, the use of macro data has been argued to be a weakness of GVAR models 
when investigating the transmission of crisis, since, as Claessens and Forbes (2004) 
point out, the aggregate proxies for trade and financial links are often correlated and 
it is difficult to quantify the specific channels. For instance, firms' performance can be 
worsened by both a decline in exports and a reversal of capital flows. Furthermore, 
macro data often do not account for all the underlying channels of transmission of 
crises, such as consumption and investment behaviour. On the other hand, using 
firm-level data allows the different exposures of firms to the GFC to be distinguished 
(e.g. firms that were more exposed to exports and those firms that were more 
dependent on external financing). Therefore, a firm-level investigation could provide 
more insights into the specific channels for the international transmission of crisis 
and complement the study at macro level. Consequently, this chapter investigates the 
transmission of the GFC by employing firm-level data. This is the first study that 
comprehensively investigates the transmission of the GFC to ETEs using firm-level 
data.   
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 examines the research 
design and specifies the variables and data to be used in the model. Section 5.3 
provides the details of the estimation technique adopted. Section 5.4 provides 
diagnostic tests. Section 5.5 reports and discusses the results, and section 5.6 
provides conclusions.  
5.2 Research design and data description 
Firm-level analysis of the 2007-2009 GFC is relatively scarce, partly because firm-
level data for many countries are released only with a long lag. The closest study to 
the one presented in this chapter is Claessens et al. (2012), who investigate how the 
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2007-2009 crisis affected firm performance and how various linkages propagated 
shocks across borders by using accounting data for 7,722 non-financial firms in 42 
countries. They find that the crisis had a bigger negative impact on firms with a 
greater sensitivity to demand and trade (constructed as the elasticity of firm-specific 
sales and exports to the country’s GDP in the six years before the crisis, i.e. 2000-
2006), particularly in those countries more open to trade. Other studies that used 
firm or sector-level data to investigate the 2007-2009 GFC can be classified into two 
main groups: the first group focus on the financial channel and credit constraints as 
the main source of transmission and amplification of shocks (Ongena et al., 2015; 
Iyer et al., 2014 and Laeven and Valencia, 2013); while the second group focus on the 
drivers of the decline in trade (Levchenko et al., 2010; Alessandria et al., 2010 and 
Duchin et al., 2010). 
In this chapter firm-level data is used from the World Bank's Financial Crisis Survey 
conducted in 2010 and the World Bank/EBRD's Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey (BEEPS) conducted in 2009. BEEPS is a firm-level survey of a 
representative sample of an economy’s private sector whose objective is to gain an 
understanding of firms’ perception of the environment in which they operate. BEEPS 
covers a broad range of business environment topics including access to finance, 
corruption, infrastructure, crime, competition, and performance measures. There are 
five rounds of surveys: 1999-2000; 2002; 2005; 2009; and 2012-2013. This study 
uses data from the fourth round of BEEPS carried out in 2008-2009 but referring to 
fiscal year 2007. The survey covered almost 12,000 enterprises in 29 countries. 
The World Bank conducted three rounds of the Enterprise Financial Crisis Survey in 
six countries of the Europe and Central Asia region (Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania and Kazakhstan). The range and variety of the countries included 
makes them informative about transition countries as a whole, given that Hungary is 
included as one of the Visegrad Group of the more advanced transition countries, 
Bulgaria and Romania as representatives of less advanced ETEs, Latvia and Lithuania 
as representative of the Baltic states, and Kazakhstan as a representative of Central 
Asian transition countries. The surveys aimed to assess the effect of the GFC on each 
country's private sector. The first round took place in June/July 2009, covering 1,686 
firms, the second one in February/March 2010 covered 1,892 firms, and the last one 
 in June 2010, covered 1,393 firms in both the manufacturing and service sectors. For 
these surveys, the World Bank contacted the same companies interviewed in BEEPS 2009. 
The main idea was to use the previous round of surveys of the BEEPS as a baseline to 
quantify the effect of the recent financial crisis on the private sector. Efforts were made to 
contact all respondents of the baseline survey (BEEPS 2009) to determine which of the 
companies were still operating and which were not. The original data also served as a 
baseline for comparisons, because it referred mostly to fiscal year 2007, thus measuring 
the pre-crisis scenario.  The data from the BEEPS survey of 2009 mostly refers to the 
fiscal year 2007, which suits this investigation as these data are used to account for the 
pre-crisis conditions. Regarding the Financial Crisis Survey, given the profound impact of 
the crisis in the countries of interest in 2009 (refer to Chapter 1), it was decided to use the 
second survey, as it refers also to the fiscal year 2009 (hereafter Financial Crisis Survey 
2009). Accordingly, the variables that are employed to measure the severity of the crisis 
across these six countries are obtained from the Financial Crisis Survey 2009, while the 
variables that account for the pre-crisis conditions as well as general information about the 
firms are obtained from the BEEPS 2009. Data from the two surveys is linked together 
through the common firm ID appearing in both surveys. Most of the companies surveyed 
for BEEPS 2009 appear also in the Financial Crisis Survey 2009. 
This empirical analysis investigates whether the initial conditions from 2007 had an 
impact on the firms' sales during the GFC in 2009. In order to do so, the relationship 
between firms' sales growth and different initial conditions is examined. More 
specifically, the determinants of sales growth are estimated using a basic Cobb-
Douglas production function augmented with some additional variables of interest. 
The dependent variable, which also proxies the severity of the crisis, is the 
percentage change in sales from 2008 to 2009. Sales data are often used as proxies for 
output in production functions. Moreover, the sales growth enables the investigation 
of both price and output responses to the GFC and it reflects changes in demand 
generally better than output growth, which includes inventory changes. In addition, 
as a robustness check, the variable capacity utilization rate in 2009 is employed as a 
dependent variable, which proxies for firms' performance during the GFC, where 
firms that were able to cope better with the crisis are expected to have a higher 
capacity utilization rate. This approach allows examining the underlying economic 
factors, which have driven any observed changes in the potential output. The 
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percentage change in employment and capital purchased are also included as basic 
variables of the Cobb-Douglas production function. Further, other variables are 
employed that might have affected the firms' sales during the GFC. This study's 
intention is to distinguish between two main channels of transmission as suggested 
by theory and confirmed by the previous investigation in this thesis, namely the 
trade and financial channels. In order to do that, the following approach is pursued. If 
the trade channel was important for the impact of the severity of the crisis on firms, 
it would be expected that exporting firms would have been more affected by the GFC. 
Consequently, the dummy variable exports is employed to capture the trade channel. 
In terms of the financial channel, several indicators are employed to capture its 
importance. Namely, if the financial channel was important, this would have been 
reflected in firms that relied more on external finances for working capital being 
more affected by the GFC; hence, the variable share of working capital financed by 
banks is employed to account for this channel. In addition, following the literature 
review presented in section 2.3 and based on the results from the previous empirical 
chapter, it would be expected that firms with a larger share of foreign currency loans 
would have been more severely affected by the GFC. The firms with larger amounts 
of foreign currency loans in their balance sheets are expected to face stronger 
financial difficulties if their domestic currencies depreciate. Therefore, the variable 
share of firm's foreign currency loans in total loans is employed. Finally, given the 
potential importance of the FDI channel in the transmission of the GFC discussed in 
Chapters 1 and 2, this study also investigates whether the share of foreign ownership 
affected firms' performance during the crisis. Previous empirical studies suggest that 
the nationality of a firm’s owner has an important influence on its financial 
vulnerability, and foreign-owned firms generally have broader access to financial 
support, especially during periods of crisis and in countries with weak financial 
institutions (Desai et al., 2004; Desai et al., 2008). Since foreign ownership potentially 
represents a financial advantage, it is expected that foreign-owned firms will suffer 
less from the financial crisis, in particular from the tightening of liquidity conditions. 
Next, a number of control variables are employed to account for various aspects of 
sales change during the GFC. Considering that the managers' decisions before and 
during the crisis will have affected firms' sales during the crisis, the number of years 
 of top managers' experiences are used as a proxy for the otherwise unobserved top 
manager’s ability. We would expect managerial ability to influence a firm’s response 
to change in demand conditions, since the firm cannot be considered as just a passive 
recipient but also should be considered as an active agent. In addition, in production 
function models managerial ability is typically acknowledged as an input, in 
particular in cross-section analysis, otherwise the unobserved managerial ability 
would go into the error term. Given that the managerial ability affects directly the use 
of labour and capital to generate output, then we would have an error term 
correlated with the independent variables. Further, the variable firm age is employed 
to account for the years of experience of the firms and to investigate whether older or 
newer firms performed better during the crisis. On the one hand, due to their 
experience, it can be argued that older firms might be more able to adjust to difficult 
circumstances than younger firms and are less likely to fail because they have 
acquired a reputation in the market and therefore face a smaller liquidation risk 
(Görg and Strobl, 2002). On the other hand, younger firms may be more likely to use 
advanced technologies, which boost productivity and product quality, hence, they 
may cope better with the crisis (Van Dijk, 2002). In terms of access to finance and the 
liquidity of the firms, it is also investigated whether the firms that received subsidies 
in the last three years had a better performance during the GFC. Given the common 
difficulties in accessing finance during the GFC due to tightened financial conditions, 
the firms that received subsidies before the crisis are expected to have performed 
better during the crisis. The level of innovativeness of the firms is also included as a 
control variable, which is proxied by a dummy variable for whether the firm had 
introduced any new products during the last three years. To account for the firm’s 
perceptions of the environment in which it operates, political instability is also 
controlled for by a dummy that shows whether or not a firm considered political 
instability as a main obstacle to its operations. In addition, the categorical variables 
industry and firm size are employed to investigate whether particular industries and 
firm sizes were more severely affected by the crisis. Finally, country dummies are 
employed to account for heterogeneity of the crisis impact across countries.  
Table 5.1 presents the list of variables together with their description, expected 
impact on sales growth (derived from the literature review), data sources and 
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descriptive statistics of the variables. The summary of descriptive statistics reveals 
that, on average, firms' sales decreased by 19% from 2008 to 2009. The maximum 
increase in sales was 106% and the maximum decrease was 100%, while 69% of the 
firms reported a decrease, 18% reported an increase and 13% no change in their 
sales, suggesting that the majority of the firms were severely affected by the crisis. 
The standard deviation for the change in firms' sales is relatively low, implying that 
data are spread relatively tightly around the mean. Similarly, the standard deviations 
of explanatory variables are generally relatively low. The number of employees, on 
average decreased by 17% from 2008 to 2009. The average proportion of working 
capital financed by banks was 36%. On average the proportion of foreign currency 
loans in the total loans of these firms was 13%, while the average level of foreign 
ownership of the firms was 12%. The average experience of the top managers was 15 
years and the average age of the firms was 14 years. When it comes to dummy 
variables, it is worth mentioning that the percentage of exporting firms is relatively 
low in the sample; only 18 percent of the firms exported more 10% of their sales in 
2007. In addition, only 12 percent of the firms reported having received subsidies in 
the three years before 2007. The data for industries, firm size and country dummies 
are more or less proportionally distributed within each category of the respective 
variable. The statistics from the table below also show that some data are missing for 
a number of variables. However, the absence of these data seems to be random, 
therefore this is not expected to affect the accuracy of the results. 
 Table 5.1 Summary of variables 
CONTINUES VARIABLES 
 
       
Variable (as it 
appears in equa. 1) Description 
Expected 
sign Source 
Units of 
measurement Obs. Mean 
Std. 
dev. Min 
      
Max  
salesgrowth 
Percentage change in sales 
from 2008 to 2009 n/a 
Financial 
Crisis Survey, 
2009 
% change (in 
decimal form) 1186 -0.19 0.31 -1.00 1.06  
emplgrowth 
Percentage change in 
employment from 2008 to 
2009 Positive 
Financial 
Crisis Survey, 
2009 
% change (in 
decimal form) 1186 -0.17 0.48 -1.00 2.75  
capitalpurch 
Capital purchased during 
2007 (i.e. investment) Positive BEEPS, 2009 
Additions to the 
capital stock 1186 2.93 2.42 0.00 9.13  
wcbanks 
Proportion of working 
capital financed by banks 
in 2007 Negative 
Financial 
Crisis Survey, 
2009 Proportion 1155 0.36 0.41 0.00 1.00  
foreigncurr 
Proportion of foreign 
currency loans in total 
loans on the firm in 2009 Negative 
Financial 
Crisis Survey, 
2009 Proportion 1049 0.13 0.27 0.00 1.00  
foreignown 
Proportion of the firm’s 
equity owned by foreign 
individuals, companies or 
organizations in 2007 Positive BEEPS, 2009 Proportion 1186 0.12 0.31 0.00 1.00  
topmanagerexp 
Years of experience of the 
top manager Positive BEEPS, 2009 Years 1186 15.57 10.11 2.00 53.00  
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firmage 
Number of years since the 
firm started operating Ambiguous BEEPS, 2009 Years 1166 14.20 11.60 1.00 144.00  
DUMMY VARIABLES 
   
       
Variable (as it 
appears in equ. 1) Description 
Expected 
sign Source Obs. Yes No 
% 
(Yes) 
% 
(No)   
directexp A dummy variable equal to 
one if the firms' direct 
exports as a percentage of 
total sales is greater than 
10%  and zero otherwise Negative BEEPS, 2009 1186 208 978 18% 82%   
subsidies A dummy variable with the 
value of one if the firm has 
received subsidies in the 
last three years (before 
2007); otherwise zero Positive BEEPS, 2009 1173 140 1033 12% 88%  
newproduct3years A dummy variable with the 
value of one if the firm has 
introduced any new 
products during the last 
three years (before the 
crisis) and zero otherwise Positive BEEPS, 2009 1178 544 634 46% 54%   
politicalinstability A dummy variable equal to 
one if firm considered 
political instability as a 
major obstacle to its 
operations in 2007 and 
zero otherwise Negative BEEPS, 2009 1140 724 416 64% 36% 
 
 
 
  
                                                              
19 Firm size as defined in BEEPS based on the number of employees: very small - less than 5; small >=5<=19; medium >=20<=99; large >=100. 
currdep A dummy variable 
equal to one if there 
was currency 
depreciation in 
2009 and zero 
otherwise Ambiguous 
EUROSTAT, 
World Bank 1186 638 548 54% 46%   
Variable (as it 
appears in equ. 1) 
Description 
Expected 
sign Source Obs. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
industry 1 - manufacturing; 2 - 
retail; 3 - wholesale; 4 - 
services  Ambiguous BEEPS, 2009 1186 432 366 93 295   
firmsize 
1 - very small; 2 - small; 3 - 
medium; 4 - large19 Ambiguous BEEPS, 2009 1186   38 382 404   362 
    
 
country 1-Bulgaria; 2-Hungary; 3-
Kazakhstan; 4-Latvia; 5-
Lithuania, 6-Romania Ambiguous BEEPS, 2009 1186 133 147 218 208 207 273 
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5.3 Estimation technique 
This study employs a Cobb-Douglas production function augmented with 
additional variables of interest and controls. The augmentation enables the 
estimation of the determinants of changes in sales other than changes in inputs of 
capital and labour. Due to data limitations, only labour and capital are employed as 
inputs in the production function. The one-step production function has been 
widely used to determine the impact of a various number of variables. An 
alternative approach would be to use a two-step procedure, in which case during 
the first step the total factor productivity (TFP) would be obtained from the error 
term of the basic Cobb-Douglas production function which, during the second step, 
would be regressed on the other variables which might have impacted on sales 
during the GFC (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003). However, considering that the data 
for changes in other inputs from 2008 to 2009 (materials, electricity, fuel etc.) are 
not available, the one-step production function is used in this study. The basic 
function is specified as follows:  
 %∆𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1%∆𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2∆𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑖  + 𝛽3𝑤𝑐𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠𝑖 +
𝛽4𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 +
𝛽8𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽9𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽10𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡3𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖 +
𝛽11𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽12𝐶𝑖 + 𝜀                                                                      (5.1)  
where 𝜀 is the usual white noise error term. Assuming that the model (5.1) 
satisfies the assumptions of the classical linear regression model, the OLS 
methodology is used to estimate it. Given the assumptions of the classical linear 
regression model, the least-squares estimates possess some ideal or optimum 
properties. These properties are contained in the well-known Gauss–Markov 
theorem: "Given the assumptions of the classical linear regression model, the 
least-squares estimators, in the class of unbiased linear estimators, have minimum 
variance, that is, they are BLUE" (Gujarati, 2003, p.79). 
Before proceeding with the model estimation, two potential problems related to 
the empirical strategy employed are acknowledged. Firstly, the potential 
simultaneity between input choices is mentioned in most production function 
 models. Marschak and Andrews (1944) were among the first who raised the 
problem of the potential correlation between input levels and the unobserved 
firm-specific productivity shocks in the estimation of a production function. The 
simultaneity can arise with firm-level data when input choices respond to shocks, 
such as the GFC, which would cause some reductions in firms’ prices, output and 
profitability below the levels anticipated and, if this shock is perceived as a 
permanent one, then input choices are likely to be lowered. However, it has been 
previously argued that capital and employment adjust only slowly with respect to 
shocks. Consequently, in the face of shocks, sales fluctuate more than labour and 
capital input changes (Smolny, 1998). In addition, the capital variable is lagged, so 
any contemporaneous feedback from changes in sales is broken. Therefore, the 
change in sales from 2008 to 2009 are not expected to alter the capital input in 
2007; whereas it might reasonably be expected that contemporaneous changes in 
labour will affect sales, the feedback effect takes time. As an additional robustness 
check, we investigate whether the same variables that affected the firms' sales 
during the GFC also affected the employment change and we find no significant 
results (see Table 5.11), which is reassuring and implies that the model does not 
suffer from simultaneity.  
Secondly, a common concern when using survey data is the potential perception 
bias, since it is common that responses of firms based on surveys are likely to be 
biased by the general perceptions of firms (Kaufman and Wei, 1999). Depending 
on their general perception of the environment where they operate, some firms 
may consistently provide positive or negative answers. In cross-country surveys, 
such as the BEEPS, the group within which the bias is typically correlated is the 
particular country in which respondents operate (Godart and Görg, 2013). Fries et 
al. (2003) check for such perception bias in the BEEPS 2002 and find no significant 
perception biases across the countries in the sample. Therefore, since the BEEPS 
2009 follows a similar methodology, it is not suspected that perception bias will 
affect the results of this analysis. However, as a further control, the empirical 
model in equation (5.1) includes industry and country level fixed effects.  
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5.4 Diagnostic tests 
This section investigates how well the data meet the key assumptions underlying 
OLS estimation assumptions based on the Gaussian, standard, or classical linear 
regression model (CLRM), which is the cornerstone of most econometric theory 
(Gujarati, 2003). Table 5.2 reports the results of the main diagnostic tests 
performed. 
Table 5.2.  Diagnostic tests 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The results of the Ramsey RESET test reported above suggest that the assumption 
of linearity holds. On the other hand, tests for heteroskedasticity give ambiguous 
results. The results of the Breusch-Pagan test provide strong evidence in favour of 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of salesgrowth 
Ho: model has no omitted 
variables 
   
F(3,95) = 1.67    
Prob > F = 0.1725    
    
Cameron and Trivedi's decomposition of IM-
test 
  
Source             chi2                 df                  p 
Heteroskedasticity 291.82 244 0.0193 
Skewness 25.27 22 0.2844 
Kurtosis 14.24 1 0.0002 
Total 331.34 267 0.0045 
    
Breusch - Pagan / Cook - Weisberg test for 
heteroskedasticity 
 
Ho: Constant variance    
Variables: fitted values of salesgrowth   
chi2(1) = 1.46    
Prob > CHI2 = 0.2267    
 homoscedastic variance, while the results of Cameron & Trivedi's test reject the 
assumption of homoscedasticity. Although the null hypothesis of no excessive 
skewness is clearly rejected, evidence of kurtosis suggests some departure from a 
normal distribution of the residuals. However, this evidence of non-normality does 
not invalidate statistical inference (F- and t-tests) in a sample of the size used in 
the present study (Spanos, 1986). Therefore, a conservative approach to inference 
is adopted by reporting robust standard errors, as these can address concerns 
about failure to meet assumptions, such as minor problems about normality 
(Spanos, 1986), heteroscedasticity, or some observations that exhibit large 
residuals, leverage or influence (Wooldridge, 2015). 
In each case we have investigated the statistical characteristics of the data with 
further graphic checks, which are reported in appendix A5 (figures A5.1 – A5.4). In 
terms of the linearity assumption, in line with the results of the Ramsey RESET 
test, the plots of residuals versus predictor variables and augmented plus residual 
plots presented in figures A5.1 and A5.2 in appendix A5 do not indicate that the 
assumption is violated. These plots are evenly distributed vertically, and they do 
not have outliers, or a clear shape to them. Further, the plot of kernel density 
(kdensity) and the plots of quantiles of a variable against the quantiles of a normal 
distribution (qnorm) are presented in figures A5.3 and A5.4 in appendix A5 to 
check whether the residuals are normally distributed. The plots' appearance is in 
line with the results of the Cameron and Trivedi's test. Pnorm (representing 
skewness) shows no indications of non-normality, while the qnorm plot (kurtosis) 
shows a slight deviation from normality at the upper tail, as can be seen in 
the kdensity plot as well.  Nevertheless, this seems to be a minor deviation from 
normality and, as argued above, robust standard errors are used for inference.  
In the next step we check for multicollinearity by using the variance inflation 
factor (VIF). As a rule of thumb, if a VIF of a variable is greater than 10, it might 
require further investigation, as the variable could be considered as a linear 
combination of other independent variables. Both the individual VIFs and the 
mean VIF reported in Table 5.3 below satisfy the most conservative thresholds 
typically used by researchers. 
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Table 5.3 The variance inflation factor (VIF) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Since none of the key OLS assumptions appears to have been violated, in the next 
section we discuss the results. 
5.5 Empirical results 
Table 5.4 presents the baseline regression results from estimating equation (5.1). 
Most of the estimated coefficients are in accordance with theoretical expectations 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
capitalpurch       1.29       0.77  
foreignown       1.16       0.86  
1.directexdumm       1.34       0.74  
emplgrowth       1.06       0.95  
wcbanks       1.30       0.77  
foreigncurr       1.14       0.88  
2.subsidies       1.05       0.95  
industry 
  2      1.47      0.68  
3       1.17       0.85  
4       1.41       0.71  
1.country1       1.47       0.68  
1.country2       1.88       0.53  
1.country3       2.01       0.50  
1.country4       1.67       0.60  
1.country5       1.76       0.57  
Topmanager       1.13       0.88  
Firmsize 
  1      7.69      0.13  
2       7.80       0.13  
3       7.78       0.13  
firmage       1.13       0.88  
2.newprodu~s       1.12       0.89  
1.politicallinstability       1.09       0.92  
Mean VIF       2.22    
 and previous research.  The estimates suggest that the financial variables are the 
most economically influential and statistically significant. The relationship 
between foreign currency loans and sales growth rate is negative and significant at 
the 1% level. An increase of the share of foreign currency loans in total loans of the 
firm by one percentage point, leads to a decrease in the growth rate of sales by 
0.13 percentage points in 2009. This is a large effect relative to the mean growth of 
sales of -0.19 (i.e. a mean decline of 19 percentage points). The relationship 
between the variable working capital financed by banks (wcbanks) and the growth 
rate of sales from 2008 to 2009 (salesgrowth) is also negative and significant at the 
5% significance level. An increase in the proportion of the working capital of firms 
financed by banks by 1 percentage point decreased the growth rate of sales by 
0.06 percentage points. In addition, the dummy variable subsidies is also 
statistically significant at the 5% significance level. The firms that received 
subsidies during the previous 3 years (before 2007), compared to those firms 
which did not receive subsidies, had an increase in the growth rate of sales of 7 
percentage points. The relationship between foreignown and salesgrowth is 
positive and significant at the 5% level. An increase in the foreign ownership of the 
firm by one percentage points results in an increase of the growth rate of sales of 
0.06 percentage points.  
Results for most of the control variables appear to be statistically significant and 
their signs are in accordance with theoretical predictions and previous empirical 
findings. The relationship between the top manager's experience and the growth 
rate of sales is positive and significant at the 5% level. An increase in the 
experience of the top manager by one year leads to an increase in the growth rate 
of sales by 0.3 percentage points. The variable newproduct3years is also significant 
at the 5% level.  Firms that introduced new products in the last 3 years (prior to 
2007) experienced a growth rate of sales by 5 percentage points more than those 
that did not introduce new products. The dummy variable politicalinstability is 
also significant at the 5% level and has a negative relationship with the growth 
rate of sales. Firms that perceived political instability to be a main obstacle to their 
operations in 2007 had a decline in the growth rate of sales in 2009 of 5 
percentage points more than firms that did not. The remaining dummy variable, 
      
 
189
directexp, does not appear as statistically significant; moreover, it has very small 
coefficients across all of our estimated models. 
Table 5.4 OLS estimates of baseline regression (5.1) and extended models (5.2) 
and (5.3) 
Variables        
Dependent Variable: %∆Sales  Model (5.1)      Model (5.2)     Model (5.3) 
    Constant -0.0383 0.3325 0.3312 
 
[0.0617] [0.1007] [0.1060] 
%∆Employment 0.1251*** 0.1264*** 0.1282*** 
 
[0.0253] [0.0252] [0.0253] 
∆Capital -0.0043 -0.005 -0.005 
 
[0.0045] [0.0045] [0.0045] 
Working Capital financed by 
Banks 
-0.0660** -0.0622** -0.0522 
 
[0.0259] [0.0253] [0.1276] 
Foreign Currency Loans -0.1384*** -0.1403*** -0.1395*** 
 
[0.0355] [0.0354] [0.0356] 
Foreign Ownership 0.0576** 0.0602** 0.0582** 
 
[0.0274] [0.0274] [0.0275] 
Top Manager Experience  0.0028** 0.0028*** 0.0028** 
 
[0.0011] [0.0011] [0.0011] 
Firm Age  -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0013 
 
[0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] 
Direct Exports Dummy 0.008 0.0057 -0.0912 
 
[0.0290] [0.0288] [0.0863] 
Subsidies 0.0690** 0.0728** 0.0715** 
 
[0.0290] [0.0292] [0.0294] 
New Product 3 years 0.0494** 0.0481** 0.0462** 
 
[0.0207] [0.0203] [0.0203] 
Political Instability -0.0528** -0.0477** -0.0470** 
 
[0.0213] [0.0206] [0.0206] 
Firm Size Dummy1 -0.0516 -0.0496 -0.0501 
 
[0.0412] [0.0417] [0.0424] 
Firm Size Dummy2 -0.0326 -0.0281 -0.0276 
 
[0.0423] [0.0429] [0.0435] 
Firm Size Dummy3 0.0226 0.0297 0.0296 
 
[0.0456] [0.0448] [0.0456] 
Foreign Bank Ownership 
 
-0.3311*** -0.2996*** 
  
[0.0576] [0.0729] 
Aggregate Foreign Currency 
Loans 
 
-0.1889*** -0.2025** 
  
[0.0686] [0.0792] 
 Exports / GDP 
 
0.0039 -0.0259 
  
[0.0759] [0.0788] 
Working Capital Banks * 
Aggregate Foreign Currency 
Loans 
  
0.0947 
   
[0.1632] 
Direct Exports * Exports / GDP   
  
0.2009 
   
[0.1533] 
Working Capital Banks* Foreign 
Bank Ownership 
  
-0.0962 
   
[0.1262] 
    Country Fixed Effects   
Industry Fixed Effects   
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1     
 
Additional robustness checks 
As argued in chapter 1 and based on the results of the previous chapter, the 
transmission of the GFC is likely to depend not only on the firms’ features, but also 
country characteristics. Therefore, in the second results column of Table 5.4 
(model 5.2) we introduce country-specific variables that were found to be 
important in the theoretical and literature review chapters, such as trade 
openness, foreign bank ownership and share of foreign currency loans. These 
variables are described in Table 5.5, while the full model is given in equation 5.2 
below. 
%∆𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1%∆𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝛽2 +
%∆𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑖  + 𝛽3𝑤𝑐𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖 +
𝛽6𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽9𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 +
𝛽10𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡3𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽11𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽12𝐶𝑖 +
 𝛽13 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽14 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽15 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑏𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖 +
  𝜀                                                                                                                                                                      
(5.2)
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Table 5.5 Description of country-level variables and interaction terms 
VARIABLES 
 
      
Variable (as it 
appears in equ. 5.2) Description 
Expected 
sign Source 
Units of 
measurement Obs. Mean 
Std. 
dev. Min Max 
tradeopenness Exports as a share of GDP Negative World Bank Proportion 1186 0.47 0.15 0.29 0.78 
foreignbankown 
Foreign bank assets as a 
share of total assets Negative EBRD Proportion 1186 0.71 0.19 0.38 0.92 
foreigncurrloans 
Foreign currency loans as a 
share of total loans Negative EBRD Proportion 1186 0.57 0.14 0.43 0.86 
Working Capital 
Banks * Aggregate 
Foreign Currency 
Loans 
Interaction term between 
working capital financed by 
banks in 2007 and a country' 
share of foreign currency 
loans in total loans in 2007 Negative 
BEEPS 2009, 
EBRD Proportion 1155 0.20 0.23 0 0.86 
Direct Exports * 
Exports / GDP 
Interaction term between 
share of exports in firms' 
sales in 2007 and share of 
countries' exports in GDP in 
2007 Negative 
BEEPS 2009, 
World Bank Proportion 1186 0.45 0.11 0 0.70 
Working Capital 
Banks* Foreign Bank 
Ownership 
Interaction term between 
working capital financed by 
banks in 2007 and countries' 
share of foreign bank 
ownership in 2007 Negative 
BEEPS 2009, 
EBRD Proportion 1155 0.24 0.28 0 0.92 
 Adding these country-specific variables does not significantly change the results of 
the previously discussed variables from the baseline regression; indeed, it 
strengthens them in some cases. The results of the aggregate variables are in line 
with the results of their corresponding firm-level variables (where applicable) 
presented in the second column of results in Table 5.4 (model 5.2). The relationship 
between the aggregate share of foreign currency loans and sales growth is negative 
and highly significant. An increase in the share of foreign currency loans in total loans 
of a country by 1 percentage point leads to a decrease in the growth rate of sales of 
the firms by 0.2 percentage points. The relationship between foreign bank ownership 
and sales growth is also negative and highly significant. A one percentage point 
increase in foreign bank ownership leads to a decrease in growth rate of sales by 
around one third of a percentage point. A similar relationship to the firm-level 
between exports as a share of total sales of the firm and growth rate of sales is 
observed between the country-level exports as a share of GDP and sales growth; the 
exports/GDP variable does not appear to be statistically significant and has a very 
small coefficient. 
Next, the country-level variables are interacted with the firm-level features and the 
results are reported in the last column of Table 5.4 (model 5.3). For example, in order 
to investigate whether foreign bank ownership in a country affected firms’ sales by 
affecting access to finance during the GFC, the variable working capital financed by 
banks is interacted with the level of the country's foreign bank ownership. Further, in 
order to examine whether the firms that financed their working capital by banks in 
countries with higher shares of foreign currency loans were more severely affected 
by the crisis, the variable working capital financed by banks is interacted with the 
country's level of foreign bank ownership. Finally, to test whether exporting firms in 
countries more open to trade were affected differently during the GFC, the direct 
exports dummy is interacted with the country's exports as a share of GDP variable. 
Again, adding these interaction terms to the baseline regression does not change 
significantly the results, indicating that the results of the main variables are robust to 
different model specifications. We cannot infer whether there is any significant effect 
of the interaction terms based solely on the results reported in the last column of 
Table 5.3, given that the interaction coefficients show only the average effect of the 
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interaction based on the mean value of the variables composing the interaction. 
Therefore, in order to provide a more informative interpretation, the marginal effects 
of these interactions are presented in tables A5.8 and A5.9 in appendix. A5 However, 
only the final interaction term between working capital financed by banks and 
foreign bank ownership appears to have statistically significant marginal effects. 
Stata’s marginsplot is used to graphically illustrate these effects in Figure 5.1 below.  
The coefficients of the marginal effects and the plot suggest that the effect of the 
proportion of working capital financed by banks in 2007 on the firms' growth rate of 
sales in 2009 is moderated by the degree of foreign bank ownership in the economy 
in which it is located.  However, the effect of the interaction term is statistically 
significant only for countries with a degree of foreign bank ownership higher than 
61%, since, as can be seen in Figure 5.1 below, all bands are below zero when the 
level of foreign bank ownership is above 61%. More specifically, the results suggest 
that the working capital financed by banks has a more severe effect on firms’ growth 
rate of sales in the countries with a higher degree of foreign bank ownership.  
Figure 5.1 Average marginal effects of the proportion of firms’ working capital 
financed by banks at different levels of foreign bank ownership in the economy 
 
Tables 5.6 and 5.7 present the results of two further robustness checks.  The first one 
reported in Table 5.6 uses another measure of the impact of the GFC. Namely, the 
capacity utilization rate in 2009 is employed in this model as the dependant variable, 
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 which proxies for firms' performance during the GFC, where firms that were able to 
cope better with the crisis are expected to have a higher capacity utilization. The 
statistical significance and the signs of the independent variables capturing financial 
channels transmitting GFC effects do not change, which is again reassuring and 
confirms the significance of these variables on the firm's performance during the 
GFC. The variable direct exports, however, appears as highly significant, which 
suggests that exporting firms had a higher capacity utilization than non-exporting 
firms during the GFC. Nevertheless, the results of this model should be considered 
with caution as, due to data limitations (the capacity utilization data for 2007 are 
available only for a very small number of firms), it is not possible to calculate the 
growth rate of the capacity utilization from 2007 to 2009, therefore only the 2009 
value is used.  
Table 5.6 Results of the model (5.4) 
Variables 
Model (5.4) 
Dependent Variable: Capacity Utilization 
Constant 59.54108 
 
[7.1659]*** 
%∆Employment 9.5611*** 
 
[2.5201] 
∆Capital -0.3875 
 
[0.4928] 
Working Capital Banks -5.2328* 
 
[3.0505] 
Foreign Currency Loans -4.9794* 
 
[3.6399] 
Foreign Ownership 6.3722** 
 
[2.8987] 
Top Manager Experience -0.0562 
 
[0.1107] 
Firm Age -0.0131 
 
[0.0724] 
Direct Exports 8.1697*** 
 
[2.5849] 
Subsidies 0.8287 
 
[2.6147] 
New Product 3 years 1.6288 
 
[2.1689] 
Political Instability -1.3581 
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[2.2097] 
Firm Size Dummy1 4.6828 
 
[5.9677] 
Firm Size Dummy2 7.576 
 
[5.9874] 
Firm Size Dummy3 13.8414** 
 
[6.2026] 
Country Fixed Effects 
Industry Fixed Effects 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1   
 
As an additional robustness check, we investigate whether the same variables that 
affected firms' sales during the GFC also affected their employment change. As 
explained above, employment growth is potentially endogenous. However, as argued 
in section 5.3, the independent variables of the baseline regression are not expected 
to affect employment change; employment and output change do not change 
simultaneously, because employment and output have very different adjustment 
speeds. Therefore, we do not expect to find significant results from the latest 
regression. The results are reported in Table 5.7 below and, as expected, none of the 
independent variables appear to be significant influences on employment change 
within the sample period. This is reassuring as it reduces concerns regarding both 
simultaneity and common determinants, which could cause output and employment 
to be correlated even if they stood in no causal relationship to one another. However, 
we cannot demonstrate that output change and employment change have no 
unobserved influences in common.  
 
                          Table 5.7 Robustness check (dependent variable %∆Employment, model (5.5)) 
Variables 
Model (5.5) 
Dependent Variable: %∆Employment 
Constant -0.0046 
 
[0.1360] 
Working Capital Banks -0.0623 
 
[0.0437] 
Foreign Currency Loans 0.098 
 
[0.0634] 
Foreign Ownership 0.0266 
  
[0.0405] 
Top Manager Experience -0.0004 
 
[0.0014] 
Firm Age 0.0014 
 
[0.0010] 
Direct Exports 0.0337 
 
[0.0403] 
Subsidies 0.0529 
 
[0.0437] 
New Product 3 years 0.0286 
 
[0.0304] 
Political Instability -0.0225 
 
[0.0317] 
Firm Size Dummy1 -0.1355 
 
[0.1242] 
Firm Size Dummy2 -0.196 
 
[0.1240] 
Firm Size Dummy3 -0.2064 
 
[0.1245] 
Country Fixed Effects 
Industry Fixed Effects 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01; **p<0.05; 
*p<0.1 
 
Finally, a few more robustness checks are conducted to further investigate the 
statistical insignificance of the dummy variable directexp in model 5.1. Firstly, it 
should be noted that the lack of significance of this variable does not suggest that 
exporting firms have not been affected by the crisis, nor that the crisis was not 
transmitted through the exports channel; it simply suggests that exporting firms 
have not been affected by the crisis significantly differently from non-exporting 
firms. Table 5.8 reports the average predicted percentage change in sales when the 
export dummy is set to zero and the average predicted percentage change in sales 
when the export dummy is set to one in model 5.1 and shows that both types of firms 
have been significantly affected by the crisis. However, the relative sizes of the 
estimated effects suggest that the effect was slightly higher for non-exporting firms, 
even though the difference in not statistically significant. 
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Table 5.8 Predictive margins of directexdumm 
A growing body of literature has found that exporting firms are substantially and 
significantly different from non-exporting firms. Numerous authors have 
documented the superior performance of exporting firms compared to non-exporting 
firms even in the same industry and region (Chen and Tang, 1987; Clerides et al., 
1998; Bernard and Jansen, 1999. Bernard and Jensen (1999) find that exporters are 
larger, more productive, more technology and capital intensive, use more skilled 
workers and pay higher wages than non-exporting firms. Other authors, Melitz 
(2003), Melitz and Ottaviano (2003), and Bernard et al. (2003) claim that high-
productivity firms self-select themselves into export markets. Consequently, due to 
their superior performance, it can be argued that the exporting-firms might be more 
able to adjust to difficult circumstances; hence, they are more flexible when it comes 
to reallocating to a different market (foreign or domestic market) due to a decline in 
exports as a result of the crisis. In order to test whether this applies to the firms 
included in this study, the variable directexp is interacted with the variable 
changenatsales  - a new variable computed as the percentage change in proportion of 
sales to the domestic market from 2007 to 2009. Based on the arguments provided 
above, it is expected that directly exporting firms able to reallocate a higher 
percentage of their sales to domestic market have been less severely affected by the 
crisis.20 It has to be noted that when using the actual percentage of sales that are 
exports instead of the dummy variable directexp, we obtain similar results. However, 
                                                             
20 Due to lack of data, it cannot be identified whether the firms that reallocated their sales to 
other foreign markets / new countries, were less severely affected by the crisis. Therefore, it 
is only tested if those exporting firms that switched to domestic markets were less severely 
affected by the crisis. 
directexp Margin 
Std. 
Err. t-value P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
Non-exporters - 0     - 0.203  
         
0.011  - 19.170   0.000           - 0.224       - 0.183 
Exporters - 1     - 0.196  
        
0.026   -  7.480   0.000           - 0.247        - 0.144  
 we decided to use the dummy variable as it illustrates better the differences between 
exporting and non-exporting firms through the marginsplot.  The results of the 
regression are presented in the first results column in Table 5.9 (model 5.6). Even 
though the interaction term is statistically insignificant, it cannot be inferred whether 
it has any relevant and significant effect on crisis severity given that the interaction 
coefficient shows only the average effect of the interaction based on the mean value 
of the variable changenatsales. Therefore, in order to provide a more informative 
interpretation, the marginal effect of direct exports across different values of changes 
in proportion of sales to domestic market is presented in Figure 5.2 below and the 
marginsplot is used to graphically illustrate the effect. The marginal effect appears as 
statistically significant under different values of changenatsales (appendix A5, Table 
A5.17). However, the contrasts between exporting firms and non-exporting firms21 
presented in Table 5.10 below do not appear to be statistically significant. 
Nevertheless, the overall statistical significance of the contrasts increases with the 
increase of the variable changenatsales. Even though these contrasts are not 
significant at conventional levels, when combined with marginsplot presented in 
Figure 5.2, they are suggestive that exporting firms which have been able to 
reallocate higher proportions of their sales to domestic markets have been slightly 
less affected by the crisis. It should be noted that 52% of the exporting firms in the 
sample increased their proportion of sales to domestic markets in 2009, 50% of 
which had an  increase of 50% or higher. As for the rest of the exporting firms, 35% 
decreased their proportion of sales to domestic markets, which suggest that their 
sales to foreign markets increased and for the remaining 13% of the exporting firms 
the proportion of sales to domestic markets did not change from 2007 to 2009.  
Model 5.7 in Table 5.9 includes the interaction between directexp and foreigncurr, which 
fits a separate slope for the relationship between foreigncurr and salesgrowth for 
exporting firms versus non-exporting firms. Model 5.8 includes the interaction term 
between directexdumm and foreignown, which fits a separate slope for the relationship 
between the share of firms' foreign ownership and the rate of sales growth for exporting 
                                                             
21 As explained in Table 5.1, exporting firms refer to firms that export more than 10% of their 
sales, implying that the category of non-exporting firms includes low-intensity exporters, i.e. 
the firms that export less than 10% of their sales. 
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firms versus non-exporting firms. Model 5.9 includes the interaction term between 
directexdumm and wcbanks.  
Table 5.9 OLS estimates of extended models (5.6) to (5.9) 
Variables 
Model (5.6)  Model (5.7)  Model (5.8) Model (5.9)  
Dependent Variable: %∆Sales 
Constant -0.0389 -0.0334 -0.0378 -0.0367 
 
[0.0619] [0.0622] [0.0621] [0.0620] 
%∆Employment 0.1534*** 0.1516*** 0.1523*** 0.1522*** 
 
[0.0260] [0.0260] [0.2595] [0.2596] 
∆Capital -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.0039 
 
[-0.0045] [0.0046] [-0.0046] [0.0046] 
Working Capital Banks -0.0673** -0.0653** -0.0654** -0.0678** 
 
[0.0263] [0.0261] [0.0262] [0.0280] 
Foreign Currency Loans -0.1328*** -0.1626*** -0.1364*** -0.1361*** 
 
[0.0357] [0.0406] [0.0356] [0.0356] 
Foreign Ownership 0.0475* 0.0538* 0.0603* 0.0513* 
 
[0.0280] [0.0276] [0.0339] [0.0277] 
Top Manager Experience  0.0027** 0.0027** 0.0027** 0.0027** 
 
[0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0010] 
Firm Age  -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0013 -0.0013 
 
[0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] 
Direct Exports Dummy 0.0227 -0.0051 0.0225 0.012 
 
[0.0298] [0.0338] [0.0340] [0.0376] 
Subsidies  0.0676** 0.0673** 0.0672** 0.0669** 
 
[0.0295] [0.0293] [0.0294] [0.0296] 
New Product 3 years 0.0504** 0.0479** 0.0482** 0.0482** 
 
[0.0208] [0.0208] [0.0208] [0.0208] 
Political Instability -0.055*** -0.0546*** -0.0553** -0.0555*** 
 
[0.0213] [0.0214] [0.0213] [0.0213] 
Firm Size Dummy1 -0.0369 -0.0359 -0.0359 -0.03567 
 
[0.0409] [0.0414] [0.0414] [0.0415] 
Firm Size Dummy2 -0.027 -0.025 -0.0262 -0.02589 
 
[0.0422] [0.0427] [0.0427] [0.0428] 
Firm Size Dummy3 0.0198 0.0233 0.023 0.02317 
 
[0.0447] [0.0450] [0.0450] [0.0451] 
Changnetsales -0.0687 
   
 
0.0521 
   Directexp#changnatsales 0.0761 
   
 
[0.0557] 
   Directexp#foreigncurr 
 
0.1103 
  
  
[0.0741] 
  Directexp#foreignown 
  
-0.0249 
 
   
[0.0574] 
 
 Directexp#wcbanks 
   
0.0199 
    
[0.0564] 
     
Country Fixed Effects    
Industry Fixed Effects    
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1 
    
Table 5.10 Contrasts of marginal effects of changenatsales for exporting vs non-exporting 
firms 
 
Figure 5.2 Fitted values for channgnatsales and directexp interaction 
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  Exporting vs non-exporting Contrast Std. Err. p-value 
Exp. vs. non-exp. at changenatsales = 0 0.015 0.029 0.609 
Exp. vs. non-exp. at changenatsales = 0.25 0.032 0.034 0.343 
Exp. vs. non-exp. at changenatsales = 0.33 0.038 0.036 0.299 
Exp. vs. non-exp. at changenatsales = 0.5 0.049 0.043 0.242 
Exp. vs. non-exp. at changenatsales = 1 0.085 0.064 0.187 
Exp. vs. non-exp. at changenatsales = 1.7 0.134 0.098 0.174 
      
 
201 
Further, as reported in Table 5.9, a number of other factors that might have 
influenced the impact of exports on crisis severity are investigated. Given the overall 
significance of the variables comprising the financial channel, it is explored whether 
they might have affected differently exporting and non-exporting firms. Model 5.7 
includes the interaction between directexp and foreigncurr, which fits a separate 
slope for the relationship between foreigncurr and salesgrowth for exporting firms 
versus non-exporting firms. The results of the regression are reported in the second 
column of results in Table 5.9. The margins command is used to compute the 
adjusted means for foreigncurr separately for exporting firms and non-exporting 
firms. Then the marginsplot command is used to graph these adjusted means, which 
are presented in Figure 5.3. This shows the adjusted mean for salesgrowth as a 
function of foreigncurr (on the x axis) and with separate lines for exporting and non-
exporting firms. Although the marginal effects presented in Figure 5.3 for both 
exporters and non-exports are all significantly different from zero, the contrasts 
between each pair of marginal effects are uniformly non-significant at conventional 
levels, although their significance increases as the share of foreigncurr increases 
(table 5.11 below). Therefore, the results are suggestive that as the share of foreign 
currency loans increases, the sales of non-exporting firms are more severely affected. 
Again, we have some (albeit slight) evidence consistent with the interpretation that 
exporting firms are more resistant to the pressures of the GFC. It should be pointed 
out that 46% of the exporting firms and 26% of the non-exporting firms have loans in 
foreign currencies. In addition, for around 25% of exporting firms and 15% of non-
exporting firms the proportion of loans in foreign currency is higher than 50%. 
  
 Figure 5.3 Fitted values for foreigncurr and directexp interaction 
 
Table 5.11 Contrasts of marginal effects of foreigncurrr for exporting vs. non-
exporting firms 
Next, model 5.8 includes the interaction term between directexdumm and foreignown, 
which fits a separate slope for the relationship between the share of firms' foreign 
ownership and the rate of sales growth for exporting firms versus non-exporting 
firms. The regression results are reported in the third column of results in Table 5.9 
and the graphical presentation is illustrated in Figure 5.4.  The graph shows almost 
completely overlapping marginal effects of foreign ownership for exporting and non-
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Predictive Margins of directexpdumm with 95% CIs
Exporting vs non-exporting Contrast Std. Err. p-value 
Exp. vs. non-exp. at foreigncurr = 0 -0.015 0.033 0.646 
Exp. vs. non-exp. at foreigncurr = 0.1 -0.004 0.030 0.892 
Exp. vs. non-exp. at foreigncurr = 0.2 0.007 0.029 0.809 
Exp. vs. non-exp. at foreigncurr = 0.3 0.018 0.029 0.541 
Exp. vs. non-exp. at foreigncurr = 0.4 0.029 0.032 0.361 
Exp. vs. non-exp. at foreigncurr = 0.5 0.040 0.036 0.259 
Exp. vs. non-exp. at foreigncurr = 0.6 0.051 0.040 0.204 
Exp. vs. non-exp. at foreigncurr = 0.7 0.063 0.046 0.173 
Exp. vs. non-exp. at foreigncurr = 0.8 0.074 0.052 0.155 
Exp. vs. non-exp. at foreigncurr = 0.9 0.085 0.058 0.144 
Exp. vs. non-exp. at foreigncurr = 1 0.096 0.065 0.137 
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exporting firms, indicating that foreign ownership does not affect significantly 
different exporting and non-exporting firms. 
Figure 5.4 Fitted values for foreignown and directexp interaction  
-  
Figure 5.5 Fitted values for wcbank and directexp interaction 
 
Model 5.9 includes the interaction term between directexdumm and wcbanks. The 
regression results are reported in the fourth column of results in Table 5.9 and the 
graphical presentation is illustrated in Figure 5.5.  The estimated coefficients and the 
graph suggest that there is no significant difference between the slopes of exporting 
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 and non-exporting firms, indicating that variable working capital financed by banks 
similarly affects both types of firms. 
Further, given the statistical insignificance of the exporting term in all model 
specifications, we investigate whether currency depreciation during 2009 attenuated 
the trade channel. Model 5.10 includes an interaction between a dummy variable that 
controls for currency depreciation (currdep, the variable is described in Table 5.1) 
and directexpdum. The results of this model are reported in the first column of results 
in Table 5.12. Contrary to our expectations, the estimated coefficient on the 
interaction term suggests that exporting firms operating in countries that 
experienced currency depreciation during 2009 were more severely affected by the 
GFC. A potential explanation is that the short-run effect of the currency depreciation 
on exporting firms would be negative if demand for exports and imports are both 
inelastic. One the one hand, currency depreciation would have made imports more 
expensive, while not correspondingly changing their volume.  On the other hand, 
during the GFC there was a global collapse in trade, therefore currency depreciation 
might not have caused a significant increase in demand for exports. Nevertheless, 
although the marginal effects presented in Figure 5.6 for both exporters and non-
exports are all significantly different from zero, the contrasts between each pair of 
marginal effects reported in Table 5.13 are statistically non-significant.  
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Table 5.12 Results of the models (5.10) and (5.11) 
     
Model (5.10)  Model (5.11)  
Dependent Variable: %∆Sales 
Constant -0.0727 -0.071 
 
[0.0549] [0.0551] 
%∆Employment 0.1330*** 0.1361*** 
 
[0.0523] [0.0254] 
∆Capital -0.005 -0.0048 
 
[-0.0047] [0.0046] 
Working Capital Banks -0.0326 -0.0409* 
 
[0.0238] [0.0356] 
Foreign Currency Loans -0.1695*** -0.748** 
 
[0.0345] [0.0380] 
Foreign Ownership 0.0608** 0.0561** 
 
[0.0275] [0.0267] 
Top Manager Experience  0.0029*** 0.0029*** 
 
[0.0011] [0.0011] 
Firm Age  -0.0019* -0.0020** 
 
[0.0009] [0.0009] 
Direct Exports Dummy 0.0428 -0.0069 
 
[0.0336] [0.0289] 
Subsidies 0.0547* 0.0504* 
 
[0.0282] [0.02830] 
New Product 3 years 0.0480** 0.0471** 
 
[0.0206] [0.0205] 
Political Instability -0.0685*** -0.0702*** 
 
[0.0209] [0.0209] 
Currency Depreciation 0.1139*** 0.1249*** 
 
[0.0230] [0.0227] 
Firm Size Dummy1 -0.0469 -0.0521 
 
[0.0387] [0.0397] 
Firm Size Dummy2 -0.022 -0.0273 
 
[0.0398] [0.0404] 
Firm Size Dummy3 0.0418 0.0325 
 
[0.0426] [0.0435] 
Directexp#currdep -0.1153** 
 
 
[0.0542] 
 Foreigncurr#currdep 
 
-0.2356*** 
  
[0.0748] 
Country Fixed Effects  
Industry Fixed Effects  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1   
 Figure 5.6 Fitted values for currdep and directexp interaction 
 
Table 5.13 Contrasts of marginal effects of currdep for exporting vs. non-exporting 
firms 
 
 
Finally, given the consistent negative and statistically significant effect of the variable 
foreigncurr (foreign currency loans) on salesgrowth, we also investigate whether this 
effect was more severe (as emphasized in theoretical review chapter, sub-section 
2.3.1) in countries whose currencies depreciated during 2009. Model 5.11 includes 
the interaction between currdep and foreigncurr, which fits a separate slope for the 
relationship between foreigncurr and salesgrowth for firms operating in countries 
that experienced currency depreciation in 2009 versus those operating in countries 
whose currencies did not depreciate in 2009. The results of the regression are 
reported in the second column of results in Table 5.12. The margins command is 
used to compute the adjusted means for foreigncurr separately for countries that 
experienced currency depreciation versus those that did not. Then the marginsplot 
command is used to graph these adjusted means, which are presented in Figure 5.6. 
Although all marginal effects presented in Figure 5.6 are statistically significant, the 
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Exporting vs non-exporting Contrast Std. Err. p-value 
Exp. vs. non-exp. at currdep = 0  0.0418 0.0336 0.214 
Exp. vs. non-exp. at currdep = 1 -0.0735 0.0467 0.116 
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contrasts between each pair of marginal effects reported in Table 5.14 are 
statistically significant for only lower levels of foreign currency loans and they 
approach borderline levels of statistical significance at the highest levels of foreign 
currency loans. Nevertheless, the estimated coefficient and the marginal effects 
presented in Figure 5.7 reinforce the general finding that foreign currency loans had 
a negative effect on firms during the crisis. These results are also suggestive that 
firms with higher levels of foreign currency loans operating in countries that 
experienced currency depreciation in 2009 were more severely affected by the crisis.  
Figure 5.7 Fitted values for foreigncurr and currdep interaction 
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 Table 5.14 Contrasts of marginal effects of foreign currency loans for currency 
depreciation vs. no currency depreciation 
 
 
 
 
5.6 Discussion and interpretation 
One of the most important findings in this study relates to the effect of the financial 
channel on the transmission of the GFC to ETEs. The robust negative relationship 
between the growth rate of sales and financial variables in all of the estimated 
models suggest that the financial channel had played a major role in firms' 
performance during the GFC. An important transmission mechanism previously 
identified in the literature has been the global restriction of credit. This is confirmed 
by this study, as the results from all the models from 5.1 to 5.9 suggest that those 
firms that depended more on banks to finance their working capital before the crisis 
appear to have been more significantly affected by the crisis. The level of foreign 
bank ownership also appears to be a significant channel of transmission of crisis. The 
results of this study suggest that firms that operated in countries with a higher 
degree of foreign bank ownership, in particular firms that were more dependent on 
banks to finance their working capital, had worse performance during the GFC. As 
argued in Chapter 2, it is well known that a higher level of foreign bank presence may 
expose a country to foreign shocks and can tighten liquidity conditions during a 
crisis, as parent banks reallocate capital across borders and, therefore, capital may be 
withdrawn from the transition country when it is needed in the bank’s home country 
(Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011). In addition, the literature review in Chapter 3 shows 
that foreign bank subsidiaries in emerging Europe reduced lending earlier and faster 
than domestic banks. 
The incidence of foreign currency loans appears to be highly significant, both at firm-
level and country-level in all the model specifications, which suggests that firms 
more exposed to loans in foreign currencies and firms that operated in countries 
Currency depreciation vs. no currency 
depreciation 
Contrast 
Std. 
Err. 
p-
value 
Curr. dep. vs. no curr. dep. at foreigncurr = 0 0.1249 0.2267 0.000 
Curr. dep. vs. no curr. dep. at foreigncurr = 0.3 0.0542 0.0258 0.036 
Curr. dep. vs. no curr. dep. at foreigncurr = 0.7 -0.0400 0.0497 0.421 
Curr. dep. vs. no curr. dep. at foreigncurr = 1 -0.1107 0.0709 0.119 
      
 
209 
with higher levels of foreign currency loans were more severely affected by the GFC. 
As argued in chapter 2, during the GFC, the depreciation of the domestic currencies 
prevented some unhedged borrowers from servicing their loans in foreign 
currencies. Further investigation revealed evidence consistent with this conjecture. 
The margins and the marginsplot of the interaction term between foreigncurr and 
currdep are suggestive that the firms more exposed to loans in foreign currencies 
operating in countries whose currencies depreciated during 2009 have been more 
severely affected by the crisis.  
 The overall size of the coefficients and their level of statistical significance enforces 
the general finding in the literature that the financial channel does matter in 
accounting for transmission of the global financial crises and its inclusion in models 
for transition economies is crucial. 
Another finding of this study suggests that the ownership structure of the firms was 
also important in weathering the GFC. A positive relationship is found between the 
level of foreign ownership and sales growth during the GFC, which suggest that, 
ceteris paribus, the foreign-owned firms have been less severely affected by the 
crisis.  
Finally, no significant relationship is found between the dummy variable directexp 
and salesgrowth. However, this does not suggest that the trade did not serve as a 
transmission channel for the GFC for these six countries that participated in this 
study, it simply suggests that exporting firms have not been affected by the crisis 
significantly different than non-exporting firms. In addition, the non-significance of 
the exporting term most probably also reflects the cross-sectional nature of the data 
and corresponding estimation from between-firm variation only, which enabled a 
better examination of the relative performance of exporting and non-exporting firms 
than the performance of exporting firms as such. Moreover, previous empirical 
studies have documented a superior performance of exporting firms compared to 
non-exporting firms, which would suggest that exporting firms are more capable of 
adjusting to difficult circumstances and more flexible when it comes to reallocating 
output to a different market. Further investigation revealed evidence consistent with 
this conjecture. The margins and the marginsplot of the interaction term between 
 directexpm and changnatsales, even though not significant at conventional levels, are 
suggestive that the exporting firms that have been able to reallocate a higher 
proportion of their sales to their domestic market have been less severely affected by 
the crisis. Furthermore, the variable directexp appears as highly significant in the 
model 5.4, which suggests that exporting firms had a higher capacity utilization 
compared to non-exporting firms during the GFC. The superior performance of 
exporting firms during the GFC is also indicated by the interaction term between the 
directexp and foreigncurr.  
5.7 Conclusion 
In spite of a number of studies on transmission of the GFC to ETEs, there is a lack of 
empirical evidence at firm-level. This study contributes to knowledge in this area by 
providing firm-level evidence from a cross-country investigation of transmission of 
the GFC to six transition countries. The measure of sales growth from 2008 to 2009 is 
used to proxy the impact of the GFC on firms.  The Cobb-Douglas production function 
augmented with additional variables of interest was employed to estimate the 
determinants of changes in sales, which are not explained by changes in inputs. The 
model was estimated by OLS. Particular attention has been paid to diagnostic tests to 
ensure the model is statistically well specified and thus produces valid estimates. The 
major finding of this study is the importance of the financial channel in transmission 
of the GFC to ETEs: a higher share of working capital financed by banks, a higher 
share of foreign currency loans and a higher share of foreign bank ownership each 
increased the impact of the GFC on the firms operating in these countries. With 
regards to the exports channel, it was found that both exporting and non-exporting 
firms operating in the six countries covered in this study were significantly affected 
by the crisis. On the one hand, this finding does not completely confirm the 
expectation deriving from the theoretical review that exports are one of the main 
channels of transmission of crisis, as the results suggest that non-exporting firms 
were slightly more affected by the crisis than exporting firms. On the other hand, the 
theory also suggests that exporting firms have an overall superior performance 
compared to non-exporting firms, which is further confirmed in this study by 
investigating interaction terms. The results of the interaction term between the 
variables directexp and changnatsales are suggestive that exporting-firms able to 
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reallocate a higher proportion of their sales to domestic markets were less severely 
affected by the crisis. In addition, the interaction terms, although not significant at 
conventional levels, are suggestive that the financial variables, which negatively 
affect the dependant variable in models 5.1 - 5.6, appear to have affected slightly 
more severely the non-exporting firms. The superior performance of exporting firms 
is also confirmed by model 5.4, which shows that exporting firms had a higher rate of 
capacity utilization during the GFC. In the light of all the evidence presented in this 
study, the non-significance of the exporting term does not suggest that trade did not 
serve as a transmission channel of the GFC, but that there were are also other 
channels which affected the non-exporting firms, particularly the financial channel. 
Secondly, although there is a trade channel, the exporting firms were able to cope 
with the crisis better than non-exporting firms due to their overall superior 
performance. So exports, or more precisely, exporting firms constitute a 
transmission channel for the impact of GFC. Yet, exporting firms are also more able to 
offset crisis effects and thus contribute to the resilience of transitional economies.  
This study contributes to the empirical literature on transmission of the GFC by 
investigating the firm-level determinants of the severity of the GFC and by 
introducing new variables that have affected the firms' performance during that 
period. However, this chapter is subject to two main limitations. The first limitation 
is the lack of data for capital growth from 2008 to 2009 and the consequent inclusion 
in the model of the logarithm of capital purchased in 2007. However, it is not 
expected that firms purchased significant amounts of capital during a period of 
tightened liquidity conditions and, even when excluding the variable capital 
altogether from the model, the results do not change, especially those concerning the 
variables of interest. The second limitation is the cross-sectional nature of the data, 
which can only reflect between-firm differences and enabled a better examination of 
the relative performance of exporting and non-exporting firms than the performance 
of exporting firms as such. Therefore, the non-significance of the exporting term  
does not suggest that the trade did not serve as a transmission channel for the GFC 
for these six countries that participated in this study, it simply suggests that 
exporting firms have not been affected by the crisis significantly different than non-
exporting firms. Nevertheless, within-firm variation over time might have revealed 
 the impact of the GFC on exporting firms as it would shed light on the performance of 
the exporting firms before and after the GFC. It should be noted that BEEPS has 
recently introduced a panel dataset and even though it was initially considered to be 
used in this thesis, it was later deemed as unsuitable for the analysis of the 
transmission of the GFC, since only a small fraction of firms were included in it and 
even a smaller fraction of those firms were included in the Financial Crisis Survey.  
Therefore, a panel covering a longer time span would be worth assessing in the 
future to provide insights into the impact of the GFC on exporting firms as well as the 
factors that affected the firms’ speed of recovery from the GFC. 
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 6.1 Introduction 
The aim of this thesis was to investigate the transmission of the GFC to ETEs. One 
particular feature of the recent GFC has been the speed and synchronicity with which 
it has spread around the world. Even though it originated in the US, it spread not only 
to countries that shared similar vulnerabilities, but also to most emerging and 
advanced countries. Although there have been a few studies that have investigated 
the transmission of the GFC to ETEs, they have neglected factors such as: the degree 
of euroisation; integration with the EU; remittances; bank ownership; and foreign 
credit flows. This thesis fills this gap by exploring the impact of those influences on 
the transmission of the GFC to ETEs and the nature and the severity of the spillovers. 
More specifically, it addressed the following research questions: 
1) What are the relevant models and empirical evidence on the international 
transmission of financial crises? What are the gaps in knowledge? 
2) Which were the most significant channels of international transmission of shocks 
to ETEs?  
3) Did the degree of euroisation, integration with the EU, remittance inflows, bank 
ownership and foreign credit flows significantly modify the propagation of the GFC to 
ETEs? 
The objective of this chapter is to: present the key findings of the thesis; establish 
their contribution to knowledge; examine their policy implications; identify the main 
limitations of the research and provide recommendations for future research. The 
rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 summarises and discusses the 
main findings of the thesis. The main contributions to knowledge of this thesis are 
discussed in section 6.3.  Section 6.4 elaborates the main policy implications 
emerging from this thesis and suggests a range of policy interventions to reduce the 
vulnerability of ETEs to future negative global shocks. Section 6.5 summarizes the 
main limitations that have arisen while conducting the empirical analyses and 
provides recommendations for future research. 
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6.2 Findings of the thesis 
Chapter 1 provided the context of the research conducted in this thesis. It initially 
presented an overview of the transition process in the Central and Eastern European 
countries, focusing on the key areas relevant to the research questions of this thesis. 
Namely, it started by describing the process of transition from centrally planned 
economies towards open, market-oriented economies, examined the output, trade, 
FDI and remittance fluctuations throughout the period and described financial 
developments and the progress towards integration with the EU during this period.  
It then continued with an overview of the recent GFC and its impact on the ETEs. 
Stylized facts showed that the ETEs were severely affected by the GFC with an 
average GDP decline of around 7 percent in 2009, though the impact of the crisis on 
economic activity varied extensively across countries in transition.  
Having established the importance of an empirical exploration of the influences of 
exports, euroisation, bank ownership, foreign credit flows, FDI, remittances and EU 
integration in the transmission of the GFC to ETEs in Chapter 1, the thesis proceeded 
with a critical review of the theoretical and empirical literature on the transmission 
of the GFC to transition countries (the first research question). The literature review 
in Chapters 2 and 3 provided the base for developing the models that were used to 
explore the international transmission of GFC in the empirical chapters.  The 
literature review disclosed that although there were a large number of studies that 
have investigated the international transmission of crisis, the literature was still 
unable to provide conclusive results regarding the determinants of crisis severity 
across transition countries. A common weakness of empirical studies investigating 
the impact of the GFC has been argued to be the employment of inappropriate 
variables to measure the impact of the GFC and the definition of a ‘crisis’.  The most 
commonly used measures have been based on a binary definition of the presence of a 
crisis during a certain year/country or the difference between forecasted and actual 
GDP growth. It was argued in section 3.6 that the former might not be the most 
appropriate measure, given that if using binary definition of crisis presence, the 
classification of the crisis presence in a certain year/country would be subjective. 
Such variables do not provide a measure of the intensity of the crisis and do not take 
into account the situations that do not completely fit into a full-scale crisis, even 
 though they might have a certain level of macroeconomic impact. Likewise, using the 
difference between forecasted and actual GDP growth might lead to distorted results, 
given that forecasts for GDP growth for 2009 were made during 2008 when the crisis 
was already present in most of these countries, in which case the forecasted GDP 
growths for 2009 might have already taken into consideration the effect of crisis. In 
addition, previous studies have generally not reported diagnostic tests regarding 
model specification. Furthermore, these studies have generally neglected to address 
the degree of integration with the EU, bank ownership and, in particular, the level of 
euroisation and size of foreign credit flows, albeit they are each a common 
characteristic of ETEs.  
Given the severity of the GFC and its impact on ETEs, it is important for policy 
makers in these countries to understand the international channels of transmission 
of the crisis in order to reduce their vulnerability to future negative global shocks. 
Therefore, in an attempt to address research questions 2 and 3, the international 
transmission of shocks was investigated empirically in chapter 4 and 5. In order to 
investigate the interdependencies among countries and to understand how shocks 
were transmitted internationally, a model that accounted for these 
interdependencies and looked at them from a global perspective was needed. 
Consequently, Chapter 4 presented analysis of the international transmission of GFC 
in a global context. More specifically, by employing the recently developed global 
vector auto-regression (GVAR), Chapter 4 investigated the transmission of the GFC 
and propagation mechanisms to ETEs. Two samples were employed over the period 
2003Q1-2014Q4 and 1999Q1-2014Q4. The first sample encompassed 32 countries 
(17 ETEs and 15 advanced EU countries) and the second sample encompassed 30 
countries (15 ETEs and 15 advanced EU countries).  
The methodology proceeded through four stages. First, the variables that entered 
each country model were selected and the VAR model was extended with the 
addition of a set of country-specific foreign variables. Guided by the underlying 
theory presented in Chapters 2 and 3, two types of variables were used to capture 
the main channels of international financial contagion: trade and financial. The 
variable used to capture the trade channel was exports. Following the literature on 
the transmission of the GFC, the following variables were used to capture the effect of 
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transmission of crisis through the financial channel: foreign direct investment inward 
flows; foreign credit flows; credit flows in foreign currencies; and remittances. In the 
second stage, the weights for constructing the country-specific foreign variables were 
computed. Considering the importance of trade and financial linkages between ETEs 
and European advanced countries highlighted in section 1.2, both trade and financial 
(FDI and remittances) weights were computed and considered for the estimations. In 
the third stage, each variable in the model was tested for stationarity and the VECM 
was specified for each country. Subsequently, different diagnostic tests were checked 
and the global VAR was solved.  
The results suggested that, while trade appeared to be the strongest linkage between 
EU15 and ETEs, the shocks were propagated by both trade and financial channels. 
While the estimated spillovers from the GDP and financial shocks in the EU to ETEs 
were all negative, there were considerable heterogeneities across regions. The Baltic 
countries displayed the most severe and statistically significant impact from the GDP 
and financial shocks in the EU15 on their own GDP. The shocks appeared to be 
transmitted to this region mainly through foreign credit flows, FDI and remittances, 
suggesting that the financial channel, particularly foreign credit flows, played a major 
role in the transmission of the shocks to these countries. The Balkan transition 
countries also displayed a severe impact from the shock to the EU15 GDP. The shock 
in this region was mainly propagated through exports, FDI and foreign credit flows. 
However, the region did not appear to be affected by a financial shock in the EU15, 
possibly due to the relative lack of development of their financial sectors, which in 
general have not been significantly affected by risky and unsafe financial 
instruments. The other CE transition countries were less severely affected by the 
GDP and financial shocks in the EU15, possibly because they represent more 
advanced transition countries. In general, the institutional characteristics that may 
help to shape the impact of external shocks are related to the quality of institutions, 
progress with transition to a market economy and the quality of government policy 
making. The shock in this region was mainly propagated through the exports 
channel, probably due to stronger trade linkages with the EU15. In addition, through 
general forecast error variance decomposition, it was observed that the variables of 
 the EU15 can explain most of the shock on other regions’ GDPs, confirming the 
importance of linkages between the EU15 and ETEs in the transmission of shocks.  
The baseline analysis was followed by robustness checks, which in general confirm 
the results of the baseline model for the core variables representing the main 
transmission channels: exports; FDI; foreign credit flows; and GDP.  The chapter 
proceeded to analyse the transmission of shocks in various subsamples, which were 
defined by various country characteristics: degree of euroisation, EU membership 
and level of openness. The results suggested that the impact of the shock is larger 
and statistically more significant on the GDPs of highly euroised countries. This 
finding is in line with the expectations derived from the theoretical review in Chapter 
2, which highlighted various costs associated with euoisation that may become more 
visible during periods of severe financial crisis, such as: inability/ineffectiveness to 
act as a lender of last resort; adverse currency mismatches and reduction in 
monetary policy autonomy/effectiveness. Together these factors can increase the 
vulnerability of the banking system, increase interest spreads and reduce credit 
supply (Honohan and Shi, 2002; Winkler, et al., 2004; Click, 2007; Honohan, 2007; 
Chitu, 2013).  
The importance of the trade channel in the transmission of the GFC to ETEs was 
confirmed by a subsequent investigation of sub-samples defined by the level of 
country openness. The findings suggested that the impact of the shock was larger on 
the GDPs of the more open economies compared to the less open economies. When it 
comes to EU membership, it was observed that the impact of the shock in EU GDP is 
larger on all the variables of the non-EU transition countries compared to the EU 
transition countries, which suggested the advantages of EU-induced institutional 
development. In general, the institutional characteristics that may shape the impact 
of external shocks are related to the quality of developed institutions, progress with 
transition to a market economy and the quality of government policy-making. 
Therefore, it seemed that these countries were more able to offset crisis effects and 
thus contributed to the resilience of the region.  This contrast with the Balkan 
countries, where there may have been some advantages of a lack of financial 
development, may suggest that while institutional development with respect to 
governance, including the capacity for monetary and fiscal policy/stabilization, and 
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well-functioning markets are unambiguously positive, from the perspective of 
adjusting to external shocks financial development may bring both benefits and 
costs.  
Even though the GVAR model is very effective in dealing with interdependencies and 
international co-movements of business cycles, the use of macro data has often been 
argued to have some drawbacks when investigating the international transmission of 
crises. In particular, aggregate proxies for trade and financial links are often 
correlated and it is difficult to quantify the specific channels. For instance, firms' 
performance can be worsened by both a decline in exports and a reversal of capital 
flows. Furthermore, macro data often do not account for all the underlying channels 
of transmission of crises, such as consumption and investment behaviour. On the 
other hand, using firm-level data allows the different exposures of firms to the GFC to 
be distinguished (e.g. firms that were more exposed to exports and those firms that 
were more dependent on external financing). Therefore, in Chapter 5, the 
investigation of the international transmission of the GFC to ETEs was complemented 
by an additional analysis employing firm-level data. The use of both approaches 
helped overcome weaknesses that this thesis would face if only one approach were 
to be used.  
The firm-level analysis investigated whether their pre-crisis position (from 2007) 
had an impact on firms’ sales during the GFC. The measure of sales growth from 2008 
to 2009 was used to proxy the impact of the GFC on firms.  A Cobb-Douglas 
production function augmented with additional variables of interest was employed 
to estimate the determinants of changes in sales that were not explained by changes 
in inputs. The data was obtained from the World Bank's Financial Crisis Survey 
conducted in 2010 and the World Bank/EBRD's Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey (BEEPS) conducted in 2009. The study covered six countries of 
the Europe and Central Asia region (Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania 
and Kazakhstan). The data from the BEEPS survey of 2009 mostly refers to the fiscal 
year 2007, which suited this investigation as these data were used to account for the 
pre-crisis conditions. Accordingly, the variables that were employed to measure the 
severity of the crisis across these six countries were obtained from the Financial 
Crisis Survey 2010, while the variables that account for the pre-crisis conditions as 
 well as general information about the firms were obtained from the BEEPS 2009. 
Data from the two surveys was linked together through the common firm ID. This 
study's intention was to distinguish between the two main channels of transmission 
as suggested by theory and confirmed by the analysis presented in Chapter 4, namely 
the trade and financial channels. In order to do that, the following approach was 
pursued. If the trade channel was important in the severity of the crisis’s impact on 
firms, it would be expected that exporting firms would have been more affected by 
the GFC. Consequently, a dummy variable for those firms who exported was 
employed to capture the trade channel. In terms of the financial channel, several 
indicators were employed to capture its importance. Namely, if the financial channel 
was important, this would be partly reflected in firms that relied more on external 
finances for working capital being more affected by the GFC; hence, the variable 
share of working capital financed by banks was employed to account for this channel. 
In addition, following the literature review presented in section 2.3 and based on the 
results from the previous empirical chapter, it was expected that firms with a larger 
share of foreign currency loans would have been more severely affected by the GFC. 
Therefore, the variable share of firm's foreign currency loans in total loans was 
employed. Finally, given the potential importance of the FDI channel in the 
transmission of the GFC discussed in Chapter 2, this study also investigated whether 
the share of foreign ownership affected firms' performance during the crisis. In 
addition, a number of control variables were employed to account for various aspects 
of sales change during the GFC: the years of top managers' experiences were used as 
a proxy for the otherwise unobserved top manager’s ability. A variable firm age was 
employed to account for the years of experience of the firms and to investigate 
whether older or newer firms performed better during the crisis. A variable 
subsidies was used to investigate whether the firms that received subsidies in the 
previous three years had better performance during the GFC. The level of 
innovativeness of the firms was also included as a control variable, which was 
proxied by a dummy variable for whether the firm had introduced any new products 
during the last three years. Political instability was captured by a dummy that showed 
whether or not a firm considered political instability as a main obstacle to its 
operations. The categorical variables industry and firm size were employed to 
investigate whether particular industries and firm sizes were more severely affected 
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by the crisis. Finally, country dummies were employed to account for possible 
heterogeneity of the crisis impact across countries. The model was estimated by OLS. 
Particular attention was paid to diagnostic tests to ensure the model is statistically 
well specified and thus produces valid estimates.  
One of the most important findings in this study was related to the effect of the 
financial channel on the transmission of the GFC to ETEs. The robust negative 
relationship between the growth rate of sales and financial variables in all of the 
estimated models suggested that the financial channel had played a major role in 
determining firms' performance during the GFC. An important transmission 
mechanism previously identified in the literature has been the global restriction of 
credit. This was confirmed by this study, as the results from all the models suggested 
that the firms who appeared to have been more significantly affected by the crisis 
were those firms who before the crisis were more dependent on banks to finance 
their working capital. The degree of foreign bank ownership also appeared to be a 
significant channel of transmission of crisis. The results of this study suggested that 
firms which operated in countries with a higher degree of foreign bank ownership, in 
particular firms that were more dependent on banks to finance their working capital, 
had worse performance during the GFC. As argued in Chapter 2, it is well known that 
a higher level of foreign bank presence may expose a country to foreign shocks and 
can tighten liquidity conditions during a crisis, as parent banks reallocate capital 
across borders and therefore capital may be withdrawn from the transition country 
when it is needed in the bank’s home country (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011). In 
addition, the literature review in Chapter 3 showed that foreign bank subsidiaries in 
emerging Europe typically reduced lending earlier and faster than did domestic 
banks. 
The incidence of foreign currency loans appeared to be highly significant, both at 
firm-level and country-level, in all the model specifications, which suggested that 
firms more exposed to loans in foreign currencies and firms that operated in 
countries with higher levels of foreign currency loans were more severely affected by 
the GFC. As argued in Chapter 2, during the GFC, the depreciation of the domestic 
currencies prevented some unhedged borrowers from servicing their loans in foreign 
currencies.  Further investigation revealed that firms more exposed to loans in 
 foreign currencies operating in countries whose currencies depreciated during 2009 
had been more severely affected by the crisis.  
Another finding of this study suggests that the ownership structure of the firm was 
also important in weathering the GFC. A positive relationship was found between the 
level of foreign ownership and sales growth during the GFC, which suggested that, 
ceteris paribus, the foreign-owned firms have been less severely affected by the 
crisis. Results for most of the control variables appeared to be statistically significant 
and their signs were in accordance with theoretical predictions and previous 
empirical findings. The relationship between the top manager's experience and the 
growth rate of sales was positive and significant at the 5% level. The level of 
innovativeness of the firms appeared to be statistically significant as well. Firms that 
had not introduced new products in the previous 3 years (prior to 2007) experienced 
more decline in their growth rate of sales than those that had introduced new 
products. The dummy variable politicalinstability was also significant at the 5% level 
and had a negative relationship with the growth rate of sales. Firms that perceived 
political instability to be a main obstacle to their operations in 2007 had a more 
severe decline in the growth rate of sales in 2009 than firms that did not.  
Finally, no significant relationship was found between the dummy variable exports 
and firms’ sales. However, this does not suggest that the trade did not serve as a 
transmission channel for the GFC for these six countries that participated in this 
study, it simply suggests that exporting firms have not been affected by the crisis 
significantly different than non-exporting firms. Moreover, previous empirical 
studies have documented the superior performance of exporting firms compared to 
non-exporting firms, which would suggest that exporting firms are more capable of 
adjusting to difficult circumstances and more flexible when it comes to reallocating 
output to a different market. Further investigation revealed evidence suggesting that 
exporting firms that had been able to reallocate a higher proportion of their sales to 
their domestic market were less severely affected by the crisis.  In addition, findings 
suggested that exporting firms had a higher rate of capacity utilization compared to 
non-exporting firms during the GFC.  
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In the light of all the evidence presented in this thesis, both trade and financial 
channels appear to have mattered in the transmission of GFC to ETEs. Nevertheless, 
the major finding of this thesis is the greater importance of the financial channel in 
transmission of the GFC to these countries, which was confirmed by both the macro 
and micro-level studies. The overall size of the coefficients of financial variables and 
their level of statistical significance reinforces the general finding in the literature 
that the financial channel does matter when accounting for the transmission of the 
GFC and its inclusion in models for transition economies is crucial. The results from 
the macro-level study suggested that foreign credit flows were one of the main 
channels of the transmission of shocks from the EU15 to ETEs, particularly to 
countries with a higher degree of foreign bank ownership. Foreign bank ownership 
was also found to be a significant channel for the transmission of the crisis in the 
micro-level analysis.  The results of the micro-level study suggested that firms which 
operated in countries with a higher degree of foreign bank ownership, in particular 
firms that were more dependent on banks to finance their working capital, had worse 
performance during the GFC. The degree of euroisation appeared as a significant 
amplification mechanism of the GFC in both empirical studies.  
Finally, the results from the macro-level study suggest that exports were a significant 
channel for the transmission of the crisis, though the exporting term appeared to be 
insignificant in the firm-level analysis. However, this latter finding does not suggest 
that trade did not serve as a transmission channel of the GFC, but that there were 
also other channels affecting the non-exporting firms, particularly the financial 
channel.  In addition, the non-significance of the exporting term most probably also 
reflects the cross-sectional nature of the data and corresponding estimation from 
between-firm variation only, which enabled a better examination of the relative 
performance of exporting and non-exporting firms than the performance of 
exporting firms as such.  Secondly, although there was a trade channel, the exporting 
firms were able to cope with the crisis better than non-exporting firms due to their 
overall superior performance. So exports, or more precisely, exporting firms 
constituted a transmission channel of the GFC. Yet, exporting firms were also more 
able to offset crisis effects and thus contribute to the resilience of ETEs.  
 6.3 Contributions to knowledge 
In spite of a large number of studies on the international transmission of crises, 
research is still unable to quantify the determinants of crisis severity across 
countries. On the one hand, the vast majority of research studies investigating the 
international transmission of crisis to ETEs at macro level have generally neglected 
factors such as the degree of euroisation, integration with the EU, remittances, bank 
ownership and foreign credit flows. On the other hand, there is still a lack of 
empirical evidence at firm-level. This thesis contributed to knowledge in this area by 
investigating the impact of the GFC on ETEs at both the macro and micro level. In 
analysing the transmission of the GFC to these countries and the nature and severity 
of the spillovers, both trade and financial channels were examined. Particular 
emphasis was placed on exports, the degree of euroisation, integration with the EU, 
FDI, remittances, bank ownership and foreign credit flows at either macro level, 
micro level or both.  
This thesis contributes to the literature on the transmission of the GFC to ETEs by 
being, to the best of our knowledge, the first study that comprehensively investigates 
the international transmission of shocks from European advanced countries to ETEs 
using a model that looks at interdependencies among these countries. The thesis 
explores two main channels of international transmission of shocks, trade and 
financial, and finds evidence of the importance of both of these channels in the 
transmission of shocks to ETEs. An additional contribution of this thesis is the 
investigation of the influence of the degree of euroisation on the crisis severity across 
transition countries, considering that the previous empirical research on ETEs has 
neglected this impact. This thesis addressed this gap and confirmed the negative 
impact of the degree of euroisation on the severity of the impact of the crisis at both, 
macro and micro level.  Furthermore, this thesis explored the importance of foreign 
credit flows and found evidence that they served as a channel of propagation of 
crisis, particularly in countries with higher share of foreign bank ownership. A 
negative impact of the foreign bank ownership on the severity of the crisis across 
transition countries was also found in the second empirical analysis.  
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The second empirical analysis contributes to the empirical literature on transmission 
of the GFC by being, to the best of our knowledge, the first analysis to 
comprehensively investigate the firm-level determinants of the severity of the GFC 
and by introducing new variables that have affected the firms' performance during 
the crisis in 6 transition countries.  It investigated whether the initial conditions from 
2007 had an impact on the firms' sales during the GFC in 2009 and found evidence of 
the importance of the financial channel in transmission of the GFC to ETEs: a higher 
share of working capital financed by banks, a higher share of foreign currency loans 
and a higher share of foreign bank ownership each increased the impact of the GFC 
on the firms operating in these countries. With regards to the exports channel, it was 
found that both exporting and non-exporting firms operating in the countries 
covered in this study were significantly affected by the crisis. This finding suggests 
that, although there is a trade channel, the exporting firms were able to cope with the 
crisis better than non-exporting firms due to their overall superior performance and 
consequently contribute to the resilience of transitional economies.  The cross-
sectional nature of the data enabled a better examination of the relative performance 
of exporting and non-exporting firms than the performance of exporting firms as 
such.  
In terms of modelling framework, the thesis conducted extensive research for the 
most appropriate empirical approaches to investigate the interdependencies among 
countries and to understand how shocks are transmitted internationally. Given that 
we needed a model accounting for these interdependencies and examining them 
from a global perspective, in this thesis the GVAR modelling approach was used. This 
modelling framework allows for interdependencies at international level and for 
long-run and short-run relationships consistent with the theory and data, and 
provides a coherent and theory-consistent solution to the “curse of dimensionality” 
in global modelling (Smith and Galessi, 2011). By using GVAR, the limited and quite 
recent body of literature that uses this modelling framework is extended in several 
key aspects. Firstly, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that uses the 
GVAR to model the transmission of financial shocks to ETEs. Secondly, this study uses 
bilateral remittance flows to construct the weights needed for computing the foreign-
country specific variables, which, to the best of our knowledge, represents an original 
 contribution to the GVAR modelling framework. Thirdly, this method is applied to 
deal with country heterogeneity by dividing the countries in sub-samples based on 
several country characteristics (the level of country openness, the degree of 
euroisation and EU membership). Last but not least, unlike several other GVAR 
studies investigating the international transmission of shocks, the model 
specifications follow the arguments suggested by the literature on financial 
contagion and international transmission of the GFC to ETEs. 
6.4 Policy implications 
This thesis has investigated the international transmission of the GFC to ETEs. The 
findings have several policy implications for ETEs seeking to reduce their 
vulnerability to future negative global shocks. 
The major finding of this thesis is the importance of the financial channel in the 
transmission of the GFC to ETEs. First, this thesis showed that foreign credit flows in 
ETEs have increased dramatically since 2000s, which resulted in a credit boom in the 
transition region that boosted investment and output growth, but also led to large 
external imbalances financed by cross-border capital flows. As shown in section 1.2, 
during the GFC and the subsequent eurozone debt crisis, cross-border bank flows 
declined sharply in the region, contracting by an average of 13% by the first quarter 
of 2009. The results from the macro-level study suggested that the foreign credit 
flows were one of the main channels of the transmission of shocks from the EU15 to 
ETEs, particularly to the Baltic and Balkan countries. Second, an important 
transmission mechanism previously identified in the literature has been the global 
restriction of credit. This was confirmed by the micro-level study, as the results from 
the estimated models suggested that those firms that depended more on banks to 
finance their working capital before the crisis appeared to have been more 
significantly affected by the crisis. Third, the level of foreign bank ownership also 
appears to have been a significant channel of transmission of crisis. Section 1.2 
showed the dominance of foreign bank ownership in ETEs. The results of the micro-
level study suggested that firms which operated in countries with a higher degree of 
foreign bank ownership, in particular firms that were more dependent on banks to 
finance their working capital, had worse performance during the GFC. Fourth, this 
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thesis has shown that a high degree of euroisation is a common characteristic of 
ETEs. Section 1.2 showed that high levels of credit euroisation (the share of foreign 
currency loans in total loans) and deposit euroisation (the share of foreign currency 
deposits in total deposits) are prevalent in all transition countries, particularly in SEE 
countries. Further, section 2.3 highlighted the main costs associated with euroisation 
and argued that these might become more evident during periods of severe financial 
crisis. The findings from the macro-level study in Chapter 4 suggested that the impact 
of the shocks was larger and statistically more significant on the GDPs of highly 
euroised countries.  
Additionally, the incidence of foreign currency loans appeared to be highly 
significant, both at firm-level and country-level in all the model specifications in the 
micro-level study, which suggested that firms more exposed to loans in foreign 
currencies and firms operating in countries with higher shares of foreign currency 
loans as well as firms operating in countries that experienced currency depreciation 
during 2009 were more severely affected by the GFC.  
The recent financial crisis reflected weaknesses in previous economic policies at both 
national and supra-national level. There is still much to be done regarding the policy 
and reform agenda. Given the importance of financial development in terms of 
economic growth in ETEs, policymakers in these countries are faced with additional 
challenges to reform their financial system in order to mitigate the risk of 
international transmission of global shocks through the financial channel in the 
future. They have to be cautious of the impact of such reforms and policies on 
exchange rates and the wider financial sector development. The thesis has shown 
that international financial flows can grow very rapidly and then suddenly reverse, 
having a potential severe impact on economic activity in these countries. 
Policymakers in transition countries are still faced with the challenge of handling 
surges in cross-border bank flows in order to make these countries less vulnerable to 
future negative global shocks. In the aftermath of the GFC, capital controls have been 
receiving increasing attention as a tool to manage the surge in financial flows. Of 
course, given the importance of the cross-border financial flows to ETEs, the 
potential benefits of capital controls should be assessed against their costs before 
introducing/strengthening them. In addition to capital controls, macroprudential 
 policies such as additional capital requirements and limits on foreign exchange 
lending to unhedged borrowers should be used to manage the volume, maturity and 
currency composition of cross-border bank flows. Besides policies at national level, 
additional collective policies at supra-national level and their implications for global 
liquidity, leverage, and exposures, and the appropriateness of joint money and credit 
policies from the point of view of financial stability should also be considered 
carefully. For example, during the GFC the Vienna Initiative helped to ensure that an 
immediate large-scale withdrawal of foreign banks from the ETEs did not occur, thus 
it stabilised lending temporarily by the 17 banks that signed commitment letters.  
Finally, greater reliance on local savings would make these countries less vulnerable 
to future negative global shocks and subsequent reversals of cross-border bank 
flows. One approach to incentivize local savings would be through increasing interest 
rates and/or reducing tax on interest income. Moreover, deposit insurance schemes 
could be introduced and/or strengthened to protect depositors from loss in case of 
closure of a bank.  Additionally, given the prevalence of high levels of euroisation in 
ETEs, policymakers should undertake actions to reduce the degree of euroisation in 
these countries. Most importantly, given that, as discussed in section 2.3, euroization 
weakens central bank’s ability to act as a lender of last resort and reduces monetary 
policy’s autonomy/effectiveness, substituting foreign currency lending with the local 
currency lending, particularly to unhedged borrowers, would make these countries 
less vulnerable to sudden exchange rate depreciations. Again, this thesis suggests 
using/strengthening macroprudential policy instruments (i.e. limits on net open 
currency position; caps on foreign currency lending; limits on foreign currency 
lending etc.) as a tool to reduce the levels of euroization in ETEs.  
Lastly, policymakers in ETEs should carefully consider the financial implications of 
any further increases in the market share of foreign banks. Of course, given the 
importance of the foreign banks financial flows to ETEs, the potential benefits of 
capital controls should be assessed against their costs before As argued in Chapter 2, 
it is well known that a higher level of foreign bank presence may increase the 
exposure of a country to foreign shocks and can tighten liquidity conditions during a 
crisis, as parent banks reallocate capital across borders and therefore capital may be 
withdrawn from the transition country when it is needed in the bank’s home country. 
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Taking this into consideration, and given the significance of the empirical results 
related to foreign bank ownership and firms’ dependence on banks to finance their 
working capital presented in Chapter 5, enhanced supervisory and regulatory 
frameworks are required to reduce the vulnerability of banking sector in transition 
countries to future negative global shocks. One approach would be to introduce 
the countercyclical capital buffer which requires banks to add capital at times when 
credit is growing rapidly so that the buffer can be reduced when the financial cycle 
turns and it could protect the banking sector against losses that could be caused by 
cyclical systemic risks. In combination with other measures, these regulations are 
likely to help produce a more stable financial system. In turn, greater financial 
stability will help produce steady economic growth, with less risk for crisis 
fuelled recessions such as the GFC. 
The somewhat mixed evidence on the importance of the trade channel in the 
transmission of the GFC makes it trickier to suggest related policy interventions. On 
the one hand, the results from the macro-level study suggested that trade is the 
strongest linkage between EU15 and ETEs and, in line with theoretical expectations, 
the results suggested that trade served as a channel of international transmission of 
GDP and financial shocks, particularly in countries with stronger trade linkages with 
the EU15. The importance of the trade channel in the transmission of the GFC to ETEs 
was confirmed by a subsequent investigation is sub-samples defined by the level of 
country openness (exports to GDP ratio). The findings suggested that the impact of 
the shocks was larger on the GDPs of the more open economies compared to the less 
open economies.  
On the other hand, the findings of the micro-level study provided contrary evidence 
which suggested that exporting and non-exporting firms were affected similarly by 
the GFC. It has been argued that exporting firms have an overall superior 
performance compared to non-exporting firms, which was further confirmed in the 
micro-level study with interaction terms. The results suggested that exporting-firms 
were able to reallocate a higher proportion of their sales to domestic markets were 
less severely affected by the crisis, which implies that exporting firms are more 
capable of adjusting to difficult circumstances and more flexible when it comes to 
reallocating output to a different market. In addition, findings suggested that 
 exporting firms had a higher rate of capacity utilization compared to non-exporting 
firms during the GFC.  So, even though exports constituted an international 
transmission channel of the GFC, exporting firms were more able to offset crisis 
effects and thus contribute to the resilience of ETEs. Therefore, assuming that ETEs 
will most probably continue relying on an increase in exports as a major source of 
growth, policy measures will be necessary to sustain export growth. A survey of the 
literature on successful measures for promoting exports in developing countries is 
provided by Belloc and Di Maio (2012). The authors highlight the following 
measures:  creating a more favourable environment for exporters by stimulating 
institutional development, reducing corruption and improving the rule of law and 
customs procedures; entering into regional trade agreements; encouraging strategic 
collaboration between private and public actors and cooperation among producers, 
exporters and the policy makers; incentivizing innovation; and promoting the 
country in foreign markets. 
 This thesis has showed that ETEs have strong trade ties with the EU15, which makes 
these countries more vulnerable to the future negative shocks in the EU15. Taking 
this into consideration and given the growing consensus on the role of export 
diversification as a mechanism for protection against crises and shocks (Karahan, 
2017), policymakers in these countries should consider promoting export 
diversification through negotiations for a favourable international environment and 
by lowering non-tariff trade barriers (e.g. quotas, embargoes, sanctions, customs 
delays, technical barriers, voluntary export restraints etc.) that impede new export 
markets.  
6.5 Limitations and recommendations for future research 
The limitations of this thesis are mainly related to the length, the frequency and the 
quality of the data available. Due to the lack of quarterly data for earlier years, this 
thesis used data from 1999Q1-2014Q4. The relatively small number of observations 
and large number of variables included in the baseline model reduced the degrees of 
freedom available to estimate the parameters’, which might have led to statistical 
insignificance or borderline significance of the impulse response functions in some 
cases. Nevertheless, it was shown that the statistical significance of the impulse 
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responses of the main variables did not change significantly when the number of 
variables in the model was reduced. Yet, GVAR is known for providing more efficient 
estimates when using longer time series and higher frequency data.  In addition, as 
explained in section 4.4, data for several variables and countries were not available 
on quarterly basis for some of the earlier years, therefore, the cubic spline 
interpolation was used to convert annual data into quarterly data in these cases. As 
noted in section 4.4, this technique can only provide estimates of data between know 
data points, it cannot create new “unknown” data.  Enriching the dataset in the years 
to come most probably could produce more efficient estimates with less statistical 
problems. In addition, as more years of data become available and countries continue 
to recover from the recent Eurozone debt crisis, more investigation will provide 
further insights into the channels of transmission of shocks to ETEs, as well as the 
effect of policy responses and other factors on the duration of recessions and the 
speed and shape of recovery. 
Another important limitation of the investigation presented in Chapter 4 is related to 
the period under analysis, which includes the GFC. The implicit assumption in the 
GVAR analysis is that there are no structural breaks. However, the results of the tests 
suggested that there was structural instability, but it seemed to be present mainly in 
the error variances. GVAR is a relatively new empirical application and it relies 
mostly on user-written codes.  The code used in this thesis, while fairly 
comprehensive, still does not have the ability to model intercept and/or trend breaks 
to account for the otherwise un-modelled impact of the GFC. Therefore, a 
conservative approach to inference was adopted using bootstrap medians and 
confidence intervals when interpreting the impulse responses. This was argued to 
account for structural instability in the error variances. If, however, this approach 
was unable to fully address the issue of structural instability, then the use of the 
GVAR would not be entirely appropriate, and consequently the validity of the results 
would be impaired. Although the ability to overcome this problem is currently 
limited, this opens up opportunities for future research.  
The analysis presented in Chapter 5 is also subject to a couple of limitations. The first 
limitation relates to the lack of data for capital growth from 2008 to 2009 and the 
consequent inclusion in the model of capital purchased in 2007. However, it was not 
 expected that firms purchased significant amounts of capital during a period of 
tightened liquidity conditions and, even when excluding the variable capital 
altogether from the model, the results did not change, especially those concerning 
the variables of interest. The second limitation relates to the lack of data available for 
capacity utilization for 2007 when this variable was employed as a dependent 
variable to run a robustness check. Section 5.5 pointed out that the results of that 
model should be considered with caution due to data limitations (the capacity 
utilization data for 2007 were available only for a very small number of firms). It was 
not possible to calculate the growth rate of the capacity utilization from 2007 to 
2009, therefore only the 2009 value was used.  Another limitation of the data 
analysed in Chapter 5 is its cross sectional nature, which can only reflect between-
firm differences. This might have resulted in the non-significance of the exporting 
term, suggesting that exporting firms have not been affected by the crisis more 
severely than non-exporting firms. Cross-section data allowed for a better 
examination of the relative performance of exporting and non-exporting firms than 
the performance of exporting firms as such. However, within-firm variation over 
time might have revealed the impact of the GFC on exporting firms. It should be 
noted that BEEPS has recently introduced a panel dataset and even though it was 
initially considered to be used in this thesis, it was later deemed as unsuitable for the 
analysis of the transmission of the GFC, since only a small fraction of firms were 
included in it and even a smaller fraction of those firms were included in the 
Financial Crisis Survey. Therefore, a panel covering a longer time span would be 
worth assessing in the future to provide insights into the impact of the GFC on 
exporting firms as well as the factors that affected the firms’ speed of recovery from 
the GFC.  
Finally, this thesis focused on the transmission of the GFC, which was a unique crisis 
and we are uncertain how general these findings are to the other crises. 
Nevertheless, the research programme reported in this thesis has shown the 
importance of the financial channel in the transmission of the GFC to ETEs, which 
was confirmed by both the macro and micro-level studies. The results presented in 
this thesis reinforce a general finding in the literature that the financial channel does 
matter when accounting for the international transmission of shocks and its 
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inclusion in models for transition economies is crucial. In regard to the trade channel, 
this thesis has shown that while exports constituted a transmission channel of the 
GFC, exporting firms were also more able to offset the crisis effects and thus 
contribute to the resilience of ETEs.  
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Appendix to Chapter 4 
 
Table A4.6 Unit root tests for the domestic variables at 5% significance level 
 
Note: The results at the 5% significance level suggest that the majority of the variables are unable to reject the null of non-stationarity. WS statistics are weighted symmetric 
estimations of ADF type regressions introduced by Park and Fuller (1995). 
 
Domestic Variables 
Stat
istic 
Critica
l Value 
ALBANI
A 
BOSNI
A 
BULGARI
A 
CROATI
A 
CZECK 
REPUBLIC 
ESTONI
A 
EUR
O 
HUNGAR
Y 
KOSOV
O 
LATVI
A 
LITHUAN
IA 
MACED
ONIA 
MONTE
NEGRO 
POLAN
D 
ROMANI
A 
SERBI
A 
SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC 
SLOVENI
A 
gdp (with trend) ADF -3.45 -0.93 -0.88 -1.75 -1.90 -2.12 -1.88 -2.21 -2.46 -2.66 -2.22 -2.04 -4.23 -0.85 -0.89 -2.04 -1.20 -4.28 -2.35 
gdp (with trend) WS -3.24 -1.03 -1.29 -0.58 -0.67 -1.38 -1.60 -1.62 -1.54 -1.81 -1.80 -1.65 -4.36 -1.22 -0.72 -1.42 -0.21 -4.20 -1.95 
gdp (no trend) ADF -2.89 -2.17 -1.60 -3.22 -1.98 -2.60 -1.82 -2.15 -2.49 0.24 -2.28 -1.99 -1.24 -1.74 -2.02 -1.98 -3.13 -1.92 -2.60 
gdp (no trend) WS -2.55 0.77 0.48 1.04 -0.57 0.01 -0.51 0.00 -0.73 0.75 -1.06 -0.06 -0.03 0.45 1.43 0.41 1.02 -0.77 -1.24 
Dgdp ADF -2.89 -6.27 -6.05 -3.25 -2.90 -2.65 -2.70 -2.72 -3.47 -7.02 -2.19 -3.18 -7.59 -5.91 -3.52 -3.86 -4.29 -12.50 -2.86 
Dgdp WS -2.55 -6.50 -6.29 -3.50 -3.07 -2.88 -2.91 -2.98 -3.62 -7.30 -2.38 -3.38 -7.90 -6.15 -3.35 -4.06 -4.55 -12.82 -3.12 
DDgdp ADF -2.89 -7.84 -7.84 -8.30 -6.17 -5.80 -8.15 -6.01 -6.74 -7.84 -6.75 -7.33 -7.38 -7.84 -10.07 -6.59 -10.38 -10.96 -5.32 
DDgdp WS -2.55 -8.18 -8.18 -8.61 -6.46 -6.09 -8.48 -5.94 -7.06 -8.18 -7.04 -7.65 -7.71 -8.18 -9.99 -6.83 -10.75 -11.32 -5.57 
exp (with trend) ADF -3.45 -3.32 
 
-3.14 -1.86 -2.23 -1.98 -2.55 -1.84 -1.58 -2.27 -2.76 -2.44 -3.98 -2.47 -3.54 -2.04 -2.17 -2.67 
exp (with trend) WS -3.24 -3.37 
 
-3.39 -1.82 -1.88 -2.00 -2.47 -0.85 -1.40 -2.44 -3.03 -1.54 -4.25 -0.75 -3.07 -2.42 -2.30 -2.16 
exp (no trend) ADF -2.89 -0.98 
 
-1.37 -1.90 -1.98 -1.74 -2.14 -2.73 -2.05 -0.43 -1.28 -1.90 -2.46 -2.55 -1.36 -1.41 -1.44 -2.45 
exp (no trend) WS -2.55 -0.52 
 
-0.78 -1.81 0.48 -0.44 -0.70 0.71 0.24 0.79 -0.22 0.82 -2.33 1.16 0.98 -0.67 0.04 -0.35 
Dexp ADF -2.89 -5.56 
 
-6.62 -5.67 -4.19 -3.53 -3.99 -2.94 -5.49 -5.64 -5.45 -5.25 -11.36 -4.56 -5.84 -4.34 -3.92 -3.79 
Dexp WS -2.55 -5.79 
 
-6.92 -6.04 -4.45 -3.77 -4.23 -3.00 -5.72 -5.88 -5.66 -5.51 -10.26 -3.53 -5.69 -4.17 -4.12 -4.05 
DDexp ADF -2.89 -8.72 
 
-10.96 -9.29 -7.01 -7.31 -7.49 -6.09 -8.13 -9.33 -8.09 -11.18 -10.76 -6.81 -8.29 -7.41 -7.00 -5.82 
DDexp WS -2.55 -9.00 
 
-11.31 -8.69 -7.28 -7.61 -7.59 -6.28 -8.48 -9.70 -8.19 -11.61 -10.02 -7.09 -8.37 -7.72 -7.20 -6.07 
FDI (with trend) ADF -3.45 -1.99 -1.45 -1.48 -1.48 -2.32 -3.25 -1.54 -3.32 
 
-1.27 -2.03 -6.12 -4.62 -2.21 -1.56 -4.45 -0.16 -0.95 
FDI (with trend) WS -3.24 -2.15 -0.23 0.27 -0.85 0.69 -0.62 -1.74 -1.77 
 
-1.41 -1.71 1.84 1.25 -0.06 -0.62 1.57 -0.23 -1.25 
FDI (no trend) ADF -2.89 -1.90 -3.43 -4.19 -2.27 -4.92 -3.21 -1.64 -3.39 
 
-1.48 -2.16 -6.05 -5.96 -3.26 -3.35 -5.83 -3.16 -1.63 
FDI (no trend) WS -2.55 -1.15 1.01 1.35 -0.02 1.75 1.05 0.78 -0.44 
 
0.70 -0.34 2.74 2.32 1.50 0.43 2.69 0.36 -0.10 
DFDI ADF -2.89 -6.65 -2.99 -2.96 -2.35 -3.32 -3.56 -4.39 -5.25 
 
-2.90 -3.46 -4.08 -6.36 -4.11 -2.85 -6.30 -2.36 -3.22 
DFDI WS -2.55 -6.91 -3.16 -2.52 -2.62 -2.57 -2.89 -4.65 -5.52 
 
-3.16 -3.65 1.79 3.79 -3.66 -3.11 3.75 -2.60 -3.48 
DDFDI ADF -2.89 -10.07 -7.12 -9.24 -5.98 -8.72 -5.52 -8.79 -7.91 
 
-6.44 -5.52 -5.31 -7.15 -7.77 -7.91 -6.92 -6.89 -6.80 
DDFDI WS -2.55 -10.45 -7.44 -9.37 -6.24 -9.08 -5.73 -9.16 -7.84 
 
-6.68 -5.79 -5.14 -0.44 -8.07 -8.21 -0.08 -7.12 -7.08 
rem (with trend) ADF -3.45 -3.33 -2.79 -5.40 
 
-2.10 -3.02 -2.39 -4.09 -3.75 -1.93 -2.44 -1.47 -1.95 -4.34 -2.14 
 
-2.25 -2.24 
rem (with trend) WS -3.24 -3.57 -3.01 -5.66 
 
-1.59 -1.95 -2.68 -1.33 -4.01 -1.72 -1.57 -1.86 -2.19 -2.56 -1.74 
 
-2.36 -2.27 
rem (no trend) ADF -2.89 -2.69 -2.76 -3.95 
 
-2.47 -3.15 -2.30 -4.54 -3.11 -2.31 -2.79 -1.74 -1.33 -4.66 -2.26 
 
-2.02 -0.90 
rem (no trend) WS -2.55 -2.90 -3.01 -4.14 
 
-0.66 -1.85 -1.70 -0.48 -3.26 -0.85 -0.23 -1.93 -1.30 -1.93 -1.68 
 
-1.15 -1.14 
Drem ADF -2.89 -6.38 -6.82 -11.36 
 
-4.61 -5.17 -4.17 -4.65 -8.44 -4.62 -6.90 -5.53 -6.18 -5.70 -4.52 
 
-6.07 -7.86 
Drem WS -2.55 -6.66 -7.09 -11.70 
 
-4.87 -5.43 -4.44 -4.92 -8.67 -4.86 -7.18 -5.71 -6.45 -5.65 -4.77 
 
-6.36 -8.19 
DDrem ADF -2.89 -8.90 -9.29 -12.40 
 
-7.84 -6.52 -6.88 -7.84 -9.54 -7.84 -9.84 -8.18 -9.38 -8.07 -6.86 
 
-9.20 -12.14 
DDrem WS -2.55 -9.27 -9.61 -12.70 
 
-8.19 -6.81 -7.19 -8.19 -9.92 -8.16 -10.24 -8.49 -9.76 -7.90 -7.16 
 
-9.58 -12.61 
fbo (with trend) ADF -3.45 -2.24 -1.41 -0.55 -2.94 -2.27 -2.72 -2.80 -4.00 
 
-0.85 -3.71 -1.42 
 
-2.02 -1.67 -3.01 -2.48 -2.14 
fbo (with trend) WS -3.24 -1.50 -0.84 -0.87 -3.18 -2.21 -2.98 -2.80 -3.36 
 
-1.00 -3.09 -1.71 
 
-1.51 -1.82 -1.17 -2.70 -1.87 
fbo (no trend) ADF -2.89 -2.64 -2.37 -0.76 -2.59 -2.42 -2.23 -2.49 -3.67 
 
-1.60 -3.73 -1.73 
 
-0.66 -1.82 -3.39 -1.85 -1.92 
fbo (no trend) WS -2.55 -1.08 -0.54 -0.90 -2.79 -1.37 -2.43 -1.72 -2.24 
 
-0.88 -2.79 -0.71 
 
-1.16 -1.62 -0.26 -1.98 0.03 
Dfbo ADF -2.89 -4.83 -4.61 -3.60 -4.31 -4.48 -4.40 -4.84 -4.93 
 
-3.96 -5.03 -4.83 
 
-3.89 -2.79 -4.97 -3.66 -4.48 
Dfbo WS -2.55 -5.09 -4.87 -3.86 -4.57 -4.74 -4.67 -5.11 -5.20 
 
-4.21 -5.30 -5.09 
 
-4.15 -3.06 -5.23 -3.91 -4.73 
DDfbo ADF -2.89 -8.08 -7.63 -7.73 -6.96 -7.42 -7.04 -7.62 -6.88 
 
-7.71 -7.24 -7.81 
 
-7.00 -5.61 -7.72 -6.30 -7.13 
DDfbo WS -2.55 -8.42 -7.97 -8.07 -7.28 -7.75 -7.35 -7.95 -7.20 
 
-8.05 -7.57 -8.16 
 
-7.31 -5.90 -8.06 -6.60 -7.45 
  
 
Table A4.7 Unit root tests for the foreign variables at 5% significance level 
 
Note: The results at the 5% significance level suggest that the majority of the variables are unable to reject the null of non-stationarity. WS statistics are weighted symmetric 
estimations of ADF type regressions introduced by Park and Fuller (1995). 
eur (with trend) ADF -3.45 -1.01 -0.99 -1.51 -1.18 -1.36 -1.77 -1.50 -3.02 -2.53 -1.86 -0.76 -3.12 
 
-3.48 -1.13 -3.52 -1.78 -1.86 
eur (with trend) WS -3.24 -1.43 -0.99 -1.66 -1.24 -1.64 -1.84 -1.65 -3.16 -0.94 -2.12 -1.04 -3.02 
 
-3.34 -1.33 -3.72 -1.87 -2.19 
eur (no trend) ADF -2.89 -1.51 -1.79 -1.39 -0.67 -1.90 -1.14 -0.24 -2.68 -2.53 0.16 -2.20 -2.16 
 
-3.30 -0.93 -2.35 -0.90 -1.44 
eur (no trend) WS -2.55 -0.63 -0.79 -1.77 -0.98 -1.12 -1.52 -0.52 -2.95 1.22 -0.04 -0.49 -2.45 
 
-2.73 -0.92 -1.80 -0.88 -1.10 
Deur ADF -2.89 -4.91 -4.47 -6.19 -4.03 -5.47 -4.84 -3.99 -4.56 -5.04 -5.50 -3.33 -7.52 
 
-4.48 -4.13 -8.08 -4.60 -4.79 
Deur WS -2.55 -5.17 -4.73 -6.49 -4.29 -5.57 -5.10 -4.25 -4.82 -5.09 -5.77 -3.54 -7.07 
 
-4.74 -4.38 -8.41 -4.85 -5.05 
DDeur ADF -2.89 -8.71 -8.59 -9.98 -6.35 -6.97 -7.84 -7.19 -7.71 -7.24 -7.59 -5.71 -11.08 
 
-6.01 -8.95 -9.76 -8.07 -7.72 
DDeur WS -2.55 -9.07 -8.95 -10.40 -6.62 -7.19 -8.18 -7.51 -8.05 -7.51 -7.92 -6.00 -10.08 
 
-6.31 -9.32 -10.17 -8.42 -8.06 
eu (with trend) ADF -3.45 -2.09 -2.88 -5.97 -4.65 -3.89 -3.47 -1.38 -4.14 -4.05 -3.88 -3.80 -2.66 -2.17 -1.72 -2.54 -2.80 -2.78 -3.73 
eu (with trend) WS -3.24 -2.31 -3.13 -6.12 -4.89 -4.15 -3.70 -1.67 -4.47 -4.34 -3.84 -3.89 -2.93 -2.29 -2.05 -2.79 -3.02 -3.01 -3.68 
eu (no trend) ADF -2.89 -2.08 -2.83 -5.90 -4.17 -3.95 -3.38 -1.48 -3.03 -4.11 -3.81 -3.68 -2.70 -1.79 -1.76 -2.36 -2.80 -2.59 -2.37 
eu (no trend) WS -2.55 -2.36 -3.09 -6.09 -4.14 -4.18 -3.42 -1.82 -3.11 -4.36 -3.39 -3.86 -2.97 -2.11 -2.08 -2.45 -3.05 -2.63 -2.60 
Deu ADF -2.89 -4.52 -4.03 -8.89 -9.51 -7.42 -7.19 -4.88 -9.47 -6.76 -4.89 -7.11 -6.09 -4.55 -5.41 -8.50 -5.90 -6.93 -7.06 
Deu WS -2.55 -4.79 -4.27 -9.22 -7.42 -7.68 -7.23 -5.05 -9.77 -7.05 -5.00 -7.41 -6.32 -4.81 -5.07 -7.05 -5.31 -6.17 -7.28 
DDeu ADF -2.89 -9.30 -5.96 -8.60 -12.48 -8.36 -8.66 -8.49 -9.80 -6.99 -6.85 -7.54 -7.57 -7.28 -7.11 -9.63 -9.23 -7.02 -7.01 
DDeu WS -2.55 -9.66 -6.24 -8.66 -8.26 -8.37 -8.48 -8.74 -10.18 -7.15 -6.92 -7.87 -7.82 -7.59 -6.77 -8.47 -8.17 -7.23 -7.26 
Foreign 
Variables 
Stati
s. 
Critic
al 
Value 
ALBAN
IA 
BOSNIA 
BULG
ARIA 
CROA
TIA 
CZECK 
REPUB
LIC 
ESTON
IA 
EUR
O 
HUNGA
RY 
KOSOVO 
LAT
VIA 
LITHUANI
A 
MACEDO
NIA 
MONTENE
GRO 
POLAND ROMANIA SERBIA 
SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC 
SLOVEN
IA 
gdps (with trend) ADF -3.45 -2.31 -1.83 -2.30 -1.78 -2.15 -2.06 -2.21 -1.94 -2.43 -1.50 -2.00 -1.98 -2.40 -2.29 -1.60 -2.18 -2.24 -1.84 
gdps (with trend) WS -3.24 -1.89 -1.21 -1.90 -1.35 -1.74 -1.64 -1.80 -1.34 -1.96 -1.13 -1.51 -1.46 -1.97 -1.88 -1.07 -1.74 -1.80 -1.13 
     gdps (no trend)        
   
AD
F -2.89 -2.54 -2.29 -2.43 -2.20 -2.48 -2.31 
-
2.4
5 -2.17 -2.45 -2.34 -2.35 -2.19 -2.58 -2.54 -2.27 -2.49 -2.53 -2.09 
gdps (no trend) WS -2.55 -0.99 -0.01 -0.70 0.02 -0.61 -0.20 -0.64 0.31 -0.74 0.61 -0.25 -0.04 -1.06 -0.86 0.56 -0.53 -0.76 0.62 
Dgdps ADF -2.89 -2.92 -5.45 -2.83 -3.91 -2.51 -2.27 -2.64 -3.44 -1.96 -3.07 -3.15 -3.79 -2.86 -2.74 -3.68 -2.58 -2.61 -3.02 
Dgdps WS -2.55 -3.17 -5.64 -3.09 -4.14 -2.79 -2.55 -2.91 -3.63 -2.24 -3.33 -3.39 -4.00 -3.11 -3.01 -3.91 -2.85 -2.87 -3.19 
DDgdps ADF -2.89 -5.50 -10.28 -5.09 -8.39 -4.43 -4.42 -4.71 -7.02 -3.87 -5.70 -6.33 -7.50 -5.27 -4.97 -7.07 -4.72 -4.67 -7.71 
DDgdps WS -2.55 -5.76 -10.67 -5.36 -8.74 -4.68 -4.66 -4.97 -7.33 -4.13 -5.98 -6.64 -7.82 -5.53 -5.22 -7.39 -4.97 -4.91 -8.01 
exps (with trend) ADF -3.45 -2.64 -2.42 -2.54 -2.51 -2.26 -1.96 -2.36 -2.84 -2.48 -1.72 -2.45 -2.65 -2.59 -2.47 -2.62 -2.20 -2.67 -2.12 
exps (with trend) WS -3.24 -2.20 -2.14 -2.11 -2.19 -2.07 -1.53 -2.03 -2.77 -2.30 -1.49 -2.15 -2.21 -2.14 -2.13 -2.29 -1.90 -2.28 -2.02 
exps (no trend) ADF -2.89 -2.39 -2.06 -2.40 -2.30 -2.39 -2.24 -2.43 -1.78 -2.05 -2.23 -2.14 -1.89 -2.36 -2.44 -2.21 -2.37 -2.33 -1.88 
exps (no trend) WS -2.55 -0.33 -0.12 -0.24 -0.32 -0.48 0.30 -0.33 -0.02 -0.28 0.11 -0.11 0.35 -0.25 -0.43 -0.25 -0.22 -0.32 0.14 
Dexps ADF -2.89 -3.75 -3.99 -3.49 -3.43 -4.05 -3.77 -3.59 -4.03 -4.42 -4.53 -3.65 -3.97 -3.73 -3.58 -3.71 -3.66 -3.80 -3.60 
Dexps WS -2.55 -4.00 -4.23 -3.75 -3.69 -4.08 -4.02 -3.77 -4.29 -4.46 -4.58 -3.90 -4.18 -3.99 -3.80 -3.96 -3.75 -4.04 -3.86 
DDexps ADF -2.89 -5.97 -5.91 -5.65 -5.56 -6.79 -6.53 -6.09 -6.32 -7.24 -7.78 -6.51 -6.08 -5.76 -6.12 -6.14 -6.38 -5.88 -6.39 
DDexps WS -2.55 -6.19 -6.12 -5.72 -5.70 -6.47 -6.68 -5.93 -6.56 -7.08 -7.51 -6.72 -6.37 -6.01 -6.08 -6.28 -5.99 -5.99 -6.63 
FDIs (with trend) ADF -3.45 -0.97 -1.09 -0.91 -0.87 -1.87 -0.94 -0.93 -0.88 -0.92 -2.68 -0.73 -0.95 -0.94 -0.93 -0.96 -1.42 -0.95 -5.08 
FDIs (with trend) WS -3.24 -1.22 -0.73 -1.09 -1.11 0.75 -1.19 -0.68 -1.16 -0.88 0.99 -0.89 -1.24 -1.20 -1.20 -1.23 0.40 -0.83 1.32 
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FDIs (no trend) ADF -2.89 -1.69 -2.22 -1.78 -1.75 -3.43 -1.68 -2.13 -1.70 -1.98 -4.48 -1.96 -1.63 -1.67 -1.67 -1.66 -4.22 -2.09 -6.23 
FDIs (no trend) WS -2.55 -0.02 0.26 0.16 0.08 1.99 0.02 0.67 -0.01 0.52 2.02 0.27 -0.08 -0.03 0.02 -0.05 1.47 0.24 2.24 
DFDIs ADF -2.89 -3.17 -2.36 -3.13 -3.09 -3.79 -3.19 -3.13 -3.13 -3.06 -3.93 -2.89 -3.20 -3.20 -3.15 -3.19 -2.75 -2.71 -5.46 
DFDIs WS -2.55 -3.43 -2.63 -3.37 -3.34 -0.56 -3.44 -3.09 -3.39 -3.20 1.10 -3.14 -3.46 -3.45 -3.40 -3.45 -2.12 -2.96 2.56 
DDFDIs ADF -2.89 -6.65 -6.64 -6.72 -6.81 -6.39 -6.78 -6.72 -6.84 -6.69 -6.52 -6.86 -6.76 -6.79 -6.67 -6.72 -8.41 -6.84 -6.83 
DDFDIs WS -2.55 -6.94 -6.95 -6.99 -7.10 -5.35 -7.06 -6.89 -7.12 -6.91 -4.51 -7.15 -7.05 -7.08 -6.95 -7.01 -8.72 -7.15 -4.04 
rems (with trend) ADF -3.45 -2.25 -2.26 -2.29 -2.36 -2.28 -2.44 -2.28 -2.45 -2.45 -2.78 -2.47 -2.35 -2.26 -2.27 -2.38 -2.35 -2.38 -1.47 
rems (with trend) WS -3.24 -2.28 -2.48 -2.36 -2.46 -2.30 -2.50 -2.36 -2.59 -2.72 -2.93 -2.67 -2.63 -2.29 -2.31 -2.44 -2.45 -2.62 -1.35 
rems (no trend) ADF -2.89 -0.92 -1.59 -0.91 -0.94 -0.90 -0.85 -0.93 -0.91 -1.31 -1.02 -1.09 -1.31 -0.90 -0.91 -0.92 -0.93 -1.17 -2.32 
rems (no trend) WS -2.55 -1.16 -0.88 -1.08 -1.03 -1.13 -0.94 -1.11 -0.90 -1.07 -0.91 -0.93 -0.88 -1.13 -1.13 -1.05 -1.01 -1.01 -0.25 
Drems ADF -2.89 -7.86 -6.99 -7.88 -7.85 -7.87 -8.14 -7.85 -7.47 -7.27 -7.80 -7.72 -7.49 -7.87 -7.87 -7.84 -7.89 -7.52 -5.56 
Drems WS -2.55 -8.20 -7.29 -8.21 -8.18 -8.21 -8.46 -8.18 -7.79 -7.58 -8.11 -8.04 -7.81 -8.20 -8.21 -8.17 -8.22 -7.84 -5.75 
DDrems ADF -2.89 -12.11 -11.06 -12.16 
-
12.18 
-
12.12 -13.16 -12.04 -11.33 -10.72 -12.11 -11.84 -11.83 -12.14 -12.13 -12.04 -12.11 -11.82 -8.16 
DDrems WS -2.55 -12.58 -11.51 -12.63 
-
12.66 
-
12.59 -13.67 -12.51 -11.78 -11.15 -12.59 -12.31 -12.29 -12.61 -12.60 -12.50 -12.58 -12.29 -8.45 
fbos (with trend) ADF -3.45 -2.00 -2.20 -2.00 -1.90 -2.35 -1.87 -2.14 -1.37 -1.49 -2.06 -1.61 -1.47 -2.11 -2.03 -1.65 -2.02 -1.97 -1.93 
fbos (with trend) WS -3.24 -1.74 -2.01 -1.63 -1.52 -1.34 -1.55 -1.54 -1.52 -1.22 -1.76 -1.37 -1.39 -1.63 -1.61 -1.27 -1.85 -1.51 -0.92 
fbos (no trend) ADF -2.89 -2.00 -2.22 -2.15 -2.24 -2.56 -2.10 -2.29 -1.85 -2.23 -2.01 -2.12 -1.93 -2.13 -2.11 -2.35 -1.86 -2.20 -1.86 
fbos (no trend) WS -2.55 -0.08 -1.21 -0.24 -0.29 0.41 0.07 0.03 -1.21 -0.15 -0.05 -0.42 -0.71 0.12 0.12 -0.13 -0.20 0.06 -0.91 
Dfbos ADF -2.89 -4.37 -4.17 -4.48 -4.31 -5.11 -4.56 -4.74 -2.93 -4.42 -4.43 -3.93 -3.72 -4.68 -4.57 -3.87 -4.41 -4.57 -4.02 
Dfbos WS -2.55 -4.61 -4.42 -4.72 -4.55 -5.36 -4.80 -4.99 -3.19 -4.67 -4.67 -4.17 -3.97 -4.93 -4.81 -4.11 -4.66 -4.81 -4.28 
DDfbos ADF -2.89 -7.07 -6.91 -7.17 -7.02 -7.50 -7.23 -7.29 -6.16 -7.41 -7.15 -6.90 -6.83 -7.25 -7.21 -6.88 -7.07 -7.22 -7.30 
DDfbos WS -2.55 -7.39 -7.22 -7.50 -7.34 -7.83 -7.55 -7.62 -6.46 -7.74 -7.48 -7.22 -7.14 -7.58 -7.53 -7.19 -7.39 -7.54 -7.62 
eurs (with trend) ADF -3.45 -1.89 -1.62 -1.93 -1.97 -1.91 -1.86 -1.85 -3.06 -2.09 -2.00 -1.93 -2.08 -1.89 -1.96 -2.05 -1.94 -1.89 -1.40 
eurs (with trend) WS -3.24 -2.22 -1.97 -2.25 -2.28 -2.23 -2.19 -2.18 -3.26 -2.39 -2.31 -2.25 -2.39 -2.21 -2.27 -2.35 -2.26 -2.22 -1.56 
eurs (no trend) ADF -2.89 -1.44 -1.46 -1.43 -1.36 -1.41 -1.45 -1.44 -2.08 -1.39 -1.38 -1.48 -1.49 -1.42 -1.39 -1.36 -1.36 -1.45 -0.28 
eurs (no trend) WS -2.55 -1.11 -1.03 -1.09 -1.03 -1.08 -1.10 -1.10 -2.23 -1.08 -1.04 -1.13 -1.14 -1.06 -1.02 -1.05 -0.97 -1.11 -0.62 
Deurs ADF -2.89 -4.80 -4.59 -4.80 -4.83 -4.76 -4.80 -4.76 -5.19 -4.84 -4.81 -4.77 -4.88 -4.79 -4.81 -4.82 -4.80 -4.76 -4.11 
Deurs WS -2.55 -5.06 -4.85 -5.06 -5.09 -5.02 -5.06 -5.02 -5.46 -5.11 -5.07 -5.04 -5.14 -5.05 -5.07 -5.08 -5.06 -5.02 -4.37 
DDeurs ADF -2.89 -7.73 -7.77 -7.72 -7.78 -7.75 -7.73 -7.73 -7.61 -7.68 -7.69 -7.65 -7.66 -7.73 -7.74 -7.88 -7.75 -7.76 -6.83 
DDeurs WS -2.55 -8.06 -8.11 -8.06 -8.12 -8.09 -8.07 -8.07 -7.95 -8.01 -8.03 -7.99 -8.00 -8.07 -8.08 -8.22 -8.09 -8.10 -7.14 
eus (with trend) ADF -3.45 -3.81 -3.99 -3.74 -3.62 -3.44 -3.72 -3.61 -3.98 -3.80 -3.74 -3.52 -3.09 -3.75 -3.67 -3.80 -3.76 -3.74 -2.47 
eus (with trend) WS -3.24 -3.78 -3.96 -3.69 -3.56 -3.35 -3.72 -3.53 -4.23 -3.93 -3.66 -3.51 -3.08 -3.70 -3.61 -3.79 -3.69 -3.68 -2.77 
eus (no trend) ADF -2.89 -2.44 -2.58 -2.40 -2.43 -2.10 -2.23 -2.26 -3.98 -2.07 -2.17 -2.49 -2.71 -2.36 -2.27 -2.52 -2.30 -2.32 -2.58 
eus (no trend) WS -2.55 -2.67 -2.82 -2.63 -2.64 -2.33 -2.48 -2.49 -4.22 -2.32 -2.43 -2.72 -2.86 -2.59 -2.50 -2.75 -2.54 -2.55 -2.79 
Deus ADF -2.89 -7.00 -7.30 -6.98 -6.98 -6.96 -7.10 -7.00 -7.02 -6.72 -7.33 -6.85 -7.02 -7.05 -7.00 -6.90 -7.10 -7.05 -6.13 
Deus WS -2.55 -7.22 -7.53 -7.19 -7.19 -7.18 -7.33 -7.22 -7.16 -6.95 -7.58 -7.09 -7.12 -7.27 -7.22 -7.13 -7.33 -7.28 -6.40 
DDeus ADF -2.89 -6.89 -6.79 -6.87 -6.86 -6.95 -7.02 -6.92 -6.69 -6.87 -7.15 -6.74 -7.02 -6.96 -6.92 -6.70 -6.87 -6.92 -7.76 
DDeus WS -2.55 -7.14 -6.99 -7.12 -7.12 -7.20 -7.28 -7.17 -6.97 -7.11 -7.42 -7.01 -7.29 -7.21 -7.17 -6.96 -7.13 -7.17 -7.82 
 Table A4.8 Tests of residual serial correlation for country-specific VARX* models 
Note: The numbers in bold indicate the rejection of null hypothesis of no serial correlation at 
5% significance level. 
Figure A4.8 Persistence profiles for the baseline model 
 
 
Note: Persistence profiles refer to the time profiles of the effects of system or variable-
specific shocks on the cointegrating relations in the GVAR model and they have a value of 
unity on impact, while they should tend to zero as n→∞. The Figure above shows that all 
persistence profiles converge to zero by the 15th quarter. 
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Countries Fcrit_0.05 gdp exp FDI fcl rem eur 
ALBANIA F(4,33) 2.66 0.49 2.86 4.23 2.86 1.57 4.38 
BOSNIA F(4,33) 2.66 7.53 
 
2.33 1.34 1.03 1.35 
BULGARIA F(4,31) 2.68 2.18 3.60 1.64 0.66 1.31 0.66 
CROATIA F(4,32) 2.67 0.76 0.99 1.36 1.32 
 
1.31 
CZECK REPUBLIC F(4,31) 2.68 4.10 0.17 0.77 2.65 0.43 2.91 
ESTONIA F(4,32) 2.67 2.18 2.51 1.58 1.17 0.82 1.17 
EURO F(4,41) 2.60 2.99 0.41 0.03 3.87 0.03 0.49 
HUNGARY F(4,33) 2.66 1.47 0.57 0.48 0.85 0.12 0.63 
KOSOVO F(4,33) 2.66 1.40 0.78 
  
0.55 
 LATVIA F(4,31) 2.68 0.50 1.61 1.13 2.51 0.07 2.35 
LITHUANIA F(4,32) 2.67 0.82 3.63 2.39 0.45 1.59 0.52 
MACEDONIA F(4,32) 2.67 5.08 1.55 1.72 0.38 1.62 0.36 
MONTENEGRO F(4,34) 2.65 10.57 7.85 1.52 
 
2.17 
 POLAND F(4,32) 2.67 2.08 3.07 0.82 0.66 1.16 0.67 
ROMANIA F(4,32) 2.67 0.51 1.63 1.85 1.33 1.07 1.31 
SERBIA F(4,33) 2.66 2.49 5.99 1.12 
   SLOVAK REPUBLIC F(4,32) 2.67 10.61 1.76 1.16 0.40 2.60 0.40 
SLOVENIA F(4,31) 2.68 0.99 0.63 0.29 3.38 4.18 1.56 
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Table A4.9 Contemporaneous effects of foreign variables on domestic 
counterparts 
Country Coefficient gdp exp FDI fcl rem eur 
ALBANIA Newey-West's adjusted SE 0.04 0.38 1.08 3.11 0.23 1.85 
 
t-ratio_NeweyWest 5.23 2.10 1.17 0.16 1.01 0.20 
BOSNIA Newey-West's adjusted SE 0.07 
 
0.09 0.80 0.33 0.74 
 
t-ratio_NeweyWest 2.98 
 
0.43 -1.24 2.30 2.13 
BULGARIA Newey-West's adjusted SE 0.20 0.91 0.36 0.37 0.18 0.28 
 
t-ratio_NeweyWest 4.56 1.04 2.48 1.42 3.66 4.64 
CROATIA Newey-West's adjusted SE 0.12 0.23 0.22 0.26 
 
0.23 
 
t-ratio_NeweyWest 1.87 5.55 5.26 2.01 
 
3.54 
CZECK 
REPUBLIC Newey-West's adjusted SE 0.06 0.20 0.20 0.30 0.10 0.28 
 
t-ratio_NeweyWest 9.01 2.06 2.18 1.68 1.82 1.28 
ESTONIA Newey-West's adjusted SE 0.23 0.15 0.42 0.33 0.26 0.25 
 
t-ratio_NeweyWest -0.19 4.26 2.47 3.43 2.91 1.14 
EURO Newey-West's adjusted SE 
      
 
t-ratio_NeweyWest 
      HUNGARY Newey-West's adjusted SE 0.04 0.13 0.25 0.23 0.53 0.18 
 
t-ratio_NeweyWest 11.27 6.33 4.23 2.91 2.64 5.11 
KOSOVO Newey-West's adjusted SE 0.12 0.75 
  
0.07 
 
 
t-ratio_NeweyWest -0.11 2.76 
  
-3.27 
 LATVIA Newey-West's adjusted SE 0.20 0.11 0.05 0.34 0.26 0.36 
 
t-ratio_NeweyWest 5.24 0.23 0.97 0.75 2.53 2.67 
LITHUANIA Newey-West's adjusted SE 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.33 0.19 0.37 
 
t-ratio_NeweyWest 3.57 3.14 6.51 3.83 2.42 1.24 
MACEDONIA Newey-West's adjusted SE 0.88 0.46 0.10 0.80 0.31 0.61 
 
t-ratio_NeweyWest 4.82 1.27 0.52 -0.22 -0.13 2.32 
MONTENEGRO Newey-West's adjusted SE 1.02 1.29 0.19 
 
0.10 
 
 
t-ratio_NeweyWest 3.41 -0.82 -0.71 
 
0.78 
 POLAND Newey-West's adjusted SE 0.11 0.12 0.22 0.33 0.22 0.29 
 
t-ratio_NeweyWest 0.05 6.56 4.03 2.65 1.90 1.83 
ROMANIA Newey-West's adjusted SE 0.11 0.32 0.23 0.35 0.09 0.22 
 
t-ratio_NeweyWest 3.53 2.39 9.70 2.37 -2.53 4.04 
SERBIA Newey-West's adjusted SE 0.27 0.20 0.09 
   
 
t-ratio_NeweyWest -0.37 3.58 -1.59 
   SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC Newey-West's adjusted SE 0.63 0.21 0.04 0.62 0.09 0.54 
 
t-ratio_NeweyWest 8.32 3.64 1.61 2.13 -0.78 0.84 
SLOVENIA Newey-West's adjusted SE 0.13 0.10 0.14 0.19 0.13 0.18 
  t-ratio_NeweyWest 4.96 4.94 6.35 0.72 9.43 6.95 
 Table A4.10 Average pairwise cross-section correlations: variables and residuals 
 
Note: xit corresponds to the variables in log-levels; Δ xit corresponds to the variables in log-differences; Resx relates to the VECMX model’s 
residuals
                              
 
                  
 
gdp 
 
exports 
 
FDI 
 
 
fcf 
 
rem 
 
eur 
Countries Xits Δ xit Resx   Xits Δ xit Resx   Xits Δ xit Resx   Xits Δ xit 
 
Resx   Xits Δ xit Resx   Xits Δ xit Resx 
ALBANIA 0.84 0.44 0.04 
 
0.85 0.31 0.05 
 
0.77 0.03 -0.03 
 
0.46 0.01  0.05 
 
0.30 0.13 0.09 
 
0.61 0.05 0.02 
BOSNIA 0.84 0.42 0.02 
     
0.94 0.25 0.07 
 
0.84 0.11     0.00 
 
0.41 0.29 0.11 
 
0.83 0.22 0.01 
BULGARIA 0.87 0.47 -0.01 
 
0.83 0.15 -0.07 
 
0.95 0.47 0.09 
 
0.85 0.19  0.01 
 
0.33 0.15 0.08 
 
0.83 0.23 0.00 
CROATIA 0.48 0.43 0.00 
 
0.08 0.05 0.03 
 
0.89 0.44 0.14 
 
0.85 0.15  -0.01 
     
0.84 0.22 -0.01 
CZECK 
REPUBLIC 0.88 0.54 0.02 
 
0.90 0.37 0.06 
 
0.94 0.39 0.08 
 
0.76 0.04 
 
0.00 
 
0.44 0.46 0.26 
 
0.71 0.07 -0.02 
ESTONIA 0.73 0.37 -0.02 
 
0.83 0.35 0.03 
 
0.91 0.42 0.07 
 
0.80 0.20  -0.01 
 
0.28 0.32 0.20 
 
0.78 0.19 0.01 
EURO 0.87 0.49 0.04 
 
0.89 0.50 0.10 
 
0.87 0.41 0.12 
 
0.78 0.13  0.01 
 
0.43 0.42 0.22 
 
0.69 0.24 0.01 
HUNGARY 0.68 0.49 0.05 
 
0.89 0.45 0.03 
 
0.91 0.42 0.03 
 
0.66 0.21  -0.03 
 
0.39 0.45 0.19 
 
0.59 0.25 -0.04 
KOSOVO 0.73 0.19 0.06 
 
0.85 0.33 0.03 
       
 
  
-0.14 -0.11 0.01 
    LATVIA 0.73 0.37 0.01 
 
0.87 0.21 -0.08 
 
0.91 0.24 0.07 
 
0.84 0.14  0.00 
 
0.35 0.35 0.24 
 
0.82 0.18 0.00 
LITHUANIA 0.85 0.47 -0.03 
 
0.87 0.27 0.02 
 
0.93 0.45 0.14 
 
0.85 0.23  -0.05 
 
0.05 0.25 0.09 
 
0.82 0.23 -0.04 
MACEDONIA 0.78 0.17 0.03 
 
0.85 0.25 0.01 
 
0.92 0.27 0.08 
 
0.59 0.03  0.04 
 
0.31 0.20 0.08 
 
0.57 0.08 0.04 
MONTENEGRO 0.79 0.22 0.00 
 
0.79 0.08 -0.04 
 
0.93 0.29 0.02 
   
 
  
-0.16 0.00 -0.04 
    POLAND 0.79 0.23 0.02 
 
0.89 0.38 0.08 
 
0.94 0.43 0.08 
 
0.84 0.18  0.00 
 
0.43 0.45 0.27 
 
0.81 0.20 0.01 
ROMANIA 0.87 0.48 -0.02 
 
0.87 0.27 -0.04 
 
0.95 0.52 0.05 
 
0.86 0.20  -0.02 
 
-0.19 0.04 0.00 
 
0.84 0.22 -0.03 
SERBIA 0.85 0.26 0.03 
 
0.88 0.29 0.07 
 
0.90 0.22 0.02 
   
 
         SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC 0.82 0.23 0.03 
 
0.89 0.41 0.06 
 
0.94 0.30 0.03 
 
0.64 0.10 
 
0.03 
 
0.22 -0.07 -0.04 
 
0.59 0.04 0.03 
SLOVENIA 0.79 0.56 -0.08   0.88 0.49 -0.06   0.92 0.35 -0.16   0.80 0.26 
 
-0.08   0.29 0.30 -0.16   0.78 0.33 -0.09 
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Table A4.11 Proportion of the N-step ahead forecast error variance of Balkan GDP 
explained by conditioning on contemporaneous and future innovations of the 
country equations 
 
 
 
 
Quarters 
 
0 1 2 4 6        8 12 24 40 
           Regions Variables 
         
           
Balkan region gdp 12% 14% 14% 14% 13% 13% 13% 12% 12% 
 
exp 10% 12% 13% 13% 13% 13% 13% 12% 12% 
 
fdi 3% 4% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 4% 4% 
 
fcl 4% 6% 6% 7% 8% 8% 8% 7% 7% 
 
rem 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 2% 2% 2% 
  eur 2% 4% 4% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 
Total Balkan 
region 
 
35% 43% 45% 47% 47% 46% 45% 43% 43% 
           
Baltic region gdp 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
 
exp 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
 
fdi 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 
 
fcl 1% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 
 
rem 5% 4% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 
  eur 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 
Total Baltic 
region 
 
8% 9% 8% 7% 7% 7% 7% 8% 8% 
           
CE region gdp 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
 
exp 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 
 
fdi 1% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 
 
fcl 4% 3% 4% 3% 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 
 
rem 7% 6% 6% 5% 5% 5% 4% 4% 4% 
  eur 4% 3% 4% 3% 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 
Total CE 
region 
 
19% 17% 16% 15% 14% 13% 13% 13% 13% 
           
Euro region gdp 8% 6% 7% 9% 11% 11% 12% 13% 14% 
 
exp 5% 5% 5% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 12% 
 
fdi 0% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
 
fcl 1% 3% 2% 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 
 
rem 18% 12% 12% 10% 9% 8% 8% 8% 7% 
  eur 6% 5% 4% 2% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 
Total Euro 
region   38% 31% 31% 31% 32% 34% 35% 36% 36% 
           
Total   100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
           
 Table A4.12 Proportion of the N-step ahead forecast error variance of Baltic GDP 
explained by conditioning on contemporaneous and future innovations of the 
country equations 
 
 
  
Quarters   0 1 2 4 8 12 24 40 
          Regions Variables 
        
          
Balkan region gdp 2% 4% 5% 6% 7% 7% 7% 7% 
 
exp 6% 9% 10% 9% 9% 9% 8% 8% 
 
fdi 2% 3% 4% 4% 3% 3% 3% 3% 
 
fcl 2% 5% 5% 6% 5% 5% 5% 5% 
 
rem 0% 1% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
  eur 1% 3% 3% 3% 4% 4% 4% 4% 
Total Balkan region 14% 24% 27% 28% 28% 28% 28% 28% 
          
Baltic region gdp 7% 5% 4% 4% 3% 3% 3% 3% 
 
exp 0.1% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
 
fdi 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 3% 3% 
 
fcl 5% 5% 5% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 
 
rem 0.3% 0% 0% 1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 
  eur 5% 5% 5% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 
Total Baltic 
region 
 
18% 17% 16% 16% 16% 16% 16% 16% 
          
CE region gdp 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 3% 3% 3% 
 
exp 2% 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 
 
fdi 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 
 
fcl 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
 
rem 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
  eur 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
Total CE 
region 
 
10% 9% 9% 10% 11% 11% 11% 11% 
          
Euro region gdp 28% 22% 20% 19% 19% 19% 19% 19% 
 
exp 18% 17% 17% 17% 17% 18% 18% 18% 
 
fdi 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
 
fcl 3% 6% 6% 5% 4% 4% 4% 3% 
 
rem 8% 5% 4% 4% 3% 3% 3% 3% 
  eur 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Total Euro 
region   57% 51% 48% 46% 45% 45% 45% 45% 
                    
Total   100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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Table A4.13 Proportion of the N-step ahead forecast error variance of CE GDP 
explained by conditioning on contemporaneous and future innovations of the 
country equations 
 
 
Quarters   0 1 2 4 8 12 24 40 
          Regions Variables 
        
          
Balkan region gdp 6% 8% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 
 
exp 7% 10% 10% 10% 9% 9% 9% 9% 
 
fdi 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 
 
fcl 2% 4% 5% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 
 
rem 3% 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 
  eur 0% 3% 3% 3% 3% 4% 4% 4% 
Total Balkan region 19% 30% 33% 33% 33% 32% 32% 32% 
          Baltic region gdp 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
 
exp 1% 1% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
 
fdi 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 
 
fcl 2% 3% 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 
 
rem 3% 2% 2% 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 
  eur 2% 3% 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 
Total Baltic 
region 
 
9% 10% 9% 10% 11% 11% 12% 12% 
          
CE region gdp 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 
 
exp 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 
 
fdi 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 
 
fcl 3% 3% 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 
 
rem 10% 7% 5% 4% 4% 3% 3% 3% 
  eur 3% 3% 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 
Total CE region 
 
22% 18% 17% 15% 14% 14% 14% 14% 
          
Euro region gdp 17% 13% 14% 15% 16% 16% 16% 16% 
 
exp 11% 11% 12% 13% 15% 15% 15% 15% 
 
fdi 0% 2% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 
 
fcl 0% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 2% 2% 
 
rem 18% 11% 11% 9% 8% 7% 7% 7% 
  eur 4% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
Total Euro 
region   50% 42% 42% 42% 42% 42% 42% 42% 
                    
Total   100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 Table A4.14 Unit Root Tests for the Domestic Variables at 5% significance level 
 
Note: The results at the 5% significance level suggest that the majority of the variables are unable to reject the null of non-stationarity. WS statistics are weighted symmetric 
estimations of ADF type regressions introduced by Park and Fuller (1995). 
Statistic 
Critical 
Value ALBANIA BOSNIA BULGARIA CROATIA 
CZECK 
REPUBLIC ESTONIA EURO HUNGARY KOSOVO LATVIA 
LITHUAN
IA 
MACE
DONI
A 
MONTE
NEGRO POLAND ROMANIA SERBIA 
SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC SLOVENIA 
ADF -3.45 -1.39 0.03 -2.57 -2.25 -2.12 -3.31 -2.79 -2.46 -1.38 -3.36 -2.04 -0.64 -2.29 -2.10 -2.04 -2.45 -1.04 -2.35 
WS -3.24 -0.58 0.23 -2.17 -1.67 -1.38 -3.21 -2.24 -1.54 -0.57 -3.01 -1.65 -1.03 -1.76 -2.02 -1.42 -1.10 -2.28 -1.95 
ADF -2.89 -0.58 -1.42 -2.46 -2.25 -2.60 -2.80 -2.36 -2.49 2.41 -3.21 -1.99 -1.70 1.67 -1.63 -1.98 -3.86 -1.26 -2.60 
WS -2.55 1.70 0.33 -0.52 -1.61 0.01 -2.00 -0.56 -0.73 1.94 -2.18 -0.06 2.35 1.70 0.62 0.41 -0.28 -0.26 -1.24 
ADF -2.89 -2.01 -0.62 -2.10 -2.90 -2.65 -2.35 -3.07 -3.47 -1.82 -2.19 -3.18 -3.95 -1.25 -2.50 -3.86 -2.21 -1.91 -2.86 
WS -2.55 -0.22 0.03 -2.36 -3.07 -2.88 -2.58 -3.53 -3.62 -0.49 -2.38 -3.38 -3.73 -1.62 -2.51 -4.06 -2.47 -2.24 -3.12 
ADF -2.89 -2.68 -3.48 -3.62 -6.81 -5.80 -3.78 -3.40 -6.74 -3.16 -6.75 -7.33 -7.89 -2.06 -10.07 -5.73 -6.26 -33.05 -5.32 
WS -2.55 -2.42 -2.08 -3.90 -7.23 -6.09 -4.05 -4.12 -7.06 0.52 -7.04 -7.65 -5.77 -1.63 -9.99 -6.18 -6.39 -31.89 -5.57 
ADF -3.45 -3.32 
 
-3.51 -1.86 -2.23 -2.43 -2.55 -1.84 -1.58 -2.97 -2.76 -3.57 -1.76 -2.47 -3.54 -2.04 -2.17 -2.67 
WS -3.24 -3.37 
 
-3.85 -1.82 -1.88 -2.18 -2.47 -0.85 -1.40 -2.95 -3.03 -2.50 -1.88 -0.75 -3.07 -2.42 -2.30 -2.16 
ADF -2.89 -0.98 
 
-1.03 -1.90 -1.98 -2.23 -2.14 -2.73 -2.05 -0.58 -1.28 -2.19 -2.14 -2.55 -1.36 -1.41 -1.44 -2.45 
WS -2.55 -0.52 
 
-0.20 -1.81 0.48 -0.64 -0.70 0.71 0.24 1.33 -0.22 0.01 -0.46 1.16 0.98 -0.67 0.04 -0.35 
ADF -2.89 -5.56 
 
-4.38 -5.67 -4.19 -3.53 -3.99 -2.94 -3.16 -5.64 -5.45 -3.12 -3.43 -2.33 -5.84 -4.34 -3.92 -3.79 
WS -2.55 -5.79 
 
-4.76 -6.04 -4.45 -3.77 -4.23 -3.00 -3.54 -5.88 -5.66 -3.01 -3.72 -2.30 -5.69 -4.17 -4.12 -4.05 
ADF -2.89 -8.72 
 
-10.96 -5.85 -5.27 -7.31 -7.49 -6.09 -9.00 -7.53 -6.44 -11.18 -13.85 -7.40 -5.49 -5.35 -7.00 -5.82 
WS -2.55 -9.00 
 
-11.31 -4.02 -4.90 -7.61 -7.59 -6.28 -9.44 -7.91 -6.81 -11.61 -14.11 -6.69 -5.82 -5.74 -7.20 -6.07 
ADF -3.45 -1.99 -1.81 0.40 -1.72 -0.24 -1.95 -0.33 -1.79 
 
-1.68 -1.48 -2.44 -3.46 -0.50 -0.38 -3.06 -1.56 -0.06 
WS -3.24 -2.15 -0.32 -0.02 -1.12 -0.84 -0.84 -1.05 -1.02 
 
-1.65 -1.49 0.17 0.86 -0.62 0.05 0.76 -1.55 -0.62 
ADF -2.89 -1.90 -3.86 -2.94 -2.87 -1.87 -2.89 -1.65 -3.06 
 
-1.82 -2.74 -2.25 -5.00 -2.52 -3.36 -4.46 -4.47 -1.89 
WS -2.55 -1.15 0.77 0.50 -0.42 -0.18 0.26 -0.93 -0.20 
 
0.33 -0.64 1.53 2.04 0.31 0.59 1.37 -1.50 -0.09 
ADF -2.89 -6.65 -2.99 -0.71 -2.55 -3.79 -4.48 -4.41 -4.86 
 
-2.90 -3.51 -5.83 -4.49 -4.57 -3.15 -4.72 -0.87 -3.55 
WS -2.55 -6.91 -3.16 -1.24 -2.81 -4.04 -4.34 -4.67 -5.12 
 
-3.16 -3.70 1.55 2.84 -4.83 -3.40 2.62 -1.33 -3.76 
ADF -2.89 -6.25 -6.21 -6.98 -6.34 -7.31 -5.55 -5.98 -6.97 
 
-3.07 -5.28 -4.91 -5.78 -6.14 -6.49 -6.31 -6.29 -5.98 
WS -2.55 -6.29 -6.69 -7.27 -6.64 -7.60 -5.85 -6.23 -7.08 
 
-2.78 -5.58 -1.26 1.35 -6.53 -6.69 1.43 -5.12 -6.32 
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ADF -3.45 -5.11 -1.64 -1.86 -0.79 -1.80 -1.95 -2.75 -1.05 
 
-1.36 -1.22 -1.33 
 
-0.85 -1.76 
 
-3.36 -0.54 
WS -3.24 -5.38 0.22 -1.73 -0.89 -1.87 -0.43 -1.62 -0.08 
 
0.34 -1.15 -1.41 
 
-0.65 -1.43 
 
-2.67 0.04 
ADF -2.89 -3.29 -3.43 -3.27 -1.95 -1.77 -3.01 -3.03 -1.56 
 
-2.00 -2.04 -1.02 
 
-2.57 -2.98 
 
-2.65 -2.25 
WS -2.55 -3.22 0.84 -1.08 -0.45 -0.55 -1.16 -0.98 -0.98 
 
-0.56 -1.13 -0.59 
 
0.32 -0.85 
 
-0.53 -0.95 
ADF -2.89 -5.44 -5.29 -2.02 -1.90 -4.09 -2.08 -2.01 -1.66 
 
-1.72 -1.10 -5.20 
 
-4.72 -0.96 
 
-7.21 -2.61 
WS -2.55 -5.82 -5.09 -2.37 -2.01 -3.82 -2.40 -1.81 -1.78 
 
-1.25 -1.45 -5.42 
 
-4.98 -1.51 
 
-7.45 -2.85 
ADF -2.89 -5.58 -5.52 -4.52 -9.77 -6.88 -9.54 -11.67 -7.00 
 
-3.98 -8.01 -7.94 
 
-7.69 -5.47 
 
-6.62 -8.14 
WS -2.55 -6.21 -5.92 -2.85 -10.26 -7.34 -9.59 -11.62 -7.21   -3.22 -7.95 -6.41   -8.01 -5.58   -7.06 -8.47 
 Table A4.15 Weak exogeneity 
 
Note: The numbers in bold indicate the rejection of null hypothesis of weak exogeneity at 5% 
significance level 
Figure A4.9 Persistence profiles of model 4.2 
 
 
 
Note: Persistence profiles refer to the time profiles of the effects of system or variable-
specific shocks on the cointegrating relations in the GVAR model and they have a value of 
unity on impact, while they should tend to zero as n→∞. The Figure above shows that all 
persistence profiles converge to zero by the 17th quarter. 
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Country F test Fcrit_0.05 gdps exps FDIs fcls poil 
ALBANIA F(3,33) 2.891564 0.673077 0.945452 0.730948 0.743629 1.836009 
BOSNIA F(1,30) 4.170877 1.619016 8.700111 0.676834 1.146968 0.270416 
BULGARIA F(2,24) 3.402826 1.169638 0.443002 1.135797 1.279418 0.020799 
CROATIA F(2,34) 3.275898 0.484295 0.347486 0.987697 0.307618 1.62131 
CZECK 
REPUBLIC F(2,34) 3.275898 0.398117 0.066983 1.990285 0.137638 0.050562 
ESTONIA F(1,35) 4.121338 0.205629 0.945624 2.658403 0.256397 1.49481 
EURO F(0,30) 
      HUNGARY F(2,34) 3.275898 0.08568 1.130743 0.489694 0.050032 1.091419 
KOSOVO F(1,37) 4.105456 2.103334 2.208965 1.313765 1.705628 0.064116 
LATVIA F(3,33) 2.891564 0.352461 0.125132 0.505671 0.636461 0.510951 
LITHUANIA F(2,34) 3.275898 1.083029 0.083015 1.798521 2.738068 1.28156 
MACEDONIA F(4,26) 2.742594 0.897597 2.827484 0.723806 0.900173 1.948165 
MONTENEGRO F(1,27) 4.210008 5.94E-05 0.793536 4.085791 5.228221 0.064624 
POLAND F(2,34) 3.275898 0.877794 0.472863 0.73746 2.535943 0.402877 
ROMANIA F(2,34) 3.275898 0.905627 2.648081 1.359846 1.587248 0.255426 
SERBIA F(2,35) 3.267424 1.079459 0.614889 0.438104 0.461656 0.690219 
SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC F(2,34) 3.275898 0.391767 0.07409 0.064201 0.683688 0.350556 
SLOVENIA F(1,35) 4.121338 0.328679 3.505118 0.091293 0.149167 0.358508 
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Table A4.16 Serial correlation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The numbers in bold indicate the rejection of null hypothesis of no serial correlation at 
5% significance level.  
Country F test Fcrit_0.05 gdp exp FDI fcl 
ALBANIA F(4,34) 2.649894 7.784959 2.205138 1.609392 1.950175 
BOSNIA F(4,36) 2.633532 6.148891 
 
0.584639 0.771242 
BULGARIA F(4,35) 2.641465 2.433228 3.874887 2.266085 0.918138 
CROATIA F(4,35) 2.641465 1.507418 1.587211 3.047657 1.813696 
CZECK REPUBLIC F(4,35) 2.641465 1.269998 1.113074 0.421766 0.948538 
ESTONIA F(4,36) 2.633532 2.868615 0.887678 1.609392 0.604641 
EURO F(4,41) 2.599969 2.991799 0.414499 0.025118 3.870919 
HUNGARY F(4,35) 2.641465 1.343787 1.342288 0.47919 1.607022 
KOSOVO F(4,36) 2.633532 2.278627 1.241103 
  LATVIA F(4,34) 2.649894 1.950175 1.888883 1.054668 1.677691 
LITHUANIA F(4,35) 2.641465 1.258567 4.491848 1.997691 0.379074 
MACEDONIA F(4,33) 2.658867 10.6887 2.433228 3.329532 0.320343 
MONTENEGRO F(4,36) 2.633532 10.49001 10.12191 2.40308 
 POLAND F(4,35) 2.641465 0.93613 2.528115 0.82517 1.367222 
ROMANIA F(4,35) 2.641465 0.662204 0.494119 0.250509 1.450806 
SERBIA F(4,35) 2.641465 1.865061 7.838646 1.473071 
 SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC F(4,35) 2.641465 15.04171 0.674485 0.734694 0.309794 
SLOVENIA F(4,36) 2.633532 2.057576 0.687224 0.492377 1.707076 
 Table A4.17 Unit root tests for the domestic variables at 5% significance level 
 
Note: The results at the 5% significance level suggest that the majority of the variables are unable to reject the null of non-stationarity. WS statistics are weighted symmetric 
estimations of ADF type regressions introduced by Park and Fuller (1995). 
Domestic 
Variables 
Statisti
c 
Critic
al 
Value 
ALBANIA 
BOS
NIA 
BULGARI
A 
CROA
TIA 
CZECK 
REPUBLI
C 
ESTONIA EURO 
HUNGA
RY 
LATVI
A 
LITHU
ANIA 
MACE
DONI
A 
POLAND 
ROMA
NIA 
SERBIA 
SLOVAK 
REPUBLI
C 
SLOVENI
A 
gdp (with trend) ADF -3.45 -2.18 
 
-0.57 -2.16 -1.87 -2.08 -2.26 -1.17 -1.70 -2.14 -2.99 -2.66 -2.22 -1.38 
 
-1.14 
gdp (with trend) WS -3.24 -1.53 
 
-1.06 -2.50 -2.00 -2.04 -1.96 -1.34 -1.43 -2.38 -3.15 -1.69 -1.82 -1.78 
 
-0.96 
gdp (no trend) ADF -2.89 -2.48 
 
-0.53 -2.13 -0.64 -1.50 -1.97 -1.77 -2.46 -1.31 -0.57 -0.06 -0.26 -1.40 
 
-2.33 
gdp (no trend) WS -2.55 -0.83 
 
0.20 -2.33 -0.04 0.08 0.27 -1.16 -1.14 -0.44 0.85 -0.41 -0.21 -0.41 
 
0.50 
Dgdp ADF -2.89 -4.99 
 
-3.98 -2.72 -3.33 -3.16 -3.07 -1.98 -3.77 -2.61 -4.29 -2.03 -3.72 -6.61 
 
-3.60 
Dgdp WS -2.55 -5.19 
 
-4.20 -2.99 -3.54 -3.24 -3.33 -2.16 -3.95 -2.77 -4.50 -2.05 -3.94 -6.48 
 
-3.76 
DDgdp ADF -2.89 -7.71 
 
-9.36 -8.74 -5.30 -8.98 -15.95 -6.31 -6.40 -10.85 -8.32 -12.72 -7.71 -6.57 
 
-7.95 
DDgdp WS -2.55 -8.00 
 
-9.20 -9.06 -5.43 -9.22 -16.46 -6.73 -6.48 -10.59 -8.56 -13.03 -7.62 -6.42 
 
-8.15 
rem (with trend) ADF -3.45 -2.70 -3.21 -2.24 
 
-6.80 -1.37 -2.56 -3.21 -1.77 -1.57 -2.66 -2.50 -2.44 
 
-3.50 -1.54 
rem (with trend) WS -3.24 -2.95 -3.42 -2.30 
 
-3.42 -1.68 -2.30 -3.22 -1.76 -1.82 -2.78 -2.65 -1.98 
 
-3.72 -1.84 
rem (no trend) ADF -2.89 -2.41 -1.60 -2.29 
 
-7.74 -2.04 -1.54 -2.99 -2.03 -2.02 -2.76 -2.57 -3.28 
 
-1.60 -1.74 
rem (no trend) WS -2.55 -2.25 -1.32 -1.93 
 
-2.89 -0.99 -1.86 -2.57 -0.41 -0.70 -2.76 -2.64 -1.49 
 
-1.32 -1.54 
Drem ADF -2.89 -6.38 -7.11 -6.79 
 
-6.57 -4.02 -6.29 -6.18 -8.62 -5.55 -5.97 -6.20 -5.64 
 
-5.91 -7.48 
Drem WS -2.55 -5.95 -7.33 -6.92 
 
-5.12 -4.04 -6.03 -6.36 -8.86 -5.40 -5.91 -6.18 -5.38 
 
-6.09 -7.70 
DDrem ADF -2.89 -7.37 -7.90 -7.68 
 
-9.58 -9.73 -8.37 -8.39 -7.55 -6.29 -6.62 -7.80 -7.26 
 
-7.64 -7.70 
DDrem WS -2.55 -7.60 -8.26 -7.92 
 
-4.40 -10.01 -8.41 -8.69 -7.90 -6.15 -6.87 -7.98 -7.34 
 
-7.94 -8.05 
forcla (with 
trend) ADF -3.45 -5.98 -0.28 -1.75 0.39 -2.69 -1.91 -1.75 0.72 -1.04 -0.57 -2.53 -0.01 -1.92 
 
-3.65 1.28 
forcla (with 
trend) WS -3.24 -6.14 -0.41 -1.10 1.02 -2.77 -0.27 -1.55 0.55 -1.33 -0.36 -1.82 -0.39 -2.02 
 
-3.10 0.36 
forcla (no trend) ADF -2.89 -1.55 -3.33 -0.51 -3.43 -1.50 -3.35 -3.41 -1.88 -2.92 -1.91 -2.06 -4.33 -0.85 
 
-2.08 -1.88 
forcla (no trend) WS -2.55 -1.60 0.40 -0.83 1.58 -0.22 0.82 -0.12 -0.14 -0.53 0.39 0.85 0.38 -0.67 
 
-0.12 0.75 
Dforcla ADF -2.89 -7.01 -4.99 -7.84 -2.87 -8.14 -3.01 -2.07 -1.77 -1.64 -2.12 -6.30 -3.19 -2.76 
 
-8.32 -2.50 
Dforcla WS -2.55 -7.36 -5.30 -7.94 -2.55 -8.37 -2.52 -2.31 -1.86 -2.01 -1.04 -5.02 -3.48 -2.82 
 
-8.49 -2.11 
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DDforcla ADF -2.89 -7.80 -9.73 -7.29 -7.72 -7.34 -7.16 -15.49 -7.40 -7.51 -8.03 -9.64 -8.96 -6.98 
 
-8.43 -5.87 
DDforcla WS -2.55 -8.21 -8.90 -7.60 -7.98 -9.27 -4.79 -15.70 -8.09 -5.29 -8.34 -8.38 -8.37 -7.29 
 
-8.79 -4.23 
FDI (with trend) ADF -3.45 -2.95 -1.04 0.61 -1.33 -0.58 -1.26 -1.22 -2.99 -2.10 -2.17 -4.30 -1.04 -0.84 -1.56 0.08 -1.04 
FDI (with trend) WS -3.24 -3.14 0.16 -0.50 -0.47 -1.82 1.36 0.81 2.00 1.32 1.80 -4.47 0.20 -1.39 -1.89 -0.73 0.76 
FDI (no trend) ADF -2.89 -2.00 -1.58 -1.32 -2.07 -2.80 -3.87 -3.29 -5.19 -2.28 -4.46 -2.77 -3.63 -1.48 -0.71 -3.37 -2.63 
FDI (no trend) WS -2.55 -2.14 1.58 0.41 1.22 -1.18 2.13 2.19 2.74 1.80 2.38 -2.06 1.27 -0.40 0.04 -0.39 1.77 
DFDI ADF -2.89 -6.22 -6.03 -2.34 -4.52 -3.89 -4.81 -15.11 -3.40 -7.25 -4.40 -5.99 -3.13 -4.08 -5.14 -3.86 -4.85 
DFDI WS -2.55 -6.21 -0.06 0.09 -0.50 -3.09 -3.12 -0.33 -1.06 0.06 -2.04 -5.50 -3.34 -4.25 -3.02 -3.43 -0.64 
DDFDI ADF -2.89 -7.89 -6.68 -8.21 -8.31 -8.81 -6.82 -7.78 -7.19 -7.41 -6.53 -7.93 -7.61 -7.66 -5.84 -6.87 -6.31 
DDFDI WS -2.55 -8.20 -1.44 -8.41 -8.29 -9.02 -6.47 -2.12 -7.29 -1.38 -6.07 -5.65 -7.78 -7.90 -5.00 -6.61 -4.74 
exp (with trend) ADF -3.45 -2.44 
 
-3.40 -1.51 -1.62 -3.74 -2.93 -2.15 -3.20 -3.60 -1.91 -2.71 -2.84 -2.73 -1.68 -2.29 
exp (with trend) WS -3.24 -2.43 
 
-3.59 -1.82 -1.77 -3.09 -2.39 -1.32 -3.32 -3.71 -2.19 -2.86 -2.87 -3.03 -1.97 -2.52 
exp (no trend) ADF -2.89 -2.69 
 
-0.82 -0.82 -1.60 -1.91 -1.89 -2.22 -0.91 -0.97 -1.93 -1.36 -0.29 -1.20 -1.39 -1.20 
exp (no trend) WS -2.55 -2.98 
 
0.08 0.31 0.79 1.03 0.53 1.03 0.82 0.69 -2.17 0.62 0.90 0.41 0.50 0.36 
Dexp ADF -2.89 -4.53 
 
-6.96 -5.67 -4.92 -4.21 -4.28 -3.81 -4.67 -5.38 -5.85 -5.48 -5.74 -5.55 -3.84 -4.18 
Dexp WS -2.55 -4.42 
 
-7.18 -5.86 -5.11 -4.40 -4.48 -3.88 -4.63 -5.56 -6.05 -5.55 -5.92 -5.77 -3.91 -4.38 
DDexp ADF -2.89 -9.32 
 
-6.93 -10.06 -7.58 -8.11 -7.82 -7.03 -6.38 -9.33 -6.25 -7.05 -9.53 -7.11 -7.17 -6.57 
DDexp WS -2.55 -9.56 
 
-7.24 -10.33 -7.82 -8.26 -7.96 -7.11 -6.69 -9.57 -6.56 -7.11 -9.79 -7.45 -7.38 -6.70 
eur (with trend) ADF -3.45 -5.58 -0.87 -1.92 -0.98 -3.39 -2.64 -2.33 -0.27 -1.56 -1.25 -2.61 -2.59 -1.39 
 
-4.59 -0.30 
eur (with trend) WS -3.24 -5.77 -0.64 -1.61 0.86 -2.78 -0.53 -0.47 0.48 -1.31 0.00 -1.58 -0.64 -1.73 
 
-3.22 0.57 
eur (no trend) ADF -2.89 -1.70 -3.30 -0.64 -3.58 -2.05 -3.52 -3.51 -3.21 -3.24 -2.65 -2.29 -4.51 -0.87 
 
-2.51 -2.87 
eur (no trend) WS -2.55 -1.54 0.32 -0.75 1.84 -0.27 0.76 1.03 0.83 -0.21 0.94 0.89 0.85 -0.28 
 
0.03 1.38 
Deur ADF -2.89 -7.10 -4.94 -7.88 -6.48 -7.50 -3.24 -3.31 -2.73 -2.42 -2.56 -6.03 -3.31 -3.49 
 
-5.13 -3.75 
Deur WS -2.55 -7.45 -5.22 -8.01 -5.35 -7.72 -2.68 -3.43 -2.64 -2.66 -1.36 -4.73 -3.49 -3.52 
 
-4.48 -2.99 
DDeur ADF -2.89 -7.79 -9.44 -7.24 -7.60 -7.50 -6.66 -7.06 -7.65 -7.09 -7.86 -9.48 -8.85 -8.03 
 
-8.09 -8.67 
DDeur WS -2.55 -8.32 -8.56 -7.57 -7.89 -7.64 -4.92 -7.27 -8.33 -5.33 -8.21 -8.20 -8.27 -8.30   -8.43 -8.19 
                   
                   
                   
 Table A4.18 Weak exogeneity 
 
 
Note: The numbers in bold indicate the rejection of null hypothesis of weak exogeneity at 5% 
significance level. 
Figure A4.10 Persistence profiles of model 4.3 
 
 
Note: Persistence profiles refer to the time profiles of the effects of system or variable-specific 
shocks on the cointegrating relations in the GVAR model and they have a value of unity on impact, 
while they should tend to zero as n→∞. The Figure above shows that all persistence profiles 
converge to zero by the 17th quarter. 
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Country F test Fcri_0.05 gdps rems forclas FDIs exps eurs poil ciss 
ALBANIA F(4,55)     2.54  
    
0.80      0.52      0.28  
    
0.78      1.29  
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0.28      0.98      0.39  
    
0.03      0.76  
    
0.10  
    
0.13      0.59  
BULGARIA F(3,56)     2.77  
    
1.35      0.83      0.75  
    
1.10      1.05  
    
0.67  
    
0.51      0.52  
CROATIA F(4,56)     2.54  
    
0.43      1.61      1.87  
    
0.78      0.71  
    
1.94  
    
0.38      0.59  
CZECK 
REPUBLIC F(5,45)     2.42  
    
0.60      0.32      0.88  
    
3.21      0.61  
    
0.61  
    
0.51      1.61  
ESTONIA F(2,57)     3.16  
    
0.45      0.93      0.33  
    
0.08      0.28  
    
0.14  
    
0.21      0.53  
EURO F(3,41)     2.83  
      
    
1.83      0.26  
HUNGARY F(4,55)     2.54  
   
1.02      0.12      1.06  
   
0.21      0.52  
   
0.45  
    
0.72      0.40  
LATVIA F(3,56)     2.77  
    
1.26      1.24      0.34  
    
0.51      1.73  
    
0.83  
    
0.38      0.44  
LITHUANIA F(3,47)     2.80  
    
1.68      1.97      1.73  
    
0.41      0.80  
    
3.31  
    
1.01      1.62  
MACEDONIA F(4,55)     2.54  
    
1.58      0.26      0.16  
    
1.20      1.23  
    
0.37  
    
1.57      1.93  
POLAND F(3,56)     2.77  
    
0.97      0.21      1.07  
    
0.22      0.14  
    
0.94  
    
0.04      0.47  
ROMANIA F(3,56)     2.77  
    
0.15      0.46      0.40  
    
0.19      0.79  
    
0.09  
    
0.69      2.12  
SERBIA F(1,61)     4.00  
    
1.16      1.17      4.16  
    
2.85      0.62  
    
1.74  
    
1.17      1.44  
SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC F(3,57)     2.77  
    
0.56      0.75      0.57  
    
1.16      0.21  
    
1.85  
    
0.04      0.77  
SLOVENIA F(3,56)     2.77  
    
2.20      0.27      1.38  
    
1.51      1.38  
    
0.53  
    
1.93      1.15  
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Table A4.19 Serial correlation 
 
Note: The numbers in bold indicate the rejection of null hypothesis of no serial correlation at 5% 
significance level. 
 
 
 
 
  
Countries F test Fcri_0.05 gdp rem Forcla FDI exp eur 
ALBANIA F(4,51) 2.553395 0.777411 2.835887 7.110554 0.034421 0.162118 5.726621 
BOSNIA F(4,55) 2.539689 
 
1.774146 1.4582 0.157692 
 
1.557756 
BULGARIA F(4,52) 2.549763 1.353505 0.423183 1.492585 1.039938 1.586382 1.495164 
CROATIA F(4,57) 2.533583 1.410905 
 
2.361817 1.474168 2.311616 2.374164 
CZECK 
REPUBLIC F(4,50) 2.557179 6.641203 8.538251 0.953668 1.528312 2.492322 0.955121 
ESTONIA F(4,53) 2.546273 0.645088 1.296163 0.701886 0.963302 2.223254 0.701859 
EURO F(4,58) 2.530694 12.08307 0.338744 5.43414 1.451379 0.745977 1.348394 
HUNGARY F(4,57) 2.533583 2.769941 0.198589 1.719512 2.145162 0.918139 1.719738 
LATVIA F(4,52) 2.549763 0.122055 1.144449 1.013686 0.049879 0.141659 1.013671 
LITHUANIA F(4,52) 2.549763 1.240039 0.794439 0.307517 0.911858 1.353505 0.340236 
MACEDONIA F(4,51) 2.553395 1.54068 0.87465 0.851012 0.398901 0.947636 0.851178 
POLAND F(4,52) 2.549763 3.093872 1.39891 1.33193 0.446408 0.537017 1.322628 
ROMANIA F(4,51) 2.553395 0.897781 0.290299 1.388982 0.933784 0.707466 1.364596 
SERBIA F(4,57) 2.533583 0.597149 
  
0.434337 1.314563 
 SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC F(4,53) 2.546273 
 
3.899935 1.330152 1.000606 0.913007 1.321524 
SLOVENIA F(4,58) 2.530694 0.625969 0.322029 1.408096 1.243798 1.063024 1.112039 
 Appendix to Chapter 5 
 
A5.1 Model 5.1 - estimated results 
 
regress salesgrowth c.capitalpurch c.foreignown i.directexp c.emplgrowth c.wcbanks c.foreigncurr 
i.subsidies i.industry i.country1 i.country2 i.country3 i.country4 i.country5i.country6 
topmanagerexp i.firmsize c.firmage i.newproduct3years i.politicalinstability 
Note: 1.country6 omitted because of collinearity 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     972 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 22,   949) =    8.61 
       Model |  16.8699296    22  .766814982           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  84.5148194   949  .089056712           R-squared     =  0.1664 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1471 
       Total |  101.384749   971  .104412718           Root MSE      =  .29842 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
           salesgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          capitalpurch |  -.0042864     .00458    -0.94   0.350    -.0132746    .0047017 
            foreignown |    .057633   .0332814     1.73   0.084    -.0076807    .1229466 
       1.directexp |   .0079668   .0291411     0.27   0.785    -.0492216    .0651553 
            emplgrowth |    .125113   .0208496     6.00   0.000     .0841964    .1660297 
               wcbanks |  -.0660177   .0264821    -2.49   0.013     -.117988   -.0140474 
           foreigncurr |  -.1384894   .0366834    -3.78   0.000    -.2104793   -.0664995 
           1.subsidies |   .0690813   .0306606     2.25   0.024     .1292518    .0089108 
                       | 
              industry | 
                    2  |  -.0113732   .0251791    -0.45   0.652    -.0607863    .0380399 
                    3  |  -.0696036    .037962    -1.83   0.067    -.1441028    .0048955 
                    4  |  -.0279327   .0262101    -1.07   0.287    -.0793692    .0235038 
                       | 
            1.country1 |  -.0145911   .0376917    -0.39   0.699    -.0885599    .0593776 
            1.country2 |   .0971389   .0401735     2.42   0.016     .0182997    .1759782 
            1.country3 |   .1662858   .0337377     4.93   0.000     .1000767    .2324948 
            1.country4 |  -.0030422   .0313422    -0.10   0.923    -.0645502    .0584658 
            1.country5 |   -.040266   .0329422    -1.22   0.222     -.104914    .0243819 
            1.country6 |          0  (omitted) 
         topmanagerexp |   .0027655   .0010157     2.72   0.007     .0007722    .0047588 
                       | 
              firmsize | 
                    1  |  -.0515798   .0560603    -0.92   0.358    -.1615962    .0584366 
                    2  |  -.0326018   .0565542    -0.58   0.564    -.1435877     .078384 
                    3  |   .0225969   .0588348     0.38   0.701    -.0928644    .1380581 
                       | 
               firmage |  -.0013193   .0008479    -1.56   0.120    -.0029833    .0003446 
    1.newproduct3years |   .0494467    .020317     2.43   0.015     .0893181    .0095753 
1.politicalinstability |  -.0528234   .0207232    -2.55   0.011    -.0934919   -.0121548 
                 _cons |  -.0383325   .0701684    -0.55   0.585    -.1760356    .0993706 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
A5.2 Model 5.1 – diagnostic tests 
 
Check for multicollinearity - VIF command - Model 5.1 
 
. vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
capitalpurch |      1.29    0.773039 
  foreignown |      1.16    0.859329 
1.directex~m |      1.34    0.744205 
  emplgrowth |      1.06    0.946527 
     wcbanks |      1.30    0.767505 
 foreigncurr |      1.14    0.875153 
 2.subsidies |      1.05    0.948634 
      
 
275 
    industry | 
          2  |      1.47    0.678528 
          3  |      1.17    0.851445 
          4  |      1.41    0.707447 
  1.country1 |      1.47    0.680744 
  1.country2 |      1.88    0.532247 
  1.country3 |      2.01    0.498121 
  1.country4 |      1.67    0.600293 
  1.country5 |      1.76    0.569381 
topmanager~p |      1.13    0.883798 
    firmsize | 
          1  |      7.69    0.130009 
          2  |      7.80    0.128128 
          3  |      7.78    0.128519 
     firmage |      1.13    0.884307 
2.newprodu~s |      1.12    0.894536 
1.politica~y |      1.09    0.918072 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      2.22 
Tests for homoscedasticity - Model 5.1 
 
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |     294.37    244    0.0150 
            Skewness |      25.14     22    0.2903 
            Kurtosis |      14.08      1    0.0002 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |     333.59    267    0.0035 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of salesgrowth 
 
         chi2(1)      =     1.26 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.2621 
 
 
Tests for model specification - Model 5.1 
 
. linktest 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     972 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  2,   969) =   97.15 
       Model |  16.9340105     2  8.46700523           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  84.4507385   969  .087152465           R-squared     =  0.1670 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1653 
       Total |  101.384749   971  .104412718           Root MSE      =  .29522 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 salesgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        _hat |   .8812726   .1560048     5.65   0.000     .5751265    1.187419 
      _hatsq |  -.3266976    .380997    -0.86   0.391    -1.074372    .4209767 
       _cons |  -.0049804    .018289    -0.27   0.785    -.0408711    .0309103 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. ovtest 
 
                   Prob > F =      0.3668 
 
A5.3 Model 5.1 - estimated results (robust standard errors) 
 
.regress c.salesgrowth c.capitalpurch c.foreignown i.directexp c.emplgrowth c.wcbanks 
c.foreigncurr i.subsidies i.industry 
>  i.country1 i.country2 i.country3 i.country4 i.country5 i.country6 topmanagerexp i.firmsize 
c.firmage i.newproduct3years i.poli 
> ticalinstability, robust 
Note: 1.country6 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     972 
                                                       F( 22,   949) =    8.15 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1664 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .29842 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                       |               Robust 
           salesgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          capitalpurch |  -.0042864    .004589    -0.93   0.351    -.0132922    .0047194 
            foreignown |    .057633   .0274829     2.10   0.036     .0036988    .1115672 
       1.directexp |   .0079668   .0289567     0.28   0.783    -.0488598    .0647934 
            emplgrowth |    .125113   .0252644     4.95   0.000     .0755326    .1746935 
               wcbanks |  -.0660177   .0258719    -2.55   0.011    -.1167904    -.015245 
           foreigncurr |  -.1384894   .0354681    -3.90   0.000    -.2080944   -.0688844 
           1.subsidies |   .0690813   .0290239     2.38   0.018     .1260397    .0121229 
                       | 
              industry | 
                    2  |  -.0113732   .0237348    -0.48   0.632    -.0579519    .0352055 
                    3  |  -.0696036   .0445099    -1.56   0.118    -.1569529    .0177456 
                    4  |  -.0279327   .0285263    -0.98   0.328    -.0839147    .0280493 
                       | 
            1.country1 |  -.0145911   .0396365    -0.37   0.713    -.0923764    .0631942 
            1.country2 |   .0971389   .0362757     2.68   0.008     .0259491    .1683288 
            1.country3 |   .1662858   .0385082     4.32   0.000     .0907146    .2418569 
            1.country4 |  -.0030422   .0325502    -0.09   0.926     -.066921    .0608365 
            1.country5 |   -.040266    .034658    -1.16   0.246    -.1082813    .0277492 
            1.country6 |          0  (omitted) 
         topmanagerexp |   .0027655   .0010868     2.54   0.011     .0006326    .0048984 
                       | 
              firmsize | 
                    1  |  -.0515798   .0412082    -1.25   0.211    -.1324495      .02929 
                    2  |  -.0326018   .0422744    -0.77   0.441     -.115564    .0503603 
                    3  |   .0225969   .0446552     0.51   0.613    -.0650374    .1102312 
                       | 
               firmage |  -.0013193   .0009202    -1.43   0.152    -.0031252    .0004865 
    1.newproduct3years |   .0494467    .020699     2.39   0.017     .0900679    .0088255 
1.politicalinstability |  -.0528234   .0213093    -2.48   0.013    -.0946422   -.0110046 
                 _cons |  -.0383325   .0617025    -0.62   0.535    -.1594217    .0827567 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
A5.4 Model 5.2 - estimated results (robust standard errors) 
 
. . regress c.salesgrowth c.capitalpurch c.foreignown i.directexp c.emplgrowth c.wcbanks 
c.foreigncurr i.subsidies i.industry 
>  topmanagerexp i.firmsize c.firmage i.newproduct3years i.politicalinstability exportsgdp 
foreignbankownership foreigncurrrloans 
> , robust 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     972 
                                                       F( 20,   951) =    8.15 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1648 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .29839 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of salesgrowth 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 946) =      1.06 
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---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                       |               Robust 
           salesgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          capitalpurch |  -.0050364   .0045089    -1.12   0.264    -.0138849    .0038121 
            foreignown |   .0602498   .0273791     2.20   0.028     .0065193    .1139803 
       1.directexp |   .0057054   .0288298     0.20   0.843    -.0508721    .0622828 
            emplgrowth |   .1264207    .025222     5.01   0.000     .0769234    .1759179 
               wcbanks |  -.0622592   .0253858    -2.45   0.014    -.1120778   -.0124407 
           foreigncurr |  -.1402759   .0354974    -3.95   0.000    -.2099383   -.0706136 
           1.subsidies |    .072847   .0291969     2.50   0.013     .1301448    .0155492 
                       | 
              industry | 
                    2  |  -.0128481   .0235944    -0.54   0.586    -.0591513     .033455 
                    3  |   -.072464   .0441443    -1.64   0.101    -.1590955    .0141674 
                    4  |  -.0279685     .02852    -0.98   0.327    -.0839379    .0280009 
                       | 
         topmanagerexp |   .0028435   .0010793     2.63   0.009     .0007254    .0049617 
                       | 
              firmsize | 
                    1  |  -.0496189   .0417536    -1.19   0.235    -.1315588    .0323211 
                    2  |  -.0280953   .0428819    -0.66   0.513    -.1122494    .0560588 
                    3  |    .029686    .044882     0.66   0.509    -.0583932    .1177651 
                       | 
               firmage |   -.001339   .0009083    -1.47   0.141    -.0031215    .0004434 
    1.newproduct3years |   .0481239   .0202606     2.38   0.018     .0878845    .0083633 
1.politicalinstability |  -.0477444   .0205889    -2.32   0.021    -.0881493   -.0073395 
            exportsgdp |   .0038651   .0759547     0.05   0.959    -.1451931    .1529234 
  foreignbankownership |   -.331152   .0576739    -5.74   0.000    -.4443348   -.2179691 
     foreigncurrrloans |  -.1889029   .0686363    -2.75   0.006     -.323599   -.0542069 
                 _cons |   .3325962   .1006924     3.30   0.001     .1349912    .5302013 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 A5.5 Model 5.2 – diagnostic tests 
 
Check for multiocollinearity - model 5.2. Vif 
 
.vif 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
capitalpurch |      1.27    0.789096 
  foreignown |      1.15    0.870088 
1.directex~m |      1.34    0.746716 
  emplgrowth |      1.05    0.948659 
     wcbanks |      1.26    0.791043 
 foreigncurr |      1.14    0.877565 
 2.subsidies |      1.04    0.957126 
    industry | 
          2  |      1.47    0.680209 
          3  |      1.17    0.856341 
          4  |      1.41    0.707465 
topmanager~p |      1.12    0.895034 
    firmsize | 
          1  |      7.65    0.130733 
          2  |      7.74    0.129174 
          3  |      7.69    0.130085 
     firmage |      1.12    0.891610 
2.newprodu~s |      1.10    0.912273 
1.politica~y |      1.05    0.949940 
foreignban~p |      1.28    0.780705 
foreigncur~s |      1.24    0.807895 
  exportsgdp |      1.49    0.672287 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      2.19 
 Tests for homoscedasticity - Model 5.2 
 
estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |     257.72    210    0.0137 
            Skewness |      23.24     20    0.2772 
            Kurtosis |      13.51      1    0.0002 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |     294.48    231    0.0030 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of salesgrowth 
 
         chi2(1)      =     1.11 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.2930 
Tests for model specification - Model 5.2 
 
 
. linktest 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     972 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  2,   969) =   96.17 
       Model |  16.7916508     2  8.39582541           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  84.5930981   969  .087299379           R-squared     =  0.1656 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1639 
       Total |  101.384749   971  .104412718           Root MSE      =  .29546 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 salesgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        _hat |   .8675333   .1551983     5.59   0.000     .5629699    1.172097 
      _hatsq |  -.3683458   .3818967    -0.96   0.335    -1.117786    .3810941 
       _cons |  -.0053935   .0182907    -0.29   0.768    -.0412874    .0305004 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. ovtest 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of salesgrowth 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 948) =      0.90 
                  Prob > F =      0.4403 
 
A5.6 Model 5.3 - estimated results 
 
regress c.salesgrowth c.capitalpurch c.foreignown c.emplgrowth c.foreigncurr i.subsidies 
i.industry topmanagerexp i.firmsize c.firmage i.newproduct3years i.politicalinstability 
i.directexp##c.exportsgdp c.wcbanks##c.foreignbankownership c.wcbanks##c.foreigncurrrloans, 
robust 
note: wcbanks omitted because of collinearity 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     972 
                                                       F( 23,   948) =    7.47 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1666 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .29854 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                 |               Robust 
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                     salesgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                    capitalpurch |   -.005029   .0045194    -1.11   0.266    -.0138982    .0038402 
                      foreignown |   .0582247   .0275773     2.11   0.035      .004105    .1123443 
                      emplgrowth |   .1281899   .0252785     5.07   0.000     .0785816    .1777982 
                     foreigncurr |  -.1395097   .0356267    -3.92   0.000     -.209426   -.0695933 
                     1.subsidies |   .0715156   .0294416     2.43   0.015     .1292939    .0137373 
                                 | 
                        industry | 
                              2  |  -.0135385   .0237176    -0.57   0.568    -.0600837    .0330066 
                              3  |  -.0717449   .0443521    -1.62   0.106    -.1587846    .0152948 
                              4  |  -.0269138   .0284935    -0.94   0.345    -.0828315    .0290039 
                                 | 
                   topmanagerexp |   .0027913   .0010823     2.58   0.010     .0006674    .0049152 
                                 | 
                        firmsize | 
                              1  |  -.0501586   .0424244    -1.18   0.237    -.1334151    .0330979 
                              2  |  -.0276534   .0435814    -0.63   0.526    -.1131805    .0578737 
                              3  |   .0296332   .0456034     0.65   0.516    -.0598621    .1191286 
                                 | 
                         firmage |   -.001326    .000902    -1.47   0.142    -.0030962    .0004443 
              1.newproduct3years |   .0462337   .0203475     2.27   0.023     .0861652    .0063023 
          1.politicalinstability |  -.0470088   .0206359    -2.28   0.023    -.0875062   -.0065115 
                 1.directexp |  -.0912256    .086374    -1.06   0.291    -.2607319    .0782808 
                      exportsgdp |  -.0259751   .0787873    -0.33   0.742    -.1805928    .1286426 
                                 | 
      directexp#c.exportsgdp | 
                              1  |   .2008689   .1532926     1.31   0.190    -.0999632    .5017011 
                                 | 
                         wcbanks |   -.052244   .1276695    -0.41   0.682    -.3027914    .1983035 
            foreignbankownership |  -.2995911   .0728641    -4.11   0.000    -.4425847   -.1565976 
                                 | 
c.wcbanks#c.foreignbankownership |  -.0962162   .1262359    -0.76   0.446    -.3439503    .1515178 
                                 | 
                         wcbanks |          0  (omitted) 
               foreigncurrrloans |  -.2024756   .0791709    -2.56   0.011     -.357846   -.0471052 
                                 | 
   c.wcbanks#c.foreigncurrrloans |   .0947326   .1632579     0.58   0.562     -.225656    .4151212 
                                 | 
                           _cons |   .3311697   .1060759     3.12   0.002     .1229991    .5393403 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
A5.7 Model 5.3 – diagnostic tests 
 
Check for multiocollinearity - model 5.3 Vif 
 
. vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
capitalpurch |      1.27    0.784733 
  foreignown |      1.16    0.858875 
  emplgrowth |      1.06    0.944508 
 foreigncurr |      1.14    0.873503 
 2.subsidies |      1.05    0.950518 
    industry | 
          2  |      1.47    0.678862 
          3  |      1.17    0.852581 
          4  |      1.43    0.698943 
topmanager~p |      1.13    0.884179 
    firmsize | 
          1  |      9.02    0.110877 
          2  |      9.15    0.109325 
          3  |      9.04    0.110635 
     firmage |      1.12    0.890386 
2.newprodu~s |      1.11    0.901538 
1.politica~y |      1.09    0.921495 
1.directex~m |     12.28    0.081432 
  exportsgdp |      1.81    0.552635 
directexpd~m#| 
c.exportsgdp | 
          1  |     12.43    0.080427 
1.accessfi~m |     14.21    0.070381 
foreignban~p |      2.57    0.389637 
 accessfind~m#| 
          c. | 
foreignban~p | 
          1  |     15.61    0.064046 
     wcbanks |     19.98    0.050056 
foreigncur~s |      1.90    0.526890 
   c.wcbanks#| 
          c. | 
foreigncur~s |     18.86    0.053015 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      5.88 
Test for homoscedasticity  - model 5.3  
 
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |     335.87    291    0.0360 
            Skewness |      25.77     24    0.3649 
            Kurtosis |      11.52      1    0.0007 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |     373.16    316    0.0148 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Test for functional form  - model 5.3  
 
. ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of salesgrowth 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 914) =      1.53 
                  Prob > F =      0.2049 
 
5.14 Margins of interaction between directexp and exoirtsgdp 
 
. margins r.directexp, at (exportsgdp = (0.2914506  .3851856 .4931282 .5041728  .7832868)) 
contrast (nowald effects) 
 
Contrasts of predictive margins 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Linear prediction, predict() 
 
1._at        : exportsgdp      =    .2914506 
2._at        : exportsgdp      =    .3851856 
3._at        : exportsgdp      =    .4931282 
4._at        : exportsgdp      =    .5041728 
5._at        : exportsgdp      =    .7832868 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |            Delta-method 
                  |   Contrast   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
directexp@_at | 
      (1 vs 0) 1  |  -.0326822   .0461935    -0.71   0.479    -.1233355    .0579711 
      (1 vs 0) 2  |  -.0138537    .035625    -0.39   0.697    -.0837667    .0560592 
      (1 vs 0) 3  |   .0078286   .0280167     0.28   0.780    -.0471533    .0628104 
      (1 vs 0) 4  |   .0100471   .0276816     0.36   0.717    -.0442772    .0643714 
      (1 vs 0) 5  |   .0661124     .04688     1.41   0.159    -.0258881     .158113 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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A5.8 Margins of interaction between wcbanks and foreigncurrloans 
 
. margins, dydx(wcbanks) at (foreigncurrrloans = (.427089 .497385 .5314689 .5421005 
.547776.8648633 )) 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        972 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Linear prediction, predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : wcbanks 
 
1._at        : foreigncur~s    =     .427089 
2._at        : foreigncur~s    =     .497385 
3._at        : foreigncur~s    =    .5314689 
4._at        : foreigncur~s    =    .5421005 
5._at        : foreigncur~s    =     .547776 
6._at        : foreigncur~s    =    .8648633 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
wcbanks      | 
         _at | 
          1  |  -.0279687   .0380694    -0.73   0.463    -.1026785    .0467412 
          2  |   -.036642   .0303324    -1.21   0.227    -.0961682    .0228842 
          3  |  -.0408474   .0276105    -1.48   0.139     -.095032    .0133373 
          4  |  -.0421591   .0269511    -1.56   0.118    -.0950497    .0107315 
          5  |  -.0428594   .0266407    -1.61   0.108    -.0951408    .0094221 
          6  |  -.0819824   .0512363    -1.60   0.110    -.1825317    .0185669 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 A5.9 Margins of interaction between wcbanks and foreignabnkownership 
 
. margins, dydx(wcbanks) at (foreignbankownership = (0.38 0.61 0.8230277 0.87 0.92)) 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        972 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Linear prediction, predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : wcbanks 
 
1._at        : foreignban~p    =         .38 
2._at        : foreignban~p    =         .61 
3._at        : foreignban~p    =    .8230277 
4._at        : foreignban~p    =         .87 
5._at        : foreignban~p    =         .92 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
wcbanks      | 
         _at | 
          1  |  -.0342511    .046867    -0.73   0.465    -.1262261    .0577239 
          2  |  -.0563808   .0271482    -2.08   0.038    -.1096584   -.0031033 
          3  |  -.0768776   .0298192    -2.58   0.010    -.1353968   -.0183583 
          4  |  -.0813971   .0334268    -2.44   0.015    -.1469962    -.015798 
          5  |  -.0862079   .0379143    -2.27   0.023    -.1606135   -.0118023 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 A5.10 Model 5.4 - estimated results 
 
. regress c.utilcapacity c.capitalpurch c.foreignown i.directexp c.emplgrowth c.wcbanks 
c.foreigncurr i.subsidies i.industry i.country1 i. 
> country2 i.country3 i.country4 i.country5 i.country6 topmanagerexp i.firmsize c.firmage 
i.newproduct3years i.politicalinstability, robust 
 Note: 1.country6 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     751 
                                                       F( 22,   728) =   11.87 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2361 
                                                       Root MSE      =  27.223 
 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                       |               Robust 
          utilcapacity |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          capitalpurch |    -.38755   .4928133    -0.79   0.432    -1.355055    .5799548 
            foreignown |   6.372253   2.898638     2.20   0.028     .6815654    12.06294 
1.directexp|   8.169722    2.58488     3.16   0.002     3.095013    13.24443 
            emplgrowth |   9.561097   2.520129     3.79   0.000      4.61351    14.50868 
               wcbanks |    -5.2328   3.050489    -1.72   0.087     -11.2216    .7560051 
           foreigncurr |  -4.979401   3.639881    -1.37   0.172    -12.12532    2.166515 
           1.subsidies |   .8287278   2.614714     0.32   0.751     5.962008    4.304553 
                       | 
              industry | 
                    2  |    10.4259   2.583102     4.04   0.000     5.354683    15.49712 
                    3  |   5.306713   3.764399     1.41   0.159    -2.083659    12.69709 
                    4  |  -4.523032   2.882804    -1.57   0.117    -10.18263    1.136569 
                       | 
            1.country1 |  -10.34464   3.854197    -2.68   0.007     -17.9113   -2.777968 
            1.country2 |   15.21806    3.47097     4.38   0.000      8.40376    22.03237 
            1.country3 |  -21.92102   7.003018    -3.13   0.002    -35.66954     -8.1725 
            1.country4 |  -14.69637   2.936204    -5.01   0.000    -20.46081   -8.931932 
            1.country5 |  -14.87181   3.182723    -4.67   0.000    -21.12022   -8.623397 
            1.country6 |          0  (omitted) 
         topmanagerexp |  -.0562413   .1107385    -0.51   0.612    -.2736462    .1611635 
                       | 
              firmsize | 
                    1  |   4.682773   5.967666     0.78   0.433    -7.033116    16.39866 
                    2  |    7.57605   5.987467     1.27   0.206    -4.178713    19.33081 
                    3  |    13.8414   6.202596     2.23   0.026     1.664287     26.0185 
                       | 
               firmage |  -.0131667   .0723669    -0.18   0.856    -.1552394    .1289061 
    1.newproduct3years |  -1.628851   2.168827   - 0.75   0.453     -2.62905   -5.886753 
1.politicalinstability |   -1.35815   2.209718    -0.61   0.539     -5.69633     2.98003 
                 _cons |   59.54108   7.165954     8.31   0.000     45.47267    73.60948 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 A5.11 Model 5.4 – diagnostic tests 
Check for multicollinearity - model 5.4 
 
. vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
capitalpurch |      1.32    0.756792 
  foreignown |      1.16    0.861096  
1.directex~m |      1.37    0.730497 
  emplgrowth |      1.05    0.949351 
     wcbanks |      1.38    0.723266 
 foreigncurr |      1.13    0.887230 
 2.subsidies |      1.05    0.956271 
    industry | 
          2  |      1.48    0.675593 
          3  |      1.15    0.866532 
          4  |      1.42    0.703978 
  1.country1 |      1.43    0.700967 
  1.country2 |      1.99    0.503417 
  1.country3 |      1.24    0.806305 
  1.country4 |      1.58    0.631641 
  1.country5 |      1.67    0.599378 
topmanager~p |      1.13    0.886454 
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    firmsize | 
          1  |      7.09    0.140949 
          2  |      6.89    0.145185 
          3  |      6.92    0.144541 
     firmage |      1.11    0.897101 
2.newprodu~s |      1.12    0.891890 
1.politica~y |      1.08    0.927139 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      2.08 
Test for homoscedasticity - model 5.4 
 
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |     272.85    243    0.0914 
            Skewness |      82.12     22    0.0000 
            Kurtosis |      10.06      1    0.0015 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |     365.03    266    0.0001 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of utilcapacity 
 
         chi2(1)      =    30.52 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000 
Test for functional form - model 5.4 
 
. ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of utilcapacity 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 725) =      5.34 
                  Prob > F =      0.05 
 
 
 A5.12 Model 5.5 - estimated results 
 
. regress c.emplgrowth c.foreignown i.directexp c.wcbanks c.foreigncurr i.subsidies i.industry 
i.country1 i.country2 i.country3 i.country4 i.country5 i.country6 topmanagerexp i.firmsize 
c.firmage i.newproduct3years i.politicalinstability, robust 
Note: 1.country6 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     972 
                                                       F( 20,   951) =    2.44 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0004 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0535 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .46414 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                       |               Robust 
            emplgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
            foreignown |   .0265615   .0404732     0.66   0.512    -.0528656    .1059885 
       1.directexp |   .0336926   .0403484     0.84   0.404    -.0454896    .1128748 
               wcbanks |  -.0623493   .0437451    -1.43   0.154    -.1481973    .0234988 
           foreigncurr |   .0979953   .0634533     1.54   0.123    -.0265294      .22252 
           1.subsidies |   .0529026   .0436689     1.21   0.226     .1386012    -.032796 
                        | 
              industry | 
                    2  |   .0784293    .039497     1.99   0.047     .0009179    .1559407 
                    3  |   .0314543   .0598968     0.53   0.600    -.0860909    .1489994 
                    4  |   -.001553   .0429878    -0.04   0.971    -.0859149     .082809 
                       | 
            1.country1 |  -.0141464   .0548263    -0.26   0.796     -.121741    .0934482 
            1.country2 |   .1358455   .0714513     1.90   0.058    -.0043748    .2760659 
            1.country3 |   .2059657   .0545194     3.78   0.000     .0989735     .312958 
            1.country4 |  -.0774589   .0457426    -1.69   0.091     -.167227    .0123093 
            1.country5 |  -.0575682   .0429842    -1.34   0.181    -.1419232    .0267867 
            1.country6 |          0  (omitted) 
         topmanagerexp |  -.0004539   .0014424    -0.31   0.753    -.0032846    .0023767 
                       | 
              firmsize | 
                    1  |  -.1355214   .1242067    -1.09   0.276    -.3792723    .1082294 
                    2  |  -.1959559    .124023    -1.58   0.114    -.4393464    .0474345 
                    3  |  -.2064599   .1245457    -1.66   0.098     -.450876    .0379562 
                       | 
               firmage |   .0014432   .0010564     1.37   0.172      -.00063    .0035164 
    1.newproduct3years |   .0286558   .0304318     0.94   0.347     .0883771   -.0310655 
1.politicalinstability |  -.0225243   .0317396    -0.71   0.478     -.084812    .0397635 
                 _cons |  -.0045984   .1360427    -0.03   0.973     -.271577    .2623802 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 A5.13 Model 5.5 – diagnostic tests 
 
Check for multicollinearity - model 5.5 
 
. vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
  foreignown |      1.16    0.859717 
1.directex~m |      1.34    0.747957 
     wcbanks |      1.30    0.770046 
 foreigncurr |      1.14    0.878127 
 2.subsidies |      1.05    0.950723 
    industry | 
          2  |      1.46    0.682906 
          3  |      1.17    0.851705 
          4  |      1.41    0.709394 
  1.country1 |      1.47    0.680834 
  1.country2 |      1.84    0.543027 
  1.country3 |      1.97    0.507787 
  1.country4 |      1.64    0.611601 
  1.country5 |      1.74    0.573318 
topmanager~p |      1.13    0.885745 
    firmsize | 
          1  |      7.63    0.131012 
          2  |      7.66    0.130599 
          3  |      7.42    0.134739 
     firmage |      1.13    0.886303 
2.newprodu~s |      1.09    0.920984 
1.politica~y |      1.09    0.918592 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      2.29 
Test for homoscedasticity - model 5.5 
 
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
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Source        chi2     df      p 
Heteroskedasticity      239.90    199    0.0252 
Skewness       46.46     20    0.0007 
Kurtosis       14.29      1    0.0002 
Total      300.65    220    0.0002 
 
 
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of emplgrowth 
 
chi2(1)      =    47.06 
Prob > chi2  =   0.0000 
Test for functional form - model 5.5 
 
. ovtest 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of emplgrowth 
Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
F(3, 948) =      1.23 
Prob > F =      0.2967 
 
  
 Graphic checks to support diagnostic tests 
 
Figure A5.1 Standardized residuals versus predictor variables 
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  Figure A5.2 Augmented plus residual plot 
 
 
 
Figure A5.3 Kemel density plot 
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 A5.14 Model 5.6 - estimated results 
 
. regress c.salesgrowth c.capitalpurch c.foreignown i.directexp##c.changnatsales c.emplgrowth 
c.wcbanks c.foreigncurr i.subsidies i.industry i.country1 i.country2 i.country3 i.country4 
i.country5 i.country6 topmanagerexp i.firmsize c.firmage i.newproduct3years 
i.politicalinstability, robust 
Note: 1.country6 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     955 
F( 24,   930) =    7.65 
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
R-squared     =  0.1759 
Root MSE      =   .2966 
-----------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                              |               Robust 
                  salesgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------------------- +---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 capitalpurch |  -.0040398   .0045954    -0.88   0.380    -.0130583    .0049788 
                   foreignown |   .0475537   .0280948     1.69   0.091    -.0075828    .1026902 
              1.directexp |   .0226834   .0298153     0.76   0.447    -.0358296    .0811964 
                changnatsales |  -.0686885   .0521019    -1.32   0.188    -.1709393    .0335623 
                              | 
directexp#c.changnatsales | 
                           1  |   .0761294   .0557122     1.37   0.172    -.0332067    .1854655 
                              | 
                   emplgrowth |   .1533962   .0260123     5.90   0.000     .1023466    .2044458 
                      wcbanks |  -.0673179   .0262865    -2.56   0.011    -.1189055   -.0157302 
                  foreigncurr |  -.1327863   .0357443    -3.71   0.000    -.2029352   -.0626375 
                  1.subsidies |   .0676355   .0295398     2.29   0.022      .125608     .009663 
                              | 
                     industry | 
                           2  |  -.0057092   .0240414    -0.24   0.812    -.0528908    .0414725 
                           3  |   -.059473    .044265    -1.34   0.179    -.1463438    .0273978 
                           4  |  -.0202033   .0289253    -0.70   0.485    -.0769698    .0365631 
                              | 
                   1.country1 |  -.0165329   .0390571    -0.42   0.672    -.0931832    .0601174 
                   1.country2 |   .0928257   .0364676     2.55   0.011     .0212573     .164394 
                   1.country3 |   .1597575   .0384911     4.15   0.000     .0842181     .235297 
                   1.country4 |  -.0079092   .0327517    -0.24   0.809    -.0721851    .0563667 
                   1.country5 |  -.0576227   .0346844    -1.66   0.097    -.1256915     .010446 
                   1.country6 |          0  (omitted) 
                topmanagerexp |    .002682   .0010925     2.45   0.014     .0005379    .0048261 
                              | 
                     firmsize | 
                           1  |  -.0368749   .0409645    -0.90   0.368    -.1172684    .0435187 
                           2  |  -.0270122   .0422417    -0.64   0.523    -.1099122    .0558879 
                           3  |   .0198143   .0446759     0.44   0.657    -.0678629    .1074915 
                              | 
                      firmage |  -.0013637   .0009585    -1.42   0.155    -.0032449    .0005174 
           1.newproduct3years |   .0503753   .0208335     2.42   0.016     .0912614    .0094892 
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       1.politicalinstability |  -.0549248   .0213176    -2.58   0.010    -.0967609   -.0130887 
                        _cons |  -.0389558   .0619056    -0.63   0.529    -.1604467    .0825351 
-----------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 A5.15 Model 5.6 – diagnostic tests 
  
Check for multicollineaarity - model 5.6 
 
. vif 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
capitalpurch |      1.28    0.780970 
  foreignown |      1.19    0.838551 
1.directex~m |      1.37    0.731920 
changnatsa~s |      5.37    0.186221 
directexpd~m#| 
          c. | 
changnatsa~s | 
          1  |      5.31    0.188412 
  emplgrowth |      1.06    0.940073 
     wcbanks |      1.31    0.763063 
 foreigncurr |      1.14    0.876553 
 2.subsidies |      1.05    0.948089 
    industry | 
          2  |      1.49    0.671578 
          3  |      1.18    0.848822 
          4  |      1.43    0.698054 
  1.country1 |      1.47    0.680040 
  1.country2 |      1.87    0.534488 
  1.country3 |      2.02    0.494939 
  1.country4 |      1.69    0.592998 
  1.country5 |      1.74    0.576110 
topmanager~p |      1.14    0.880775 
    firmsize | 
          1  |      7.58    0.131839 
          2  |      7.69    0.129964 
          3  |      7.66    0.130508 
     firmage |      1.13    0.883383 
2.newprodu~s |      1.12    0.896533 
1.politica~y |      1.09    0.914030 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      2.47 
   Test for homoscedasticity - model 5.6 
 
. estat imtest 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |     331.13    290    0.0484 
            Skewness |      24.75     24    0.4194 
            Kurtosis |      14.42      1    0.0001 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |     370.30    315    0.0173 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Test for functional form - model 5.6 
 
                  Prob > F =      0.1681 
 
. ovtest 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of salesgrowth 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 927) =      1.69 
  A5.16 Predictive margins - model 5.6 
 
. margins directexp, at (changnatsales=( -1(0.1) 1.777778)) 
 
Predictive margins                                Number of obs   =        955 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Linear prediction, predict() 
 
1._at        : changnatsa~s    =          -1 
2._at        : changnatsa~s    =         -.9 
3._at        : changnatsa~s    =         -.8 
4._at        : changnatsa~s    =         -.7 
5._at        : changnatsa~s    =         -.6 
6._at        : changnatsa~s    =         -.5 
7._at        : changnatsa~s    =         -.4 
8._at        : changnatsa~s    =         -.3 
9._at        : changnatsa~s    =         -.2 
10._at       : changnatsa~s    =         -.1 
11._at       : changnatsa~s    =           0 
12._at       : changnatsa~s    =          .1 
13._at       : changnatsa~s    =          .2 
14._at       : changnatsa~s    =          .3 
15._at       : changnatsa~s    =          .4 
16._at       : changnatsa~s    =          .5 
17._at       : changnatsa~s    =          .6 
18._at       : changnatsa~s    =          .7 
19._at       : changnatsa~s    =          .8 
20._at       : changnatsa~s    =          .9 
21._at       : changnatsa~s    =           1 
22._at       : changnatsa~s    =         1.1 
23._at       : changnatsa~s    =         1.2 
24._at       : changnatsa~s    =         1.3 
25._at       : changnatsa~s    =         1.4 
26._at       : changnatsa~s    =         1.5 
27._at       : changnatsa~s    =         1.6 
28._at       : changnatsa~s    =         1.7 
 
 
Delta-method 
Margin   Std. Err.      t    P>t     [95% Conf. Interval] 
 
_at#directexp  
1 0    -.1390261   .0498704    -2.79   0.005    -.2368977   -.0411544 
1 1    -.1924721   .0384684    -5.00   0.000     -.267967   -.1169772 
2 0    -.1458949   .0447927    -3.26   0.001    -.2338014   -.0579884 
2 1     -.191728   .0369257    -5.19   0.000    -.2641954   -.1192607 
3 0    -.1527638   .0397493    -3.84   0.000    -.2307725    -.074755 
3 1    -.1909839   .0354413    -5.39   0.000    -.2605381   -.1214297 
4 0    -.1596326   .0347551    -4.59   0.000    -.2278402   -.0914251 
4 1    -.1902398   .0340228    -5.59   0.000    -.2570102   -.1234695 
5 0    -.1665015   .0298349    -5.58   0.000     -.225053   -.1079499 
5 1    -.1894957   .0326788    -5.80   0.000    -.2536284   -.1253631 
6 0    -.1733703   .0250323    -6.93   0.000    -.2224967   -.1242439 
6 1    -.1887516   .0314188    -6.01   0.000    -.2504116   -.1270917 
7 0    -.1802392   .0204305    -8.82   0.000    -.2203344    -.140144 
7 1    -.1880076   .0302533    -6.21   0.000    -.2473803   -.1286348 
8 0     -.187108   .0162014   -11.55   0.000    -.2189035   -.1553125 
8 1    -.1872635   .0291938    -6.41   0.000    -.2445568   -.1299702 
9 0    -.1939769   .0127223   -15.25   0.000    -.2189446   -.1690091 
9 1    -.1865194    .028252    -6.60   0.000    -.2419644   -.1310743 
10 0    -.2008457   .0107481   -18.69   0.000     -.221939   -.1797525 
10 1    -.1857753   .0274401    -6.77   0.000     -.239627   -.1319236 
11 0    -.2077146    .011112   -18.69   0.000    -.2295221   -.1859071 
11 1    -.1850312     .02677    -6.91   0.000    -.2375677   -.1324947 
12 0    -.2145834   .0136281   -15.75   0.000    -.2413288   -.1878381 
12 1    -.1842871   .0262524    -7.02   0.000    -.2358079   -.1327663 
13 0    -.2214523   .0173858   -12.74   0.000    -.2555722   -.1873324 
13 1     -.183543   .0258966    -7.09   0.000    -.2343655   -.1327205 
14 0    -.2283211   .0217508   -10.50   0.000    -.2710075   -.1856348 
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14 1    -.1827989   .0257092    -7.11   0.000    -.2332537   -.1323441 
15 0      -.23519   .0264239    -8.90   0.000    -.2870473   -.1833326 
15 1    -.1820548    .025694    -7.09   0.000    -.2324798   -.1316298 
16 0    -.2420588   .0312672    -7.74   0.000    -.3034213   -.1806964 
16 1    -.1813107   .0258513    -7.01   0.000    -.2320443   -.1305772 
17 0    -.2489277   .0362125    -6.87   0.000    -.3199954     -.17786 
17 1    -.1805666   .0261778    -6.90   0.000    -.2319411   -.1291922 
18 0    -.2557965   .0412231    -6.21   0.000    -.3366977   -.1748954 
18 1    -.1798225   .0266675    -6.74   0.000     -.232158   -.1274871 
19 0    -.2626654   .0462778    -5.68   0.000    -.3534865   -.1718443 
19 1    -.1790785   .0273116    -6.56   0.000    -.2326779    -.125479 
20 0    -.2695342   .0513636    -5.25   0.000    -.3703363   -.1687322 
20 1    -.1783344   .0280993    -6.35   0.000    -.2334798   -.1231889 
21 0    -.2764031   .0564721    -4.89   0.000    -.3872306   -.1655755 
21 1    -.1775903   .0290191    -6.12   0.000    -.2345408   -.1206397 
22 0    -.2832719   .0615976    -4.60   0.000    -.4041584   -.1623855 
22 1    -.1768462   .0300588    -5.88   0.000    -.2358372   -.1178551 
23 0    -.2901408   .0667363    -4.35   0.000    -.4211119   -.1591696 
23 1    -.1761021   .0312065    -5.64   0.000    -.2373454   -.1148588 
24 0    -.2970096   .0718852    -4.13   0.000    -.4380856   -.1559336 
24 1     -.175358   .0324506    -5.40   0.000    -.2390429   -.1116731 
25 0    -.3038785   .0770424    -3.94   0.000    -.4550755   -.1526814 
25 1    -.1746139   .0337806    -5.17   0.000    -.2409089   -.1083189 
26 0    -.3107473   .0822062    -3.78   0.000    -.4720786   -.1494161 
26 1    -.1738698   .0351866    -4.94   0.000    -.2429242   -.1048154 
27 0    -.3176162   .0873756    -3.64   0.000    -.4890924     -.14614 
27 1    -.1731257     .03666    -4.72   0.000    -.2450717   -.1011798 
28 0     -.324485   .0925495    -3.51   0.000    -.5061152   -.1428549 
28 1    -.1723816   .0381929    -4.51   0.000     -.247336   -.0974273 
  
A5.17 Margins of interaction between directexodumm and changnatsales 
 
. margins r.directexp, at (changnatsales =(-1 (0.1) 1)) contrast (nowald effects) 
 
Contrasts of predictive margins 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Linear prediction, predict() 
 
1._at        : changnatsa~s    =          -1 
2._at        : changnatsa~s    =         -.9 
3._at        : changnatsa~s    =         -.8 
4._at        : changnatsa~s    =         -.7 
5._at        : changnatsa~s    =         -.6 
6._at        : changnatsa~s    =         -.5 
7._at        : changnatsa~s    =         -.4 
8._at        : changnatsa~s    =         -.3 
9._at        : changnatsa~s    =         -.2 
10._at       : changnatsa~s    =         -.1 
11._at       : changnatsa~s    =           0 
12._at       : changnatsa~s    =          .1 
13._at       : changnatsa~s    =          .2 
14._at       : changnatsa~s    =          .3 
15._at       : changnatsa~s    =          .4 
16._at       : changnatsa~s    =          .5 
17._at       : changnatsa~s    =          .6 
18._at       : changnatsa~s    =          .7 
19._at       : changnatsa~s    =          .8 
20._at       : changnatsa~s    =          .9 
21._at       : changnatsa~s    =           1 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |            Delta-method 
                  |   Contrast   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
directexp@_at | 
     (1 vs 0)  1  |  -.0547827   .0551698    -0.99   0.321    -.1630525    .0534871 
     (1 vs 0)  2  |  -.0478041   .0507956    -0.94   0.347    -.1474897    .0518814 
     (1 vs 0)  3  |  -.0408256   .0465961    -0.88   0.381    -.1322696    .0506184 
      (1 vs 0)  4  |   -.033847   .0426229    -0.79   0.427    -.1174937    .0497996 
     (1 vs 0)  5  |  -.0268685   .0389453    -0.69   0.490    -.1032979     .049561 
     (1 vs 0)  6  |  -.0198899    .035655    -0.56   0.577    -.0898622    .0500823 
     (1 vs 0)  7  |  -.0129114   .0328684    -0.39   0.695     -.077415    .0515923 
     (1 vs 0)  8  |  -.0059328    .030723    -0.19   0.847    -.0662261    .0543605 
     (1 vs 0)  9  |   .0010457   .0293596     0.04   0.972    -.0565719    .0586633 
     (1 vs 0) 10  |   .0080243   .0288891     0.28   0.781    -.0486701    .0647186 
     (1 vs 0) 11  |   .0150028   .0293546     0.51   0.609     -.042605    .0726107 
     (1 vs 0) 12  |   .0219814   .0307134     0.72   0.474    -.0382932     .082256 
     (1 vs 0) 13  |   .0289599    .032855     0.88   0.378    -.0355175    .0934374 
     (1 vs 0) 14  |   .0359385   .0356385     1.01   0.314    -.0340015    .1058785 
     (1 vs 0) 15  |    .042917   .0389265     1.10   0.271    -.0334755    .1193096 
     (1 vs 0) 16  |   .0498956   .0426023     1.17   0.242    -.0337106    .1335018 
     (1 vs 0) 17  |   .0568741   .0465741     1.22   0.222    -.0345267     .148275 
     (1 vs 0) 18  |   .0638527   .0507726     1.26   0.209    -.0357876     .163493 
     (1 vs 0) 19  |   .0708313   .0551459     1.28   0.199    -.0373917    .1790542 
     (1 vs 0) 20  |   .0778098   .0596558     1.30   0.192    -.0392636    .1948832 
     (1 vs 0) 21  |   .0847884   .0642733     1.32   0.187    -.0413469    .2109237 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 A5.18 Model 5.7 - estimated results 
 
. regress c.salesgrowth c.capitalpurch c.foreignown i.directexp##c.foreigncurr c.emplgrowth 
c.wcbanks i.subsidies i.industry i.country1 i.country2 i.country3 i.country4 i.country5 
i.country6 topmanagerexp i.firmsize c.firmage i.newproduct3years i.politicalinstability, robust 
Note: 1.country6 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     955 
                                                       F( 23,   931) =    7.71 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1757 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .29647 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                            |               Robust 
                salesgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
               capitalpurch |  -.0038529   .0046055    -0.84   0.403    -.0128912    .0051855 
                 foreignown |   .0538036   .0275944     1.95   0.051    -.0003509     .107958 
            1.directexp |   -.005166   .0338529    -0.15   0.879    -.0716028    .0612707 
                foreigncurr |  -.1625775   .0406594    -4.00   0.000    -.2423722   -.0827827 
                            | 
directexp#c.foreigncurr | 
                         1  |   .1103522   .0741834     1.49   0.137    -.0352339    .2559382 
                            | 
                 emplgrowth |   .1515807   .0260041     5.83   0.000     .1005472    .2026142 
                    wcbanks |  -.0653196   .0261453    -2.50   0.013    -.1166302   -.0140091 
                1.subsidies |    .067283   .0292836     2.30   0.022     .1247525    .0098135 
                            | 
                   industry | 
                         2  |  -.0095386   .0239076    -0.40   0.690    -.0564576    .0373804 
                         3  |  -.0604223   .0441792    -1.37   0.172    -.1471247    .0262801 
                         4  |  -.0204026   .0289228    -0.71   0.481     -.077164    .0363588 
                            | 
                 1.country1 |  -.0201469   .0391114    -0.52   0.607    -.0969036    .0566098 
                 1.country2 |   .0901933   .0365619     2.47   0.014     .0184401    .1619465 
                 1.country3 |    .153369   .0387838     3.95   0.000     .0772552    .2294829 
                 1.country4 |  -.0077571    .032258    -0.24   0.810    -.0710639    .0555497 
                 1.country5 |   -.059074   .0350837    -1.68   0.093    -.1279264    .0097783 
                 1.country6 |          0  (omitted) 
              topmanagerexp |    .002707   .0010911     2.48   0.013     .0005656    .0048483 
                            | 
                   firmsize | 
                         1  |  -.0359946    .041411    -0.87   0.385    -.1172644    .0452752 
                         2  |  -.0249882   .0426953    -0.59   0.559    -.1087784    .0588019 
                         3  |   .0233391   .0450529     0.52   0.605    -.0650779    .1117561 
                            | 
                    firmage |  -.0013937   .0009288    -1.50   0.134    -.0032164     .000429 
         1.newproduct3years |   .0479269   .0207851     2.31   0.021     .0887179    .0071358 
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     1.politicalinstability |  -.0546395   .0214081    -2.55   0.011    -.0966532   -.0126259 
                      _cons |  -.0333938   .0622046    -0.54   0.592    -.1554711    .0886836 
 
               capitalpurch |  -.0038529   .0046055    -0.84   0.403    -.0128912    .0051855 
                 foreignown |   .0538036   .0275944     1.95   0.051    -.0003509     .107958 
            1.directexp |   -.005166   .0338529    -0.15   0.879    -.0716028    .0612707 
                foreigncurr |  -.1625775   .0406594    -4.00   0.000    -.2423722   -.0827827 
                            | 
directexp#c.foreigncurr | 
                         1  |   .1103522   .0741834     1.49   0.137    -.0352339    .2559382 
                            | 
                 emplgrowth |   .1515807   .0260041     5.83   0.000     .1005472    .2026142 
                    wcbanks |  -.0653196   .0261453    -2.50   0.013    -.1166302   -.0140091 
                1.subsidies |    .067283   .0292836     2.30   0.022     .1247525    .0098135 
                            | 
                   industry | 
                         2  |  -.0095386   .0239076    -0.40   0.690    -.0564576    .0373804 
                         3  |  -.0604223   .0441792    -1.37   0.172    -.1471247    .0262801 
                         4  |  -.0204026   .0289228    -0.71   0.481     -.077164    .0363588 
                            | 
                 1.country1 |  -.0201469   .0391114    -0.52   0.607    -.0969036    .0566098 
                 1.country2 |   .0901933   .0365619     2.47   0.014     .0184401    .1619465 
                 1.country3 |    .153369   .0387838     3.95   0.000     .0772552    .2294829 
                 1.country4 |  -.0077571    .032258    -0.24   0.810    -.0710639    .0555497 
                 1.country5 |   -.059074   .0350837    -1.68   0.093    -.1279264    .0097783 
                 1.country6 |          0  (omitted) 
              topmanagerexp |    .002707   .0010911     2.48   0.013     .0005656    .0048483 
                            | 
                   firmsize | 
                         1  |  -.0359946    .041411    -0.87   0.385    -.1172644    .0452752 
                         2  |  -.0249882   .0426953    -0.59   0.559    -.1087784    .0588019 
                         3  |   .0233391   .0450529     0.52   0.605    -.0650779    .1117561 
                            | 
                    firmage |  -.0013937   .0009288    -1.50   0.134    -.0032164     .000429 
         1.newproduct3years |   .0479269   .0207851     2.31   0.021     .0887179    .0071358 
     1.politicalinstability |  -.0546395   .0214081    -2.55   0.011    -.0966532   -.0126259 
                      _cons |  -.0333938   .0622046    -0.54   0.592    -.1554711    .0886836 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 A5.19 Model 5.7 – diagnostic tests 
 
 Test for homosecdasticity - model 5.7 
 
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |     305.63    265    0.0436 
            Skewness |      25.09     23    0.3456 
            Kurtosis |      14.68      1    0.0001 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |     345.40    289    0.0127 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
Test for functional form - model 5.7 
 
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of salesgrowth 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 928) =      2.52 
                  Prob > F =      0.0564 
 
. estat linktest 
 invalid subcommand linktest 
r(321); 
 
. linktest 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     955 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  2,   952) =  101.84 
       Model |  17.4970492     2  8.74852461           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  81.7799292   952  .085903287           R-squared     =  0.1762 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1745 
       Total |  99.2769784   954  .104063919           Root MSE      =  .29309 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 salesgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        _hat |   .9032781   .1453551     6.21   0.000     .6180246    1.188531 
      _hatsq |   -.264777   .3484769    -0.76   0.448    -.9486485    .4190945 
       _cons |  -.0039115   .0177297    -0.22   0.825    -.0387053    .0308824 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 A5.20 Predicive margins form - model 5.7 
 
. margins directexp, at ( foreigncurr = ( 0(0.1)  1)) 
 
Predictive margins                                Number of obs   =        955 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Linear prediction, predict() 
 
1._at        : foreigncurr     =           0 
2._at        : foreigncurr     =          .1 
3._at        : foreigncurr     =          .2 
4._at        : foreigncurr     =          .3 
5._at        : foreigncurr     =          .4 
6._at        : foreigncurr     =          .5 
7._at        : foreigncurr     =          .6 
8._at        : foreigncurr     =          .7 
9._at        : foreigncurr     =          .8 
10._at       : foreigncurr     =          .9 
11._at       : foreigncurr     =           1 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |            Delta-method 
                  |     Margin   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
_at#directexp | 
             1 0  |  -.1828785   .0118132   -15.48   0.000     -.206062    -.159695 
             1 1  |  -.1880445   .0310092    -6.06   0.000    -.2489006   -.1271885 
             2 0  |  -.1991362    .010655   -18.69   0.000    -.2200468   -.1782256 
             2 1  |  -.1932671    .028026    -6.90   0.000    -.2482686   -.1382655 
             3 0  |   -.215394   .0109805   -19.62   0.000    -.2369433   -.1938446 
             3 1  |  -.1984896   .0263377    -7.54   0.000    -.2501777   -.1468014 
             4 0  |  -.2316517   .0126758   -18.28   0.000    -.2565282   -.2067752 
             4 1  |  -.2037121   .0261958    -7.78   0.000    -.2551217   -.1523025 
             5 0  |  -.2479095    .015292   -16.21   0.000    -.2779203   -.2178987 
             5 1  |  -.2089346   .0276241    -7.56   0.000    -.2631474   -.1547219 
             6 0  |  -.2641672   .0184412   -14.32   0.000    -.3003584    -.227976 
             6 1  |  -.2141572   .0304022    -7.04   0.000    -.2738219   -.1544925 
             7 0  |   -.280425   .0218947   -12.81   0.000    -.3233936   -.2374564 
             7 1  |  -.2193797   .0342026    -6.41   0.000    -.2865029   -.1522565 
             8 0  |  -.2966827   .0255291   -11.62   0.000     -.346784   -.2465814 
             8 1  |  -.2246022   .0387256    -5.80   0.000    -.3006019   -.1486026 
             9 0  |  -.3129405   .0292773   -10.69   0.000    -.3703976   -.2554833 
             9 1  |  -.2298248   .0437477    -5.25   0.000    -.3156802   -.1439693 
            10 0  |  -.3291982   .0331006    -9.95   0.000    -.3941586   -.2642378 
            10 1  |  -.2350473   .0491159    -4.79   0.000     -.331438   -.1386566 
            11 0  |  -.3454559   .0369757    -9.34   0.000    -.4180213   -.2728906 
            11 1  |  -.2402698   .0547285    -4.39   0.000    -.3476754   -.1328642 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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     (1 vs 0) 10  |   .0850163   .0581789     1.46   0.144    -.0291581    .1991907 
     (1 vs 0) 11  |   .0961576   .0646667     1.49   0.137    -.0307488    .2230639 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
A5.22 Model 5.8 - estimated results 
  
. regress c.salesgrowth c.capitalpurch i.directexp##c.foreignown c.emplgrowth c.wcbanks 
c.foreigncurr i.subsidies i.ind 
> ustry i.country1 i.country2 i.country3 i.country4 i.country5 i.country6 topmanagerexp 
i.firmsize c.firmage i.newproduct3y 
> ears i.politicalinstability, robust 
Note: 1.country6 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     955 
                                                       F( 23,   931) =    7.76 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1743 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .29672 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                           |               Robust 
               salesgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
              capitalpurch |  -.0039863   .0046092    -0.86   0.387    -.0130318    .0050593 
           1.directexp |   .0225364   .0340292     0.66   0.508    -.0442465    .0893193 
                foreignown |   .0602978    .033875     1.78   0.075    -.0061824    .1267781 
                           | 
directexpdum#c.foreignow  | 
                        1  |  -.0248653   .0573906    -0.43   0.665    -.1374952    .0877647 
                           | 
                emplgrowth |   .1521593   .0259534     5.86   0.000     .1012253    .2030933 
                   wcbanks |   -.065366   .0262094    -2.49   0.013    -.1168023   -.0139297 
A5.21 Margins of interaction term between directexp and foreigncurr 
 
. margins r.directexp, at (foreigncurr =(0 (0.1) 1)) contrast (nowald effects) 
 
Contrasts of predictive margins 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Linear prediction, predict() 
 
1._at        : foreigncurr     =           0 
2._at        : foreigncurr     =          .1 
3._at        : foreigncurr     =          .2 
4._at        : foreigncurr     =          .3 
5._at        : foreigncurr     =          .4 
6._at        : foreigncurr     =          .5 
7._at        : foreigncurr     =          .6 
8._at        : foreigncurr     =          .7 
9._at        : foreigncurr     =          .8 
10._at       : foreigncurr     =          .9 
11._at       : foreigncurr     =           1 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |            Delta-method 
                  |   Contrast   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
directexp@_at | 
     (1 vs 0)  1  |  -.0152552   .0331796    -0.46   0.646    -.0803691    .0498587 
     (1 vs 0)  2  |  -.0041139   .0303327    -0.14   0.892    -.0636409    .0554131 
     (1 vs 0)  3  |   .0070274   .0291188     0.24   0.809    -.0501174    .0641721 
     (1 vs 0)  4  |   .0181686   .0297386     0.61   0.541    -.0401924    .0765297 
     (1 vs 0)  5  |   .0293099   .0320859     0.91   0.361    -.0336577    .0922775 
     (1 vs 0)  6  |   .0404512   .0358228     1.13   0.259      -.02985    .1107523 
     (1 vs 0)  7  |   .0515925    .040567     1.27   0.204    -.0280191    .1312041 
     (1 vs 0)  8  |   .0627337   .0460081     1.36   0.173    -.0275557    .1530231 
     (1 vs 0)  9  |    .073875   .0519273     1.42   0.155    -.0280307    .1757807 
                foreigncurr |  -.1363997   .0356232    -3.83   0.000    -.2063108   -.0664887 
               1.subsidies |    .067229   .0294126    -2.29   0.022     .1249517    .0095064 
                           | 
                  industry | 
                        2  |  -.0094953   .0239042    -0.40   0.691    -.0564076     .037417 
                        3  |  -.0623888   .0443859    -1.41   0.160    -.1494968    .0247191 
                        4  |  -.0210109   .0289332    -0.73   0.468    -.0777929     .035771 
                           | 
                1.country1 |  -.0171258   .0390912    -0.44   0.661    -.0938429    .0595912 
                1.country2 |   .0923516   .0365079     2.53   0.012     .0207042    .1639989 
                1.country3 |   .1577685   .0387271     4.07   0.000     .0817659    .2337711 
                1.country4 |  -.0050315   .0323458    -0.16   0.876    -.0685106    .0584476 
                1.country5 |  -.0566758   .0347805    -1.63   0.104    -.1249331    .0115816 
                1.country6 |          0  (omitted) 
             topmanagerexp |   .0026888   .0010902     2.47   0.014     .0005493    .0048283 
                           | 
                  firmsize | 
                        1  |  -.0358831   .0413745    -0.87   0.386    -.1170811    .0453149 
                        2  |  -.0262107   .0427235    -0.61   0.540    -.1100562    .0576347 
                        3  |   .0230363   .0450475     0.51   0.609    -.0653702    .1114427 
                   firmage |  -.0013542   .0009295    -1.46   0.145    -.0031783      .00047 
        1.newproduct3years |    .048224   .0208043     2.32   0.021     .0890528    .0073952 
    1.politicalinstability |  -.0553177   .0213711    -2.59   0.010    -.0972589   -.0133765 
                     _cons |  -.0377747   .0620723    -0.61   0.543    -.1595926    .0840431 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 A5.23 – Model 5.8 – diagnostic tests 
 
Check for multocollinearity - model 5.8 
 
. vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
capitalpurch |      1.28    0.780905 
1.directex~m |      1.72    0.582106 
  foreignown |      1.84    0.543859 
directexpd~m#| 
c.foreignown | 
          1  |      2.32    0.430887 
  emplgrowth |      1.06    0.944964 
     wcbanks |      1.31    0.765538 
 foreigncurr |      1.14    0.878141 
 2.subsidies |      1.06    0.947703 
    industry | 
          2  |      1.48    0.677122 
          3  |      1.19    0.839454 
          4  |      1.43    0.697719 
  1.country1 |      1.47    0.679703 
  1.country2 |      1.87    0.534473 
  1.country3 |      2.01    0.496709 
  1.country4 |      1.67    0.599339 
  1.country5 |      1.73    0.577574 
topmanager~p |      1.13    0.882916 
    firmsize | 
          1  |      7.58    0.131862 
          2  |      7.69    0.129992 
          3  |      7.65    0.130802 
     firmage |      1.13    0.881348 
2.newprodu~s |      1.11    0.897701 
1.politica~y |      1.09    0.914233 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      2.26 
Test for homoscedasticity - model 5.8 
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. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |     302.03    263    0.0492 
            Skewness |      24.34     23    0.3853 
            Kurtosis |      14.63      1    0.0001 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |     341.01    287    0.0156 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Test for functional form - model 5.8 
 
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of salesgrowth 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 928) =      1.57 
                  Prob > F =      0.1943 
 
A5.24 Predicitve margins - model 5.8 
 
. margins directexp, at ( foreignown = ( 0 (0.1)  1)) 
 
Predictive margins                                Number of obs   =        955 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Linear prediction, predict() 
 
1._at        : foreignown      =           0 
2._at        : foreignown      =          .1 
3._at        : foreignown      =          .2 
4._at        : foreignown      =          .3 
5._at        : foreignown      =          .4 
6._at        : foreignown      =          .5 
7._at        : foreignown      =          .6 
8._at        : foreignown      =          .7 
9._at        : foreignown      =          .8 
10._at       : foreignown      =          .9 
11._at       : foreignown      =           1 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |            Delta-method 
                  |     Margin   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
_at#directexp | 
             1 0  |  -.2100983    .011482   -18.30   0.000    -.2326318   -.1875648 
             1 1  |  -.1875619   .0312377    -6.00   0.000    -.2488663   -.1262575 
             2 0  |  -.2040685   .0106081   -19.24   0.000     -.224887     -.18325 
             2 1  |  -.1840186   .0287991    -6.39   0.000    -.2405373   -.1274999 
             3 0  |  -.1980387   .0107786   -18.37   0.000    -.2191918   -.1768856 
             3 1  |  -.1804754   .0269621    -6.69   0.000    -.2333888   -.1275619 
             4 0  |  -.1920089   .0119488   -16.07   0.000    -.2154587   -.1685591 
             4 1  |  -.1769321    .025855    -6.84   0.000    -.2276729   -.1261913 
             5 0  |  -.1859791    .013868   -13.41   0.000    -.2131953   -.1587629 
             5 1  |  -.1733888   .0255729    -6.78   0.000     -.223576   -.1232017 
             6 0  |  -.1799493   .0162733   -11.06   0.000    -.2118859   -.1480128 
             6 1  |  -.1698456   .0261424    -6.50   0.000    -.2211505   -.1185407 
             7 0  |  -.1739196   .0189807    -9.16   0.000    -.2111695   -.1366696 
             7 1  |  -.1663023   .0275108    -6.04   0.000    -.2202928   -.1123119 
             8 0  |  -.1678898   .0218784    -7.67   0.000    -.2108265    -.124953 
             8 1  |  -.1627591   .0295674    -5.50   0.000    -.2207855   -.1047326 
             9 0  |    -.16186   .0249001    -6.50   0.000    -.2107268   -.1129932 
             9 1  |  -.1592158   .0321804    -4.95   0.000    -.2223703   -.0960613 
             10 0  |  -.1558302   .0280056    -5.56   0.000    -.2107916   -.1008688 
            10 1  |  -.1556726   .0352263    -4.42   0.000    -.2248046   -.0865405 
            11 0  |  -.1498004   .0311699    -4.81   0.000    -.2109718    -.088629 
            11 1  |  -.1521293   .0386027    -3.94   0.000    -.2278876    -.076371 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
A5.25 Margins of interaction term between directexp and foreignown 
 
. margins r.directexp, at ( foreignown = ( 0 (0.1)  1)) contrast (nowald effects) 
 
Contrasts of predictive margins 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Linear prediction, predict() 
 
1._at        : foreignown      =           0 
2._at        : foreignown      =          .1 
3._at        : foreignown      =          .2 
4._at        : foreignown      =          .3 
5._at        : foreignown      =          .4 
6._at        : foreignown      =          .5 
7._at        : foreignown      =          .6 
8._at        : foreignown      =          .7 
9._at        : foreignown      =          .8 
10._at       : foreignown      =          .9 
11._at       : foreignown      =           1 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |            Delta-method 
                  |   Contrast   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
directexp@_at | 
     (1 vs 0)  1  |   .0105051   .0340638     0.31   0.758    -.0563441    .0773542 
     (1 vs 0)  2  |   .0094017   .0312967     0.30   0.764    -.0520171    .0708205 
     (1 vs 0)  3  |   .0082983   .0293638     0.28   0.778    -.0493272    .0659239 
     (1 vs 0)  4  |    .007195   .0284357     0.25   0.800    -.0486091    .0629991 
     (1 vs 0)  5  |   .0060916   .0286103     0.21   0.831    -.0500552    .0622384 
     (1 vs 0)  6  |   .0049882   .0298683     0.17   0.867    -.0536275    .0636039 
     (1 vs 0)  7  |   .0038849   .0320826     0.12   0.904    -.0590763     .066846 
     (1 vs 0)  8  |   .0027815   .0350725     0.08   0.937    -.0660471    .0716101 
     (1 vs 0)  9  |   .0016781   .0386583     0.04   0.965    -.0741877    .0775439 
     (1 vs 0) 10  |   .0005747   .0426903     0.01   0.989    -.0832037    .0843532 
     (1 vs 0) 11  |  -.0005286   .0470539    -0.01   0.991    -.0928704    .0918131 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
A5.26 Model 5.9 - estimated results  
 
. regress c.salesgrowth c.capitalpurch c.foreignown i.directexp##c.wcbanks c.emplgrowth 
c.foreigncurr i.su 
> bsidies i.industry i.country1 i.country2 i.country3 i.country4 i.country5 i.country6 
topmanagerexp i.firmsiz 
> e c.firmage i.newproduct3years i.politicalinstability, robust 
Note: 1.country6 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     955 
                                                       F( 23,   931) =    7.81 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1743 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .29673 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                        |               Robust 
            salesgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           capitalpurch |  -.0039254   .0046109    -0.85   0.395    -.0129744    .0051236 
             foreignown |   .0513374   .0277484     1.85   0.065    -.0031193    .1057941 
        1.directexp |   .0102679   .0376976     0.27   0.785    -.0637142      .08425 
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                wcbanks |    -.06776   .0280731    -2.41   0.016    -.1228538   -.0126662 
                        | 
directexp#c.wcbanks | 
                     1  |   .0198737    .056374     0.35   0.725    -.0907611    .1305084 
                        | 
             emplgrowth |   .1522892   .0259683     5.86   0.000      .101326    .2032523 
            foreigncurr |  -.1361089   .0356187    -3.82   0.000    -.2060111   -.0662067 
            1.subsidies |   .0669206   .0296065     2.26   0.024     .1250237    .0088175 
                        | 
               industry | 
                     2  |  -.0091082   .0238962    -0.38   0.703    -.0560048    .0377884 
                     3  |  -.0604922   .0442334    -1.37   0.172    -.1473009    .0263166 
                     4  |  -.0204592   .0289237    -0.71   0.480    -.0772224    .0363041 
                        | 
             1.country1 |  -.0170772   .0390533    -0.44   0.662    -.0937199    .0595656 
             1.country2 |   .0908646   .0363885     2.50   0.013     .0194516    .1622776 
             1.country3 |   .1569983   .0386722     4.06   0.000     .0811034    .2328931 
             1.country4 |   -.005039   .0323063    -0.16   0.876    -.0684405    .0583626 
             1.country5 |  -.0566828   .0347984    -1.63   0.104    -.1249752    .0116095 
             1.country6 |          0  (omitted) 
          topmanagerexp |   .0026827   .0010906     2.46   0.014     .0005424     .004823 
                        | 
               firmsize | 
                     1  |  -.0356657   .0414942    -0.86   0.390    -.1170986    .0457672 
                     2  |  -.0258879   .0428271    -0.60   0.546    -.1099367    .0581608 
                     3  |   .0231684   .0451346     0.51   0.608    -.0654089    .1117457 
                        | 
                firmage |  -.0013459   .0009284    -1.45   0.147     -.003168    .0004762 
     1.newproduct3years |   .0482378   .0208072     2.32   0.021     .0890723    .0074033 
 1.politicalinstability |  -.0555947   .0213272    -2.61   0.009    -.0974496   -.0137397 
                  _cons |  -.0367569   .0620936    -0.59   0.554    -.1586166    .0851028 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 A5.27 Model 5.9 – diagnostis tests 
 
Check for multicollinearity - model 5.9 
 
. vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
capitalpurch |      1.28    0.780671 
  foreignown |      1.17    0.857311 
1.directex~m |      1.98    0.504027 
     wcbanks |      1.46    0.687141 
directexpd~m#| 
   c.wcbanks | 
          1  |      1.90    0.527388 
  emplgrowth |      1.06    0.944612 
 foreigncurr |      1.14    0.879192 
 2.subsidies |      1.06    0.944754 
    industry | 
          2  |      1.47    0.678495 
          3  |      1.18    0.850325 
          4  |      1.43    0.697814 
  1.country1 |      1.47    0.679696 
  1.country2 |      1.89    0.529174 
  1.country3 |      2.01    0.496979 
  1.country4 |      1.67    0.599296 
  1.country5 |      1.73    0.577523 
topmanager~p |      1.13    0.882380 
    firmsize | 
          1  |      7.58    0.131841 
          2  |      7.69    0.130018 
          3  |      7.64    0.130820 
     firmage |      1.13    0.883181 
2.newprodu~s |      1.11    0.896947 
1.politica~y |      1.10    0.912674 
 -------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      2.23 
 
Test for homoscedasticity - model 5.9 
 
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |     302.77    264    0.0505 
            Skewness |      24.34     23    0.3853 
            Kurtosis |      14.50      1    0.0001 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |     341.61    288    0.0163 
--------------------------------------------------- 
                  Prob > F =      0.1765 
 
 A5.28 Predictive margins - model 5.9 
 
 
. margins directexp, at (wcbanks = ( 0 (0.1)  1)) 
 
Predictive margins                                Number of obs   =        955 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Linear prediction, predict() 
 
1._at        : wcbanks         =           0 
2._at        : wcbanks         =          .1 
3._at        : wcbanks         =          .2 
4._at        : wcbanks         =          .3 
5._at        : wcbanks         =          .4 
6._at        : wcbanks         =          .5 
7._at        : wcbanks         =          .6 
8._at        : wcbanks         =          .7 
9._at        : wcbanks         =          .8 
10._at       : wcbanks         =          .9 
11._at       : wcbanks         =           1 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |            Delta-method 
                  |     Margin   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
_at#directexp | 
             1 0  |  -.1784528   .0139911   -12.75   0.000    -.2059106   -.1509951 
             1 1  |  -.1681849   .0345579    -4.87   0.000    -.2360054   -.1003645 
             2 0  |  -.1852288   .0123285   -15.02   0.000    -.2094238   -.1610339 
             2 1  |  -.1729736   .0312384    -5.54   0.000    -.2342794   -.1116678 
             3 0  |  -.1920048   .0111354   -17.24   0.000    -.2138582   -.1701515 
             3 1  |  -.1777622    .028514    -6.23   0.000    -.2337214    -.121803 
             4 0  |  -.1987808   .0105717   -18.80   0.000    -.2195281   -.1780336 
             4 1  |  -.1825509   .0265685    -6.87   0.000    -.2346919   -.1304098 
             5 0  |  -.2055568   .0107373   -19.14   0.000    -.2266289   -.1844848 
Test for functional form - model 5.9 
 
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of salesgrowth 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 928) =      1.65 
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             5 1  |  -.1873395   .0255802    -7.32   0.000     -.237541    -.137138 
             6 0  |  -.2123328   .0116008   -18.30   0.000    -.2350996   -.1895661 
             6 1  |  -.1921281   .0256599    -7.49   0.000    -.2424861   -.1417701 
             7 0  |  -.2191089   .0130242   -16.82   0.000    -.2446691   -.1935486 
             7 1  |  -.1969168   .0267982    -7.35   0.000    -.2495086   -.1443249 
             8 0  |  -.2258849   .0148473   -15.21   0.000     -.255023   -.1967467 
             8 1  |  -.2017054     .02887    -6.99   0.000    -.2583632   -.1450475 
             9 0  |  -.2326609   .0169416   -13.73   0.000     -.265909   -.1994127 
             9 1  |   -.206494   .0316929    -6.52   0.000    -.2686918   -.1442963 
            10 0  |  -.2394369   .0192186   -12.46   0.000    -.2771537     -.20172 
            10 1  |  -.2112827   .0350859    -6.02   0.000    -.2801393    -.142426 
            11 0  |  -.2462129   .0216207   -11.39   0.000    -.2886438   -.2037819 
            11 1  |  -.2160713   .0389003    -5.55   0.000    -.2924137   -.1397289 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  
 A5.29 Model 5.10 - estimated results 
 
 
. regress c.salesgrowth c.capitalpurch c.foreignown i.directexp##i.currdep c.emplgrowth c.wcban 
> ks c.foreigncurr i.subsidies i.industry  topmanagerexp i.firmsize c.firmage i.newproduct3years 
i. 
> politicalinstability, robust 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     972 
                                                       F( 19,   952) =    7.93 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1473 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .30135 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                       |               Robust 
           salesgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          capitalpurch |  -.0050224   .0046333    -1.08   0.279    -.0141149    .0040702 
            foreignown |   .0607811   .0274819     2.21   0.027      .006849    .1147133 
       1.directexp |   .0417837   .0335941     1.24   0.214    -.0241433    .1077107 
             1.currdep |   .1138799   .0230122     4.95   0.000     .0687194    .1590404 
                       | 
 directexp#currdep | 
                  1 1  |  -.1152724   .0542334    -2.13   0.034    -.2217033   -.0088414 
                       | 
            emplgrowth |   .1330162   .0252287     5.27   0.000      .083506    .1825264 
               wcbanks |  -.0326326   .0237992    -1.37   0.171    -.0793376    .0140725 
           foreigncurr |  -.1695198   .0344748    -4.92   0.000    -.2371753   -.1018643 
           2.subsidies |  -.0547278   .0281932    -1.94   0.053    -.1100558    .0006003 
                       | 
              industry | 
                    2  |  -.0094258    .023792    -0.40   0.692    -.0561166    .0372649 
                    3  |  -.0623808   .0442772    -1.41   0.159    -.1492729    .0245113 
                    4  |  -.0361624   .0287096    -1.26   0.208    -.0925038     .020179 
                       | 
         topmanagerexp |   .0028864   .0010822     2.67   0.008     .0007626    .0050102 
                       | 
              firmsize | 
                    1  |  -.0469063   .0387442    -1.21   0.226    -.1229402    .0291276 
                    2  |   -.021989   .0397773    -0.55   0.581    -.1000503    .0560722 
                    3  |   .0418536   .0426451     0.98   0.327    -.0418357    .1255429 
                       | 
               firmage |  -.0018555    .000982    -1.89   0.059    -.0037826    .0000715 
    2.newproduct3years |  -.0480434   .0206118    -2.33   0.020    -.0884931   -.0075936 
1.politicalinstability |  -.0685419   .0209023    -3.28   0.001    -.1095618    -.027522 
                 _cons |  -.0726648   .0548628    -1.32   0.186    -.1803308    .0350012 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  A5.30 Predictive margins - model 5.10 
 
 
. margins directexpdum, at ( currdep = (0  1)) 
 
Predictive margins                                Number of obs   =        972 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Linear prediction, predict() 
 
1._at        : currdep         =           0 
 
2._at        : currdep         =           1 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |            Delta-method 
                  |     Margin   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
_at#directexp | 
             1 0  |  -.2615397    .015032   -17.40   0.000    -.2910394   -.2320401 
             1 1  |   -.219756   .0292098    -7.52   0.000    -.2770792   -.1624329 
             2 0  |  -.1476598   .0164529    -8.97   0.000    -.1799479   -.1153718 
             2 1  |  -.2211485   .0435707    -5.08   0.000    -.3066541   -.1356429 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
. margins r.directexpdum, at ( currdep = (0, 1)) contrast (nowald effects) 
 
Contrasts of predictive margins 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Linear prediction, predict() 
 
1._at        : currdep         =           0 
 
2._at        : currdep         =           1 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |            Delta-method 
                  |   Contrast   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
directexp@_at | 
      (1 vs 0) 1  |   .0417837   .0335941     1.24   0.214    -.0241433    .1077107 
      (1 vs 0) 2  |  -.0734886   .0466959    -1.57   0.116    -.1651273      .01815 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 A5.31 Model 5.11 – estimated results 
 
 
. regress c.salesgrowth c.capitalpurch c.foreignown i.directexp c.emplgrowth c.wcbanks c.foreig 
> ncurr##i.currdep i.subsidies i.industry  topmanagerexp i.firmsize c.firmage i.newproduct3years 
i. 
> politicalinstability, robust 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     972 
                                                       F( 19,   952) =    7.84 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1524 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .30045 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                       |               Robust 
           salesgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          capitalpurch |   -.004843   .0046304    -1.05   0.296      -.01393     .004244 
            foreignown |   .0560996   .0266605     2.10   0.036     .0037795    .1084197 
       1.directexp |  -.0069599   .0289549    -0.24   0.810    -.0637827    .0498629 
            emplgrowth |    .136109   .0254355     5.35   0.000     .0861928    .1860251 
               wcbanks |  -.0409122   .0235562    -1.74   0.083    -.0871404     .005316 
           foreigncurr |  -.0747667   .0379746    -1.97   0.049    -.1492904   -.0002431 
             1.currdep |   .1248714   .0226701     5.51   0.000     .0803823    .1693605 
                       | 
 currdep#c.foreigncurr | 
                    1  |  -.2355602   .0757979    -3.11   0.002    -.3843104     -.08681 
                       | 
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           2.subsidies |  -.0503977   .0283037    -1.78   0.075    -.1059426    .0051472 
                       | 
              industry | 
                    2  |  -.0092563   .0237212    -0.39   0.696    -.0558082    .0372956 
                    3  |  -.0557798    .044686    -1.25   0.212    -.1434743    .0319147 
                    4  |  -.0351359   .0285071    -1.23   0.218    -.0910799     .020808 
                       | 
         topmanagerexp |   .0028904   .0010748     2.69   0.007     .0007811    .0049997 
                       | 
              firmsize | 
                    1  |  -.0521443   .0397585    -1.31   0.190    -.1301687    .0258801 
                    2  |  -.0273189   .0404228    -0.68   0.499    -.1066469    .0520091 
                    3  |   .0324703    .043467     0.75   0.455    -.0528319    .1177724 
                       | 
               firmage |  -.0019632   .0009582    -2.05   0.041    -.0038436   -.0000829 
    2.newproduct3years |  -.0471344   .0205404    -2.29   0.022     -.087444   -.0068247 
1.politicalinstability |   -.070163   .0208762    -3.36   0.001    -.1111317   -.0291943 
                 _cons |  -.0710323   .0551443    -1.29   0.198    -.1792507     .037186 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  
A5.32 Predictive margins - model 5.11 
 
 margins currdep, at ( foreigncurr = (0 (0.1) 1)) 
 
Predictive margins                                Number of obs   =        972 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Linear prediction, predict() 
 
1._at        : foreigncurr     =           0 
 
2._at        : foreigncurr     =          .1 
 
3._at        : foreigncurr     =          .2 
 
4._at        : foreigncurr     =          .3 
 
5._at        : foreigncurr     =          .4 
 
6._at        : foreigncurr     =          .5 
 
7._at        : foreigncurr     =          .6 
 
8._at        : foreigncurr     =          .7 
 
9._at        : foreigncurr     =          .8 
 
10._at       : foreigncurr     =          .9 
 
11._at       : foreigncurr     =           1 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |     Margin   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 _at#currdep | 
        1 0  |  -.2461149   .0147452   -16.69   0.000    -.2750518    -.217178 
        1 1  |  -.1212435   .0162337    -7.47   0.000    -.1531015   -.0893855 
        2 0  |  -.2535916   .0133574   -18.99   0.000    -.2798049   -.2273782 
        2 1  |  -.1522762   .0153672    -9.91   0.000    -.1824337   -.1221187 
        3 0  |  -.2610683   .0129715   -20.13   0.000    -.2865243   -.2356122 
        3 1  |  -.1833089   .0172787   -10.61   0.000    -.2172176   -.1494001 
        4 0  |  -.2685449   .0136727   -19.64   0.000     -.295377   -.2417129 
        4 1  |  -.2143416   .0212307   -10.10   0.000    -.2560059   -.1726772 
        5 0  |  -.2760216   .0153122   -18.03   0.000    -.3060712    -.245972 
        5 1  |  -.2453743   .0263195    -9.32   0.000    -.2970252   -.1937233 
        6 0  |  -.2834983   .0176303   -16.08   0.000    -.3180971   -.2488994 
        6 1  |   -.276407   .0320074    -8.64   0.000    -.3392202   -.2135937 
        7 0  |  -.2909749   .0203969   -14.27   0.000    -.3310031   -.2509468 
        7 1  |  -.3074397   .0380266    -8.08   0.000    -.3820652   -.2328141 
        8 0  |  -.2984516   .0234538   -12.73   0.000    -.3444788   -.2524244 
        8 1  |  -.3384723    .044242    -7.65   0.000    -.4252954   -.2516493 
        9 0  |  -.3059283   .0267015   -11.46   0.000    -.3583289   -.2535277 
        9 1  |   -.369505   .0505813    -7.31   0.000    -.4687688   -.2702413 
        10 0  |   -.313405   .0300782   -10.42   0.000    -.3724323   -.2543776 
       10 1  |  -.4005377   .0570032    -7.03   0.000    -.5124042   -.2886712 
       11 0  |  -.3208816   .0335451    -9.57   0.000    -.3867125   -.2550508 
       11 1  |  -.4315704   .0634827    -6.80   0.000    -.5561527   -.3069882 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
margins r.currdep, at ( foreigncurr = (0, 0.3, 0.7, 1)) contrast (nowald effects) 
 
Contrasts of predictive margins 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Linear prediction, predict() 
 
1._at        : foreigncurr     =           0 
 
2._at        : foreigncurr     =          .3 
 
3._at        : foreigncurr     =          .7 
 
4._at        : foreigncurr     =           1 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |   Contrast   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 currdep@_at | 
 (1 vs 0) 1  |   .1248714   .0226701     5.51   0.000     .0803823    .1693605 
 (1 vs 0) 2  |   .0542033   .0257602     2.10   0.036       .00365    .1047567 
 (1 vs 0) 3  |  -.0400207   .0497174    -0.80   0.421    -.1375891    .0575476 
 (1 vs 0) 4  |  -.1106888   .0709543    -1.56   0.119    -.2499337    .0285561 
 
